

**LOS BRICS COMO CONSTRUCCIÓN INTERSUBJETIVA PARA LA
LEGITIMACIÓN DE REGLAS EN EL SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL**

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“Los BRICS como construcción intersubjetiva como una plataforma para la legitimación de reglas en el Sistema Internacional (2004-2014)”

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Resumen: A partir de la implementación del término BRIC por parte de Goldman Sachs, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y posteriormente Sudáfrica han profundizado sus relaciones y han adelantado un discurso de reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global para su adecuación a las nuevas realidades del milenio. Sin embargo, este discurso ha venido acompañado de prácticas y de intereses que contravienen con el mismo en la medida en la que el aumento de la influencia de los miembros supone la competencia entre estos Estados y el choque de intereses. En consecuencia, es posible observar que el término BRICS, más que tender a la constitución de un foro intergubernamental para la legitimación de reglas en el Sistema Internacional, ha sido instrumentalizado por sus miembros para la consecución de objetivos individuales y, por lo tanto, la posibilidad de que estos Estados legitimen sus reglas se ve dificultada por sus mismas interacciones.

Palabras clave: BRICS, Brasil, Rusia, India, China, Sudáfrica, construcción intersubjetiva, legitimación de reglas, reforma de organizaciones internacionales, gobernanza global, representación.

Introducción

“BRICS” es el término acuñado por Jim O’Neill, de la firma Goldman Sachs, en el informe *Building Better Economic BRICs* de 2001 para referirse a Brasil, Rusia, India y China. En este, el autor afirmaba que el tamaño de la economía de estos cuatro países variaba dependiendo de la, por lo que estos países tenían un papel más importante en las dinámicas económicas mundiales de lo que parecía a simple vista y que tendría implicaciones en las políticas económicas, monetarias y fiscales mundiales, así como en los procesos de cooperación política y económica (pp. 4-5); en este sentido, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica representaban grandes oportunidades para la inversión.

O’Neill proyectó que para el 2050 la suma de las economías de estos cuatro países sería mayor que la del G-6. La evolución económica de estos países se dio de manera positiva. Fue así que en 2003, un nuevo informe de Goldman Sachs estimó que este resultado se alcanzaría once años antes de lo pensado, es decir, en el 2039. Estas proyecciones se hicieron con base en el tamaño de sus economías y la velocidad de su crecimiento, el tamaño de su población y otros factores demográficos, la extensión territorial, los ingresos medios, la inserción de estos países dentro de los patrones de demanda global y sus movimientos cambiarios (Wilson & Purushothaman, p. 4).

A partir de ese momento, el término BRICs empezó a adquirir cada vez más importancia, no solo en la esfera económica y financiera; también en la esfera política. De esta manera, su empleo pasó de denotar a cuatro países con grandes posibilidades de desarrollo económico a un grupo de Estados con unas aspiraciones en el Sistema Internacional.

La transición en el término – para referirse a cuatro países que representaban posibilidades económicas y financieras a un foro intergubernamental con reivindicaciones en el Sistema Internacional – fue posible por un cambio en la percepción que los BRICs tuvieron de sí mismos. Así, Brasil, Rusia, India y China comenzaron a replantearse el papel que debían desempeñar dentro del Sistema Internacional y en especial dentro de las instituciones de gobernanza global: Estos Estados decidieron que, considerando su importancia futura dentro de las dinámicas económicas, comerciales y financieras globales, debían ejercer un papel más activo dentro de las mismas y no conformarse con ser simples espectadores de los procesos de toma de decisión dentro de ellas.

Así pues, los BRICS han decidido movilizar sus recursos con la intención de adquirir una posición más relevante dentro de la distribución de poder en el Sistema Internacional. Esto se ha visto acompañado de una serie de discursos por parte de cada uno de estos Estados cuyo contenido ha sido la democratización de las relaciones internacionales para así poder incluir a cinco de ellos que cuentan con el potencial para convertirse en jugadores predominantes de la realidad internacional.

La consolidación de este grupo, sin embargo, no fue un proceso rápido e inmediato. Por el contrario, esta respondió a un lento proceso mediante el cual los jefes de Estado y de gobierno de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y desde el 2011 Sudáfrica, entablaron diálogos cada vez más formales y que fueron involucrando progresivamente a diferentes áreas de gobierno para tratar cada vez más temas dentro de su agenda. Asimismo, su consolidación dependió de las interacciones entre estos Estados, de manera que las posiciones, el discurso y las acciones del grupo se nutrían por cada uno de sus miembros y viceversa; en este sentido es posible entender a los BRICS como una construcción intersubjetiva.

La primera de estas reuniones se dio en 2006, en el marco de la Asamblea

General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas. En esta, los mandatarios de Brasil, Rusia, India y China tuvieron una primera aproximación y quedó abierta la posibilidad de nuevos espacios para el diálogo. Al año siguiente se llevó a cabo una segunda reunión informal, también en el marco de la Asamblea General. Su resultado fue la necesidad de creación de un espacio formal para la discusión de los temas de interés común para las partes. Así pues, en 2008 se dio la primera reunión formal entre los BRIC (Itamaraty, s.f., ¶ 7-8).

En adelante se han llevado a cabo cumbres anuales (en Ekaterimburgo (2009), Brasilia (2010), Sanya (2011), Nueva Delhi (2012), Durban (2013) y Fortaleza (2014)) en las que Brasil, Rusia, India y China han establecido una agenda común centrada en la cooperación y en la necesidad de reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global para que los Estados más pequeños y menos desarrollados puedan participar en los procesos de toma de decisión puesto que, según los BRICS, en el Sistema Internacional actual, estos procesos se guían por los intereses y los objetivos de pocos Estados del Sistema Internacional; pocos son los encargados de decidir el curso de la política internacional y muchos, los constreñidos a seguir las disposiciones acordadas por una minoría.

A partir de los encuentros entre los representantes de Brasil, Rusia, India y China, estos Estados comenzaron a articular un discurso común basado en el anacronismo de las organizaciones intergubernamentales y las instituciones de gobernanza global. Partiendo de la lógica planteada por los referidos Estados, las dinámicas del mundo moderno no se ven reflejadas dentro de dichas organizaciones e instituciones y por lo tanto, es necesario reformarlas para adaptarlas y que sean capaces de responder a los desafíos de la actualidad. Así, es necesario que nuevas reglas se legitimen en el Sistema Internacional.

Con base en la definición de reglas de Onuf (entendidas como “declaraciones acerca de lo que se debería hacer” (1998, p. 59)), para el presente trabajo estas se entenderán como declaraciones acerca de cómo debería funcionar el Sistema Internacional; su legitimación consiste en la creación de patrones de comportamiento estables en los que se enmarca el comportamiento de los agentes y de esta manera, moldea las intenciones y las maneras de actuar de los mismos (1998, pp. 59-60).

Se puede apreciar que a partir de los informes de Goldman Sachs, Brasil, Rusia, India y China empezaron a construir un rol de reivindicadores de reformas dentro del Sistema Internacional. Su desarrollo ha estado dado por las interacciones entre estos Estados de manera que, conforme sus representantes se reunían, se coordinaban sus posiciones y su discurso.

Lo que inicialmente empezó con la necesidad de reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global, evolucionó en la cooperación entre los BRICS en numerosas áreas: el desarrollo sostenible y los objetivos de desarrollo del milenio, en virtud de lo cual se promovió una agenda que incluía el uso de energías renovables – incluyendo la energía nuclear, de cuya tecnología todos los BRICS disponen (Brasil y Sudáfrica solo para fines civiles –, la cooperación en salud, educación, tecnología y técnicas agrícolas que garanticen la sostenibilidad de las tierras de manera que se pueda erradicar la hambruna (Itamaraty, s.f., ¶ 11-13).

No obstante, a pesar de la evolución en las interacciones entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica, es difícil que las reivindicaciones de estos Estados puedan pasar del discurso a la práctica ya que las acciones de los miembros de los BRICS se pueden considerar como obstáculos en sí para la persecución de sus objetivos. En efecto, las diferencias entre sí, sus concepciones del Sistema Internacional y sus intereses de política exterior dificultan a dichos Estados alcanzar y poner en práctica decisiones que promuevan su discurso de reivindicación. Es entonces que los BRICS pueden ser considerados como una construcción que ha sido útil para la persecución de objetivos particulares de sus miembros, más que como un grupo que busca la reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global y la promoción de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio.

En virtud de lo anterior, el presente trabajo se dividirá en tres capítulos: en el primero, los BRICS serán analizados como una construcción intersubjetiva y se explicará la historia detrás del concepto; en el segundo, se describirán sus diferencias para entender cuáles son los impedimentos a la actuación de estos Estados como un bloque unitario. Finalmente, se estudiará la pertinencia de la participación de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica en los BRICS y cómo esta se ha visto afectada por su contexto.

La historia de los BRICS

La historia de los BRICS se remonta a 2001, cuando Jim O'Neill utilizó este término para referirse a cuatro economías emergentes (Brasil, Rusia, India y China) cuya capacidad aumentaba significativamente al compararla en términos de Paridad del Poder Adquisitivo (PPA): al utilizar estos parámetros para la medición, la economía de estos cuatro países resultaba mayor que la de Canadá e India y China eran respectivamente la cuarta y la segunda economías mundiales. De esta manera, O'Neill proyectó que para el 2050, la suma de las economías de los BRICS superaría a la del G-7.

Esto tendría serias implicaciones para la definición de las políticas comerciales, económicas, fiscales y financieras globales y pondría en entredicho la representación en los encuentros a este respecto porque sería necesaria la inclusión de otros actores dentro de los procesos de toma de decisión. En efecto, O'Neill planteó que el G-7 debería ser el foro para la coordinación global de las políticas económicas y para lograr este cometido, India y China deberían reemplazar a Italia y Canadá, siendo entonces el G-7 un foro formado por EE.UU., China, Japón, India, Alemania, Francia y Reino Unido (O'Neill, 2001, p. 5).

En 2003, un nuevo informe de Goldman Sachs proyectó con base en el tamaño de las economías, su velocidad de crecimiento, el tamaño de su población y otras características demográficas, su inserción dentro de los patrones de demanda global y sus flujos monetarios, que las economías de los BRICS alcanzarían a las del G-6 en el 2039 (Wilson & Purushothaman, p. 4).

Estos informes desempeñaron un papel fundamental en la medida en la que le permitieron a Brasil, Rusia, India y China entender su potencial económico y las implicaciones que este tendría en la política internacional. Así, inició el proceso de transformación del término "BRIC" como categoría económica a foro intergubernamental compuesto por estos Estados para la persecución de objetivos en la esfera internacional.

Brasil, Rusia, India y China eran Estados que habían criticado constantemente la falta de representación y de participación del Sistema Internacional. Desde el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, los Estados vencedores de la guerra, particularmente EE.UU., Reino Unido y Francia, han desempeñado

una función fundamental en el diseño de la arquitectura de gobernanza global y en los procesos de toma de decisión dentro de la misma –a través del establecimiento de objetivos, intereses y prioridades –, dejando a los Estados en vía de desarrollo un papel marginal dentro de estas instituciones que ha implicado en algunas ocasiones (y dependiendo de los niveles de obligación de estas estructuras) que los Estados deban seguir disposiciones con las que no necesariamente concuerdan. Por esta razón, Fourcade (2013) afirmó que parecía no haber un espacio para los BRICs en las estructuras de gobernanza global en materia económica; a partir de esta exclusión, se dio la construcción de los BRICs como un grupo coherente y con un discurso articulado (p 261).

Lo anterior se explica a partir de lo afirmado por Cox (1981, p. 219), pues él estableció que se ha demostrado el rol estratégico que desempeñan las instituciones en el establecimiento de un particular orden global en el sentido en el que las instituciones reflejan las relaciones de poder dadas con el establecimiento de las mismas y buscan garantizar el mantenimiento de ese orden en el tiempo (en Contipelli & Picciau, 2015, p. 121). De esta manera, las instituciones creadas tras el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial buscaron la afirmación de las potencias vencedoras de la guerra como artífices del orden global y la preservación de su status a lo largo del tiempo.

En efecto, en el Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, a pesar de que en teoría las decisiones se dan por el acuerdo entre sus quince Estados miembros (cinco permanentes: EE.UU., Reino Unido, Francia, Rusia y China y 10 miembros no permanentes que se alternan cada dos años), el poder de decidir reside en la práctica en los miembros permanentes ya que son ellos los que disponen del poder de veto: en caso de que uno de ellos no esté de acuerdo, la decisión o resolución automáticamente no será aprobada (Organización de las Naciones Unidas, s.f., pág. 2 & Artículo 27 Carta de San Francisco).

A este respecto, Amber Fitzgerald afirmó que

Contrariamente a los principios de equidad y representación, el Consejo de Seguridad y sus miembros permanentes dominan la ONU, en lugar de actuar en su nombre. Este dominio es el producto de los poderes exclusivos del Consejo de Seguridad, el interés propio de los miembros del Consejo y la ausencia de pesos y contrapesos que limiten el poder del Consejo de

Seguridad [...]. Los miembros del Consejo de Seguridad actúan, o dejan de actuar, solo de acuerdo con sus propio interés [...]El Consejo de Seguridad puede actuar, por lo tanto, en detrimento de lo que puede ser más beneficioso para la comunidad internacional en su conjunto. La autorización para el uso de la fuerza, que normalmente se hace a petición de un miembro en particular, con frecuencia refleja propia agenda de un miembro individual (2000, pp. 329- 330).

En lo que respecta a las instituciones económicas y comerciales (Fondo Monetario Internacional y Banco Mundial), el sistema de votación en la toma de decisiones no corresponde a un modelo biunívoco en el que a cada miembro se le atribuya un voto. Por el contrario, estos se basan en el tamaño de las cuotas de manera que los Estados que más contribuyen tienen una mayor influencia en la toma de decisiones.

A propósito del Fondo Monetario Internacional, Blomberg y Broz afirmaron que su estructura de gobernanza se basa en un sistema que ata las contribuciones (cuotas) de cada Estado a su poder de votación de manera que aquellos más ricos contribuyen más y tienen mayor influencia en el FMI que los miembros con economías más pequeñas (2006, p. 1).

El sistema de votación del Banco Mundial, al igual que el del Fondo Monetario Internacional, parte de la atribución de 250 votos a todos los miembros. Sin embargo, el voto de cada miembro varía dependiendo de su número de acciones en el capital social del Banco de manera que entre más acciones tenga un Estado, mayor será su poder de influencia en las decisiones de la organización. Es así que quienes más relevancia tienen en la toma de decisión son EE.UU., Japón, Alemania, Francia y Reino Unido (Blomberg & Broz, 2006, p. 4 & Banco Mundial, s.f., ¶5-6).

Por su parte, si bien en la Organización Mundial del Comercio las decisiones se toman con base en el consenso y en la atribución de un voto a cada Estado miembro, el espacio para la participación de Estados menores se ha visto reducido en tanto estos han quedado al margen de las negociaciones. En efecto, las negociaciones más importantes son llevadas a cabo por un pequeño conjunto de Estados encabezados por los Quad (EE.UU., Unión Europea, Japón y Canadá: los actores más influyentes y estratégicos en las negociaciones) en la denominadas

‘reuniones del Salón Verde’; una vez llegado el acuerdo entre este grupo, la decisión se extendía hasta el resto de los miembros y era considerado como una realidad dada (Hopewell, 2015, p. 317)

En consecuencia, los BRICS consideran pertinente la reforma de las organizaciones intergubernamental y las instituciones de gobernanza global. Con esto se espera una mayor participación de los pequeños Estados a través de su representación mediante Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica, (en efecto Hu Jintao afirmó: “Estamos comprometidos con la intensificación del intercambio con otros países sobre las reformas de gobernanza económica y el aumento de la representación de los países en vía de desarrollo”¹, (en Contipelli & Picciau, 2015, p. 123)) de manera que las decisiones de política internacional se tomen considerando otras perspectivas y en consecuencia, se pueda apreciar una mayor representación en el Sistema Internacional. Es por esta razón que en la *Declaración conjunta de los líderes de los países BRIC* tras la cumbre de Ekaterimburgo (2009) se afirmó

que una arquitectura económica y financiera reformada debería estar basada, inter alia, en los siguientes principios:

- Proceso de toma de decisión e implementación democrático y transparente en las organizaciones financieras internacionales;
- Bases legales sólidas
- Compatibilidad de las actividades nacionales de regulación eficaces y los organismos internacionales que fijan estándares;
- Fortalecimiento de las prácticas de gestión de riesgo y supervisión.

Además, en las declaraciones resultantes de las cumbres de Ekaterimburgo, Brasilia, Sanya, Nueva Delhi, Durban y Fortaleza se expresó “la necesidad de una reforma integral de la ONU, que incluya al Consejo de Seguridad, para hacerlo más eficaz, eficiente y representativo de manera que pueda lidiar con los desafíos globales actuales con más éxito” asimismo, “China y Rusia reiteraron la importancia concedida al estado de Brasil, India y Sudáfrica en los asuntos internacionales y apoyaron sus aspiraciones de desempeñar un papel más relevante en la ONU”. (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).

¹Traducción propia de “We are committed to stepping up exchange with other countries on global economic governance reforms and increasing representation of developing countries”

Estas reformas corresponden a un proceso mediante el cual los BRICS pretenden adecuar las organizaciones intergubernamentales a la realidad del siglo XXI. Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica claman que las instituciones creadas tras el fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial ya no responden a las dinámicas actuales: el Sistema Internacional ha superado su bipolaridad y posterior unipolaridad a favor de la multipolaridad. Pese a ello, las OIG siguen respondiendo a las dinámicas del pasado y a los intereses de sus arquitectos. En consecuencia, son muchos los Estados que no se ven representados a pesar de que en el presente desempeñen un papel más relevante dentro de las dinámicas políticas, económicas, comerciales y financieras mundiales (Glosny, 2010, p. 118).

A propósito de la Organización Mundial del Comercio, India y Brasil han movilizad recursos y ejercido su liderazgo para desempeñar un papel más relevante. De esta forma, en la Ronda de Doha, los Quads² han sido remplazado por los Nuevos Quads como principales negociadores en los temas de la agenda. A través de la posición de voceros del G-20, Brasil e India han logrado importantes victorias en el sentido en el que han impedido que iniciativas para la liberalización del comercio que beneficiaban a las grandes economías occidentales en detrimento de los países menos desarrollados se lleven a cabo (Hopewell, 2015 & Efstathopoulos, 2012).

De esta manera se evidencia que los BRICS son un grupo particular en el sentido que

A diferencia de la mayoría de coaliciones, el grupo de los BRICS no encuentra sus orígenes en preocupaciones sobre su seguridad – tres de los cuatro cuentan con disuasión nuclear para sus requisitos centrales de seguridad. Este fue diseñado como un marco para el diálogo en donde

² Quads es el término utilizado para referirse a EE.UU., la Unión Europea, Japón y Canadá. Este surgió durante la Ronda de Uruguay cuando las negociaciones entre estos Estados permitieron superar los impasses que atravesaba la ronda para así llegar a acuerdos definitivos y vinculantes para todos los miembros de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. A partir de ese momento, los Quads fueron los encargados de llevar a cabo las principales negociaciones ya que una vez alcanzado acuerdos entre EE.UU., la Unión Europea, Japón y Canadá, los acuerdos se extenderían al resto de las partes (Efstathopoulos, 2012, p. 283 & Hopewell, 2015, p. 317).

converjan intereses, no como una coalición para la confrontación anti-occidental (Roberts, 2010b, p. 51).

Por lo tanto, el grupo de los BRICS respondió a un proceso orgánico cuya consolidación fue dada por las interacciones entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y, desde 2011, Sudáfrica. Mediante ellas, estos Estados acordaron puntos alrededor de los cuales era necesaria la reforma de las reglas que guían el Sistema Internacional.

La primera reunión de los BRICs se dio en el 2006 en el marco de la Asamblea General de la Organización de Naciones Unidas. Esta ofreció una primera aproximación entre los Estados. En la 62 Asamblea General de Naciones Unidas (2007), se llevó a cabo una segunda reunión informal de cancilleres, dirigida por Brasil; “en dicha ocasión, se comprobó que el interés en profundizar el diálogo merecía la organización de una reunión específica de Cancilleres” (Itamaraty, s.f., párr. 6).

A partir de ese momento surgió para Brasil, Rusia, India y China la necesidad de creación de un marco dentro del cual celebrar reuniones formales entre sí; por esta razón, en 2008 se celebró la primera reunión formal entre estos cuatro Estados. En este contexto, el acrónimo “BRIC” dejó de tener una denotación orientada a la identificación de cuatro potencias emergentes para constituirse como una realidad política y diplomática (Itamaraty, s.f. párr. 7). En adelante, estos cuatro Estados celebraron anualmente cumbres en las que participaron sin excepción los cuatro miembros.

En este orden de ideas, entre 2009 y 2014 se celebraron cinco cumbres en las que Brasil, Rusia, India y China desarrollaron espacios de concertación para la cooperación en distintos ámbitos; por esta razón, en ellas participaron cancilleres, ministros de agricultura, directores de bancos de desarrollo e institutos estadísticos, representantes de *think tanks* –hasta la creación del Consejo de *think tanks* de los BRICS (Larionova, Scaffardi & Federico, 2015, p. 7)– altos funcionarios de los respectivos Estados encargados de temas relativos a la seguridad. Asimismo, inició un proceso que buscaba la creación de foros paralelos entre cooperativas y empresarios de los BRIC (Itamaraty, s.f. párr. 11).

De igual manera, en estas cumbres, empezó a calar el discurso de necesidad de reforma de las organizaciones intergubernamentales para democratizarlas: el

Consejo de Seguridad, las instituciones económicas y financieras multilaterales – Fondo Monetario Internacional y Banco Mundial – , dentro de la cual se acordó la creación del Banco de Desarrollo de los BRICS, para la cooperación financiera entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica y con los países en vía de desarrollo (Itamaraty, s.f., párrs. 11-16).

Además, en las cumbres entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica se propuso una agenda que buscaba promover el desarrollo sostenible y la persecución de los objetivos de desarrollo del milenio a través de programas para fomentar el uso de energías renovables, el apoyo a la utilización de la energía nuclear con fines civiles, la cooperación en ámbito de salud, educación y tecnología y también técnicas a favor de la sostenibilidad de los territorios en relación a la explotación agrícola, con el fin de disminuir y eventualmente erradicar la hambruna (Itamaraty, s.f., párrs. 11-13).

En consecuencia, es posible observar que la consolidación de los BRICS desde una construcción conceptual generada por un agente privado hasta su instrumentalización como un foro intergubernamental, ha respondido claramente a un proceso dado a partir de la profundización en las interacciones entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica. De hecho, cada uno de los encuentros le ha dado a los miembros una mayor claridad acerca de qué es lo que esperan de una reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global a partir de las interacciones con los demás y la coordinación de sus posiciones.

Es así que se puede apreciar a los BRICS como una construcción intersubjetiva, pues la percepción que Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica tienen de la realidad se ha modificado e influenciado por las interacciones entre sí. Algunos autores como Glosny, ponen de manifiesto lo señalado anteriormente en los siguientes términos:

“China y los BRICs han aprendido que intercambiar ideas también les permite coordinar posiciones y maximizar su capacidad de negociación en reuniones con los poderes occidentales” (2010, p. 112). En efecto, las diferentes cumbres permitieron que los Estados establecieran posiciones comunes con respecto a los diferentes temas de manera que sus reivindicaciones pudieran ser mejor escuchadas en el Sistema Internacional y, para tales fines, la coordinación y

la cooperación en distintas áreas se fue profundizando e incluyendo más sectores.

A este respecto, es interesante notar cómo los objetivos que los BRICS persiguen responden también a interacciones previas entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica, ocurridas antes del 2006. Esto se puede observar a través de la presencia de Brasil, India y Sudáfrica en el foro IBSA, constituido en 2003, y de Rusia y China en la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghái (OCS), fundada en 2001; los objetivos perseguidos por cada una de dichas instituciones fueron incluidos a la agenda de los BRICS, como se puede apreciar en las declaraciones de las cumbres de este foro. De esta manera, como lo evidencian las declaraciones de Ekaterimburgo, Brasilia, Sanya, New Delhi y Durban, el terrorismo (uno de los temas centrales de la OCS) y la persecución de los ODM – eje central del Foro IBSA – han adquirido gran relevancia para los BRICS.

Esto se entiende a partir de la afirmación de J.J. Kirton:

Con solo un miembro añadido en sus primeros seis años para convertirse en un grupo de cinco miembros, los BRICS son un club altamente compacto. Reuniéndose dos veces al año desde 2011, este adquirió la intensidad de interacciones necesaria para convertirse en un club interpersonal. Todos los miembros también pertenecían al G20, mientras que Rusia conectó los BRICS con el G8 hasta el 2014, India y Sudáfrica con el *Commonwealth*, Rusia y China con la OCS, China e India con el Encuentro Asia-Europa (2015, p. 18)³

A partir de los discursos y los acuerdos alcanzados en las cumbres de los BRICS, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica han desarrollado una serie de prácticas en pro de los objetivos promulgados en los encuentros. Estos discursos y la legitimación de reglas que estos promulgan han sido el resultado de la evolución orgánica del grupo: el término “BRICS” pasó de ser un término utilizado por Goldman Sachs para referirse a un conjunto de países que eran útiles para la inversión a causa de sus proyecciones de crecimiento a convertirse gradualmente, a

³ Traducción propia de: “With only one member added in its first six years to make it a five-member group, the BRICS was a highly compact club. Meeting twice a year since 2011, it acquired the interaction intensity needed to become an interpersonal club. All members also belonged to the G20, while Russia connected the BRICS to the G8 until 2014, India and South Africa to the Commonwealth, Russia and China to the SCO, and Russia, China and India to the Asia-Europe Meeting” (Kirton, 2015, p. 18).

partir de encuentros periódicos entre los jefes de Estado y de gobierno en un foro intergubernamental con miras a la legitimación de una serie de reglas en el Sistema Internacional para mejorar su posición relativa en el mismo. Sin embargo, como se discutirá en la segunda parte, las diferencias entre estos Estados han dificultado que las acciones se coordinen y posibiliten legitimar las reglas propuestas.

Las diferencias como obstáculo

Desde la primera reunión entre Brasil, Rusia, India y China en 2006 se han advertido una serie de éxitos por parte del grupo. En 2011, por ejemplo, los BRICS formaron parte simultáneamente del Consejo de Seguridad de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Ahí, desempeñaron un papel fundamental con respecto a los casos de Libia y de Siria. En efecto, los BRICS asumieron una posición conjunta a partir de la declaración de la cumbre de Sanya – y de los subsiguientes compromisos de Hainan –, por medio de la cual impidieron la intervención en estos Estados y el uso de la violencia, propuesta por los demás miembros permanentes del Consejo; China y Rusia, como detentores del poder de veto lo aplicaron y Brasil, India y Sudáfrica se abstuvieron (Santos, 2014, p. 319).

Asimismo, el grupo de los BRICS ha llegado a acuerdos en el ámbito económico y financiero. Por una parte, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica se comprometieron en 2014 a crear el Nuevo Banco de Desarrollo, cuya función, según su carta fundacional, es la financiación de proyectos de infraestructura para los países en vía de desarrollo y las economías emergentes, de acuerdo a esquemas más flexibles respecto a otros bancos multilaterales de desarrollo, con mira a que estos puedan desarrollarse según los esquemas de sostenibilidad (2015).

The new BRICS bank was intended to complement the old World Bank and Asian Development Bank rather than substitute for them. The new bank would fill the gaps that the old ones could not cover. This was in the interest of developing countries, such as Indonesia, which had complained about the detailed, intrusive conditionality of the IMF and World Bank, especially in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The new bank would do things the other banks and IMF were not able or willing to (Kirton, 2015, p. 19).

Por otra parte, los BRICS han llegado a acuerdos que buscan disminuir los costos de transacción en sus intercambios; el Acuerdo Marco sobre la Ampliación

de la Línea de Crédito en Moneda Local y la Carta Multilateral de los BRICS sobre el Acuerdo de Confirmación de Facilidad de Crédito, presentados en la cumbre de Nueva Delhi (2012), surgieron como herramientas para facilitar la transición a sus monedas locales en el comercio intra-BRICS y reducir su dependencia al dólar para dichos intercambios (Sijbren de Jong, 2012, p. 45; Glosny, 2010, p. 120).

A pesar de que los BRICS han alcanzado estos avances en pro de la legitimación de reglas en el Sistema Internacional, las diferencias entre sus miembros se pueden convertir en un obstáculo para la legitimación de las reglas que estos Estados reivindican ya que generan prácticas que contradicen el discurso promulgado, con base en sus percepciones del Sistema Internacional y sus intereses en el mismo.

Es innegable que son muchas las diferencias entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica; no solo en términos geográficos (a causa de su geografía física, de la distancia que los separa y de su extensión territorial), también en términos institucionales: Brasil, India y Sudáfrica son democracias, Rusia y China son gobiernos de corte autoritario. A partir de estos dos factores es fácil darse cuenta que la posibilidad de que estos Estados logren articular sus demandas alrededor de unos valores o principios comunes es baja. En efecto, al considerar los retos y los problemas globales no solo desde una óptica diferente – por su ubicación – sino a partir de una serie de valores inherentes a sus particularidades institucionales, las posibilidades de llegar a acuerdos se ven limitadas pues estos inciden en la manera en la que ven el mundo y actúan en él (Roberts, 2010b, pp. 51-52; Atale, 2012, p. 17; Armijo, 2007, pp. 8-9).

Por otra parte, es necesario considerar las diferencias económicas entre estos Estados. En primera medida, hay una clara disparidad en términos de PIB (ver Tabla No. 1) y de crecimiento económico; en segunda medida, los sectores más productivos de cada uno son diferentes: Brasil se especializa en la agricultura; Rusia, en la extracción de hidrocarburos; India, en los servicios y China, en la manufactura (Roberts, 2010a, pp. 9-10; Centro Superior de Estudios de Defensa Nacional, 2011, p. 20).

Si bien esto ofrece una oportunidad para los BRICS en el sentido en el que las actividades económicas de cada uno se ven complementadas (Centro Superior

de Estudios de Defensa Nacional, 2011, p. 8) por las de los otros, también dificulta la posibilidad de acuerdos y más si al análisis se le agrega el grado de proteccionismo de sus economías. India por ejemplo es uno de los países con más altos aranceles en lo relacionado con el sector de la agroindustria; Brasil, por el contrario, busca la reducción de todos los mecanismos de distorsión del comercio. En este sentido, sus intereses se ven contrapuestos ya que a pesar de que ambos esperan acceder al comercio internacional en una mayor proporción, cada uno espera hacerlo de una manera diferente (Cameron, 2011, pp. 3-4). Pese a ello, en la ronda de Doha, ambos han estado dispuestos a hacer concesiones para contraponerse a los intereses de las grandes economías occidentales.

Además, las diferencias en el tamaño de sus economías conduce a que el número de votos que cada uno de los BRICS tiene dentro del Fondo Monetario Internacional y el Banco Mundial difiera: una reforma en el sistema de votación de estas organizaciones, con base en el tamaño de su PIB, implica una mayor influencia en los procesos de toma de decisión, mas no que la mejora sea igual para todos. En efecto, esta diferencia significaría que en el caso en el que se efectuara una reforma con base en un cambio en la contribución de estos Estados a partir de su capacidad económica (Glosny afirmó que este es el tipo de reforma que promueven los BRICS (2010, p. 120)), las diferencias entre el PIB de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica no conllevarían un mismo aumento en el número de votos para todos.

Country	Population		Size of Economy		Economic Growth
	No. in mill	% BRICS	GDP USD Billion	% BRICS	Average annual GDP growth, 2009-2013
Brazil	193	6.6	2 252	15.4	2.5
Russia	143	4.9	2 007	13.8	1.3
India	1 210	41.0	1 743	11.9	5.0
China	1 351	45.8	8 227	56.3	7.7
South Africa	51	1.7	384	2.6	1.9
Total BRICS	2 948	100.0	14 613	100.0	-

Tabla No. 1

Fuente: Publicación Estadística Conjunta de los BRICS, 2013 en Harrison, 2014, p. 69

Asimismo, es importante tener en consideración las diferencias demográficas entre los BRICS ya que sus características tienen implicaciones directas en el crecimiento de sus economías: sin una fuerza productiva que garantice este crecimiento, los pilares a partir de los que se empezó a construir la reivindicación de reforma de las organizaciones intergubernamentales se desplomarían porque los BRICS han construido su idea de reforma de la arquitectura de gobernanza global a partir del crecimiento económico y de las proyecciones de Goldman Sachs para referirse a su necesidad de mayor participación dentro de la misma. En consecuencia, si estos países no cuentan con las capacidades productivas y la mano de obra necesaria para alcanzar con estas proyecciones de crecimiento, es muy difícil que el argumento de su importancia futuro en las relaciones económicas mundiales le sirva a los BRICS para las reivindicaciones de reglas en el Sistema Internacional.

En este orden de ideas, Sudáfrica se encuentra en una gran desventaja con respecto a Brasil, Rusia, India y China porque su tasa de desempleo es de 25,1%, según la *Publicación estadística conjunta de los BRICS* del 2015 (p. 12). De esta manera, se evidencia que las posibilidades de que la posibilidad que el Estado africano alcance un desarrollo económico semejante al de Brasil, Rusia, India o China son complicadas.

Además, hay que tener en consideración el hecho de que Rusia y China son dos países que están envejeciendo en términos poblacionales, India y Brasil por el contrario son países en los que la población crece rápidamente y Sudáfrica está en la mitad de estos extremos – con tendencia a ser un país con crecimiento poblacional lento – porque si bien tiene una de las tasas de fertilidad más altas, viene acompañada de una altísima tasa de mortalidad infantil (Sijbren de Jong, 2012, p. 18) .

Por otra parte, las diferencias sociales y culturales entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica obstaculizan la definición de prioridades y el establecimiento de acciones conjuntas para llevar a cabo los objetivos deseados (Movchan, 2015, ¶ 6). Esto se refleja particularmente en lo que respecta a la persecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio. Las particularidades de cada uno de estos países

dificultan la manera en la que Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica se aproximan a las problemáticas a ser resueltas de los ODM y en este sentido, factores como el sistema de castas en India obstaculizan la implementación de medidas para solventar el hambre y la pobreza extrema y promover la equidad de género. De igual manera, las tradiciones de Sudáfrica y China dificultan el empoderamiento de la mujer y la equidad de género. En el país africano, además, la mortalidad infantil, la salud materna y el VIH/SIDA son producto del contexto cultural y en este sentido, es difícil encontrar medidas de cooperación intra-BRICS que sean pertinentes para cada uno de los miembros.

Las diferencias entre los BRICS no se dan solo a nivel de particularidades socio-económicas, políticas y culturales; también hay distintas concepciones y aspiraciones del Sistema Internacional y del papel que deben ocupar en este. De esta manera, es necesaria una coordinación en una multiplicidad de áreas para que sus aspiraciones sean satisfechas y no se reduzcan a un mero discurso dentro del Sistema Internacional. Así pues, los BRICS

Como grupo están buscando una manera de usar su organización para una mejor colaboración en asuntos económicos mundiales. Ellos desean ser relevantes no solo en solucionar la crisis económica global, sino también en la creación de un nuevo sistema económico. Para ello, los BRICS deben hacer lo que hasta ahora han sido incapaces de hacer, e interactuar mejor entre ellos (Frank, 2013, p. 5).

De hecho, las relaciones intra-BRICS no son prioritarias para los miembros del grupo. Brasil, Rusia, India y Sudáfrica han profundizado la cooperación con China, mas no han intensificado en la misma proporción sus relaciones con los demás miembros del grupo. De esta manera, se observa que estos Estados necesitan mucho más a China de lo que esta a aquellos en tanto China está atravesando un proceso mediante el que los Estados del Sistema Internacional le han reconocido el status de potencia (en tanto miembro permanente del Consejo de Seguridad, potencia nuclear, la economía más grande y el mayor detentor de reservas internacionales). Por lo tanto, la participación del Estado chino dentro del foro le da relevancia al mismo en tanto esta hace que las demandas del grupo puedan ser escuchadas precisamente porque son hechas por una potencia económica mundial (Glosny, 2010, pp. 109-110 & Centro Superior de Estudios de

Defensa Nacional, 2011, pp. 88-89).

Cada uno de los BRICS busca mejorar su posición en el Sistema Internacional; sin embargo, sus aspiraciones en este varían. Las políticas exteriores de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica, tienen objetivos convergentes, mas no significa que compartan todos los intereses. Estos Estados quieren ser considerados como jugadores estratégicos en la política internacional, pero detrás de ello hay motivaciones diversas y diferencias en su manera de conducir sus relaciones exteriores.

La política exterior de Brasil, en primera medida, se ha caracterizado por la búsqueda de autonomía en el Sistema Internacional. En el pasado, esta se dio a partir de dos estrategias: la “autonomía por la distancia” y la “autonomía por la participación”⁴ (Sotero & Armijo, 2007, p. 58); a partir de la presidencia de Lula Da Silva, Brasil ha buscado la autonomía por medio de la diversificación. En virtud de ella, el Estado brasileño ha considerado que la mejor herramienta para garantizar su autonomía es el establecimiento de relaciones con Estados que tradicionalmente no habían sido considerados estratégicos y fomentar la cooperación Sur-Sur (Actis, 2014, p. 22).

En segunda medida, la política exterior de Brasil ha buscado aumentar su influencia en la política internacional, no solo en el ámbito regional, también a nivel global y para ello, el multilateralismo ha sido fundamental. En consecuencia, el Estado latinoamericano ha llamado para una reforma de las organizaciones internacionales intergubernamentales. No obstante, esto no significa que Brasil haya adelantado una agenda contraria al statu quo; Brasil busca ser reconocido

⁴ La “autonomía por la distancia” fue la estrategia de política exterior de Brasil durante los años 80. Bajo esta lógica, para que el Estado preservara su autonomía y su soberanía con respecto a las grandes potencias, Brasil debía rechazar los regímenes internacionales y desarrollar un modelo económico autárquico, según el modelo de la sustitución de importaciones. La “autonomía por la participación” fue la estrategia de política exterior brasileña durante los años 90. Esta consistía en la participación activa en las instituciones internacionales de manera que Brasil pudiera desempeñar un papel en la definición de reglas en el Sistema Internacional y en consecuencia, su autonomía se preservara a través de las decisiones y el consenso derivado de la participación en las instituciones de gobernanza global (Actis, 2014, p. 22).

como tomador de decisiones clave en el Sistema Internacional, mas no revertir la configuración actual de poder (Doval, 2015, p. 10).

Las prioridades de la política exterior brasilera han dado vida a un comportamiento corresponde con el denominado *middlepowermansship*, un término que hace referencia a “las tendencias de las potencias medias de buscar soluciones multilaterales a los problemas internacionales, su tendencia a adoptar posiciones de compromiso en las disputas internacionales, y su tendencia a utilizar las nociones de ‘buena ciudadanía internacional’ para guiar su diplomacia” (Lopes, 2015, p. 162). Fundamental en este comportamiento ha sido además el reconocimiento de la soberanía nacional como eje rector de las relaciones internacionales.

Esto explica por qué la búsqueda de autonomía de Brasil ha conducido a que Brazil will neither simply bandwagon the efforts of traditional oligarchic world powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China) nor emulate positions taking by emerging military powers (Turkey, South Africa, India etc.). Its position will be carefully crafted so as to sound authoritative and nationalistic rather than merely guided by the balance-of-power logic [...]. At a slow pace, Brazil is engaging in issues/regions that did not otherwise belong to its top foreign policy priorities” (Lopes, 2015, p. 171).

Cabe resaltar que en la búsqueda de liderazgo regional y mundial, Brasil y Estados Unidos han competido en aumentar su esfera de influencia en América Latina, especialmente en lo que respecta la materia comercial pues las políticas comerciales brasileras se han constituido como uno de los elementos primordiales de poder internacional del Estado en tanto Brasil ha conducido su política exterior evitando los conflictos con otros Estados y de esta manera, ha centrado sus relaciones exteriores en el comercio (Armijo & Burges, 2010, p. 25).

En lo que respecta a China, esta ha venido conduciendo una política exterior con miras a desempeñar un papel cada vez más relevante en el Sistema Internacional; sin embargo, el interés chino busca alcanzar este objetivo por medios diplomáticos y sin desafiar el orden actual. Es por esta razón que se habla del ascenso pacífico de este Estado y es por ello que Cynthia Roberts afirmó en 2010b que este Estado estaba dispuesto a aceptar una especie de asociación con

EE.UU., con la intención de no provocar o deteriorar sus relaciones con la potencia norteamericana (p. 54).

De esta manera, el modo de conducir la política exterior de China en los últimos tiempos ha estado guiado por su posicionamiento en el Sistema Internacional como un Estado cada vez más importante en las distintas esferas de la política internacional, de un modo en el que su ascenso no sea percibido como una amenaza para la distribución actual de poder; sin embargo, como se ilustrará en la siguiente sección, su cada vez mayor participación en el escenario internacional ha generado dudas acerca de cuál es el papel que este Estado desea ocupar en el mismo, por lo que la participación en el grupo de los BRICS le sirve China para disipar la percepción de los demás Estados como una amenaza al orden internacional.

Pese a ello, dos actividades parecerían demostrar lo contrario: el aumento en el PIB del gasto militar y las actividades en el Mar de China Meridional. Con respecto a lo primero, China ha aumentado el gasto militar con respecto al porcentaje del PIB que tradicionalmente había destinado a fines bélicos. Sin embargo, la razón para hacerlo responde a un proceso de modernización con miras a disminuir la diferencia en el equipo militar entre este Estado y los países desarrollados y garantizar su soberanía efectiva en el Mar de China Meridional (Smith, 2011; Glaser, 2012, p. 1).

Frente a las actividades de China en el Mar de China Meridional, el Estado ha manifestado que estas responden a un proceso de reafirmación de su soberanía en un territorio que le ha pertenecido. Es entonces que, dichas actividades no son dadas por motivaciones expansionistas sino que buscan exclusivamente demostrar a quién pertenece esa porción de mar (Glaser, 2012, p. 1). De esta manera se reafirma que “la paz es una necesidad fundamental para garantizar el desarrollo chino y, por lo tanto, China debe ayudar a mantener esta paz” (Chin, 2008, p. 86).

Por otra parte, India busca que le sea reconocido su status de potencia mundial, mas no está interesado en dirigir su política exterior hacia la región para afirmar su hegemonía en el subcontinente indio (ya que considera que la hegemonía regional está dada). De esta forma, “la India tradicionalmente ha dado una mayor importancia a sus relaciones con los Estados situados fuera de la región,

que a las propiamente regionales” (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, 2011, p. 70). Esto representa un desafío a causa de dos factores: el primero de ellos es que los Estados de la región no la reconocen como la potencia regional (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional, 2011, p. 70). El segundo factor es la importancia de la influencia de EE.UU. en Asia. En este sentido, el discurso de la representación de los Estados en vía de desarrollo por parte de los BRICS como potencias emergentes, carece de fundamentos en sur de Asia, ya que los Estados de la región no se sienten representados por India y su discurso, ni están dispuestos a coordinar y adecuar las políticas en virtud de mutuos intereses, y perciben a EE.UU., como el verdadero líder en Asia.

A pesar de lo anterior, India no considera que su participación como potencia mundial en la toma de decisiones en el Sistema Internacional se dé abruptamente; por el contrario, este Estado está convencido que conforme se den las dinámicas globales, y crezcan su productividad y, consecuentemente, el tamaño de su economía, su poder aumentará paulatinamente. Así pues, los demás Estados lo considerarán como una potencia y de esta manera, India se volverá un actor fundamental en la toma de decisiones dentro de las instituciones de gobernanza global, sin la necesidad de imponer una agenda diferente a la que se ha venido tratando (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa nacional, 2011, p. 76).

En este sentido, India no quiere ser percibido como una Estado reivindicador ni opositor en el Sistema Internacional y, precisamente por esta razón, no desea alterar el tipo de relaciones que mantiene con EE.UU. ni ejecutar políticas que puedan afectar dichos nexos, ya que estos son considerados prioritarios – y muchos más importantes que los lazos con Brasil, Rusia, China y Sudáfrica–. Siguiendo esta línea argumentativa, se encuentra que “India está genuinamente interesada en trabajar con EE.UU. y no desea desafiar el poderío estadounidense, [...] que es en la actualidad considerado por la mayoría de tomadores de decisiones como el mejor interés de la India” (Sinha & Dorschner, 2010, p. 88).

El caso de Rusia es diferente ya que este Estado aspira recuperar la posición perdida en el Sistema Internacional para volver a jugar un papel definitorio en la política internacional y además, recuperar a Europa Oriental, el Cáucaso y Asia

Central como áreas de influencia, ya que estas regiones son según Rusia la base de su seguridad y su crecimiento económico (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa nacional, 2011, p. 44).

Estos dos objetivos se retroalimentan mutuamente en la medida en la que según el Estado ruso, el fortalecimiento de su poderío regional refuerza su vocación de potencia mundial; a su vez, su condición de potencia mundial legitima su voluntad de afirmarse como la potencia regional en Europa Oriental, Asia Central y el Cáucaso (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa nacional, 2011, p. 45).

Rusia, además, mantiene relaciones ambivalentes con EE.UU.. Por una parte, como todos los BRICS, mantiene importantes nexos con esta potencia y siente respeto por la misma (Roberts, 2010b, p. 54). De igual manera, el Centro de Estudios Superior de la Defensa Nacional aseguró que estas relaciones se mantendrán mientras que las potencias garanticen que la Federación Rusa preservará su influencia en los territorios anteriormente mencionados (2011, p. 44).

En este sentido, Rusia espera que su liderazgo regional no se vea impedido por las actividades estadounidenses en sus áreas de influencia; es así que se explican la guerra de Georgia en 2008 (Roberts, 2010b, p. 56) y la crisis de Crimea en 2014: la adhesión de Georgia y Ucrania a la OTAN, interferían con los intereses geoeconómicos y geopolíticos. De esta manera, al verse amenazados, la vía militar fue la alternativa para evitar la injerencia de otras potencias en su esfera de influencia.

Por otra parte, Rusia ha aplicado una postura de oposición a Estados Unidos a través no cooperar con este (cuando no satisface los intereses rusos). En efecto, “los unipolos tienen un enorme poder pero no pueden alcanzar todos sus objetivos de política exterior sin la ayuda de otros Estados” (Roberts, 2010b, p. 58). De esta manera se observa que si bien Rusia no está interesada en entrar en un conflicto con EE.UU., tampoco está dispuesta a que se materialicen los intereses de la potencia estadounidense (el unipolo) en el Sistema Internacional. Por esta razón, Rusia se ha valido de su poder de veto para bloquear las iniciativas de este Estado que se distancien de sus prioridades e intereses de política exterior. Esta postura se puede observar por ejemplo, en la utilización de su poder de veto en el Consejo de

Seguridad en lo que respecta a las iniciativas estadounidenses para la intervención en Siria.

Las prioridades de la política exterior de Sudáfrica, buscan fortalecer su inserción en las dinámicas globales y regionales para posicionarse mejor en las mismas, a la vez que se compromete con la defensa y la promoción de los Derechos Humanos, la democracia, la justicia y el derecho internacional como herramientas para la resolución de conflictos, de manera que el Estado pueda reinventarse y desligarse de la imagen del apartheid (Leon, 2013, pp. 447-449).

Es así como los BRICS pueden ser percibidos como un bloque muy poco homogéneo, no solo en términos económicos; también en términos políticos. En efecto, hay profundas diferencias tanto entre los sistemas de gobierno de estos Estados, como en las maneras de percibir el Sistema Internacional, sus aspiraciones y prioridades, su modo de comportarse en este y su capacidad de influenciar su entorno regional y el escenario mundial.

Es entonces que surgen preguntas alrededor de la manera en la que Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica pueden actuar de forma conjunta para articular la legitimación de las reglas que han intentado legitimar. Por una parte, no hay una base social o cultural común a los cinco Estados que les permita actuar de manera conjunta para solventar sus necesidades particulares con base en principios comunes o alcanzar una aproximación conjunta frente a los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio; por otra parte, las principales actividades económicas y el tamaño de las economías de los BRICS son diferentes y esto repercute además en la manera en la que los Estados actúan frente a la economía política. Finalmente, su proyección internacional y su ubicación han significado que entre los miembros del grupo, los intereses, prioridades, influencias y objetivos no necesariamente converjan; común a todos es el deseo de mejorar su posición relativa en el Sistema Internacional.

La instrumentalización del término

Las diferencias entre los BRICS constituyen un obstáculo para la persecución de los objetivos de legitimación de reglas que han promovido sus miembros a través de su discurso. Así, es poco probable que estas reglas sean

legitimadas porque las diferencias entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica han implicado la escasa coordinación entre los miembros, que han visto en el grupo una plataforma útil a sus intereses nacionales; en este sentido, el término “BRICS” ha sido instrumentalizado en virtud de las agendas particulares.

El grupo de los BRICS no trasciende más allá de un grupo y por ello carece de altos grados de centralización e independencia. Estas son definidas respectivamente como “estructura organizacional estable y concreta y un aparato administrativo que administre las actividades colectivas” y “la autoridad para actuar con un cierto grado de autonomía, y a menudo con neutralidad, en esferas definidas” (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 9). En consecuencia, el foro carece de la capacidad de tomar decisiones autónomamente, pues depende de los acuerdos y negociaciones entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica y, en consecuencia, los BRICS no son una institución del todo neutral.

De esta manera, es necesaria la coordinación de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica para cualquier actividad del foro. No obstante, cabe recordar que Abbott y Snidal afirmaron que estas características se pueden ver en cierta medida en otras instituciones internacionales, como son los foros y a este respecto, la rotación de la sede y sus prácticas institucionales les pueden dar un cierto grado de centralización; esto sucede en el G-7 y le concede al grupo autonomía en la legitimación de las acciones de sus miembros (1998, p. 9). Al tener esto en consideración, la rotación de la sede de las cumbres entre los BRICS le daría al foro un cierto grado de centralización, mas no necesariamente legitimidad frente a las acciones individuales de los miembros. Lo anterior se da porque la rotación de la sede de las cumbres provee al foro un entorno despolitizado y estable para la negociación (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 10).

Su construcción como foro, ha hecho además que el grupo de los BRICS carezca de bajos elementos de legalización; en efecto, sus grados de obligación (vinculación entre actores del Sistema Internacional a través de reglas, compromisos o un conjunto de los mismos), precisión (“las reglas definen sin ambigüedades ña conducta que requieren, autorizan o proscriben”) y delegación (“terceros han sido investidos con la autoridad para implementar, interpretar y aplicar las reglas; resolver conflictos y (posiblemente para crear nuevas normas”)

(Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, & Snidal, 2000, p. 401) han implicado escasa coordinación entre Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica.

La escasa coordinación, fruto de la baja legalización, ha tenido como consecuencia que el término “BRICS” haya sido instrumentalizado por sus miembros en virtud de los intereses nacionales individuales. Es así como en el corto plazo, la legitimación de reglas promovida por el discurso del grupo no es plausible pues las prácticas para alcanzarlo son supeditadas a la voluntad individual de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica de mejorar su posición relativa en el Sistema Internacional. La escasa coordinación entre los BRICS ha llevado a que su voluntad de convertirse en potencias mundiales no venga acompañada de una agenda global. La agenda de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica ha sido establecida a partir de los intereses particulares de los Estados. De esta manera, solo se puede observar la existencia de una agenda común en el continente africano. Este ha sido el foco de la cooperación Sur-Sur y de la inversión de Brasil, India, China, Sudáfrica y en menor medida de Rusia.

A pesar de que los países BRICS declaran su voluntad de cooperar, todavía actúan como rivales en África. India compete con China por el acceso a los mercados africanos. La gran inversión china en infraestructura africana y también recientemente en tecnología ha forzado a India a buscar oportunidades para superar a China, principalmente en las áreas de nuevas tecnologías y capital humano. Brasil e India están ansiosos por convertirse en miembros del Consejo de Seguridad, lo que también los convierte en competidores. China, India y Brasil compiten con respecto a la agricultura africana, donde cada uno es muy activo. Brasil está tratando de contrarrestar a China e India en el África lusófona, que considera como su esfera de influencia (Deych, 2015, p. 165)

Asimismo, los BRICS tienen múltiples intereses en Asia, pero no han desarrollado un enfoque conjunto para aproximarse a la región por diferentes razones. A este respecto, H. Niu afirmó que esto se da en primera medida porque a pesar del interés, esta no es una región prioritaria para Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica. En segunda medida, porque estos Estados tienen poca capacidad para influir en ella: Brasil y Sudáfrica son potencias meramente regionales; el ascenso de Rusia, India y China puede alterar las dinámicas en el continente. En tercera medida y citando a Laidi (2002), porque al tratar los asuntos regionales, los BRICS se basan en la soberanía para abordarlos y esto conlleva que adopten posiciones

meramente nacionales o defensivas. En cuarta medida, porque ha sido muy difícil reunir a todos los líderes de Asia o una amplia agenda común a todos los Estados a una cumbre de los BRICS (2015, pp. 148-149).

La anexión de Sudáfrica a los BRICS una prueba de cómo los miembros del grupo se han valido de este para sus objetivos. En efecto, a pesar de que hay una gran diferencia en términos de poder económico y demográfico como lo muestra la Tabla 1, el poder blando del Estado le ha permitido influenciar la agenda global (Harrison, 2014, p. 84). Además, esta le permitió a los BRICS darle más coherencia a su discurso de mayor representación de las organizaciones internacionales intergubernamentales, pues la inclusión del Estado africano permitía la participación de líderes regionales de todos los continentes. Según el gobierno sudafricano, esta también es útil al grupo pues Sudáfrica ha demostrado ser un actor regional y mundial líder en la promoción de una mayor inclusión dentro de las estructuras de toma de decisión a escala mundial (RSA, 2013 en Harrison, 2014, p. 84).

Pertenecer a los BRICS ha sido útil para China porque le ha permitido usar a este grupo para matizar sus aspiraciones dentro del Sistema Internacional y mejorar su percepción en el mismo. En efecto, este Estado es el único que tiene las capacidades para revertir la unipolaridad actual del Sistema Internacional. No obstante, esta no quiere ser percibida como una amenaza para la distribución actual de poder, en especial si se considera que China es un miembro permanente del Consejo de Seguridad, dispone de arsenal nuclear, es el mayor detentor de reservas extranjeras y una de las mayores potencias económicas mundiales – por lo que, además, dota a los BRICS de una mayor protagonismo (Glosny, 2010, pp. 109, 113).

La política exterior china ha promovido el ascenso pacífico; de esta manera, el Estado quiere mejorar su posición en el Sistema Internacional sin tener que recurrir a la violencia para ello. En consecuencia, el ascenso se basa en la vía económica y en la cooperación para su consolidación como potencia y a partir de esta influenciar las dinámicas de la política internacional sutilmente, para evitar una percepción negativa de los demás Estados y una alteración en la seguridad internacional en tanto “mientras que China emerge como gran potencia, su

continuo desarrollo depende de la paz mundial, una paz que debería tratar de reforzar” (Chin, 2008, p. 86).

En este orden de ideas, la pertenencia a los BRICS es un instrumento de China con miras a evitar la confrontación. En primera medida, porque este Estado “es capaz de esconderse detrás de los otros y no ser percibido como la mayor amenaza a los intereses de EE.UU., en especial porque los otros BRICS han sido mucho más francos en sus críticas” (Glosny, 2010, pp. 111, 113), mostrándose así como miembro de un grupo promotor de reformas en vez de un Estado revisionista (Brütsch & Papa, 2013, p. 303). En segunda medida, porque evita la desconfianza de India y de Rusia con respecto a sus actividades en la región –pues con ambos ha tenido conflictos, e incluso guerras, por cuestiones territoriales—, motivada además de la competencia entre sí a causa de sus pretensiones económicas y geopolíticas y de su papel en la arena internacional futura (Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa nacional, 2011, p. 94).

Sin embargo, cabe mencionar que las aspiraciones económicas y comerciales de China no han sido percibidas de buena manera por parte de todos los Estados, ni siquiera entre los BRICS, pues los intereses chinos han afectado a los brasileños en América Latina. En efecto, el Estado asiático ha incrementado sustancialmente sus actividades en la región (obtiene *commodities* como petróleo de Venezuela, soya de Brasil y Argentina y cobre de Perú y Chile a cambio de préstamos con bajas tasas de interés) en detrimento de Brasil hasta el punto que este acusó a China de dumping (Contipelli & Picciau, 2015, pp. 124-125; Rewizorski, 2015, p. 137).

De manera similar, Rusia se ha valido de los BRICS para recuperar su imagen de potencia mundial. Esta se reconstruye según su jefe de Estado, Vladimir Putin, en su capacidad de proveer de bienestar y un buen nivel de vida a la población, el liderazgo en la creación y uso de tecnología de punta, en la soberanía efectiva y en la defensa de sus intereses en la arena internacional y no tanto en el tamaño de su arsenal (en Roberts, 2010, p. 53).

Así pues, la adhesión a los BRICS es un instrumento mediante el cual Rusia espera defender sus intereses en la esfera internacional y aumentar su influencia en el Sistema Internacional a través de su participación en el foro, pues según Putin, este Estado “solo se fortalecerá si se posiciona con estas potencias emergentes”

(Roberts, 2010, p. 68). No obstante lo anterior, es necesario recordar que hay una gran diferencia entre los miembros de los BRICS términos de PIB per cápita, liderazgo a nivel tecnológico y proyección internacional.

Además, la pertenencia de Rusia a los BRICS le ha permitido volver a inserirse en el Sistema Internacional ya que “con el apoyo de los BRICs como un multiplicador de poder, Rusia, el eterno forastero, está ahora listo para convertirse en un miembro de la comunidad, pero aún no en las instituciones euro-atlánticas” (Roberts, 2010, p. 42). Vital en este proceso, ha sido el desempeño de los otros Estados en lo relativo a la toma de decisiones cuando han tenido la oportunidad de detentar una posición privilegiada – como miembros no permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad –.

Los casos de Brasil, India y Sudáfrica son diferentes a los de India y China pues a diferencia de los otros dos Estados, los IBSA esperan que su pertenencia al grupo les garantice la apertura de nuevos espacios de participación en el escenario internacional y de reconocimiento dentro del mismo como Estados capaces de tomar decisiones con respecto a los temas globales y, en consecuencia, les sea reconocido su capacidad de liderazgo (Brütsch & Papa, 2013, pp. 303-304; Wasserman, 2015, p. 110; Doval, 2015, p. 3; Sinha & Dorschner, 2010, p. 78; Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y de Cooperación de la República de Sudáfrica, 2014 en Shubin, 2015, p. 74).

Así, la pertenencia a los BRICS ha sido un instrumento para legitimar decisiones con respecto a acciones e inacciones en las estructuras de gobernanza global. En este sentido, estos Estados se presentan a sí mismos como los representantes del Sur global y como miembros de los BRICS para ampliar su margen de maniobra en el Sistema Internacional.

El Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales y de Cooperación de la República de Sudáfrica declaró en 2014 que mediante su participación en este foro, Sudáfrica espera el apoyo y el compromiso de los BRICS en la promoción de su agenda en África y en el ámbito global, mayor apoyo en la reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global y en el resurgimiento de la agenda de la ronda de Doha (en Shubin, 2015, p. 174).

A partir de esto, se observa el comportamiento de Brasil, India y Sudáfrica

en el Consejo de Seguridad. Estos Estados manifestaron en 2011 su apoyo a China y a Rusia en las decisiones relativas a la intervención en Siria y Libia: los miembros permanentes del Consejo vetaron las resoluciones propuestas por los Estados occidentales en lo referente a Siria y se abstuvieron con respecto al caso libio; los IBSA se abstuvieron pues estas acciones violaban la soberanía e incluso la integridad territorial de estos Estados, lo cual favorecía las pretensiones coloniales de las potencias de Occidente en estos territorios (Traub, 2012; Santos, 2014, pp. 317, 322- 323).

De esta manera, el sistema de votación demostraba la capacidad de tomar decisiones de Brasil, India y Sudáfrica bajo el argumento de la imparcialidad y de los principios de defensa de la integridad territorial de estos Estados, lo cual resultaba útil también a China y Rusia en el sentido que legitimaba su posición a partir del apoyo de los IBSA de manera que sus decisiones no eran vistas como un mecanismo para impedir a causa de sus intereses particulares la participación de otros Estados en los conflictos libio y sirio. Cabe mencionar, sin embargo, que en 2012 India y Sudáfrica votaron a favor de una resolución similar a la del año anterior frente a Siria (Traub, 2012; Santos, 2014, pp. 317, 322-323).

El paquete de Bali, firmado en el marco de la IX Conferencia Ministerial de la OMC, es otro ejemplo de coordinación de los BRICS. Con este, se acordó la eliminación de subsidios a la agricultura para los países desarrollados y la preservación de los mismos en los países en vía de desarrollo de manera que se garantizara la seguridad alimentaria de estos y se facilitara su acceso al comercio mundial. Asimismo, se acordó la supresión de las herramientas de distorsión del comercio con este propósito. Frente a esta iniciativa, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica votaron a favor (al igual que el resto de miembros de la OMC) (Declaración Ministerial de Bali, 2013).

Las decisiones relativas a las intervenciones extranjeras para hacer frente a las crisis políticas e institucionales en Libia y Siria, al igual que el Paquete de Bali como solución al estancamiento de la ronda de Doha en el tema de los subsidios a la agricultura demuestran que la coordinación se ha dado en temas concretos y frente a situaciones prácticas. No obstante, en los ámbitos propositivos, la coordinación de los BRICS no ha sido igual de satisfactoria.

En 2012, frente a la decisión de quién sería el Nuevo director del Banco Mundial, los BRICS no asumieron una postura coordinada y, además, la posición de China difirió de la de Brasil, Rusia, India y Sudáfrica en la elección de Christine Lagarde para el FMI, para obtener la tercera posición más ventajosa en esta organización internacional (Santos, 2014, p. 324). Además, Sijbren de Jong afirma que los BRICS actúan más solos que como grupo cuando hay desacuerdos en el Consejo de Seguridad por lo que no se puede decir que exista un pacto entre estos Estado en este órgano de la ONU (2012, p. 53).

Por otra parte, las declaraciones de las cumbres de los BRICS afirman la necesidad de actuar para la reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global y para garantizar la sostenibilidad y la seguridad del planeta, el problema es que ni en estas ni en sus planes de acción se mencionan los pasos a seguir para alcanzar esas aspiraciones. Es por esta razón que autores como Michael Glosny afirman que incluso si a los BRICS les dieran la oportunidad de modificar el Sistema Internacional como quisieran, y legitimando las reglas promovidas por su discurso, no sabrían cómo hacerlo o cómo presentar una visión concreta de sus ideas (2010, pp. 119-120).

De esta manera, los bajos grados de centralización, independencia y legalización han afectado a los BRICS y a la legitimación de las reglas reivindicadas en su discurso, pues no solo no se han llegado a acuerdos acerca de cómo perseguir dicha legitimación, sino que la falta de obligación, precisión y delegación ha además facilitado que Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica actúen de la manera que consideren más apropiada para sus intereses individuales y en cierto sentido, desconociendo al foro.

Vale la pena mencionar además que a pesar de que estos Estados desean ocupar un puesto más influyente en el Sistema Internacional, no necesariamente ven un futuro en el que los BRICS sean un bloque sólido e imprescindible en la toma de decisiones. India por ejemplo utiliza su participación en este foro “para pedir más voz y participación en las estructuras de gobernanza existentes, pero aún no ve a los BRICS como una agrupación política o alianza viable, en consonancia con la opinión de la mayoría de otras potencias (Sinha & Dorschner, 2010, p. 78).

Se evidencia entonces que el foro los BRICS tiene utilidad para sus

miembros en la medida en la que les permite visibilizar y alcanzar objetivos individuales, pero que una vez que estos sean alcanzados, la razón de existir – y por lo tanto, el discurso de legitimación de reglas – de los BRICS, probablemente desaparecerán. Lo anterior es producido por el diseño institucional bajo el cual funciona el grupo.

Este, de hecho, carece de los instrumentos (fruto de sus bajos niveles de centralización e independencia) que le permitan tomar decisiones independientemente del acuerdo entre los jefes de Estado y de gobierno de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica. Por esta razón, los acuerdos entre los BRICS dependen de la voluntad individual de los signatarios y, en este sentido, están supeditados a los intereses particulares de estos Estados; en la medida en la que el grupo les permita perseguir sus objetivos individuales, la razón de existir permanecerá, es probable que sobreviva solo mientras el discurso de legitimación de reglas persista y les permita mejorar su posición relativa en el Sistema Internacional.

Además, cabe mencionar que los bajos niveles de legalización de los acuerdos entre los BRICS han significado que cada uno de sus miembros actúe de la manera más útil para sí mismo, sin consideración de los intereses o de las implicaciones para los otros. En la práctica, esto se traduce en acciones descoordinadas que no generan espacios en los que la legitimación de reglas promulgadas pueda llevarse a cabo y la existencia de ventanas de oportunidad para alcanzar objetivos individuales de política exterior.

Conclusiones

A partir de la acuñación del término “BRICS” por Goldman Sachs, Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica han profundizado sustancialmente sus relaciones y, a partir de sus interacciones y de su interés en mejorar su posición relativa en el Sistema Internacional, han articulado un discurso de reforma de las instituciones de gobernanza global y persecución de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio, que se ha nutrido por las relaciones entre los miembros de los BRICS.

Sin embargo, es difícil que los BRICS legitimen ese discurso y creen reglas que moldeen las acciones y las intenciones de los actores del Sistema Internacional,

pues las diferencias entre los miembros y los bajos niveles de centralización, independencia y legalización, con su consecuente falta de coordinación de sus acciones han implicado percepciones diferentes del contexto y la competencia entre los BRICS acerca de su influencia en el Sistema Internacional.

Al ser un término instrumentalizado, la perduración de los BRICS depende de la persecución de los objetivos particulares de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica: en el momento en el que los miembros alcancen sus objetivos de política exterior relacionados con su pertenencia al foro, no necesitarán seguir en éste, por lo que el futuro de los BRICS es incierto.

Además, es necesario tener en consideración que si el liderazgo de los BRICS era cuestionado en el periodo en consideración (2004-2014), lo es aún más en el 2016 a causa de la desaceleración económica de Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica -la causa principal por la que se previó que estos Estados iban a ser potencias mundiales- y de la crisis política que agobia a Brasil en este momento.

La desaceleración de las economías es una realidad que afrontan todos los BRICS en este momento. En la medida en la que estos países atraviesan este proceso, su capacidad de desempeñar un papel de liderazgo dentro de la arquitectura de gobernanza global en materia económica entra en duda: si estos Estados no son capaces de garantizar niveles de crecimiento estables y políticas económicas en pro de su desarrollo económico, ¿cómo podrán ser artífices de una reforma en las instituciones económicas?

Por otra parte, la crisis política de Brasil ha significado que su liderazgo regional sea puesto en entredicho en la medida en la que los escándalos de corrupción agobian al país, su imagen de una democracia respetable y transparente se desvanece. Asimismo, esta crisis significa que los procesos de toma de decisión y de creación de políticas públicas se han estancado. Ante estas dificultades, la posibilidad de mejorar su posición relativa en el Sistema Internacional se aleja, de la misma manera que la posibilidad de que los BRICS sean considerados un grupo creíble para la cooperación y para la legitimación de reglas en el Sistema Internacional.

De esta manera, las diferencias entre los BRICS así como la instrumentalización del término han implicado un proceso mediante el cual el

discurso articulado por Brasil, Rusia, India, China y Sudáfrica no se ha visto acompañado por una serie de prácticas congruentes con dicho discurso. De esta manera, si bien la necesidad de reforma del Sistema Internacional y el establecimiento de normas en pro de la sostenibilidad han calado, las maneras para su implementación siguen siendo una gran incógnita.

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Anexo

Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries' Leaders

Yekaterinburg, Russia, June 16, 2009

We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, have discussed the current situation in global economy and other pressing issues of global development, and also prospects for further strengthening collaboration within the BRIC, at our meeting in Yekaterinburg on June 16, 2009.

We have arrived at the following conclusions:

1. We stress the central role played by the G20 Summits in dealing with the financial crisis. They have fostered cooperation, policy coordination and political dialogue regarding international economic and financial matters.
2. We call upon all states and relevant international bodies to act vigorously to implement the decisions adopted at the G20 Summit in London on April 2, 2009. We shall cooperate closely among ourselves and with other partners to ensure further progress of collective action at the next G20 Summit to be held in Pittsburgh in September 2009. We look forward to a successful outcome of the United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on Development to be held in New York on June 24-26, 2009.
3. We are committed to advance the reform of international financial institutions, so as to reflect changes in the global economy. The emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial institutions, whose heads and executives should be appointed through an open, transparent, and merit-based selection process. We also believe that there is a strong need for a stable, predictable and more diversified international monetary system.
4. We are convinced that a reformed financial and economic architecture should be based, *inter alia*, on the following principles:
 - democratic and transparent decision-making and implementation process at the international financial organisations;
 - solid legal basis;
 - compatibility of activities of effective national regulatory institutions and international standard-setting bodies;
 - strengthening of risk management and supervisory practices.
5. We recognise the important role played by international trade and foreign direct investments in the world economic recovery. We call upon all parties to work together to improve the international trade and investment environment. We urge the international community to keep the multilateral trading system stable, curb

trade protectionism, and push for comprehensive and balanced results of the WTO's Doha Development Agenda.

6. The poorest countries have been hit hardest by the financial crisis. The international community needs to step up efforts to provide liquid financial resources for these countries. The international community should also strive to minimise the impact of the crisis on development and ensure the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Developed countries should fulfil their commitment of 0.7% of Gross National Income for the Official Development Assistance and make further efforts in increasing assistance, debt relief, market access and technology transfer for developing countries.

7. The implementation of the concept of sustainable development, comprising, *inter alia*, the Rio Declaration, Agenda for the 21st Century and multilateral environmental agreements, should be a major vector in the change of paradigm of economic development.

8. We stand for strengthening coordination and cooperation among states in the energy field, including amongst energy producers and consumers and transit states, in an effort to decrease uncertainty and ensure stability and sustainability. We support diversification of energy resources and supply, including renewable energy, security of energy transit routes and creation of new energy investments and infrastructure.

9. We support international cooperation in the field of energy efficiency. We stand ready for a constructive dialogue on how to deal with climate change based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, given the need to combine measures to protect the climate with steps to fulfill our socio-economic development tasks.

10. We reaffirm to enhance cooperation among our countries in socially vital areas and to strengthen the efforts for the provision of international humanitarian assistance and for the reduction of natural disaster risks. We take note of the statement on global food security issued today as a major contribution of the BRIC countries to the multilateral efforts to set up the sustainable conditions for this goal.

11. We reaffirm to advance cooperation among our countries in science and education with the aim, *inter alia*, to engage in fundamental research and development of advanced technologies.

12. We underline our support for a more democratic and just multi-polar world order based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all states. We reiterate our support for political and diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in international relations.

13. We strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterate that there can be no justification for any act of terrorism anywhere or for whatever reasons. We note that the draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism is currently under the consideration of the UN General Assembly and call for its urgent adoption.

14. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this respect, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN with a view to making it more efficient so that it can deal with today's global challenges more effectively. We reiterate the importance we attach to the status of India and Brazil in international affairs, and understand and support their aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations.

15. We have agreed upon steps to promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way. The dialogue and cooperation of the BRIC countries is conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.

16. Russia, India and China welcome the kind invitation of Brazil to the next BRIC summit it will host in 2010.

Recuperado de: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/090616-leaders.html>

2nd BRIC Summit of Heads of State and Government: Joint Statement

Brasília, April 15, 2010

We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, met in Brasília on 15 April 2010 to discuss major issues of the international agenda as well as concrete steps to move forward the cooperation and coordination within BRIC.

We have agreed on the following:

Common Vision and Global Governance

1. We share the perception that the world is undergoing major and swift changes that highlight the need for corresponding transformations in global governance in all relevant areas.

2. We underline our support for a multipolar, equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States.

3. We stress the central role played by the G-20 in combating the crisis through

unprecedented levels of coordinated action. We welcome the fact that the G-20 was confirmed as the premier forum for international economic coordination and cooperation of all its member states. Compared to previous arrangements, the G-20 is broader, more inclusive, diverse, representative and effective. We call upon all its member states to undertake further efforts to implement jointly the decisions adopted at the three G-20 Summits. We advocate the need for the G-20 to be proactive and formulate a coherent strategy for the post-crisis period. We stand ready to make a joint contribution to this effort.

4. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this respect, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative, so that it can deal with today's global challenges more effectively. We reiterate the importance we attach to the status of India and Brazil in international affairs, and understand and support their aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations.

5. We believe the deepened and broadened dialogue and cooperation of the BRIC countries is conducive not only to serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries, but also to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity. We have agreed upon steps to promote dialogue and cooperation among our countries in an incremental, proactive, pragmatic, open and transparent way.

International Economic and Financial Issues

6. The world economic situation has improved since our first meeting in June 2009, in Ekaterinburg. We welcome the resumption of economic growth, in which emerging market economies are playing a very important role. However, we recognize that the foundation of world economic recovery is not yet solid, with uncertainties remaining. We call upon all states to strengthen macroeconomic cooperation, jointly secure world economic recovery and achieve a strong, sustainable and balanced growth. We reiterate our determination to make positive efforts in maintaining domestic economic recovery and promoting development in our own countries and worldwide.

7. We underline the importance of maintaining relative stability of major reserve currencies and sustainability of fiscal policies in order to achieve a strong, long-term balanced economic growth.

8. We are convinced that emerging market economies and developing countries have the potential to play an even larger and active role as engines of economic growth and prosperity, while at the same time commit to work together with other countries towards reducing imbalances in global economic development and fostering social inclusion.

9. G-20 members, with a significant contribution from BRIC countries, have greatly

increased resources available to the IMF. We support the increase of capital, under the principle of fair burden-sharing, of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of the International Finance Corporation, in addition to more robust, flexible and agile client-driven support for developing economies from multilateral development banks.

10. Despite promising positive signs, much remains to be done. We believe that the world needs today a reformed and more stable financial architecture that will make the global economy less prone and more resilient to future crises, and that there is a greater need for a more stable, predictable and diversified international monetary system.

11. We will strive to achieve an ambitious conclusion to the ongoing and long overdue reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. The IMF and the World Bank urgently need to address their legitimacy deficits. Reforming these institutions' governance structures requires first and foremost a substantial shift in voting power in favor of emerging market economies and developing countries to bring their participation in decision making in line with their relative weight in the world economy. We call for the voting power reform of the World Bank to be fulfilled in the upcoming Spring Meetings, and expect the quota reform of the IMF to be concluded by the G-20 Summit in November this year. We do also agree on the need for an open and merit based selection method, irrespective of nationality, for the heading positions of the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, staff of these institutions needs to better reflect the diversity of their membership. There is a special need to increase participation of developing countries. The international community must deliver a result worthy of the expectations we all share for these institutions within the agreed timeframe or run the risk of seeing them fade into obsolescence.

12. In the interest of promoting international economic stability, we have asked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to look into regional monetary arrangements and discuss modalities of cooperation between our countries in this area. In order to facilitate trade and investment, we will study feasibilities of monetary cooperation, including local currency trade settlement arrangement between our countries.

13. Recent events have shattered the belief about the self-regulating nature of financial markets. Therefore, there is a pressing need to foster and strengthen cooperation regarding the regulation and supervision of all segments, institutions and instruments of financial markets. We remain committed to improve our own national regulations, to push for the reform of the international financial regulatory system and to work closely with international standard setting bodies, including the Financial Stability Board.

International Trade

14. We stress the importance of the multilateral trading system, embodied in the

World Trade Organization, for providing an open, stable, equitable and non discriminatory environment for international trade. In this connection, we commit ourselves and urge all states to resist all forms of trade protectionism and fight disguised restrictions on trade. We concur in the need for a comprehensive and balanced outcome of the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks, in a manner that fulfills its mandate as a "development round", based on the progress already made, including with regard to modalities. We take note and strongly support Russia's bid for accession to the WTO.

Development

15. We reiterate the importance of the UN Millennium Declaration and the need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We underscore the importance of preventing a potential setback to the efforts of poor countries aimed at achieving MDGs due to the effects of the economic and financial crisis. We should also make sustained efforts to achieve the MDGs by 2015, including through technical cooperation and financial support to poor countries in implementation of development policies and social protection for their populations. We expect the UN MDG Summit, in September 2010, to promote the implementation of MDGs through policy recommendations. We stress that sustainable development models and paths of developing countries should be fully respected and necessary policy space of developing countries should be guaranteed.

16. The poorest countries have been the hardest hit by the economic and financial crisis. The commitments regarding the aid to the developing states, especially those related to the MDGs, should be fulfilled, and there should be no reduction in development assistance. An inclusive process of growth for the world economy is not only a matter of solidarity but also an issue of strategic importance for global political and economic stability.

Agriculture

17. We express our satisfaction with the Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development in Moscow, where they discussed ways of promoting quadripartite cooperation, with particular attention to family farming. We are convinced that this will contribute towards global food production and food security. We welcome their decision to create an agricultural information base system of the BRIC countries, to develop a strategy for ensuring access to food for vulnerable population, to reduce the negative impact of climate change on food security, and to enhance agriculture technology cooperation and innovation.

Fight against poverty

18. We call upon the international community to make all the necessary efforts to fight poverty, social exclusion and inequality bearing in mind the special needs of developing countries, especially LDCs, small islands and African Countries. We support technical and financial cooperation as means to contribute to the

achievement of sustainable social development, with social protection, full employment, and decent work policies and programmes, giving special attention to the most vulnerable groups, such as the poor, women, youth, migrants and persons with disabilities.

Energy

19. We recognize that energy is an essential resource for improving the standard of living of our peoples and that access to energy is of paramount importance to economic growth with equity and social inclusion. We will aim to develop cleaner, more affordable and sustainable energy systems, to promote access to energy and energy efficient technologies and practices in all sectors. We will aim to diversify our energy mix by increasing, where appropriate, the contribution of renewable energy sources, and will encourage the cleaner, more efficient use of fossil fuels and other fuels. In this regard, we reiterate our support to the international cooperation in the field of energy efficiency.

20. We recognize the potential of new, emerging, and environmentally friendly technologies for diversifying energy mix and the creation of jobs. In this regard we will encourage, as appropriate, the sustainable development, production and use of biofuels. In accordance with national priorities, we will work together to facilitate the use of renewable energy, through international cooperation and the sharing of experiences on renewable energy, including biofuels technologies and policies.

21. We believe that BRIC member countries can cooperate in training, R&D, Consultancy services and technology transfer, in the energy sector.

Climate Change

22. We acknowledge that climate change is a serious threat which requires strengthened global action. We commit ourselves to promote the 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 6th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, in Mexico, to achieve a comprehensive, balanced and binding result to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and the Protocol. We believe that the Convention and the Protocol provide the framework for international negotiations on climate change. The negotiations in Mexico should be more inclusive, transparent, and should result in outcomes that are fair and effective in addressing the challenge of climate change, while reflecting the principles of the Convention, especially the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.

Terrorism

23. We condemn terrorist acts in all forms and manifestations. We note that the fight against international terrorism must be undertaken with due respect to the UN Charter, existing international conventions and protocols, the UN General

Assembly and Security Council resolutions relating to international terrorism, and that the prevention of terrorist acts is as important as the repression of terrorism and its financing. In this context, we urge early conclusion of negotiations in the UN General Assembly of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States.

24. Brazil and China express their sympathy and solidarity with the people and Governments of Russia and India which suffered from recent barbaric terrorist attacks. Terrorism cannot be justified by any reason.

Alliance of Civilizations

25. We affirm the importance of encouraging the dialogue among civilizations, cultures, religions and peoples. In this respect, we support the "Alliance of Civilizations", a United Nations' initiative aimed at building bridges, mutual knowledge and understanding around the world. We praise the Brazilian decision to host, in Rio de Janeiro, in May 2010, the 3rd Global Forum and confirm our intention to be present at the event, in appropriate high level.

Haiti

26. We reaffirm our solidarity towards the Haitian people, who have been struggling under dire circumstances since the earthquake of January 12th, and reiterate our commitment to gather efforts with the international community in order to help rebuilding the country, under the guidance of the Haitian government, and according to the priorities established by the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti.

Cooperation

27. We welcome the following sectoral initiatives aimed at strengthening cooperation among our countries:

- a) the first Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development;
- b) the Meetings of Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks;
- c) the Meetings of High Representatives for Security Issues;
- d) the I Exchange Program for Magistrates and Judges, of BRIC countries, held in March 2010 in Brazil following the signature in 2009 of the Protocol of Intent among the BRIC countries' Supreme Courts;
- e) the first Meeting of Development Banks;
- f) the first Meeting of the Heads of the National Statistical Institutions;
- g) the Conference of Competition Authorities;
- h) the first Meeting of Cooperatives;
- i) the first Business Forum;
- j) the Conference of think tanks.

28. We also endorse other important manifestations of our desire to deepen our relationship, such as:

- a) the joint publication by our respective national statistical institutions which is going to be released today;
- b) a feasibility study for developing a joint BRIC encyclopedia.

29. We reaffirm our commitment to advance cooperation among BRIC countries in science, culture and sports.

30. We express our confidence in the success of the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai, the 2010 Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, the 2013 World Student Games in Kazan, the 2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Sochi, the FIFA 2014 World Cup in Brazil and the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.

31. We reaffirm the efforts to strengthen our cooperation and assistance for reduction of natural disasters. Russia and India express their condolences and solidarity with the people and Governments of Brazil and China, for the lives lost in the mudslide in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and in the earthquake in Yushu, China.

III BRIC Summit

32. Brazil, Russia and India appreciate the offer of China to host the III BRIC Summit in 2011.

33. Russia, India and China express their profound gratitude to the Government and people of Brazil for hosting the II BRIC Summit.

Recuperado de: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/100415-leaders.html>

Sanya Declaration

Sanya, Hainan, China, April 14, 2011

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in Sanya, Hainan, China for the BRICS Leaders Meeting on 14 April 2011.

2. The Heads of State and Government of Brazil, Russia, India and China welcome South Africa joining the BRICS and look forward to strengthening dialogue and cooperation with South Africa within the forum.

3. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries with a total population of nearly 3 billion from different continents. BRICS aims at contributing significantly to the development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fair world.

4. The 21st century should be marked by peace, harmony, cooperation and scientific development. Under the theme "Broad Vision, Shared Prosperity", we conducted candid and in-depth discussions and reached broad consensus on strengthening BRICS cooperation as well as on promoting coordination on international and regional issues of common interest.

5. We affirm that the BRICS and other emerging countries have played an important role in contributing to world peace, security and stability, boosting global economic growth, enhancing multilateralism and promoting greater democracy in international relations.

6. In the economic, financial and development fields, BRICS serves as a major platform for dialogue and cooperation. We are determined to continue strengthening the BRICS partnership for common development and advance BRICS cooperation in a gradual and pragmatic manner, reflecting the principles of openness, solidarity and mutual assistance. We reiterate that such cooperation is inclusive and non-confrontational. We are open to increasing engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular emerging and developing countries, and relevant international and regional organizations.

7. We share the view that the world is undergoing far-reaching, complex and profound changes, marked by the strengthening of multipolarity, economic globalization and increasing interdependence. While facing the evolving global environment and a multitude of global threats and challenges, the international community should join hands to strengthen cooperation for common development. Based on universally recognized norms of international law and in a spirit of mutual respect and collective decision making, global economic governance should be strengthened, democracy in international relations should be promoted, and the voice of emerging and developing countries in international affairs should be enhanced.

8. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this respect, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative, so that it can deal with today's global challenges more successfully. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of India, Brazil and South Africa in international affairs, and understand and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

9. We underscore that the concurrent presence of all five BRICS countries in the Security Council during the year of 2011 is a valuable opportunity to work closely together on issues of peace and security, to strengthen multilateral approaches and to facilitate future coordination on issues under UN Security Council consideration. We are deeply concerned with the turbulence in the Middle East, the North African and West African regions and sincerely wish that the countries affected achieve peace, stability, prosperity and progress and enjoy their due standing and dignity in

the world according to legitimate aspirations of their peoples. We share the principle that the use of force should be avoided. We maintain that the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected.

10. We wish to continue our cooperation in the UN Security Council on Libya. We are of the view that all the parties should resolve their differences through peaceful means and dialogue in which the UN and regional organizations should as appropriate play their role. We also express support for the African Union High-Level Panel Initiative on Libya.

11. We reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism. We believe that the United Nations has a central role in coordinating the international action against terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of the international law. In this context, we urge early conclusion of negotiations in the UN General Assembly of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States. We are determined to strengthen our cooperation in countering this global threat. We express our commitment to cooperate for strengthening international information security. We will pay special attention to combat cybercrime.

12. We note that the world economy is gradually recovering from the financial crisis, but still faces uncertainties. Major economies should continue to enhance coordination of macro-economic policies and work together to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

13. We are committed to assure that the BRICS countries will continue to enjoy strong and sustained economic growth supported by our increased cooperation in economic, finance and trade matters, which will contribute to the long-term steady, sound and balanced growth of the world economy.

14. We support the Group of Twenty (G20) in playing a bigger role in global economic governance as the premier forum for international economic cooperation. We expect new positive outcomes in the fields of economy, finance, trade and development from the G20 Cannes Summit in 2011. We support the ongoing efforts of G20 members to stabilize international financial markets, achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth and support the growth and development of the global economy. Russia offers to host the G20 Summit in 2013. Brazil, India, China and South Africa welcome and appreciate Russia's offer.

15. We call for a quick achievement of the targets for the reform of the International Monetary Fund agreed to at previous G20 Summits and reiterate that the governing structure of the international financial institutions should reflect the changes in the world economy, increasing the voice and representation of emerging economies and developing countries.

16. Recognizing that the international financial crisis has exposed the inadequacies and deficiencies of the existing international monetary and financial system, we support the reform and improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We welcome the current discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing international monetary system including the composition of SDR's basket of currencies. We call for more attention to the risks of massive cross-border capital flows now faced by the emerging economies. We call for further international financial regulatory oversight and reform, strengthening policy coordination and financial regulation and supervision cooperation, and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and banking systems.

17. Excessive volatility in commodity prices, particularly those for food and energy, poses new risks for the ongoing recovery of the world economy. We support the international community in strengthening cooperation to ensure stability and strong development of physical market by reducing distortion and further regulate financial market. The international community should work together to increase production capacity, strengthen producer-consumer dialogue to balance supply and demand, and increase support to the developing countries in terms of funding and technologies. The regulation of the derivatives market for commodities should be accordingly strengthened to prevent activities capable of destabilizing markets. We also should address the problem of shortage of reliable and timely information on demand and supply at international, regional and national levels. The BRICS will carry out closer cooperation on food security.

18. We support the development and use of renewable energy resources. We recognize the important role of renewable energy as a means to address climate change. We are convinced of the importance of cooperation and information exchange in the field of development of renewable energy resources.

19. Nuclear energy will continue to be an important element in future energy mix of BRICS countries. International cooperation in the development of safe nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of relevant safety standards and requirements concerning design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

20. Accelerating sustainable growth of developing countries is one of the major challenges for the world. We believe that growth and development are central to addressing poverty and to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is a moral, social, political and economic imperative of humankind and one of the greatest global challenges facing the world today, particularly in Least Developed Countries in Africa and elsewhere.

21. We call on the international community to actively implement the outcome document adopted by the High-level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on the MDGs held in September 2010 and achieve the objectives of the MDGs by 2015 as scheduled.

22. Climate change is one of the global threats challenging the livelihood of communities and countries. China, Brazil, Russia and India appreciate and support South Africa's hosting of UNFCCC COP17/CMP7. We support the Cancun Agreements and are ready to make concerted efforts with the rest of the international community to bring a successful conclusion to the negotiations at the Durban Conference applying the mandate of the Bali Roadmap and in line with the principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. We commit ourselves to work towards a comprehensive, balanced and binding outcome to strengthen the implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. The BRICS will intensify cooperation on the Durban conference. We will enhance our practical cooperation in adapting our economy and society to climate change.

23. Sustainable development, as illustrated by the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and multilateral environmental treaties, should be an important vehicle to advance economic growth. China, Russia, India and South Africa appreciate Brazil as the host of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development and look forward to working with Brazil to reach new political commitment and achieve positive and practical results in areas of economic growth, social development and environmental protection under the framework of sustainable development. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa appreciate and support India's hosting of the eleventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Brazil, China and South Africa also appreciate and support India's hosting of the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to be held in October 2012.

24. We underscore our firm commitment to strengthen dialogue and cooperation in the fields of social protection, decent work, gender equality, youth, and public health, including the fight against HIV/AIDS.

25. We support infrastructure development in Africa and its industrialization within framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

26. We have agreed to continue further expanding and deepening economic, trade and investment cooperation among our countries. We encourage all countries to refrain from resorting to protectionist measures. We welcome the outcomes of the meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers held in Sanya on 13 April 2011. Brazil, China, India and South Africa remain committed and call upon other members to support a strong, open, rule-based multilateral trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization and a successful, comprehensive and balanced conclusion of the Doha Development Round, built on the progress already made and consistent with its development mandate. Brazil, India, China and South Africa extend full support to an early accession of Russia to the World Trade Organization.

27. We reviewed the progress of the BRICS cooperation in various fields and share the view that such cooperation has been enriching and mutually beneficial and that

there is a great scope for closer cooperation among the BRICS. We are focused on the consolidation of BRICS cooperation and the further development of its own agenda. We are determined to translate our political vision into concrete actions and endorse the attached Action Plan, which will serve as the foundation for future cooperation. We will review the implementation of the Action Plan during our next Leaders Meeting.

28. We intend to explore cooperation in the sphere of science, technology and innovation, including the peaceful use of space. We congratulate the Russian people and government upon the 50th anniversary of the flight of Yury Gagarin into the space, which ushered in a new era in development of science and technology.

29. We express our confidence in the success of the 2011 Universiade in Shenzhen, the 2013 Universiade in Kazan, the 2014 Youth Olympic Games in Nanjing, the 2014 Winter Olympic and Paralympics Games in Sochi, the FIFA 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the 2016 Olympic and Paralympics Games in Rio de Janeiro and the FIFA 2018 World Cup in Russia.

30. We extend our deepest condolences to the people of Japan with the great loss of life following the disasters that struck the country. We will continue our practical support to Japan in overcoming consequences of these catastrophes.

31. The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa extend our warm appreciation to China for hosting the BRICS Leaders Meeting and the Hainan Provincial Government and Sanya Municipal Government and their people for their support to the Meeting.

32. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa thank India for hosting the BRICS Leaders Meeting in 2012 and offer their full support.

Action Plan

We formulated the Action Plan, laying the foundation for the BRICS cooperation, with the purpose to strengthen BRICS cooperation and benefit our peoples.

I. Enhance existing cooperation programs

1. Hold the third Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in the latter half of 2011 in China.
2. Hold the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs during the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.
3. Hold sherpas/sous-sherpas meeting in due time.
4. Representatives to international organizations based in New York and Geneva

meet periodically in an informal manner.

5. Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks meet under the G20 framework and during the annual meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

6. Hold the Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group and the second Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture in 2011 in China, and cooperate in issues including establishment of BRICS System of Agricultural Information and holding a seminar on food security.

7. Hold the Meeting of the heads of the National Statistical Institutions in September 2011 in China.

8. Hold the second BRICS International Competition Conference in September 2011 in China, and explore the possibility of signing an Agreement on Cooperation between Antimonopoly Agencies.

9. Continue to hold the BRICS Think-tank Symposiums, and consider establishing a network of research centers of all BRICS countries.

10. Hold another Business Forum prior to the next BRICS Leaders Meeting.

11. Strengthen financial cooperation among the BRICS Development Banks.

12. Implement the Protocol of Intent among the BRIC Countries' Supreme Courts.

13. Release the Joint Statistical Publication by BRICS Countries.

14. Continue to hold the Meeting of Cooperatives.

II. New areas of cooperation

1. Host the first BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum in 2011 in China.

2. Host the Meeting of Ministers of Health in 2011 in China.

3. Engage in joint research on economic and trade issues.

4. Update, as appropriate, the Bibliography on the BRICS countries.

III. New proposals to explore

1. Cooperate in the cultural field according to the agreement of the BRICS leaders.

2. Encourage cooperation in sports.

3. Explore the feasibility to cooperate in the field of green economy.
4. Hold a meeting of Senior Officials for discussing ways of promoting scientific, technological and innovation cooperation in BRICS format, including by establishment a working group on cooperation in pharmaceutical industry.
5. Establish, at UNESCO, a "BRICS-UNESCO GROUP", aiming at developing common strategies within the mandate of the Organization.

Recuperado de: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/110414-leaders.html>

Fourth BRICS Summit: Delhi Declaration

New Delhi, March 29, 2012

1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in New Delhi, India, on 29 March 2012 at the Fourth BRICS Summit. Our discussions, under the overarching theme, "*BRICS Partnership for Global Stability, Security and Prosperity*", were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and warmth and inspired by a shared desire to further strengthen our partnership for common development and take our cooperation forward on the basis of openness, solidarity, mutual understanding and trust.
2. We met against the backdrop of developments and changes of contemporary global and regional importance - a faltering global recovery made more complex by the situation in the euro zone; concerns of sustainable development and climate change which take on greater relevance as we approach the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) and the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity being hosted in Brazil and India respectively later this year; the upcoming G20 Summit in Mexico and the recent 8th WTO Ministerial Conference in Geneva; and the developing political scenario in the Middle East and North Africa that we view with increasing concern. Our deliberations today reflected our consensus to remain engaged with the world community as we address these challenges to global well-being and stability in a responsible and constructive manner.
3. BRICS is a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43% of the world's population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world. Coming, as we do, from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, the transcontinental dimension of our interaction adds to its value and significance.
4. We envision a future marked by global peace, economic and social progress and enlightened scientific temper. We stand ready to work with others, developed and

developing countries together, on the basis of universally recognized norms of international law and multilateral decision making, to deal with the challenges and the opportunities before the world today. Strengthened representation of emerging and developing countries in the institutions of global governance will enhance their effectiveness in achieving this objective.

5. We are concerned over the current global economic situation. While the BRICS recovered relatively quickly from the global crisis, growth prospects worldwide have again got dampened by market instability especially in the euro zone. The build-up of sovereign debt and concerns over medium to long-term fiscal adjustment in advanced countries are creating an uncertain environment for global growth. Further, excessive liquidity from the aggressive policy actions taken by central banks to stabilize their domestic economies have been spilling over into emerging market economies, fostering excessive volatility in capital flows and commodity prices. The immediate priority at hand is to restore market confidence and get global growth back on track. We will work with the international community to ensure international policy coordination to maintain macroeconomic stability conducive to the healthy recovery of the global economy.

6. We believe that it is critical for advanced economies to adopt responsible macroeconomic and financial policies, avoid creating excessive global liquidity and undertake structural reforms to lift growth that create jobs. We draw attention to the risks of large and volatile cross-border capital flows being faced by the emerging economies. We call for further international financial regulatory oversight and reform, strengthening policy coordination and financial regulation and supervision cooperation, and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and banking systems.

7. In this context, we believe that the primary role of the G20 as premier forum for international economic cooperation at this juncture is to facilitate enhanced macroeconomic policy coordination, to enable global economic recovery and secure financial stability, including through an improved international monetary and financial architecture. We approach the next G20 Summit in Mexico with a commitment to work with the Presidency, all members and the international community to achieve positive results, consistent with national policy frameworks, to ensure strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

8. We recognize the importance of the global financial architecture in maintaining the stability and integrity of the global monetary and financial system. We therefore call for a more representative international financial architecture, with an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries and the establishment and improvement of a just international monetary system that can serve the interests of all countries and support the development of emerging and developing economies. Moreover, these economies having experienced broad-based growth are now significant contributors to global recovery.

9. We are however concerned at the slow pace of quota and governance reforms in

the IMF. We see an urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010 Governance and Quota Reform before the 2012 IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, as well as the comprehensive review of the quota formula to better reflect economic weights and enhance the voice and representation of emerging market and developing countries by January 2013, followed by the completion of the next general quota review by January 2014. This dynamic process of reform is necessary to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund. We stress that the ongoing effort to increase the lending capacity of the IMF will only be successful if there is confidence that the entire membership of the institution is truly committed to implement the 2010 Reform faithfully. We will work with the international community to ensure that sufficient resources can be mobilized to the IMF in a timely manner as the Fund continues its transition to improve governance and legitimacy. We reiterate our support for measures to protect the voice and representation of the IMF's poorest members.

10. We call upon the IMF to make its surveillance framework more integrated and even-handed, noting that IMF proposals for a new integrated decision on surveillance would be considered before the IMF Spring Meeting.

11. In the current global economic environment, we recognise that there is a pressing need for enhancing the flow of development finance to emerging and developing countries. We therefore call upon the World Bank to give greater priority to mobilising resources and meeting the needs of development finance while reducing lending costs and adopting innovative lending tools.

12. We welcome the candidatures from developing world for the position of the President of the World Bank. We reiterate that the Heads of IMF and World Bank be selected through an open and merit-based process. Furthermore, the new World Bank leadership must commit to transform the Bank into a multilateral institution that truly reflects the vision of all its members, including the governance structure that reflects current economic and political reality. Moreover, the nature of the Bank must shift from an institution that essentially mediates North-South cooperation to an institution that promotes equal partnership with all countries as a way to deal with development issues and to overcome an outdated donor-recipient dichotomy.

13. We have considered the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank for mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development. We direct our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of such an initiative, set up a joint working group for further study, and report back to us by the next Summit.

14. Brazil, India, China and South Africa look forward to the Russian Presidency of G20 in 2013 and extend their cooperation.

15. Brazil, India, China and South Africa congratulate the Russian Federation on its accession to the WTO. This makes the WTO more representative and strengthens the rule-based multilateral trading system. We commit to working together to safeguard this system and urge other countries to resist all forms of trade protectionism and disguised restrictions on trade.

16. We will continue our efforts for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, based on the progress made and in keeping with its mandate. Towards this end, we will explore outcomes in specific areas where progress is possible while preserving the centrality of development and within the overall framework of the single undertaking. We do not support plurilateral initiatives that go against the fundamental principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. We believe that such initiatives not only distract members from striving for a collective outcome but also fail to address the development deficit inherited from previous negotiating rounds. Once the ratification process is completed, Russia intends to participate in an active and constructive manner for a balanced outcome of the Doha Round that will help strengthen and develop the multilateral trade system.

17. Considering UNCTAD to be the focal point in the UN system for the treatment of trade and development issues, we intend to invest in improving its traditional activities of consensus-building, technical cooperation and research on issues of economic development and trade. We reiterate our willingness to actively contribute to the achievement of a successful UNCTAD XIII, in April 2012.

18. We agree to build upon our synergies and to work together to intensify trade and investment flows among our countries to advance our respective industrial development and employment objectives. We welcome the outcomes of the second Meeting of BRICS Trade Ministers held in New Delhi on 28 March 2012. We support the regular consultations amongst our Trade Ministers and consider taking suitable measures to facilitate further consolidation of our trade and economic ties. We welcome the conclusion of the Master Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in Local Currency under BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism and the Multilateral Letter of Credit Confirmation Facility Agreement between our EXIM/Development Banks. We believe that these Agreements will serve as useful enabling instruments for enhancing intra-BRICS trade in coming years.

19. We recognize the vital importance that stability, peace and security of the Middle East and North Africa holds for all of us, for the international community, and above all for the countries and their citizens themselves whose lives have been affected by the turbulence that has erupted in the region. We wish to see these countries living in peace and regain stability and prosperity as respected members of the global community.

20. We agree that the period of transformation taking place in the Middle East and North Africa should not be used as a pretext to delay resolution of lasting conflicts but rather it should serve as an incentive to settle them, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict. Resolution of this and other long-standing regional issues would

generally improve the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus we confirm our commitment to achieving comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict on the basis of the universally recognized international legal framework including the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid principles and the Arab Peace Initiative. We encourage the Quartet to intensify its efforts and call for greater involvement of the UN Security Council in search for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We also underscore the importance of direct negotiations between the parties to reach final settlement. We call upon Palestinians and Israelis to take constructive measures, rebuild mutual trust and create the right conditions for restarting negotiations, while avoiding unilateral steps, in particular settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

21. We express our deep concern at the current situation in Syria and call for an immediate end to all violence and violations of human rights in that country. Global interests would best be served by dealing with the crisis through peaceful means that encourage broad national dialogues that reflect the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. Our objective is to facilitate a Syrian-led inclusive political process, and we welcome the joint efforts of the United Nations and the Arab League to this end. We encourage the Syrian government and all sections of Syrian society to demonstrate the political will to initiate such a process, which alone can create a new environment for peace. We welcome the appointment of Mr. Kofi Annan as the Joint Special Envoy on the Syrian crisis and the progress made so far, and support him in continuing to play a constructive role in bringing about the political resolution of the crisis.

22. The situation concerning Iran cannot be allowed to escalate into conflict, the disastrous consequences of which will be in no one's interest. Iran has a crucial role to play for the peaceful development and prosperity of a region of high political and economic relevance, and we look to it to play its part as a responsible member of the global community. We are concerned about the situation that is emerging around Iran's nuclear issue. We recognize Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue between the parties concerned, including between the IAEA and Iran and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

23. Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to attain lasting peace and stability. We support the global community's commitment to Afghanistan, enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in December 2011, to remain engaged over the transformation decade from 2015-2024. We affirm our commitment to support Afghanistan's emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscore the need for more effective regional and international cooperation for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, including by combating terrorism.

24. We extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact.

25. We reiterate that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any act of terrorism in any form or manifestation. We reaffirm our determination to strengthen cooperation in countering this menace and believe that the United Nations has a central role in coordinating international action against terrorism, within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of international law. We emphasize the need for an early finalization of the draft of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in the UN General Assembly and its adoption by all Member States to provide a comprehensive legal framework to address this global scourge.

26. We express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the United Nations playing a central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. In this regard, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more effective, efficient and representative so that it can deal with today's global challenges more successfully. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

27. We recall our close coordination in the Security Council during the year 2011, and underscore our commitment to work together in the UN to continue our cooperation and strengthen multilateral approaches on issues pertaining to global peace and security in the years to come.

28. Accelerating growth and sustainable development, along with food, and energy security, are amongst the most important challenges facing the world today, and central to addressing economic development, eradicating poverty, combating hunger and malnutrition in many developing countries. Creating jobs needed to improve people's living standards worldwide is critical. Sustainable development is also a key element of our agenda for global recovery and investment for future growth. We owe this responsibility to our future generations.

29. We congratulate South Africa on the successful hosting of the 17th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 7th Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP17/CMP7) in December 2011. We welcome the significant outcomes of the Conference and are ready to work with the international community to implement its decisions in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

30. We are fully committed to playing our part in the global fight against climate change and will contribute to the global effort in dealing with climate change issues through sustainable and inclusive growth and not by capping development. We emphasize that developed country Parties to the UNFCCC shall provide enhanced

financial, technology and capacity building support for the preparation and implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing countries.

31. We believe that the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) is a unique opportunity for the international community to renew its high-level political commitment to supporting the overarching sustainable development framework encompassing inclusive economic growth and development, social progress and environment protection in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.

32. We consider that sustainable development should be the main paradigm in environmental issues, as well as for economic and social strategies. We acknowledge the relevance and focus of the main themes for the Conference namely, Green Economy in the context of Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication (GESDPE) as well as Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD).

33. China, Russia, India and South Africa look forward to working with Brazil as the host of this important Conference in June, for a successful and practical outcome. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa also pledge their support to working with India as it hosts the 11th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in October 2012 and look forward to a positive outcome. We will continue our efforts for the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols, with special attention to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, Biodiversity Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and the Resource Mobilization Strategy.

34. We affirm that the concept of a 'green economy', still to be defined at Rio+20, must be understood in the larger framework of sustainable development and poverty eradication and is a means to achieve these fundamental and overriding priorities, not an end in itself. National authorities must be given the flexibility and policy space to make their own choices out of a broad menu of options and define their paths towards sustainable development based on the country's stage of development, national strategies, circumstances and priorities. We resist the introduction of trade and investment barriers in any form on the grounds of developing green economy.

35. The Millennium Development Goals remain a fundamental milestone in the development agenda. To enable developing countries to obtain maximal results in attaining their Millennium Development Goals by the agreed time-line of 2015, we must ensure that growth in these countries is not affected. Any slowdown would have serious consequences for the world economy. Attainment of the MDGs is fundamental to ensuring inclusive, equitable and sustainable global growth and

would require continued focus on these goals even beyond 2015, entailing enhanced financing support.

36. We attach the highest importance to economic growth that supports development and stability in Africa, as many of these countries have not yet realised their full economic potential. We will take our cooperation forward to support their efforts to accelerate the diversification and modernisation of their economies. This will be through infrastructure development, knowledge exchange and support for increased access to technology, enhanced capacity building, and investment in human capital, including within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

37. We express our commitment to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis that still affects millions of people in the Horn of Africa and support international efforts to this end.

38. Excessive volatility in commodity prices, particularly those for food and energy, poses additional risks for the recovery of the world economy. Improved regulation of the derivatives market for commodities is essential to avoid destabilizing impacts on food and energy supplies. We believe that increased energy production capacities and strengthened producer-consumer dialogue are important initiatives that would help in arresting such price volatility.

39. Energy based on fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy mix for the foreseeable future. We will expand sourcing of clean and renewable energy, and use of energy efficient and alternative technologies, to meet the increasing demand of our economies and our people, and respond to climate concerns as well. In this context, we emphasise that international cooperation in the development of safe nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of relevant safety standards and requirements concerning design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. We stress IAEA's essential role in the joint efforts of the international community towards enhancing nuclear safety standards with a view to increasing public confidence in nuclear energy as a clean, affordable, safe and secure source of energy, vital to meeting global energy demands.

40. We have taken note of the substantive efforts made in taking intra-BRICS cooperation forward in a number of sectors so far. We are convinced that there is a storehouse of knowledge, know-how, capacities and best practices available in our countries that we can share and on which we can build meaningful cooperation for the benefit of our peoples. We have endorsed an Action Plan for the coming year with this objective.

41. We appreciate the outcomes of the Second Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development at Chengdu, China in October 2011. We direct our Ministers to take this process forward with particular focus on the potential of cooperation amongst the BRICS to contribute effectively to global food

security and nutrition through improved agriculture production and productivity, transparency in markets and reducing excessive volatility in commodity prices, thereby making a difference in the quality of lives of the people particularly in the developing world.

42. Most of BRICS countries face a number of similar public health challenges, including universal access to health services, access to health technologies, including medicines, increasing costs and the growing burden of both communicable and non-communicable diseases. We direct that the BRICS Health Ministers meetings, of which the first was held in Beijing in July 2011, should henceforth be institutionalized in order to address these common challenges in the most cost-effective, equitable and sustainable manner.

43. We have taken note of the meeting of S&T Senior Officials in Dalian, China in September 2011, and, in particular, the growing capacities for research and development and innovation in our countries. We encourage this process both in priority areas of food, pharma, health and energy as well as basic research in the emerging inter-disciplinary fields of nanotechnology, biotechnology, advanced materials science, etc. We encourage flow of knowledge amongst our research institutions through joint projects, workshops and exchanges of young scientists.

44. The challenges of rapid urbanization, faced by all developing societies including our own, are multi-dimensional in nature covering a diversity of inter-linked issues. We direct our respective authorities to coordinate efforts and learn from best practices and technologies available that can make a meaningful difference to our societies. We note with appreciation the first meeting of BRICS Friendship Cities held in Sanya in December 2011 and will take this process forward with an Urbanization and Urban Infrastructure Forum along with the Second BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum.

45. Given our growing needs for renewable energy resources as well as on energy efficient and environmentally friendly technologies, and our complementary strengths in these areas, we agree to exchange knowledge, know-how, technology and best practices in these areas.

46. It gives us pleasure to release the first ever BRICS Report, coordinated by India, with its special focus on the synergies and complementarities in our economies. We welcome the outcomes of the cooperation among the National Statistical Institutions of BRICS and take note that the updated edition of the BRICS Statistical Publication, released today, serves as a useful reference on BRICS countries.

47. We express our satisfaction at the convening of the III BRICS Business Forum and the II Financial Forum and acknowledge their role in stimulating trade relations among our countries. In this context, we welcome the setting up of BRICS Exchange Alliance, a joint initiative by related BRICS securities exchanges.

48. We encourage expanding the channels of communication, exchanges and people- to-people contact amongst the BRICS, including in the areas of youth, education, culture, tourism and sports.

49. Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa extend their warm appreciation and sincere gratitude to the Government and the people of India for hosting the Fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi.

50. Brazil, Russia, India and China thank South Africa for its offer to host the Fifth BRICS Summit in 2013 and pledge their full support.

Delhi Action Plan

1. Meeting of BRICS Foreign Ministers on sidelines of UNGA.
2. Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on sidelines of G20 meetings/other multilateral (WB/IMF) meetings.
3. Meeting of financial and fiscal authorities on the sidelines of WB/IMF meetings as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
4. Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers on the margins of multilateral events, or stand-alone meetings, as required.
5. The Third Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture, preceded by a preparatory meeting of experts on agro-products and food security issues and the second Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group.
6. Meeting of BRICS High Representatives responsible for national security.
7. The Second BRICS Senior Officials' Meeting on S&T.
8. The First meeting of the BRICS Urbanisation Forum and the second BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum in 2012 in India.
9. The Second Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers.
10. Mid-term meeting of Sous-Sherpas and Sherpas.
11. Mid-term meeting of CGETI (Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues).
12. The Third Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2013.
13. Meeting of experts on a new Development Bank.
14. Meeting of financial authorities to follow up on the findings of the BRICS Report.

15. Consultations amongst BRICS Permanent Missions in New York, Vienna and Geneva, as required.

16. Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on the margins of relevant environment and climate related international fora, as necessary.

17. New Areas of Cooperation to explore: (i) Multilateral energy cooperation within BRICS framework. (ii) A general academic evaluation and future long-term strategy for BRICS. (iii) BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue. (iv) Cooperation in Population related issues.

Recuperado de: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/120329-delhi-declaration.html>

BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation

eThekwini Declaration Durban, South Africa, March 27, 2013

1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in Durban, South Africa, on 27 March 2013 at the Fifth BRICS Summit. Our discussions took place under the overarching theme, "BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation". The Fifth BRICS Summit concluded the first cycle of BRICS Summits and we reaffirmed our commitment to the promotion of international law, multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations (UN). Our discussions reflected our growing intra-BRICS solidarity as well as our shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation. We also considered our role in the international system as based on an inclusive approach of shared solidarity and cooperation towards all nations and peoples.

2. We met at a time which requires that we consider issues of mutual interest and systemic importance in order to share concerns and to develop lasting solutions. We aim at progressively developing BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics. The prevailing global governance architecture is regulated by institutions which were conceived in circumstances when the international landscape in all its aspects was characterised by very different challenges and opportunities. As the global economy is being reshaped, we are committed to exploring new models and approaches towards more equitable development and inclusive global growth by emphasising complementarities and building on our respective economic strengths.

3. We are open to increasing our engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs), and relevant international and regional organisations, as envisioned in the Sanya

Declaration. We will hold a Retreat together with African leaders after this Summit, under the theme, "Unlocking Africa's potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure". The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent.

4. Recognising the importance of regional integration for Africa's sustainable growth, development and poverty eradication, we reaffirm our support for the Continent's integration processes.

5. Within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), we support African countries in their industrialisation process through stimulating foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacity-building and diversification of imports from Africa. We acknowledge that infrastructure development in Africa is important and recognise the strides made by the African Union to identify and address the continent's infrastructure challenges through the development of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU NEPAD Africa Action Plan (2010-2015), the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), as well as the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plans that have identified priority infrastructure development projects that are critical to promoting regional integration and industrialisation. We will seek to stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa.

6. We note policy actions in Europe, the US and Japan aimed at reducing tail-risks in the world economy. Some of these actions produce negative spillover effects on other economies of the world. Significant risks remain and the performance of the global economy still falls behind our expectations. As a result, uncertainty about strength and durability of the recovery and the direction of policy in some major economies remains high. In some key countries unemployment stays unusually elevated, while high levels of private and public indebtedness inhibit growth. In such circumstances, we reaffirm our strong commitment to support growth and foster financial stability. We also underscore the need for appropriate action to be taken by advanced economies in order to rebuild confidence, foster growth and secure a strong recovery.

7. Central Banks in advanced economies have responded with unconventional monetary policy actions which have increased global liquidity. While this may be consistent with domestic monetary policy mandates, major Central Banks should avoid the unintended consequences of these actions in the form of increased volatility of capital flows, currencies and commodity prices, which may have negative growth effects on other economies, in particular developing countries.

8. We welcome the core objectives of the Russian Presidency in the G20 in 2013, in

particular the efforts to increased financing for investment and ensure public debt sustainability aimed at ensuring strong, sustainable, inclusive and balanced growth and job creation around the world. We will also continue to prioritise the G20 development agenda as a vital element of global economic stability and long-term sustainable growth and job creation.

9. Developing countries face challenges of infrastructure development due to insufficient long-term financing and foreign direct investment, especially investment in capital stock. This constrains global aggregate demand. BRICS cooperation towards more productive use of global financial resources can make a positive contribution to addressing this problem. In March 2012 we directed our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a New Development Bank for mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development. Following the report from our Finance Ministers, we are satisfied that the establishment of a New Development Bank is feasible and viable. We have agreed to establish the New Development Bank. The initial contribution to the Bank should be substantial and sufficient for the Bank to be effective in financing infrastructure.

10. In June 2012, in our meeting in Los Cabos, we tasked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to explore the construction of a financial safety net through the creation of a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) amongst BRICS countries. They have concluded that the establishment of a self-managed contingent reserve arrangement would have a positive precautionary effect, help BRICS countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures, provide mutual support and further strengthen financial stability. It would also contribute to strengthening the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements as an additional line of defence. We are of the view that the establishment of the CRA with an initial size of US\$ 100 billion is feasible and desirable subject to internal legal frameworks and appropriate safeguards. We direct our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to continue working towards its establishment.

11. We are grateful to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors for the work undertaken on the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and direct them to negotiate and conclude the agreements which will establish them. We will review progress made in these two initiatives at our next meeting in September 2013.

12. We welcome the conclusion between our Export-Import Banks (EXIM) and Development Banks, of both the "Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing for Sustainable Development" and, given the steep growth trajectory of the African continent and the significant infrastructure funding requirements directly emanating from this growth path, the "Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure Co- Financing for Africa".

13. We call for the reform of International Financial Institutions to make them more representative and to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries. We remain concerned with the slow pace of the reform of the IMF. We see an urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Governance and Quota Reform. We urge all members to take all necessary steps to achieve an agreement on the quota formula and complete the next general quota review by January 2014. The reform of the IMF should strengthen the voice and representation of the poorest members of the IMF, including Sub-Saharan Africa. All options should be explored, with an open mind, to achieve this. We support the reform and improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We welcome the discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing international monetary system including the composition of SDR's basket of currencies. We support the IMF to make its surveillance framework more integrated and even-handed. The leadership selection of IFIs should be through an open, transparent and merit-based process and truly open to candidates from the emerging market economies and developing countries.

14. We emphasise the importance of ensuring steady, adequate and predictable access to long term finance for developing countries from a variety of sources. We would like to see concerted global effort towards infrastructure financing and investment through the instrumentality of adequately resourced Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Regional Development Banks (RDBs). We urge all parties to work towards an ambitious International Development Association (IDA) replenishment.

15. We reaffirm our support for an open, transparent and rules-based multilateral trading system. We will continue in our efforts for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, based on the progress made and in keeping with its mandate, while upholding the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. We are committed to ensure that new proposals and approaches to the Doha Round negotiations will reinforce the core principles and the developmental mandate of the Doha Round. We look forward to significant and meaningful deliverables that are balanced and address key development concerns of the poorest and most vulnerable WTO members, at the ninth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Bali.

16. We note that the process is underway for the selection of a new WTO Director-General in 2013. We concur that the WTO requires a new leader who demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and to enhancing the effectiveness of the WTO including through a commitment to support efforts that will lead to an expeditious conclusion of the DDA. We consider that the next Director-General of the WTO should be a representative of a developing country.

17. We reaffirm the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) mandate as the focal point in the UN system dedicated to consider the interrelated issues of trade, investment, finance and technology from a development perspective. UNCTAD's mandate and work are unique and necessary

to deal with the challenges of development and growth in the increasingly interdependent global economy. We also reaffirm the importance of strengthening UNCTAD's capacity to deliver on its programmes of consensus building, policy dialogue, research, technical cooperation and capacity building, so that it is better equipped to deliver on its development mandate.

18. We acknowledge the important role that State Owned Companies (SOCs) play in the economy and encourage our SOCs to explore ways of cooperation, exchange of information and best practices.

19. We recognise the fundamental role played by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the economies of our countries. SMEs are major creators of jobs and wealth. In this regard, we will explore opportunities for cooperating in the field of SMEs and recognise the need for promoting dialogue among the respective Ministries and Agencies in charge of the theme, particularly with a view to promoting their international exchange and cooperation and fostering innovation, research and development.

20. We reiterate our strong commitment to the United Nations (UN) as the foremost multilateral forum entrusted with bringing about hope, peace, order and sustainable development to the world. The UN enjoys universal membership and is at the centre of global governance and multilateralism. In this regard, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can be more responsive to global challenges. In this regard, China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

21. We underscore our commitment to work together in the UN to continue our cooperation and strengthen multilateral approaches in international relations based on the rule of law and anchored in the Charter of the United Nations.

22. We are committed to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity and reaffirm that the 21st century should be marked by peace, security, development, and cooperation. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries.

23. We welcome the twentieth Anniversary of the World Conference on Human Rights and of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and agree to explore cooperation in the field of human rights.

24. We commend the efforts of the international community and acknowledge the central role of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council in conflict resolution in Africa. We call upon the UNSC to enhance cooperation with the African Union, and its Peace and Security Council, pursuant to UNSC resolutions in this regard. We express our deep concern with instability stretching from North

Africa, in particular the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea. We also remain concerned about reports of deterioration in humanitarian conditions in some countries.

25. We welcome the appointment of the new Chairperson of the AU Commission as an affirmation of the leadership of women.

26. We express our deep concern with the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Syria and condemn the increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law as a result of continued violence. We believe that the Joint Communiqué of the Geneva Action Group provides a basis for resolution of the Syrian crisis and reaffirm our opposition to any further militarization of the conflict. A Syrian-led political process leading to a transition can be achieved only through broad national dialogue that meets the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect for Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty as expressed by the Geneva Joint Communiqué and appropriate UNSC resolutions. We support the efforts of the UN-League of Arab States Joint Special Representative. In view of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria, we call upon all parties to allow and facilitate immediate, safe, full and unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations to all in need of assistance. We urge all parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers.

27. We welcome the admission of Palestine as an Observer State to the United Nations. We are concerned at the lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process and call on the international community to assist both Israel and Palestine to work towards a two-state solution with a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian state, existing side by side in peace with Israel, within internationally recognized borders, based on those existing on 4 June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. We are deeply concerned about the construction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which is a violation of international law and harmful to the peace process. In recalling the primary responsibility of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security, we note the importance that the Quartet reports regularly to the Council about its efforts, which should contribute to concrete progress.

28. We believe there is no alternative to a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We recognise Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue, including between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and consistent with Iran's obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are concerned about threats of military action as well as unilateral sanctions. We note the recent talks held in Almaty and hope that all outstanding issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme will be resolved through discussions and diplomatic means.

29. Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to attain lasting peace and stability. We support the global community's commitment to Afghanistan, enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in December 2011, to remain engaged over the transformation decade from 2015-2024. We affirm our commitment to support Afghanistan's emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscore the need for more effective regional and international cooperation for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, including by combating terrorism. We extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact.

30. We commend the efforts of the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mali aimed at restoring sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. We support the civilian efforts of the Malian Government and its international community partners in realising the transitional programme leading up to the presidential and legislative elections. We emphasise the importance of political inclusiveness and economic and social development in order for Mali to achieve sustainable peace and stability. We express concern about the reports of the deterioration in humanitarian conditions in Mali and call upon the international community to continue to cooperate with Mali and its neighbouring countries in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to civilian population affected by the armed conflict.

31. We are gravely concerned with the deterioration in the current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and deplore the loss of life. We strongly condemn the abuses and acts of violence against the civilian population and urge all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and return to negotiations. We call upon all parties to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access. We are ready to work with the international community to assist in this endeavour and facilitate progress to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Brazil, Russia and China express their sympathy to the South African and Indian governments for the casualties that their citizens suffered in the CAR.

32. We are gravely concerned by the ongoing instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We welcome the signing in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013 of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. We support its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. We support the efforts of the UN, AU and sub-regional organisations to bring about peace, security and stability in the country.

33. We reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism. We believe that the UN has a central role in coordinating international action against terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of international law. In this context, we support the implementation of the UN General Assembly Global Counter-

Terrorism Strategy and are determined to strengthen cooperation in countering this global threat. We also reiterate our call for concluding negotiations as soon as possible in the UN General Assembly on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States and agreed to work together towards this objective.

34. We recognize the critical positive role the Internet plays globally in promoting economic, social and cultural development. We believe it's important to contribute to and participate in a peaceful, secure, and open cyberspace and we emphasise that security in the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) through universally accepted norms, standards and practices is of paramount importance.

35. We congratulate Brazil on hosting the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012 and welcome the outcome as reflected in "The Future we Want", in particular, the reaffirmation of the Rio Principles and political commitment made towards sustainable development and poverty eradication while creating opportunities for BRICS partners to engage and cooperate in the development of the future Sustainable Development Goals.

36. We congratulate India on the outcome of the 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Conference on Biological Diversity (CBD COP11) and the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.

37. While acknowledging that climate change is one of the greatest challenges and threats towards achieving sustainable development, we call on all parties to build on the decisions adopted in COP18/CMP8 in Doha, with a view to reaching a successful conclusion by 2015, of negotiations on the development of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, guided by its principles and provisions.

38. We believe that the internationally agreed development goals including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) address the needs of developing countries, many of which continue to face developmental challenges, including widespread poverty and inequality. Low Income Countries (LICs) continue to face challenges that threaten the impressive growth performance of recent years. Volatility in food and other commodity prices have made food security an issue as well as constraining their sources of revenue. Progress in rebuilding macro-economic buffers has been relatively slow, partly due to measures adopted to mitigate the social impact of exogenous shocks. Many LICs are currently in a weaker position to deal with exogenous shocks given the more limited fiscal buffers and the constrained aid envelopes, which will affect their ability to sustain progress towards achieving the MDGs. We reiterate that individual countries, especially in Africa and other developing countries of the South, cannot achieve the MDGs on their own and therefore the centrality of Goal 8 on Global Partnerships for Development to achieve the MDGs should remain at the core of the global

development discourse for the UN System. Furthermore, this requires the honouring of all commitments made in the outcome documents of previous major international conferences.

39. We reiterate our commitment to work together for accelerated progress in attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date of 2015, and we call upon other members of the international community to work towards the same objective. In this regard, we stress that the development agenda beyond 2015 should build on the MDG framework, keeping the focus on poverty eradication and human development, while addressing emerging challenges of development taking into consideration individual national circumstances of developing countries. In this regard the critical issue of the mobilization of means of implementation in assisting developing countries needs to be an overarching goal. It is important to ensure that any discussion on the UN development agenda, including the "Post 2015 Development Agenda" is an inclusive and transparent inter-Governmental process under a UN-wide process which is universal and broad based.

40. We welcome the establishment of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in line with the Rio+20 Outcome Document which reaffirmed the Rio Principles of Sustainable Development as the basis for addressing new and emerging challenges. We are fully committed to a coordinated inter- governmental process for the elaboration of the UN development agenda.

41. We note the following meetings held in the implementation of the Delhi Action Plan:

- Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA.
- Meeting of National Security Advisors in New Delhi.
- Meetings of Finance Ministers, and Central Bank Governors in Washington DC and Tokyo.
- Meeting of Trade Ministers in Puerto Vallarta.
- Meetings of Health Ministers in New Delhi and Geneva.

42. We welcome the establishment of the BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Business Council and take note of the following meetings which were held in preparation for this Summit:

- Fifth Academic Forum
- Fourth Business Forum
- Third Financial Forum

43. We welcome the outcomes of the meeting of the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and endorse the Joint Communique of the Third Meeting of the BRICS Trade Ministers held in preparation for the Summit.

44. We are committed to forging a stronger partnership for common development. To this end, we adopt the eThekweni Action Plan.

45. We agree that the next summit cycles will, in principle, follow the sequence of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

46. Brazil, Russia, India and China extend their warm appreciation to the Government and people of South Africa for hosting the Fifth BRICS Summit in Durban.

47. Russia, India, China and South Africa convey their appreciation to Brazil for its offer to host the first Summit of the second cycle of BRICS Summits, i.e. the Sixth BRICS Summit in 2014 and convey their full support thereto.

eThekweni Action Plan:

1. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA.
2. Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors.
3. Mid-term meeting of Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas.
4. Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in the margins of G20 meetings, WB/IMF meetings, as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
5. Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers on the margins of multilateral events, or stand-alone meetings, as required.
6. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, preceded by a preparatory meeting of experts on agro-products and food security issues and the Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group.
7. Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers and preparatory meetings.
8. Meeting of BRICS Officials responsible for population on the margins of relevant multilateral events.
9. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science and Technology and meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on Science and Technology.
10. Meeting of BRICS Cooperatives.
11. Meetings of financial and fiscal authorities in the margins of WB/IMF meetings as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
12. Meetings of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI).
13. Meeting of the BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum.

14. Meeting of the BRICS Urbanisation Forum.
15. Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2013 in New Delhi.
16. 5th Meeting of BRICS Heads of National Statistical Institutions.
17. Consultations amongst BRICS Permanent Missions and/or Embassies, as appropriate, in New York, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Washington, Nairobi and Geneva, where appropriate.
18. Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials in the margins of relevant sustainable development, environment and climate related international fora, where appropriate.

New areas of cooperation to be explored

- BRICS Public Diplomacy Forum.
- BRICS Anti-Corruption Cooperation.
- BRICS State Owned Companies / State Owned Enterprises.
- National Agencies Responsible for Drug Control.
- BRICS virtual secretariat.
- BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue.
- Tourism.
- Energy.
- Sports and Mega Sporting Events.

Recuperado de: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/130327-statement.html>

The 6th BRICS Summit: Fortaleza Declaration July 15, 2014, Fortaleza, Brazil

1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in Fortaleza, Brazil, on 15 July 2014 at the Sixth BRICS Summit. To inaugurate the second cycle of BRICS Summits, the theme chosen for our discussions was "Inclusive Growth: Sustainable Solutions", in keeping with the inclusive macroeconomic and social policies carried out by our governments and the imperative to address challenges to humankind posed by the need to simultaneously achieve growth, inclusiveness, protection and preservation.

2. In the aftermath of the first cycle of five Summits, hosted by every BRICS member, our coordination is well established in various multilateral and plurilateral initiatives and intra-BRICS cooperation is expanding to encompass new areas. Our shared views and commitment to international law and to multilateralism, with the United Nations at its center and foundation, are widely recognized and constitute a major contribution to global peace, economic stability,

social inclusion, equality, sustainable development and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries.

3. We renew our openness to increasing engagement with other countries, particularly developing countries and emerging market economies, as well as with international and regional organizations, with a view to fostering cooperation and solidarity in our relations with all nations and peoples. To that effect, we will hold a joint session with the leaders of the South American nations, under the theme of the Sixth BRICS Summit, with a view to furthering cooperation between BRICS and South America. We reaffirm our support for the South American integration processes, and recognize in particular the importance of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in promoting peace and democracy in the region, and in achieving sustainable development and poverty eradication. We believe that strengthened dialogue among BRICS and South American countries can play an active role in enhancing multilateralism and international cooperation, for the promotion of peace, security, economic and social progress and sustainable development in an interdependent and increasingly complex, globalizing world.

4. Since its inception the BRICS have been guided by the overarching objectives of peace, security, development and cooperation. In this new cycle, while remaining committed to those objectives, we pledge to deepen our partnership with a renewed vision, based on openness, inclusiveness and mutually beneficial cooperation. In this sense, we are ready to explore new areas towards a comprehensive cooperation and a closer economic partnership to facilitate market inter-linkages, financial integration, infrastructure connectivity as well as people-to-people contacts.

5. The Sixth Summit takes place at a crucial juncture, as the international community assesses how to address the challenges of strong economic recovery from the global financial crises, sustainable development, including climate change, while also formulating the post-2015 Development Agenda. At the same time, we are confronted with persistent political instability and conflict in various global hotspots and non-conventional emerging threats. On the other hand, international governance structures designed within a different power configuration show increasingly evident signs of losing legitimacy and effectiveness, as transitional and ad hoc arrangements become increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of multilateralism. We believe the BRICS are an important force for incremental change and reform of current institutions towards more representative and equitable governance, capable of generating more inclusive global growth and fostering a stable, peaceful and prosperous world.

6. During the first cycle of BRICS Summits, collectively our economies have consolidated their position as the main engines for sustaining the pace of the international economy as it recovers from the recent economic and financial global crisis. The BRICS continue to contribute significantly to global growth and to the reduction of poverty in our own and other countries. Our economic growth and social inclusion policies have helped to stabilize global economy, to foster the creation of jobs, to reduce poverty, and to combat inequality, thus contributing to

the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. In this new cycle, besides its contribution in fostering strong, sustainable and balanced growth, BRICS will continue to play a significant role in promoting social development and in contributing to define the international agenda in this area, building on its experience in addressing the challenges of poverty and inequality.

7. To better reflect the advancement of the social policies of the BRICS and the positive impacts of its economic growth, we instruct our National Institutes of Statistics and the Ministries of Health and Education to work on the development of joint methodologies for social indicators to be incorporated in the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication. We also encourage the BRICS Think Tanks Council to provide technical support in this task. We further request the BRICS National Institutes of Statistics to discuss the viability and feasibility of a platform for the development of such methodologies and to report thereon.

8. The world economy has strengthened, with signs of improvement in some advanced economies. Significant downside risks to this recovery remain, however. Unemployment and debt levels are worryingly high and growth remains weak in many advanced economies. Emerging market economies and developing countries (EMDCs) continue to contribute significantly to global growth and will do so in the years to come. Even as the global economy strengthens, monetary policy settings in some advanced economies may bring renewed stress and volatility to financial markets and changes in monetary stance need to be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated in order to minimize negative spillovers.

9. Strong macroeconomic frameworks, well regulated financial markets and robust levels of reserves have allowed EMDCs in general, and the BRICS in particular, to better deal with the risks and spillovers presented by the challenging economic conditions in the last few years. Nevertheless, further macroeconomic coordination amongst all major economies, in particular in the G20, remains a critical factor for strengthening the prospects for a vigorous and sustainable recovery worldwide. In this context, we reaffirm our strong commitment to continue working among ourselves and with the global community to foster financial stability, support sustainable, stronger and inclusive growth and promote quality jobs. The BRICS stand ready to contribute to the G20 goal of lifting our collective GDP by more than 2 percent above the trajectory implied by current policies over the coming 5 years.

10. We commend Russia for the successful work during its presidency of the G20 in 2013. The institution of the BRICS Summits largely coincided with the beginning of the global crisis, the first G20 Summits and the consolidation of that Group as the premier forum for economic coordination among its members. As a new round of BRICS Summits begins, we remain committed to deliver constructive responses to global economic and financial challenges and to serve as a strong voice for the promotion of sustainable development, inclusive growth, financial stability and of more representative international economic governance. We will continue to pursue our fruitful coordination and to promote our development goals within the international economic system and financial architecture.

11. BRICS, as well as other EMDCs, continue to face significant financing constraints to address infrastructure gaps and sustainable development needs. With this in mind, we are pleased to announce the signing of the Agreement establishing the New Development Bank (NDB), with the purpose of mobilizing resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies. We appreciate the work undertaken by our Finance Ministers. Based on sound banking principles, the NDB will strengthen the cooperation among our countries and will supplement the efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global development, thus contributing to our collective commitments for achieving the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced growth.

12. The Bank shall have an initial authorized capital of US\$ 100 billion. The initial subscribed capital shall be of US\$ 50 billion, equally shared among founding members. The first chair of the Board of Governors shall be from Russia. The first chair of the Board of Directors shall be from Brazil. The first President of the Bank shall be from India. The headquarters of the Bank shall be located in Shanghai. The New Development Bank Africa Regional Center shall be established in South Africa concurrently with the headquarters. We direct our Finance Ministers to work out the modalities for its operationalization.

13. We are pleased to announce the signing of the Treaty for the establishment of the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) with an initial size of US\$ 100 billion. This arrangement will have a positive precautionary effect, help countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures, promote further BRICS cooperation, strengthen the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements. We appreciate the work undertaken by our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. The Agreement is a framework for the provision of liquidity through currency swaps in response to actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures.

14. We also welcome the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation among BRICS Export Credit and Guarantees Agencies that will improve the support environment for increasing trade opportunities among our nations.

15. We appreciate the progress our Development Banks have made in enhancing and strengthening the financial ties among BRICS countries. Given the importance of adopting innovation initiatives, we welcome the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement on Innovation within the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism.

16. We recognize that there is potential for BRICS insurance and reinsurance markets to pool capacities. We direct our relevant authorities to explore avenues of cooperation in this regard.

17. We believe that sustainable development and economic growth will be facilitated by taxation of revenue generated in jurisdictions where economic

activity takes place. We express our concern over the harmful impact of tax evasion, transnational fraud and aggressive tax planning on the world economy. We are aware of the challenges brought by aggressive tax avoidance and non-compliance practices. We, therefore, affirm our commitment to continue a cooperative approach on issues related to tax administrations and to enhance cooperation in the international forums targeting tax base erosion and information exchange for tax purposes. We direct our relevant authorities to explore ways of enhancing cooperation in this area. We also direct our relevant authorities to strengthen cooperation in the field of customs.

18. We remain disappointed and seriously concerned with the current non-implementation of the 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, which negatively impacts on the IMF's legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness. The IMF reform process is based on high-level commitments, which already strengthened the Fund's resources and must also lead to the modernization of its governance structure so as to better reflect the increasing weight of EMDCs in the world economy. The Fund must remain a quota-based institution. We call on the membership of the IMF to find ways to implement the 14th General Review of Quotas without further delay. We reiterate our call on the IMF to develop options to move ahead with its reform process, with a view to ensuring increased voice and representation of EMDCs, in case the 2010 reforms are not entered into force by the end of the year. We also call on the membership of the IMF to reach a final agreement on a new quota formula together with the 15th General Review of Quotas so as not to further jeopardize the postponed deadline of January 2015.

19. We welcome the goals set by the World Bank Group to help countries end extreme poverty and to promote shared prosperity. We recognize the potential of this new strategy in support of the fulfillment of these ambitious goals by the international community. This potential will only be realized, however, if the institution and its membership effectively move towards more democratic governance structures, strengthen the Bank's financial capacity and explore innovative ways to enhance development financing and knowledge sharing while pursuing a strong client orientation that recognizes each country's development needs. We look forward to initiating the work on the next shareholding review at the World Bank as soon as possible in order to meet the agreed deadline of October 2015. In this sense, we call for an international financial architecture that is more conducive to overcoming development challenges. We have been very active in improving the international financial architecture through our multilateral coordination and through our financial cooperation initiatives, which will, in a complementary manner, increase the diversity and availability of resources for promoting development and ensuring stability in the global economy.

20. We are committed to raise our economic cooperation to a qualitatively new level. To achieve this, we emphasize the importance of establishing a road map for intra- BRICS economic cooperation. In this regard, we welcome the proposals for a "BRICS Economic Cooperation Strategy" and a "Framework of BRICS Closer Economic Partnership", which lay down steps to promote intra-BRICS economic,

trade and investment cooperation. Based on the documents tabled and informed by the input of the BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC), we instruct our Sherpas to advance discussions with a view to submit their proposal for endorsement by the next BRICS Summit.

21. We believe all countries should enjoy due rights, equal opportunities and fair participation in global economic, financial and trade affairs, recognizing that countries have different capacities and are at different levels of development. We strive for an open world economy with efficient allocation of resources, free flow of goods, and fair and orderly competition to the benefit of all. In reaffirming our support for an open, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent and rule-based multilateral trading system, we will continue our efforts towards the successful conclusion of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO), following the positive results of the Ninth Ministerial Conference (MC9), held in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2013. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to establish by the end of this year a post-Bali work program for concluding the Doha Round, based on the progress already made and in keeping with the mandate established in the Doha Development Agenda. We affirm that this work program should prioritize the issues where legally binding outcomes could not be achieved at MC9, including Public Stock-Holding for Food Security Purposes. We look forward to the implementation of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. We call upon international partners to provide support to the poorest, most vulnerable WTO members to enable them to implement this Agreement, which should support their development objectives. We strongly support the WTO dispute settlement system as a cornerstone of the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and we will enhance our ongoing dialogue on substantive and practical matters relating to it, including in the ongoing negotiations on WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding reform. We recognize the importance of Regional Trade Agreements, which should complement the multilateral trading system, and of keeping them open, inclusive and transparent, as well as refraining from introducing exclusive and discriminatory clauses and standards.

22. We reaffirm the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) mandate as the focal point in the UN system dedicated to consider the interrelated issues of trade, investment, finance and technology from a development perspective. UNCTAD's mandate and work are unique and necessary to deal with the challenges of development and growth in the increasingly interdependent global economy. In congratulating UNCTAD for the 50th anniversary of its foundation in 2014, which is also the anniversary of the establishment of the Group of 77, we further reaffirm the importance of strengthening UNCTAD's capacity to deliver on its programs of consensus building, policy dialogue, research, technical cooperation and capacity building so that it is better equipped to deliver on its development mandate.

23. We acknowledge the important role that State Owned Companies (SOCs) play in the economy and encourage our SOCs to continue to explore ways of cooperation, exchange of information and best practices. We also recognize the

fundamental role played by small and medium-sized enterprises in the economies of our countries as major creators of jobs and wealth. We will enhance cooperation and recognize the need for strengthening intra-BRICS dialogue with a view to promote international exchange and cooperation and to foster innovation, research and development.

24. We underline that 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations (UN) and the end of the Second World War. In this connection, we support the UN to initiate and organize commemorative events to mark and pay tribute to these two historical moments in human history, and reaffirm our commitment to safeguarding a just and fair international order based on the UN Charter, maintaining world peace and security, as well as promoting human progress and development.

25. We reiterate our strong commitment to the UN as the fundamental multilateral organization entrusted with helping the international community maintain international peace and security, protect and foster human rights and promote sustainable development. The UN enjoys universal membership and is at the very center of global governance and multilateralism. We recall the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. We reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can adequately respond to global challenges. China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to Brazil, India and South Africa's status and role in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.

26. We recall that development and security are closely interlinked, mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace. We reiterate our view that the establishment of sustainable peace requires a comprehensive, concerted and determined approach, based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equity and cooperation, that addresses the root causes of conflicts, including their political, economic and social dimensions. In this context, we also stress the close interrelation between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We also highlight the importance of bringing gender perspectives to conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.

27. We will continue our joint efforts in coordinating positions and acting on shared interests on global peace and security issues for the common well-being of humanity. We stress our commitment to the sustainable and peaceful settlement of disputes, according to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. We condemn unilateral military interventions and economic sanctions in violation of international law and universally recognized norms of international relations. Bearing this in mind, we emphasize the unique importance of the indivisible nature of security, and that no State should strengthen its security at the expense of the security of others.

28. We agree to continue to treat all human rights, including the right to

development, in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis. We will foster dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual respect in the field of human rights, both within BRICS and in multilateral fora – including the United Nations Human Rights Council where all BRICS serve as members in 2014 – taking into account the necessity to promote, protect and fulfill human rights in a non-selective, non-politicized and constructive manner, and without double standards.

29. We commend the efforts made by the United Nations, the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), among others, in support for the realization of legislative and presidential elections in Guinea Bissau, paving the way for the return to constitutional democracy in the country. We recognize the importance of promoting long-term political stability in Guinea-Bissau, which necessarily encompasses measures to reduce food insecurity and to advance a comprehensive security sector reform, as proposed by the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Similarly, we also welcome the efforts of the UN, AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in support of legislative and presidential elections in Madagascar, assisting in the return of constitutional democracy in the country.

30. We commend the efforts of the international community in addressing instability in Africa through engagement with, and coordination by, the AU and its Peace and Security Council. We express our deep concern at the deterioration of the security and the humanitarian situation in West Africa. We call upon all parties in these conflicts to cease hostilities, exercise restraint and engage in dialogue to ensure return to peace and stability. However, we also note the progress that has been made in areas of the region in addressing political and security challenges.

31. We also express our concern with the plight of the abducted women and children of Chibok and call for an end to the continued terrorist acts perpetrated by Boko Haram.

32. We support the efforts of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in its task to help the Government of Mali fully stabilize the country, facilitate national political dialogue, protect civilians, monitor the human rights situation, create conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, and extend the State authority in the whole country. We emphasize the importance of an inclusive political process; the immediate implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process; and political, economic and social development in order for Mali to achieve sustainable peace and stability.

33. We express our concern about the ongoing political and humanitarian crises in South Sudan. We condemn the continuation of violence against civilians and call upon all parties to ensure a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. We also condemn the continuation of confrontations despite the successive commitments to the cessation of hostilities and express our belief that a

sustainable solution to the crisis is only possible through an inclusive political dialogue aimed at national reconciliation. We support, in this regard, the regional efforts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis, especially the mediation process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). We welcome the "Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan", signed on May 9, and expect the political leaders of South Sudan to remain committed to the negotiation process and to the completion of dialogue on the formation of a transitional government of national unity within 60 days, as announced by IGAD on June 10. We commend the efforts of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan to fulfill its mandate and express our deep concern about the armed attacks that were led against UN bases in the country.

34. We reiterate our grave concern with the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). We strongly condemn the abuses and acts of violence against the civilian population, including sectarian violence, and urge all armed groups to cease hostilities immediately. We recognize the efforts of the Economic Community of Central African States and the AU to restore peace and stability in the country. We commend the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA). We express our support for a successful transition from the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) to MINUSCA by 15 September 2014. We urge the transitional authorities in the CAR to adhere strictly to the N'Djamena Roadmap. We call upon all parties to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access to those in need. We reaffirm our readiness to work with the international community to assist the CAR in accelerating the implementation of the political process of the country.

35. We support the efforts by the UN, in particular the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), deployed under UN Security Council resolution 2098, and the regional and sub-regional organizations to bring peace and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and we call upon all involved to honor their obligations in order to achieve lasting peace and stability in the DRC.

36. We welcome the AU Malabo Summit decision to establish an interim African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) by October 2014 to respond quickly to crisis situations as they arise. We stress the importance of adequate support to ensure the timely operationalization of the ACIRC, pending the final establishment of the African Stand-by Force.

37. We express deep concern about the ongoing violence and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria and condemn the increasing violations of human rights by all parties. We reiterate our view that there is no military solution to the conflict, and highlight the need to avoid its further militarization. We call upon all parties to commit immediately to a complete cease-fire, to halt violence and to allow and facilitate immediate, safe, full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and agencies, in compliance with the UN Security Council resolution 2139. We recognize practical steps undertaken by the Syrian

parties in implementing its requirements, including the practice of local cease-fire agreements reached between the Syrian authorities and the opposition forces.

We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever it occurs. We are gravely concerned at the continued threat of terrorism and extremism in Syria. We call on all Syrian parties to commit to putting an end to terrorist acts perpetrated by Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist organizations.

We strongly condemn the use of chemical weapons in any circumstances. We welcome the decision of the Syrian Arab Republic to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In accordance with related Organization for the Proscription of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council decisions and UN Security Council resolution 2118, we reiterate the importance of the complete removal and elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons. We commend the progress in that regard and welcome the announcement that the removal of declared chemicals from the Syrian Arab Republic was completed. We call on all Syrian parties and interested external actors with relevant capabilities to work closely together and with the OPCW and the UN to arrange for the security of the monitoring and destruction mission in its final stage.

We support the mediation role played by the UN. We appreciate the contribution made by former Joint UN – Arab League Special Representative for Syria, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, and welcome the appointment of Mr. Staffan De Mistura as UN Special Envoy to Syria, and express our hope for his active efforts to promote an early resumption of comprehensive negotiations. We recall that national dialogue and reconciliation are key to the political solution for the Syrian crisis. We take note of the recent Syrian presidential elections. We stress that only an inclusive political process, led by the Syrians, as recommended in the Action Group on Syria Final Communiqué of 2012, will lead to peace, effective protection of civilians, the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian society for freedom and prosperity and respect for Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. We emphasize that a national reconciliation process needs to be launched as early as possible, in the interest of the national unity of Syria. To that end, we urge all parties in Syria to demonstrate political will, enhance mutual understanding, exercise restraint and commit to seeking common ground in accommodating their differences.

38. We reaffirm our commitment to contribute to a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of the universally recognized international legal framework, including the relevant UN resolutions, the Madrid Principles and the Arab Peace Initiative. We believe that the resolution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is a fundamental component for building a sustainable peace in the Middle East. We call upon Israel and Palestine to resume negotiations leading to a two-State solution with a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian State existing side by side in peace with Israel, within mutually agreed and internationally recognized borders based on the 4 June 1967 lines, with East

Jerusalem as its capital. We oppose the continuous construction and expansion of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by the Israeli Government, which violates international law, gravely undermines peace efforts and threatens the viability of the two-State solution. We welcome recent efforts to achieve intra-Palestinian unity, including the formation of a national unity government and steps towards conducting general elections, which is key element to consolidate a democratic and sustainable Palestinian State, and call on the parties to fully commit to the obligations assumed by Palestine. We call on the UN Security Council to fully exercise its functions under the UN Charter with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We recall with satisfaction the decision of the UN General Assembly to proclaim 2014 the International Year of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, welcome the efforts of UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in providing assistance and protection for Palestine refugees and encourage the international community to continue to support the activities of the agency.

39. We express our support for the convening, at the earliest possible date, of the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We call upon all states of the region to attend the Conference and to engage constructively and in a pragmatic manner with a view to advancing that goal.

40. Noting the open-ended consultations on a draft International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities, and the active and constructive engagement of our countries in these consultations, we call for an inclusive and consensus-based multilateral negotiation to be conducted within the framework of the UN without specific deadlines in order to reach a balanced outcome that addresses the needs and reflects the concerns of all participants. Reaffirming our will that the exploration and use of outer space shall be for peaceful purposes, we stress that negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Conference on Disarmament, and welcome the introduction by China and Russia of the updated draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects.

41. While reiterating our view that there is no alternative to a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, we reaffirm our support to its resolution through political and diplomatic means and dialogue. In this context, we welcome the positive momentum generated by talks between Iran and the E3+3 and encourage the thorough implementation of the Geneva Joint Plan of Action of 24 November 2013, with a view to achieving a comprehensive and long-lasting solution to this issue. We also encourage Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to continue strengthening their cooperation and dialogue on the basis of the Joint Statement signed on 11 November 2013. We recognize Iran's inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in a manner consistent with its international obligations.

42. Recognizing that peace, security and development are closely interlinked, we

reaffirm that Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential access to world markets and foreign investment to attain lasting peace and stability. We support the commitment of the international community to remain engaged in Afghanistan during the transformation decade (2015-2024), as enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in December 2011. We stress that the UN should play an increasingly important role in assisting Afghanistan's national reconciliation, recovery and economic reconstruction. We also reaffirm our commitment to support Afghanistan's emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscore the need for more effective regional and international cooperation for the stabilization of Afghanistan, including by combating terrorism. We extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact. We expect a broad-based and inclusive peace process in Afghanistan which is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. We welcome the second round of the presidential elections in Afghanistan which contribute to the democratic transfer of power in this country. We welcome China's offer to host the Fourth Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference in August 2014.

43. We are deeply concerned by the situation in Iraq. We strongly support the Iraqi government in its effort to overcome the crisis, uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity. We are concerned about spillover effects of the instability in Iraq resulting from increased terrorist activities in the region, and urge all parties to address the terrorist threat in a consistent manner. We urge all regional and global players to refrain from interference that will further deepen the crisis and to support the Iraqi government and the people of Iraq in their efforts to overcome the crisis, and build a stable, inclusive and united Iraq. We emphasize the importance of national reconciliation and unity in Iraq, taking into consideration the wars and conflicts the Iraqi people have suffered and in this context we commend the peaceful and orderly holding of the latest parliamentary elections.

44. We express our deep concern with the situation in Ukraine. We call for a comprehensive dialogue, the de-escalation of the conflict and restraint from all the actors involved, with a view to finding a peaceful political solution, in full compliance with the UN Charter and universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.

45. We reaffirm our commitment to continue to tackle transnational organized crime, with full respect for human rights, in order to reduce the negative impact it has on individuals and societies. We encourage joint efforts aimed at preventing and combating transnational criminal activities in accordance with national legislations and international legal instruments, especially the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In this regard, we welcome BRICS cooperation in multilateral fora, highlighting our engagement in the ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice.

46. Piracy and armed robbery at sea are complex phenomena that must be fought effectively in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We welcome the efforts

made by the international community to counter maritime piracy and call upon all stakeholders – civilian and military, public and private – to remain engaged in the fight against this phenomenon. We also highlight the need for a transparent and objective review of the High Risk Areas, with a view to avoiding unnecessary negative effects on the economy and security of coastal states. We commit to strengthen our cooperation on this serious issue.

47. We are deeply concerned by the world drug problem, which continues to threaten public health, safety and well-being and to undermine social, economic and political stability and sustainable development. We are committed to countering the world drug problem, which remains a common and shared responsibility, through an integrated, multidisciplinary, mutually reinforcing and balanced approach to supply and demand reduction strategies, in line with the three UN drug conventions and other relevant norms and principles of international law. We welcome the substantive work done by Russia in preparing and hosting the International Ministers Meeting on 15 May 2014 to discuss the world drug problem. We take note of the proposal for the creation of an Anti-Drug Working Group presented at the Second Meeting of BRICS Heads of Drug Control Agencies.

48. We reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism, whether based upon ideological, religious, political, racial, ethnic, or any other justification. We call upon all entities to refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities. We believe that the UN has a central role in coordinating international action against terrorism, which must be conducted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, and with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. We express our concern at the increasing use, in a globalized society, by terrorists and their supporters, of information and communications technologies (ICTs), in particular the Internet and other media, and reiterate that such technologies can be powerful tools in countering the spread of terrorism, including by promoting tolerance and dialogue among peoples. We will continue to work together to conclude as soon as possible negotiations and to adopt in the UN General Assembly the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. We also stress the need to promote cooperation among our countries in preventing terrorism, especially in the context of major events.

49. We believe that ICTs should provide instruments to foster sustainable economic progress and social inclusion, working together with the ICT industry, civil society and academia in order to realize the ICT-related potential opportunities and benefits for all. We agree that particular attention should be given to young people and to small and medium-sized enterprises, with a view to promoting international exchange and cooperation, as well as to fostering innovation, ICT research and development. We agree that the use and development

of ICTs through international cooperation and universally accepted norms and principles of international law is of paramount importance, in order to ensure a peaceful, secure and open digital and Internet space. We strongly condemn acts of mass electronic surveillance and data collection of individuals all over the world, as well as violation of the sovereignty of States and of human rights, in particular the right to privacy. We take note of the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet, held in São Paulo, on 23- 24 April 2014. We thank Brazil for having organized it.

50. We will explore cooperation on combating cybercrimes and we also recommit to the negotiation of a universal legally binding instrument in that field. We consider that the UN has a central role in this matter. We agree it is necessary to preserve ICTs, particularly the Internet, as an instrument of peace and development and to prevent its use as a weapon. Moreover, we commit ourselves to working together in order to identify possibilities of developing joint activities to address common security concerns in the use of ICTs. We reiterate the common approach set forth in the eThekweni Declaration about the importance of security in the use of ICTs. We welcome the decision of the National Security Advisors to establish a group of experts of BRICS member States which will elaborate practical proposals concerning major fields of cooperation and coordinate our positions in international fora. Bearing in mind the significance of these issues, we take note of Russia's proposal of a BRICS agreement on cooperation in this field to be jointly elaborated.

51. We reiterate our commitment to the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Protocols, with special attention to the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Targets. We recognize the challenge posed by the agreed targets on conservation of biodiversity and reaffirm the need to implement the decisions on resource mobilization agreed to by all parties in Hyderabad in 2012, and set resource mobilization targets that are ambitious in order to allow for their fulfillment.

52. Acknowledging that climate change is one of the greatest challenges facing humankind, we call on all countries to build upon the decisions adopted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with a view to reaching a successful conclusion by 2015, of negotiations on the development of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, in accordance with the principles and provisions of UNFCCC, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. In this regard, we reiterate our support to the Presidency of the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties and the 10th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, to be held in Lima, Peru, in December 2014. We also note the convening of the UN Climate Summit 2014 to be held this September.

53. While bearing in mind that fossil fuel remains one of the major sources of energy, we reiterate our belief that renewable and clean energy, research and

development of new technologies and energy efficiency, can constitute an important driver to promote sustainable development, create new economic growth, reduce energy costs and increase the efficiency in the use of natural resources. Considering the dynamic link between renewable and clean energy and sustainable development, we reaffirm the importance of continuing international efforts aimed at promoting the deployment of renewable and clean energy and energy efficiency technologies, taking into account national policies, priorities and resources. We stand for strengthening international cooperation to promote renewable and clean energy and to universalize energy access, which is of great importance to improving the standard of living of our peoples.

54. We are committed to working towards an inclusive, transparent and participative intergovernmental process for building a universal and integrated development agenda with poverty eradication as the central and overarching objective. The agenda should integrate the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in a balanced and comprehensive manner with concise, implementable and measurable goals, taking into account differing national realities and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities. The Post- 2015 Development Agenda must also be based on and fully respect all Rio principles on sustainable development, including the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. We welcome the outcome document of the UN General Assembly Special Event on the Millennium Development Goals, which decided to launch an intergovernmental process at the beginning of the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly that will lead to the adoption of the Post-2015 Development Agenda.

55. We reiterate our commitment to the UN General Assembly Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to working together to achieve a consensual and ambitious proposal on SDGs. We emphasize the importance of the work by the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing and highlight the need for an effective sustainable development financing strategy to facilitate the mobilization of resources in achieving sustainable development objectives and supporting developing countries in the implementation efforts, with ODA as a major source of financing. We support the creation of a facilitation mechanism for the development, transfer and dissemination of clean and environmentally sound technologies and call for the establishment of a working group within the UN on this proposal, taking into account the Rio+20 outcome document and the Secretary General's reports on the issue. In this regard, we reaffirm that the outcome of each of these processes can contribute to the formulation of Sustainable Development Goals.

56. We recognize the strategic importance of education for sustainable development and inclusive economic growth. We reaffirm our commitment to accelerating progress in attaining the Education for All goals and education-related Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and stress that the development agenda beyond 2015 should build on these goals to ensure equitable, inclusive and quality

education and lifelong learning for all. We are willing to strengthen intra-BRICS cooperation in the area and welcome the meeting of Ministers of Education held in Paris, in November 2013. We intend to continue cooperation with relevant international organizations. We encourage the initiative to establish the BRICS Network University.

57. In March 2014 we agreed to collaborate through dialogue, cooperation, sharing of experiences and capacity building on population related matters of mutual concern to member states. We recognize the vital importance of the demographic dividend that many of us possess to advance our sustainable development as well as the need to integrate population factors into national development plans, and to promote a long-term balanced population and development. The demographic transition and post-transition challenges, including population ageing and mortality reduction are amongst the most important challenges facing the world today. We confirm our strong commitment to address social issues in general and in particular gender inequality, women's rights and issues facing young people and we reaffirm our determination to ensure sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights for all.

58. We recognize that corruption negatively affects sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction and financial stability. We are committed to combat domestic and foreign bribery, and strengthen international cooperation, including law enforcement cooperation, in accordance with multilaterally established principles and norms, especially the UN Convention Against Corruption.

59. Considering the link between culture and sustainable development, as well as the role of cultural diplomacy as a promoter of understanding between peoples, we will encourage cooperation between BRICS countries in the cultural sector, including on the multilateral basis. Recognizing the contribution and the benefits of cultural exchanges and cooperation in enhancing our mutual understanding and friendship, we will actively promote greater awareness, understanding and appreciation of each other's arts and culture. In this regard, we ask our relevant authorities responsible for culture to explore areas of practical cooperation, including to expedite negotiations on the draft agreement on cultural cooperation.

60. We are pleased with progress in implementing the eThekweni Action Plan, which further enhanced our cooperation and unleashed greater potential for our development. In this regard, we commend South Africa for the full implementation of the eThekweni Action Plan.

61. We are committed to promoting agricultural cooperation and to exchange information regarding strategies for ensuring access to food for the most vulnerable population, reduction of negative impact of climate change on food security and adaptation of agriculture to climate change. We recall with satisfaction the decision of UN General Assembly to declare 2014 the International Year of Family Farming.

62. We take note of the following meetings which were held in preparation for this

Summit:

- Third BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC);
- Third BRICS Business Council;
- Sixth Academic Forum;
- Fifth Business Forum;
- Fourth Financial Forum.

63. We welcome the outcomes of the meeting of the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and endorse the Joint Communiqué of the Meeting of the BRICS Trade Ministers held in preparation for the Summit.

64. The 5th edition of the BRICS Business Forum provided an opportunity for match-making and for in-depth discussion of highly relevant issues of the trade and investment agenda. We welcome the meeting of the BRICS Business Council and commend it for its Annual Report 2013/2014. We encourage the respective business communities to follow-up the initiatives proposed and to deepen dialogue and cooperation in the five areas dealt with by the Industry/Sector Working Groups with a view to intensifying trade and investment flows amongst BRICS countries as well as between BRICS and other partners around the world.

65. We reiterate our commitment made during the BRICS Leaders-Africa Retreat at the 5th BRICS Summit to foster and develop BRICS-Africa cooperation in support of the socioeconomic development of Africa, particularly with regard to infrastructure development and industrialization. We welcome the inclusion of these issues in discussions during the BRICS Business Council Meeting, held in Johannesburg in August 2013.

66. We welcome the BTTC Study "Towards a Long-Term Strategy for BRICS: Recommendations by the BTTC". We acknowledge the decision taken by the BTTC, taken at its Rio de Janeiro meeting in March 2014 to focus its work on the five pillars upon which the BRICS long-term strategy for cooperation will rest. The BTTC is encouraged to develop strategic pathways and action plans that will lead to the realization of this long-term strategy.

67. We welcome the holding of the first Meeting of the BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology and Innovation and the Cape Town Declaration, which is aimed at: (i) strengthening cooperation in science, technology and innovation; (ii) addressing common global and regional socio-economic challenges utilizing shared experiences and complementarities; (iii) co-generating new knowledge and innovative products, services and processes utilizing appropriate funding and investment instruments; and (iv) promoting, where appropriate, joint BRICS partnerships with other strategic actors in the developing world. We instruct the BRICS Ministers of Science and Technology to sign at their next meeting the Memorandum of Understanding on Science, Technology and Innovation, which provides a strategic framework for cooperation in this field.

68. We welcome the establishment of the BRICS Information Sharing and

Exchange Platform, which seeks to facilitate trade and investment cooperation.

69. We will continue to improve competition policy and enforcement, undertake actions to address challenges that BRICS Competition Authorities face and further enable competitive environments in order to enhance contributions to economic growth in our economies. We note South Africa's offer to host the 4th Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2015.

70. We reiterate our commitment to fostering our partnership for common development. To this end, we adopt the Fortaleza Action Plan.

71. Russia, India, China and South Africa extend their warm appreciation to the Government and people of Brazil for hosting the Sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza.

72. Brazil, India, China and South Africa convey their appreciation to Russia for its offer to host the Seventh BRICS Summit in 2015 in the city of Ufa and extend their full support to that end.

Fortaleza Action Plan

1. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs / International Relations on the margins of UN General Assembly.
 2. Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors.
 3. Mid-term meeting of BRICS Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas.
 4. Meetings of BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on the margins of G20 meetings, WB/IMF meetings, as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
 5. Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers on the margin of multilateral events, or stand-alone meetings, as required.
 6. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, preceded by the Meeting of BRICS Agricultural Cooperation Working Group.
 7. Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers.
 8. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science, Technology and Innovation.
 9. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Education.
 10. Meeting of Ministers or Senior Officials responsible for social security, on the margins of a multilateral meeting.
 11. BRICS Seminar of Officials and Experts on Population Matters.
 12. Meeting of BRICS Cooperatives (held in Curitiba on 14-16 May 2014).
 13. Meetings of financial and fiscal authorities on the margins of WB/IMF meetings as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
 14. Meetings of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI).
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15. Meeting of the BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum.
 16. Meeting of the BRICS Urbanization Forum.
 17. Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2015 in South Africa.

18. Meeting of BRICS Heads of National Statistical Institutions.
19. Meeting of Anti-Drug Experts.
20. Meeting of BRICS Experts on Anti-corruption cooperation, on the margins of a multilateral meeting
21. Consultations amongst BRICS Permanent Missions and/or Embassies, as appropriate, in New York, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Washington, Nairobi and Geneva, where appropriate.
22. Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on the margins of relevant sustainable development, environment and climate related international fora, where appropriate.
23. Sports and Mega Sporting Events.

New areas of cooperation to be explored

- Mutual recognition of Higher Education Degrees and Diplomas;
- Labor and Employment, Social Security, Social Inclusion Public Policies;
- Foreign Policy Planning Dialogue;
- Insurance and reinsurance;
- Seminar of Experts on E-commerce.

Recuperado de: <http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/140715-leaders.html>