The Construction of Italy’s National-State Identity between 2008-2014

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ABSTRACT

The objective of the present article is to explain how the construction of Italy’s national-State identity is affected by an internal and an external identity. The first is due to a regional identity, constructed between the north and the south of Italy, the second, is due to Italy’s role in its diplomatic relationship with the European Union. Both in which, each identity passes through a process of symbolic interaction and a co-constitution created by discourse that defines roles, and thus, constructs a national identity. Therefore, a qualitative methodology was used, based on documental/archive work that guided this research.

El objetivo del presente artículo es explicar cómo la construcción de identidad nacional-estatal italiana es afectada por una identidad interna y una externa. La primera se debe a una identidad regional, construida entre el norte y sur de Italia, la segunda, se debe al rol de Italia en su relación diplomática con la Unión Europea. En ambos, cada una de las identidades pasa por un proceso de interacción simbólica y una co-constitución creada por discursos que definen roles y, por lo tanto, construyen una identidad nacional. Por consiguiente, se utilizó una metodología cualitativa, basada en un trabajo de archivo/documental que guiaron esta investigación.

Key Words: Construction of Identity, Italy, Process of Symbolic Interaction, Co-constitution, Role, European Union, Berlusconi, Giorgio Napolitano, Mafia, Northern League, Mario Monti
INTRODUCTION

REVISION OF LITERATURE ON IDENTITY

A revision of literature about identity exposes agreements and disagreements around tendencies and postures on the concept. Without a doubt, to talk about identity in International Relations Alexander Wendt, from the constructivist paradigm, must be referenced. He highlights that “actors acquire identities [which are] relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt, 1992, p.397). This means, an actor makes an auto-perception of what “itself” means, which is a principle in the basis of identity formation. Later, there is a co-constitution due to intersubjectivity with an “other”, in a process of symbolic interaction between “self” and the “other” that constructs a complete identity of “self”, in this case of the State, the nation-State identity.

A first discussion, on identity, is the paper history has on defining it, which arises in-between post structural authors like Grossberg, and structuralist like Hobsbawm and Bartelson. Grossberg, affirms that identity has three logics: temporality (changes in time), individuality (role and status), and difference (differentiating from another group). Thus, he clarifies that due to these three logics history has no relevance in identity, since temporality makes identity change constantly. But, on the contrary, Hobsbawm clarifies that the historic continuation is a fundamental characteristic in identity. Bartelson also determines that identity crystalizes historical practices. This is how identity considers the historic component and not only temporality.

Another discussion, is the debate on how a nation-state’s identity is composed, due to its members or due to its state’s characteristic. Alberto Melucci determined that individuals have an emotional involvement with a community, so therefore, in this way they identify with it. Andres Piqueras also highlights that it’s necessary for social actors to have shared traits to identify as members of a group (Piqueras, 1996). But, there are other authors, Cedermann and Daase, that affirm that a nation-state’s identity is formed by its characteristics as a State: territory, borders, legal framework and institutions as components of identity (Cedermann & Daase, 2003). On this topic, Charles Tilly defines that a State’s identity is formed on territorial control, accumulation of capital and coercion.
Also, it’s necessary to include a debate on what defines identity: discourse or social actors. For Thomas Banchoff, discourse is divided in two: the political elites, which is descriptive and related to the idea of friends and enemies, and the historical one, which is narrative based on a collective memory (Banchoff, 1999). Discourse is also understood as a story that constitutes identity, since it’s a narrative that “constitutes history” for Neumann and Williams (Neumann & Williams, 2010). Discordantly, Astrid Von Busekist defines that discourse does not create identity, for her, social actors are the main characters in identity because they define and delimit politics (Von Busekist, 2004). Asael Mercado and Alejandrina Hernández would agree, calling this a process of socialization, in which identity is marked by the social actors that compose it (Mercado & Hernández, 2010).

On a more specific matter, there exists a debate on how one identity differentiates from another. The author Gilberto Gimenez justifies that differentiations can be determined by borders, which are symbolic. Borders delimit the pertinence of a group on a temporal-spatial spectrum regarding another group, which develops proper logics in each group and defines differences toward the other group, which is on another temporal-spatial spectrum (Gimenez, n.d.). Barth also relates the construction of identity to borders, since it differentiates one group from another. On the other hand, the historian Anthony D. Smith with a case study determined that Persian identity in the Sasanian Empire was not destroyed because of islamization, but consequently was fortified (Smith, 1988). In Identity and Culture, Vine Deloria determines that one identity is formed due to the existence of the “other”, creating an identity based on difference (Deloria, 1981). Lastly, it’s important to consider Edward Said’s Orientalism, in which he determines that identity can be created from the “other”. Though, on the other hand, Geertz (1990), Roseberry (1989), Lechner y Zemmelman (1990) determined culture as a symbolic producer that affects understandings and politics.

Correspondingly, to International Relations theories, Jonathan Mercer determined that identity is constructed on competitive logics between states, highlighting the interaction with the “other” as a result of anarchy (Mercer, 1995), which as an idea shared that he shares with Wendt. Catalina Arteada also agrees with Wendt’s idea of auto-perception in identity and the competitive logics mentioned by Mercer. İnąc and Ünal, determine that there is existence and pertinence of “self”;
and a identifier and a identified “other”, due to a a process of symbolic interaction based on reciprocity and mutual understanding, that constructs identity (İnaç & Ünal, 2013).

In each discussion, there are different elements mentioned that compose identity. This article will try to see how on an applied case study, the debated elements of identity converge or which authors are correct. Also, there is no current study on what elements form an Italian nation-State identity, so this study will try to detect them.

**APPROACH TO THE IDENTITY PROBLEM IN ITALY**

For this case study, it is necessary to explain Italy’s identity problem throughout history, and how this problem persists but has changed over the years. Hence, the historic complexity of the Italian State must be grasped. This identity problem is over three centuries old, it started in the XIX Century, with a time denominated as the Italian Unification or *Risorgimento*. In 1814, in the Congress of Vienna the borders of Europe were redefined after Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat. It was in this moment that Victor Manuel I, King of Sardinia, tried to create a powerful kingdom that could resist any intervention from France and so, he carried out union and strengthening strategies. But, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 divided Italy in 7 independent States.

After the division of Italy, Victor Manuel I’s son, Carlos Alberto, King since 1831 and his son, Victor Manuel II, tried to unify Italy. Without a doubt, the Count of Cavour was vital for this unification, as Gramsci noted, he was not just a diplomat, above all, he was “a political creator” (Graziano, 2010, p.21). Cavour constantly negotiated with other kingdoms and countries. He annexed “Romagna, Marche and Umbria … thus achieving the unification of the peninsula” (Graziano, 2010, p.22). The British were also involved and for political reasons protected Italy.

When the military alliance between France and the Kingdom of Sardinia against Austria in 1859 provoked the unintended result of insurrections in central Italy and Sicily, Great Britain swapped its initial caution for unreserved support for unification. Therefore, from its very birth, Italy was often to be an instrument used by the major powers (Graziano, 2010, p.4).

Either way, the unification was still being thrusted by Victor Manuel II, whom allied with Prussia in 1866, during the Prussian-Austrian war. With this, he obtained Venetia with was in the hands
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Biografías y Vidas: La Enciclopedia Biográfica en Línea, s.f.). He also annexed Toscana, Parma and Modena (Unificación Italiana, s.f.). Both Victor Manuel II and the Count of Cavour used governmental strategies that started integration dynamics between Italian regions.

During the French-Prussian War in 1870, Victor Manuel II conquered Rome, which was under French command since 1867. Then, he asked the Pope Pius IX to give him the Papal states, since he was the authoritarian figure there, but he refused. Therefore, Victor Manuel II decided to fight for the territory in the Battle of Porta Pia in 1870 and annexed Castleford, Ancona, and the kingdom of Piemonte-Sardinia (North of Italy). This last kingdom became the ruling class of Italy, “Giacomo Biffi, wrote that the gravest error of the Piedmontese ruling class in the 1860’s was to underestimate “how deeply rooted Catholic faith is in the Italian soul, and its near consubstantiality with national identity”” (Graziano, 2010, p.121). The Pope didn’t legitimize this triumph.

Since Catholicism was so important, the regions annexed had an integration problem with the nation-State. “The catholic identity could be a deeply unifying element of the Italian nation, though hardly a really distinctive element because of the well-known supranationality of Catholicism” (Graziano, 2010). So, when the Pope didn’t accept Italy as a State, a new problem for the construction of national-State identity appeared. Catholic identity existed even before the country was unified and it “benefited from having strong and clear identities, which were even more salient in contrast to the governing powers, which lacked any clearly defined personality” (Graziano, 2010, p.28).

Later, due to the forced unification and annexation of States, the north-south problem developed. This also led to harsh wars between the Italian army and the southern (Mezzogiorno) “peasants”, which made it a hostile nation-State for these new Italians that based the war on misconceptions between regions. The conditions in the Mezzogiorno worsened after the forced unification from the kingdoms of the north, the south didn’t even have a role in the affairs of the new state (Graziano, 2010, pg.114). Because of the lack of State institutions and understanding of the South, the Mafia developed as a group that protected the goods of landowners. The differences and problems between North and South were marked between 1880-1910 (Molnar, 2010). It wasn’t
until World War I that Italians from every region were united at the fronts of the war and the Italian language was the only way of communicating, and dialects were left aside.

In 1922, Benito Mussolini became Prime Minister, he “believed it possible to found a collective Italian identity on the ideas of Italy as a great power” (Graziano, 2010, pg.149). He later signed the Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran pact) with the Vatican in 1929. Their ideas at time converged and they achieved a type of citizenship because of the effect they had on mass society. Mussolini also created projects to mitigate the disparity between regions, creating institutions and hospitals for the south, since the north was more developed. Fascism also achieved the alphabetization of the south, an industrialization project and a war against the Sicilian mafia (Sueiro, 2014), known as Cosa Nostra. “Fascism represented the most coherent attempt to create an Italian civil religion-a homogenous body of values, feelings and behaviors to be shared among all the peoples of the peninsula” (Graziano, 2010, pg.145). Though, it must be noted that the resistance, anti-fascist parties, wanted to have no identification with the regime, specially during World War II when Mussolini allied with Germany. Later, king Victor Manuel III incarcerated Mussolini (Italia en Guerra, s.f.).

In 1944, Italy was transitioning from fascism to a free country. After the World War II, political parties start having conflicts, on how the State should be and the made a referendum to determine how the constitution should be in 1946 (Brini, 2001). Part of the south and center were in favor of the monarchy, since the Partisan Movement was for the north. The Movement Uomo Qualunque was impulsed in the south, which was leaded by the mafias that supported the monarchy (Verbitsky, 2007). Though, farmers in the south voted for the Republic. In the north only landowners and Catholics, that had a link with the royal house voted for the monarchy.

Additionaly, Italy never left behind its foreign dependency. “During the 1950’s... Italy was the most receptive country in Europe to American cultural offerings” (Graziano, 2010, pg.164). During the cold War, the South had a communist ideology while the North had a capitalist one. The North developed banks and companies, while the South had unskilled labor and low salaries (Centro di Economia e Politica Industriale, University of Bologna, 1988). An industrial national policy was created to mitigate the gap between regions, offering industrialization for the south, in
the 70’s, which led to an economic success. “Italian success … provided by the development period 1945 to 1975 (the so-called Trente Glorieuses, the glorious thirty) and … integration into the European market” (Graziano, 2010, pg.171).

Afterwards, Bettino Craxi became Prime Minister in 1983 and so, Italy started having a closer relationship with Europe. Italians felt that “national pride could legitimately be displayed” (Graziano, 2010, pg.191). In 1992 while Carlos Ciampi was Prime Minister the Maastricht Treaty was signed, and Italian identity officially had to define itself regarding a “European citizenship”. This made it clearly evident that “foreign policy makes Italy more than Italy makes foreign policy” (Graziano, 2010, pg.197).

In 1996, the Northern League was created, which wanted cutbacks in the economic aid given to the south, it wanted to eradicate migration from the south to the north and it promoted a critical position against the European Union (Libertad Digital Política, 2014). In 2001, Ciampi, now Presidente of the Italian Republic established federalism, which led to a reform of the State. This reform cutback the economic aid transferred from the north to the center and south, like the Northern League wanted. Thus, this created a greater distancing between the regions (Gatto, 2012, pp.21-22).

Under this scenario, the question arises as to how the Italian State is defined, based on an identity of “self” from the co-constituted identity between the north and the south of Italy, and an identity of the “other” from its diplomatic relationship with the European Union; to grasp the implications of the construction of the creation of Italian identity. So, the question for the development of this article is, how does the identity of the north and south of Italy and the diplomatic relation with the European Union affect the construction of Italian nation-State identity between 2008-2014?
HYPOTHESIS

The construction of an Italian nation-State identity between 2008-2014 is affected by two characteristics, one internal and one external. The first is determined by the identity co-constituted between the north and the south, that which through a process of symbolic interaction shaped the identity of each “self” and of each “other”, and therefore, of the Italian nation-State. This identity of the north and the south is identified from the cultural practices of each region, the socioeconomic roles of each region, and the declarations and discourses proclaimed by political-social actors. The external characteristic will be evidenced by Italy’s role in its diplomatic relationship with the European Union, in which there is a process of symbolic interaction: Italy defines itself regarding a “other” actor, the European Union. This process can be evidenced from joint activities developed between the EU and Italy, such as cooperation projects that create, modify and/or destroy the roles of Italians, the declarations that proclaim a European citizenship, and the discourses of social actors which affects Italy’s nation-State Identity.

The 2008-2014 time period is chosen since, the 2008 economic crisis affected the role of each State in the European Union. Also, because in 2011 the Prime Minister was changed, after a long reign of Berlusconism government. And, additionally, because of the change in the ideals of social actors, such as the Northern League.

JUSTIFICATION

This article will explain how the identities of two regions within the same Nation-State affect their own identity construction and how they identify each other; and how a state identity is created because of this and a relationship with an external actor. In the academic field, this concrete case study will observe and expose both internal and external characteristics that create a nation-State identity. As a result, for International Relations and Political Science, it’s a case study that analyzes how different characteristics of identity converge; how political-social actors and political discourse can affect a country that has a historical internal division and at the same time an external “other” that affects its identity; and how due to international phenomena this internal and external identity changes.
METHODOLOGY

This case study will use a qualitative methodology, since it supports an interpretation, narration and research of a State’s identity. The information gathering mechanisms will be documentary; principally, archive work obtained from academic journals of International Relations and Sociology, as well as reports from the European Union; and discourse analysis. Discourse analysis will thrust this research, particularly the understanding of how political and social actors affect the identity of a Nation-State.

The primary sources will be academic articles and books. Within these are Alexander Wendt’s texts, such as: "Social Theory of International Politics", "Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of Power Politics" and "Collective identity formation and the international state". Additionally, a book that complement the understanding of Italy as a nation-State, Manlio Graziano's " The Failure of Italian Nationhood: The Geopolitics of a Troubled Identity ". For secondary sources, academic articles and newspaper articles on identity in the construction of the Italian Nation-State will be used. As well as, reports and texts regarding the relationship of the European Union with Italy between 2008-2014.
CHAPTER ONE: INTERNAL IDENTITY, THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

To understand the Construction of the Italian State, both of its regions must be understood, the North and the South, and an important internal characteristic: political discourse. In both regions, there are important actors that define the regions Identity, and Italy’s identity for that matter. The purpose of this chapter is to understand how Italy’s identity has been formed on an internal level, due to the roles and declarations made by important political actors of both regions. This chapter consists on analyzing how political discourse and roles of influential social-political groups affect the north and the south of Italy’s identity, and therefore, how these political actors define Italy’s internal political identity between 2008-2014.

The most important political figure in Italy since the 1990’s was Silvio Berlusconi, four-time Prime Minister of Italy. His reign is known as Berlusconism, which ended on November 2011. For this article, it is important to understand his time in power, since “Today, it is possible to describe “Berlusconi-ism” as the most recent version of this country’s autobiography” (Graziano, 2010). He even had an alliance in 2006 with the Lega Lombarda-Lega Nord ("Lombard League–Northern League").

On the other hand, to understand the South it is necessary to ponder on the Mafia, especially Cosa Nostra (The Sicilian Mafia), Ndrangheta (The Mafia in Calabria) and Porta Nuova (A Mafia clan in Palermo). Communities in the South of Italy identify with these groups not because of its criminal and black market activities, but because they provide social welfare, and they appear to care for the population and territory in the South. As will be argued later, the Mafia groups political discourse and role clearly and directly affects the south’s identity.

Additionally, it’s important to consider social and cultural symbolic interactions, such as music. Thus, in this chapter, two songs from two different artists will have be analyzed because they show how Italians in the south identify regarding the Italian identity and unification.

Now, to understand Italy as a nation, it is necessary to mention Giorgio Napolitano or Re Giorgio (King Giorgio) since he served as President from May 2006 to January 2015 “representing the
unity of the State and the Nation” (Nevola, 2011, p.1). His role as President directly binds together Italy’s identity, reducing differences between the north and the south, and focusing on the construction of an identity of Italy. In his book, Il patto che ci lega (The Pact that Binds Us Together), there are twenty public speeches made by him between May 2006 (the inaugural presidential address to Parliament) and October 2009 that directly lead to a national identity construction;

We thus find speeches that move along a two-track political discourse. The first track is that of ‘memory’ (why are we a democratic nation and what has made us such?); the second is that of ‘reflection’ (in what spirit should we understand the problems of our democratic nation, and how should we act to safeguard the value of national unity and democratic quality?) (Nevola, 2011, p.3).

Lastly, Mario Monti must be mentioned as he was an academic, economist and European Commissioner that later became the Prime Minister of Italy from November 2011 to April 2013; whom achieved this role due to his close relationship to Napolitano. Monti’s technocratic government started to focus not only on an internal identity, but on an external identity with the European Union.

So, to start this research, it is necessary to understand the phenomenon of Berlusconismo, which started in the 1990’s when Berlusconi went from being a successful businessman to the Prime Minister of Italy. His success was without a doubt due to his techniques of ideological propaganda based on a mobilization of newer media channels of political communication (Barisone, 2012, p.199). He also used his own television channels to attract attention from Italians, even other television channels became interested in his topics, which led to him commanding the entire mass media system. Therefore, it is important to mention that in the 2008 campaign in which he won, “81% of the voters got news from the television” (Mancini, 2011, p.36). This way he built a charismatic leadership, especially because he owned television stations he knew exactly what Italians would respond to, he started creating this political character of himself based on what Italians are and what they preferred. “Berlusconi is not just the owner of television channels, he is television, in particular he is commercial television – with its culture, values, discourses, practices, aspirations” (Mancini, 2011, p.21). The process of symbolic interaction is achieved by television since “television tends to reduce the distance between the actor (the leader) and the spectator (the citizen)” (Barisone, 2012, p.201).
The notion of language as capital, which is therefore a form of symbolic power relates to… the fact that what Berlusconi says becomes news, not only in his own sphere of power but also beyond; and secondly, the power of the press to inculcate its ‘market’, that is, its readers” (Filmer, 2014, p.70).

Italian media started using the term Berlusconism in the 2000’s, in 2010, Beppe Serverning, a leading Italian journalist said that Berlusconi was the belly of the Italians, “he has transferred the dreams, the aspirations of many Italian citizens into a political programme and a political-symbolic apparatus” (Mancini, 2011, p. 24). This means that Berlusconi allows Italy’s identity to be a specific understanding of roles, his role and the role Italians play in the identity of the country. His political interest directly depended on the interaction between the interests and identities of Italians.

“Citizens’ exposure to the mass media generates a complex of symbols, values, dreams, aspirations within politics is asserted” (Mancini, 2011, p.51). So, television is a political apparatus that allows political declarations and representations to be sent to citizens, and in this way, a process of constant symbolic interaction is assured. Pierre Musso, philosopher and doctor in political science in 2008 affirmed that Berlusconi’s policies were constructed on the relationship with citizens (Mancini, 2011, p.52). Therefore, the role he played with citizens was not just as Prime Minister but as a charismatic leader that they could look up to. So, Italy’s identity started to revolve around what was known as Berlusconism.

Paolo Mancini says that there is a commodification of politics, in which “Berlusconi, as his figure identifies the values the voter aspires to possess” (Mancini, 2011, p.25). This includes the loss of traditional values acquired after the post-war era and newly acquired values with Berlusconi, like wealth and his lifestyle, which is called lifestyle politics by Mancini. Berlusconi even said in an interview: “Why do my fellow citizens like me so much? Because the largest part of Italians would, fundamentally, wish to be like me” (Mancini, 2011, p.24). He knew his role in society, he knew how this constant process of symbolic interaction with the citizens defined him, and thus defined Italy. “Berlusconi represents … a specific set of values, images and dreams that connect everyday life to politics and have little to do with the set of motives that used to determine political participation” (Mancini, 2011, p.8).
Berlusconi’s party after 2007, was *Il Popolo della Libertà* (PdL) which demonstrates how Italy is organized, it is a clear representation of how Italy’s politics are managed and the process of symbolic interaction between the people and the State. Since, the party had a “decentralized diffused organization, nor any important decision making-structure… weak organization… no fixed procedures for the decision-making process and very weak intermediary bodies between the leader and party members and voters” (Mancini, 2011, p.12). Thus, the importance of the party is directly given to his personality, since he represents Italians and who Italians want to be.

The very weak structure of his party forces a focus on his personality, while the decision-making processes of both the party and the government, together with most of the symbolic values with which the party identifies, are also centered on him (Mancini, 2011, p.12).

On the other hand, Berkley’s Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs determines that in 2009 “Approximately 90 percent of Italians consider themselves to be Roman Catholics” (McCormick, 2009). Berlusconi used this fact to his favor. One of his most common nicknames was: L’uomo della provvidenza, which literally means the man touched by god (Mancini, 2011, p.15) and showed him as the savior of the country, the person Italians can look up too and that he will resolve their problems. This type of relationship to the religion gave him a symbolic power. For this same reason, *Cosa Nostra* maintained a strong religious connection with the Catholic Church.

In 2008, Michel Greco´s (a known Mafia boss, whose nickname was *Il Papa*, The Pope) funeral was being held, the father of the community announced to the community that a mass and procession would be held “in hour of their beloved brother” (Merlino, 2014, p.69). The police commissioner prohibited the public funeral, but the whole town gathered outside Greco’s home and stood there in silence, showing their respects.

Thus religious processions become means for the organization to reaffirm itself periodically and for the mafia leaders to assert their authority. The more social actors are able to “bind” the audience to themselves, the more prestige and authority they will gain over it… (Merlino, R., 2014, p.124).

In July 2012 Alessandro D’Ambrogio, mafia boss of *Porta Nuova* faction in Palermo, had one of the most important roles in the annual festival of Our Lady of Mount Carmel, carrying the statue of the Madonna. This meant that he had a key symbolic role in the religious ritual. This honor was iconic of deference and the link to the community. The devotion and respect shows how mafia
bosses and members used cultural practices to create processes of symbolic interaction with the people, by relating to them and being part of their most important events. Moreover, this led to a control and authority over the community. The Mafia could interpret traditions and social surroundings and use it in their actions, or performances to the public. The identifiable link between the people and the Mafia marks the existence of a relationship, outside of criminal activity and submerged in important social events. Furthermore, this shows basic constructivism where “actors act based on the meanings that objects have for them” (Wendt, 1996. p.50).

On June 22nd 2014, Pope Francis excommunicated all mafia members, which marked the Catholic Church’s anti-mafia stance. That same year, D’Ambrogio was in prison, and during the same festival mentioned above, the procession stopped in front of the funeral home of his family, the statue of the Madonna stood there for nearly five minutes (Merlino R., 2014, p.125). This was a clear public deference despite the sanctions imposed by the Vatican, showing the loyalty people had to D’Ambrogio and how they followed his ideas.

The mafia immerses itself social-cultural practices and ritual interactions, that lead to the creation of roles and rules. “The interactions between mafia bosses in religious processions and the members of the community represent a clear example of rules of conduct, specifically rules of deference and demeanor” (Merlino R., 2014, p.125). Also, there are other symbols present, interpersonal ones like solutions, acts of affection from the population to the mafia bosses. Therefore, an identity is formed in some regions of the South, based on a process of symbolic interaction in which roles, practices, declarations and rules are evident, and social legitimization is marked.

The 'Ndrangheta’s role as an intermediary -- from job provider to lender of last resort -- dates back to the creation of Italy 150 years ago, when a northern king conquered the south. The mob has long cultivated a warped sort of colonial mentality where the state is considered a foreign occupier (Scherer & Piscioneri, 2015).

As can be seen in Calabria, the Ndrangheta’s role is constant throughout history, people identify more with it than with the Italian State. In this region, its normal to see this mafia as a job provider, a lender, and an arbitrator in business. But, contrary to common belief, the Mafia is not the only
representative of the South, for example in 2013 people protested La Camorra ‘s (The Mafia in Naples) practices, since they illegally contaminated the territory (BBC News, 2013).

Italy’s identity is constantly undermined, and undetermined. But, Berlusconi considers points that are common between the North and the South, like “the low level of civic culture and the strong dependence on television by a large part of Italian population” (Mancini, 2011, p.34). Therefore, his political discourse expressed his role as Prime Minister, which directly influences Italy’s identity, the north and the south. The division between the north and the south is erased on a social-political level with Berlusconi. Both regions where very pro-Berlusconi in the polls, because Berlusconi had a political alliance with the Northern League and a close relationship with the Mafia.

In 2008, the Northern League was not focused directly on a division between north and south, but on a separation from Europe and foreign influences. In the same year, one of Berlusconi’s promises was to favor tax revenue where it was collected. This was a key issue for the Northern League, since it believed that too much tax money flows from the north to the south, to better their economy (Lyman, 2008), as they have argued since 1996.

After 2008, the Northern League expanded to the regions of Central Italy, due to the cultural and close identity these had with what the League represented, like: “a fight against the welfarism of Southern Italy; the creation of a Po Valley identity; opposition to immigration” and “values of labour, equality and solidarity” (Barbieri, 2012, p.278). One of the biggest preoccupations of Italy, in the 2008-2014 time period was the growing number of immigrants and how this is directly related to crime and safety issues (which led to more people identifying with the Leagues objectives. “This allowed the League to assume a position as the defender of local communities” (Barbieri, 2012, p.280). Since, most of the population felt that immigrants were a danger, so the League used this discourse to its advantage, to gain more followers. As mentioned before interests and identities depend on interactions inside the State.

In addition, the League had a role as the protector of the community, meaning that people in the North identified with security. They created security patrols throughout Northern Italy, which were
a key publicity tool in campaigning (Globalsecurity.org, 2014). It’s important to note that this protection was only offered in the North of Italy, in addition to neighborhood watch groups, the South wasn’t at all influenced. Therefore, the identity with which the party was born, was still quite evident, and their role as protector and security was established for the northern and central regions.

So as seen with the Northern League´s actions, where the government lacks, other actors take its place, in the south of Italy, the Mafia has had a social role for centuries, representing security and protection, apart from organized crime. This social role of protection and identification between the mafia and the communities have always been based on a need, and a process of symbolic interaction in which the state is not present and the people have needs, so the Mafia fills in the gap, like evidenced above with the Northern League.

The Mafia influence in the south is determined on a political and social matter, that contributes to the division between north and south. “Dino (2012) points to the Cosa Nostra family as the provider of identity, and explains that the organization often actively discourages individuality … to strengthen its own interests” (Anzalone, 2013). The Mafia bases the process of symbolic interaction on family, making it impossible for southerners to trust others, divide and conquer. When the state fails the people, the mafia takes more control and representation for the south. State incapacity is one of the principal factors that determine the route of response to the Mafia with the help of civil society and rural community (Cayli, 2014, p.13).

Moreover, the European elections of 2009 and the regional elections of 2010 and 2013 had both had a high percentage of ratings for the Northern League, not only due to the instability of Berlusconi´s government and the growing number of non-EU immigrants, but also due to the globalization process. These facts are all examples of how Italians identified with these ideals and so consequently voted for the League.

… many people voted for the League to emphasize the lack of representation of the territory and to give an aggressive form to a certain accumulation of social demands. A sort of symptomatic vote, in which expectations of order (social/territorial) mix with desires for vindication (of the peripheries towards the centers) and identity patterns… (Andrelini, 2009).
Furthermore, interviews where realized to secretaries in four regions that make up the Red Belt, which is the Northern Leagues political power zones: Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria and The Marches. The provinces where interviewed in Barbieri’s work, where he determined six principal reasons for people identifying with the Northern League: fear for their material wellbeing due to the economic crisis (post-2008), antipathy towards other political parties, security concerns (safety and immigration), negative idea of the government, mayors of the provinces linked to the League, and anti-political protest (Barbieri, 2012, p.285). All these issues where political and economic issues that the League declared in political statements, which were issues in their discourse that people in the Red Belt and even the White Belt (usually central region that historically has been linked to Catholicism and the Pope) could directly identify with and relate to, since they had common interests. Therefore, interests and identity are once again connected. This led to an increase of votes from 4.6% in 2006 to 8.3% in 2008 in political national elections, 10.2% in the 2009 European elections and 13.3% in regional elections in 2010 (see Figure 1) (Barbieri, 2012, p.281); which was clear evidence that people in the North and even central regions identified with the Northern League’s ideals and political discourse, and hence, voted for them.

In 2011, Berlusconi resigned as Prime Minister, since he had political and economic scandals. At the same time, Giorgio Napolitano choose Mario Monti as senator for life, which is in his constitutional power. But Napolitano had a different, defined role from Berlusconi:

Napolitano’s principal concern: to ‘remind’ Italians (ordinary citizens, political and social forces, and the institutions) that they constitute a political community, a democratic nation held together by a political ‘pact’ (republican, constitutional, liberal-democratic). His main purpose, therefore, is to remind Italians of the ‘pact that binds us together’ (Nevola, 2011, p.4).

It’s important to mention that Giorgio Napolitano as President of The Republic made a speech to the European House in memory of the 150 years of Italian Unification, in 2011. Napolitano, seen as one of the most important figures of Italy in this speech said:

But in celebrating the experience of the Risorgimento and its victorious conclusion, and in retracing the long route followed in the united Italy’s subsequent 150 years, we have not concealed or played down the burden posed by the underlying problems that we have failed to resolve as we developed. We have not hidden or underplayed the contradictions that have not been eliminated, or the persistent imbalances and tensions in the institutional, economic and social fabric of our country (Napolitano, 2011).
This speech marked exactly what the representative of Italy observed in his country, that a unified Italy doesn’t exist. This discourse evidences that one of the principal figures of Italy, President Giorgio Napolitano, whom is in favor of unification, knows for a fact that the country has failed to do this, even in his presidency. His role as President in the speech is also determined, as he directly exposes how Italy as a nation believes that they are not unified, they have social and economic imbalances between regions and tensions with State institutions, both in the north and in the south. Unfortunately, this is a wide spread belief around Italy, evident in its co-constitution and both historic and everyday processes of symbolic interaction between regions.

Also, it is important to note that the roles of the Mafia and the Northern League are not directed on separating a country, because there is a fault of unification in Italy, but this doesn’t mean there is no Italian identity. Thus, this means the state lacks power in both regions and has not been able to consolidate the country and the people’s needs, even though Italy has had a unitary goal since the XIX century. The identity in the north and the south is created on a constant symbolic interaction with the direct representatives in each region. The distance with the “other” region in the 21st century is not marked on aversion between regions, but mostly on the different social-economic factors in each, which has been cultivated through time.

Despite the widespread idea of an atavistic and profound deficit in national identity, and despite the rise of political-cultural movements that challenge Italian unity and national identity, President Napolitano proclaims that Italy has always possessed a unitary spirit and has always recognized the bonds of national belonging. (Nevola, 2011, p.8).

In contrast, to this belief of unity as positive element in the State of Italy, Eddy Napoli (pseudonym of Eduardo de Crezcenzo), a famous Italian singer from Rome, in 2011 released a song named Malaunità, in which he blames the Unification attempts throughout history for the current problems of the Mezzogiorno. The song questions Italian brotherhood (differentiating the north and the south) and shows indifference to the flag, since this is not a symbol of unity. Thus, Eddy shows that the south and north are different, that there is no common identity. The lyrics even say: “Oè! … e si frato tu a mme?! E nun dirme che r’è ‘sta bandiera, pecchè nun tengo niente ‘a vedè!” (Messina, 2015, p.7) which means: Hey!... are you really my brother?! And don’t tell me about this flag, cause’ I haven’t had anything to do with it! (Messina, 2015, p.7). Most people in the Mezzogiorno identify with this type of rejection to the North.
In addition, Tueff (pseudonym of Federico Flugi), a napoleon singer, also released a hit song in 2014 that showed the discontent of the South with the North, called *Fratelli d’Itaglia* (Brothers of Striptease), named this way as in to designate a name for how the South has been colonized by the North and stripped from everything. He felt that Italians were not his brothers and claimed that the South is his nation, in interviews he even proclaims how this discourse in his song represents common beliefs in Naples and its surroundings, how people in the south could identify to these songs. The lyrics of the song say: “Ma quali frati d’Italia? Nun simmu frati pe ‘sta nazione […] Il meridione è la mia nazione, Napoli capitale” (Messina, 2015, p.7) which means: Which brothers of Italy? We aren’t brothers of this nation […] The South is my nation, and Naples is the capital. (Messina, 2015, p.7). With this, it is possible to understand how Italy is separated into two.

Tueff clearly shows in his songs that Italians in the south don’t feel united to the north, that there isn’t a brotherhood, nor a common nation identity. Tueff’s discourse is based on his belief that “writing books like songs are acts which can help to regain possession of their identity” (Flugi aka Tueff, 2014). Correspondingly, he shows how Italians in the South feel, how they identify regarding the South itself and Italy as a nation-State. Identity in the South is therefore constantly based on the process of symbolic interaction, a co-constitution with the north, using language and other forms of symbolic exchange.

After Berlusconi resigned, Mario Monti was asked to form a cabinet, and became the Prime Minister of Italy in 2011 until 2013. In his keynote address to the Senate, he spoke of his principal goal: national commitment which he created to deal with a serious emergency in a unified and constructive spirit (Cossiri & Di Cosimo, 2012, p.44). Monti tried to unite the country, but his unification was different to Berlusconism. Principally, his attention was drawn forward to European Union, and how to solve Italy’s economic problems, avoiding the resent to Europe after the economic crisis.

In 2013, regional elections were held and the League won in the north with Roberto Maroni. His campaign underlined serious issues like the economic crisis, unemployment and small business man problems (Passarelli, 2013, p.2), as did Berlusconi in his government since a large part of Italian families are small and medium businessman. Hence, he tried to relate to the population.
Maroni wanted to end the League’s usual racism identifier and the idea of a sub-national identity, converting the League into a more inclusive party, and succeeded evidently since other regions supported his government. This is one of the first achieved attempts of a unification, in Italy, based on political discourse and common interests to a political-social actor.

After Maroni, in 2014 Matteo Salvini became the leader of the party, and impulse this unification while abandoning the topics on federalism, regionalism and independence of central-northern Italy. So, Salvini started a campaign in the whole country, not just the north, focusing on being an anti-EU party, that will fight for Italian emancipation from the process of European integration, by becoming a real national party. “This required an intensive campaign in the southern Italian regions, which would allow the territorial expansion of the League” (Vampa, 2017, p.4). The slogan in central-southern regions was “Noi con Salvini” (Us with Salvini), declaring nationalism based on a political strategy, and it was the first time that the Northern League played a role of responsible party in the South. As Berlusconi, Salvini obtained followers due to his charisma and populist views.

Consequently, with Salvini it is possible to speak of a national identity, a national unification in Italy, based on a political view against Europe, especially the European Union, which will be explained in chapter two of this document. The possibility for this new identity was clearly based on the role of responsibility, the anti-EU and national unification declarations and the symbolic interaction between the Northern League and the southern regions.
The Failure of Italian Nationhood: The Geopolitics of a Troubled Identity by Manlio Graziano is a book that explains how historically Italy had failed to become a nation but he also says that:

Indeed, if the lack of an effective national identity could have been a handicap for Italy in the past, in the present transition of the European Union-states toward entrusting increasing shares of sovereignty to the European Union, Italy might suffer less and be better equipped to live under a “glocal” regime: global institutions on the one side and local governments on the other side (Graziano, 2010).

Italy’s identity has had a clear influence from Europe, especially the European Union (EU) and the decisions taken in it by different political leaders. Monti realized this when he was a commissioner, and when he was elected Prime Minister. He directly focused on the EU because he knew that after the 2008 economic crisis, Italy’s identity and his role was affected by the debt crisis and the Eurozone. In 2008, before the crisis affected the country about 69.2% of Italians identified with Europeanism (Serricchio, 2012, p.117). Italy started transforming itself from a country identified with the European Union’s project of integration and identity to Euroscepticism, because of the political discourse and the role the country played in the crisis. In 2009, the European Election Studies data, only 60% of Italian’s identified themselves with European identity (Serricchio, 2012, p.116).

Both Berlusconi and Monti criticized the French and German decisions, which reflected Italians ideas. Why? Italy was in a sore spot due to the crisis, where wages went down and economy was affected. Both leaders had to represent a country in which people could identify with them, so they did. Berlusconi knew he couldn’t change this fact, and started blaming the EU for the problems Italians had on an economic level, configuring the EU as an enemy, specially France and Germany.

Monti on the other hand, was a diplomatic leader that reconnected with the EU, but he was looking for a way to mitigate the problems the country had, and therefore, his government also saw the EU as “the other” but not as a direct enemy. Berlusconi and Monti governments had different processes of symbolic interaction, Berlusconi’s consisted in blaming the EU and the EU pushing away from Italy, “the strong influence of the EU’s most powerful member states, that is, France and Germany, … had lost confidence in the Berlusconi government” (Cornelli, 2012, p.5). Monti’s on the
contrary, consisted in an approach to the EU so that Italy’s economic problems could be solved. Both cases are clear examples of the co-constitution between Italy and the EU.

In Autumn 2011, Eurobarometer revealed that Italians continued to view positively the EU (42%) (Cornelli, 2012, p.7). But, this shows that 58% of the population didn’t believe in the EU, due to the driven political discourse developed since Berlusconi’s government. ‘Sacrifici’ (economic sacrifices) were increasingly asked to the citizens, and the first signs of discourse of deresponsabilization began to appear at the begging of the summer of 2011” (Trobbiani, 2013, p.32). These sacrifices were realized when Berlusconi was still in government, he blamed the EU for these sacrifices, so that Italians wouldn’t blame him, but this led to a shift in the belief of the European Union system, marking once again the EU as the “other”, as an enemy.

Consequently, Italians identity started shifting from a European one to an anti-EU identity that focuses on the country. So, Berlusconi used his media companies in the development of political discourse and identity, against the EU. A journalist of Il Giornale, Berlusconi’s family newspaper wrote “the world had understood Merkel’s tricks’ and ‘the selfishness of the Germans, who have benefitted from the crisis’ (Brunetta, 2012). So, Euroscepticism was created after 2008 with his government, differentiating the identity of Italy “self” and the EU as the “other”.

Now, the North and South have also developed identification and un-identification with the EU. “High levels of identification with Europe emerge in some of the rich, highly developed regions of the north such a Liguria, Tuscany and Piemonte, but also in one of the poorest of Italy’s regions, Calabria” (Serricchio, 2012, p.120). Calabria is in the South, therefore geographical location in Italy does not define its identity regarding Europe. Therefore, Italians perception of Europe was not dependent on a North-South divide, since there were regions in both zones that identified as European as can be seen in Table 1.

In the South, the subsides received by the EU defined the role the union had in the region. “Italians still see Europe as a source of benefits, for themselves and for their country” (Serricchio, 2012, p.131). The anti-Europeanism flow after 2008 is highly influenced by the European Union’s close relationship to Eastern Europe. Italians have perceived this as a shift of subsides from a European
Union country to “non-Europeans”. “The European Union’s policy of enlargement towards the East has reduced the share of Community subsidies coming to Italy” (Serricchio, 2012, pp.131-132). Thus, Italian’s saw this as a betrayal. So, in addition to the anti-European political discourse, the distancing of the EU had reinforced the Italian populations differentiation with the EU.

However, the European Commission’s national report on Italy defined that 48% of Italians consider their country’s EU membership as positive and 16% judge it as negative (European Commission’s Representation in Italy, 2009, p.2). The report also mentions that trust in the European institutions was growing in Italy. Italians blamed the European Union for the “sacrifices” they made but that doesn’t mean that they stopped considering themselves Europeans that trust the EU. The European Commission report stated that “Italians are mostly convinced that the EU is the best positioned to take effective actions against the effects of the financial and economic crisis” (European Commission’s Representation in Italy, 2009, p.3).

The report finalizes with a chapter on Identity. In this chapter, the Commission states that “68% of Italians say they feel European” (European Commission’s Representation in Italy, 2009, p.6). The European identity that Italian’s shared were based on democratic values, a common culture, social protection, common history, geography and entrepreneurship, according to the Commission.

Mario Monti’s government, unlike Berlusconi’s assured Italians that the that the EU was not at fault regarding the crisis. Therefore, through political discourse he influenced Italians; so, they didn’t distance themselves from a European identity after all.

At the end of 2014, a European cooperation project started to develop, called “culture emergenti”, in which an important festival in Italy would have a Youth Program, in which young artists will have full support of the EU. Collisioni is a festival in which there is an exchange between arts. “The project aims to promote cultural integration and exchange through the creation of a European network for the promotion of skills” (Secco, 2015). This was a way in which young adults could identify with a European identity, not only Italian identity. The cooperation project allowed a reinforcement of European culture in Italy, promoting transnationality inside the EU. Hence, it is
important to mention that Italians that identify with Europe vary, it depends on age, occupation and education (see Table 2). The identity of Italians is completely co-constituted with a European identity, therefore, to understand Italy’s national identity it is necessary to involve European identity, though the internal identity precedes.
DISCUSSION

Indisputably, this article agrees with Wendt’s findings on the construction of identity. As can be seen in this article, actors do acquire identities. Political actors in Italy have acquired an identity through political discourse, which is then spread to the Italian population so they can relate and identify with this identity as well, as clearly seen in Berlusconism. These political actors and groups have specific roles in the country. Hence, the people start identifying with the actor’s role, and their own role in Italy’s identity. On an internal level, there is a co-constitution between political actors and the people, and between the north and the south. Contrary to the belief that the North and the South define each other’s identity, I would say that political actors greatly influence this co-constituted identity, but at the same time, form a national identity, leaving aside this division of north-south; as seen with the new Northern League ideal created in 2014 by Matteo Salvini, Berlusconism, and Napolitano’s public speeches. Italy’s “expectations about self”, as Wendt would say, are clearly maneuvered by the government and media, Italians identified with what they saw on TV and believed to be true as is statically proven above in the Berlusconism era.

Now, the construction of the national-State identity of Italy is also evidenced by the historical process of symbolic interaction. But, for this research, this process was marked by the 2008 economic crisis, in which Italy redefined its role regarding the European Union. This research achieved the understanding of this process in which Italians acted upon this new role and therefore, redefined their national-State identity and their identity regarding Europe. This process of symbolic interaction is like Asael Mercado and Alejandrina Hernández is process of socialization, in which identity is marked by the social actors that compose it and how they socialize. İnac and Ünal contribution in this process is the idea of mutual understanding and reciprocity, which implies that Italy and the EU constantly define each other, as seen in both Berlusconi’s and Monti’s government.

Nevertheless, history is vital to understanding identity, it defines roles, and redefines them, in this case study this was the seed of Italian identity, though it wasn’t the stem of this research. Grossberg’s theory on identity is validated by this article, since the logic of temporality implies that identity changes over time, as seen in the transition of government from Berlusconi to Monti,
and the transition in the Northern League. The transition implied a change of State identity, and the effect on Italians implied a National-State identity change. The Northern League is a clear example of how identity changes due to new circumstances, like immigrants, which also demonstrates the other two logics named by Grossberg: individuality and difference. Hobsbawm’s idea of history affecting identity is a common idea found in this article, since the unification problems in Italy are historical facts that are maintained. This case study agrees with Bartelson, identity does crystallize historical practices, as can be seen in the songs of Tueff and Napoli.

Now differentiation in identity, is not only determined by borders as Gilberto Gimenez determined, and is a result of a constant process of symbolic interaction between the initial actor, Italy, and another, the EU. Also, differentiation can be formed internally, as seen between the Mafia and the Northern League.

Moreover, Alberto Melucci was correct, individuals do have an emotional involvement with a community, so therefore they identify with it, this is clearly evidenced in the Mafia’s relationship to the Southern communities, as well as the Northern League in the Red Belt and White Belt regions. Berlusconi and the Mafia also prove Andres Piqueras is theory, shared traits between social actors and members of a group, in this case region or country, do create an identity.

Alternatively, Cedermann, Daase and Tilly, affirmed that a nation-state’s identity is formed by its characteristics as a State, but in this case study this does not occur, Italy is mostly defined by discourse and political actors. So, Thomas Banchoff’s idea on how political elites describe and relate to friends and enemies, does affect identity. The Northern League and the Mafia clearly define friends and enemies, initially the League saw the South as the enemy, and later it was immigrants, the Mafia usually saw the government as the enemy, but with Berlusconi it became a friend. Matteo Salvini also determined that the South was no longer an enemy of the League in 2014, and he draught up plans that unified North and South. Though, as the Italian artists Eddy Napoli and Tueff have shown, through discourse the South doesn’t identify with an Italian national-State identity, since they don’t even feel that the North and the South can share an identity. So, Astrid Von Busekist should not discredit political discourse, since in this case, political and
social actors are the main characters of the country’s identity due to their discourse, and not because they delimit politics as she argues.

Furthermore, I would agree with Jonathan Mercer’s idea that identity is constructed because of anarchy. In an internal identity created through political discourse and political-social actors, there is anarchy, as can be seen in an attempted and achieved planification of ideas in speeches and socially accepted acts, in my opinion.

Apart from this, Geertz, Roseberry, Lechner y Zemmelman determined culture as a symbolic producer that affects understandings and politics, which is the case in Italy. This was clear in the Mafia’s involvement in religious festivities and Napolitano’s speech in 2011 on the 150 years of unification. As well as the songs produced by Eddy Napoli and Tueff.

In brief, theorists have debated on the characteristics of identity, but various elements can converge and contribute to a richer understanding. So, for this case study, Italy’s identity is certainly defined by the interests of political-social actors that express these interests and their roles through political discourse, and have a process of symbolic interaction in which these roles are redefined. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to affirm that these elements mentioned contribute to the understanding of the Italian nation-State identity.

Additionally, to these debates and theories, this research shows that different phenomena such as immigration and socioeconomic roles also define identity. Italy’s role in the EU was also defined by the socioeconomic standpoint that explained Italian population’s view of the EU between 2008-2014.
CONCLUSION

The construction of an Italian nation-State identity between 2008-2014 does have two characteristics, one internal and one external. The first is not necessarily determined by the identity of each region, the North and the South, since these can converge, due to political discourse and social actors, like Berlusconi, Napolitano and even the Northern League. But, this hypothesis can’t be discredited either, since there is an identity defined in the North that can be observed by a social-political actor like the Northern league, and in the South by some Mafias influence and role in the community, as well as social actors like Eddy Napoli and Tueff.

In the findings of this research we can understand that President Napolitano’s views don’t really unify the North and the South as he intended. Also, President Napolitano didn’t represent the South, as seen in the songs of Napoli and Tueff, where the south feels that the North and Unification itself is an enemy.

There is a process of symbolic interaction as mentioned, where each of these social-political actors shape the identity of themselves as Italian figures, and of each “other”. When Monti came into power, Berlusconi tried to reshape Monti’s and Napolitano’s identity, as did the Northern League before 2014 when it identified the South as an enemy, and as did the Mafia regarding the government. Therefore, yes, the internal identity of Italy is constructed by: the cultural practices of each region, the socioeconomic roles (that led to aversion on immigration in all of Italy) developed by the people of each region, and the declarations and discourses proclaimed by political parties and social actors.

However, the external characteristic also defines Italy’s identity, on an international level that directly affects its internal identity. The Monti government redirected Italy in the reshaping of a new process of symbolic interaction. Disregarding, the Berlusconi administrations process of symbolic interaction in which Berlusconi’s government with the European Union as an adversary. So, Monti’s role was to redefine and establish a diplomatic relationship. This new process was in fact achieved by cooperation projects between the EU and Italy, that established new roles. Although, this was not the principal component in this external characteristic, it was the Italians
declarations and proclamation of a European citizenship that was rerouted after the 2008 economic crisis, and Berlusconi’s and Monti’s political discourse towards the EU that also defined Italy’s national-State identity.
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APPENDIX


Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region of residence</th>
<th>European identity (mean)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Eta</th>
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<tr>
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Table 2.

Italian citizens and Europe: Social factors that define Italian’s identity with the European Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>European identity (mean)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>Eta</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>5.35</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-39</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>2.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>40-54</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>2.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>2.90</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 No education</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.03</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>2.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>2.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.62</td>
<td>2.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Still studying</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>2.24</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
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<td>Homemakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>2.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed or temporarily not working/retired</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>2.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fishermen</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>2.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent professionals (lawyers, doctors etc)</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shopkeepers, craftsmen, other self-employed</td>
<td>6.81</td>
<td>2.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business proprietors/owners</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>2.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed professionals (employed doctors, lawyers etc)</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>2.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior managers (company directors etc)</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>1.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle managers</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>2.64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other white-collar employees</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (unskilled) manual workers, servant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life satisfaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all/not very satisfied</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly/very satisfied</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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</tbody>
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