dc.creatorJaramillo Vidales, Paula 
dc.creatorCatagay, Kayi 
dc.creatorKlijn, Flip 
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-21T14:39:22Z
dc.date.available2015-09-21T14:39:22Z
dc.date.created2012-03
dc.date.issued2012-03
dc.identifier.citationJaramillo Vidales, P., Çâğatay, K., & Klijn, F. (2012). Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10842
dc.descriptionWe study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
dc.format.extent30 páginas
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofSerie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 119
dc.relation.isversionof1
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009381.html
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.ddc333.32
dc.subject.lembDistribución de tierras::Aspectos Económicos
dc.subject.lembTenencia de la tierra::Aspectos Económicos
dc.subject.lembEconomía política
dc.titleAsymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
dc.typebook
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía
dc.subject.keywordFairness
dc.subject.keywordStrategy-proofness
dc.subject.keywordIndivisible good
dc.subject.keywordLand restitution
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAlkan, A., G. Demange, and D. Gale (1991). Fair allocation of indivisible goods and criteria of justice. Econometrica 59, 1023–1039.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAndersson, T. and L. G. Svensson (2008). Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited. Mathematical Social Sciences 56, 350–354.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAndersson, T., L. G. Svensson, and Z. Yang (2010). Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages. Games and Economic Behavior 68, 428–442
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBarry, M. (2011). Land restitution and communal property associations: The Elandskloof case. Land Use Policy 28, 139–150.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBlacksell, M. and K. M. Born (2002). Rural property restitution in Germany’s new Bundesl¨ander: The case of Bergholz. Journal of Rural Studies 18, 325–338.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationClark, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11, 17–33.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFoley, D. (1967). Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Economics Essays 7, 45–98.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGrover, R. and M. F. B´orquez (2004). Restitution and land markets. mimeo. Oxford Brookes University.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGroves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica 41, 617–631.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationIb´a˜nez, A. M. (2009). El Desplazamiento Forzoso en Colombia: Un Camino sin Retorno a la Pobreza. Editorial Uniandes.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKominers, S. D. and E. G. Weyl (2011). Concordance among holdouts. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMishra, D., S. Sarkar, and A. Sen (2008). Land deals in Sarkar Raj: Perspectives from mechanism design theory. mimeo. Indian Statistical Institute.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSouthern, D. B. (1993). Restitution or compensation: The land question in East Germany. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42, 690–697.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSun, N. and Z. Yang (2003). A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism. Economics Letters 81, 73–89.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSvensson, L. G. (1983). Large indivisibles: An analysis with respect to price equilibrium and fairness. Econometrica 51, 939–954.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTadenuma, K. and W. Thomson (1995). Games of fair division. Games and Economic Behavior 9, 191–204.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationvan Boven, T. (2010). The United Nations basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law. New York, United Nations.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationVickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance 16, 8–37.
dc.format.tipoDocumentos
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia


Archivos en el ítem

Thumbnail

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

 

Reconocimientos: