Envíos recientes

  • What predicts corruption? 

    Colonnelli, Emanuele; Gallego, Jorge; Prem, Mounu; Gallego
    Using rich micro data from Brazil, we show that multiple popular machine learning models display extremely high levels of performance in predicting municipality-level corruption in public spending. Measures of private ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2019
  • Motivating bureaucrats with non-monetary incentives when state capacity is weak : Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru 

    Dustan, Andrew; Maldonado, Stanislao; Hernandez-Agramont, Juan Manuel
    We study how non-monetary incentives, motivated by recent advances in behavioral economics, affect civil servant performance in a context where state capacity is weak. We collaborated with a government agency in Peru to ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • End-of-Conflict Deforestation : Evidence From Colombia’s Peace Agreement 

    Prem, Mounu; Saavedra, Santiago; Vargas, Juan Fernando
    Armed conflict can endanger natural resources through several channels such as direct predation from fighting groups, but it may also help preserve ecosystems by dissuading extractive economic activities through the fear ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • The Geography of Repression and Support for Democracy : Evidence from the Pinochet Dictatorship 

    Bautista, María Angélica; González, Felipe; Martínez, Luis R.; Muñoz, Pablo; Prem, Mounu
    We show that exposure to repression under dictatorship increases support for democracy and contributes to regime change when a democratic window of opportunity arises. Studying the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Can Facebook Ads and Email Messages Increase Fiscal State Capacity? Experimental Evidence from Venezuela 

    Gallego, Jorge A.; Ortega, Federico
    Tax compliance is a big challenge in weakly institutionalized countries, in which citizens do not trust the State and prefer to evade. Can compliance be increased, and hence fiscal state capacity strengthened, using online ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • The Vertical Cooperative : An experiment on cooperation and punishment across networks 

    Fatas, Enrique; Melendez, Miguel Angel; Solaz, Hector
    We experimentally study punishment patterns across network structures, and their effect on cooperation. In a repeated public goods setting, subjects can only observe and punish their neighbors. Centralized structures (like ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations 

    Colonnelli, Emanuele; Prem, Mounu; Teseo, Edoardo
    In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public em- ployment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Preventing rather than Punishing: An Early Warning Model of Malfeasance in Public Procurement 

    Gallego, Jorge A.; Rivero, Gonzalo; Martínez, Juan
    Is it possible to predict corruption and public inefficiency in public procurement? With the proliferation of e-procurement in the public sector, anti-corruption agencies and watchdog organizations in many countries currently ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • The Discrete Charm of Nominal Illusion 

    Fatas, Enrique; Morales, Antonio J.
    We investigate the emergence and persistence of nominal illusion in an experimental entry game where firms must choose which local market to enter, then compete in prices. All local markets are equivalent in real terms and ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • The Political Economy of Patrons, Brokers, and Voters 

    Gallego, Jorge A.; Li, Christopher; Wantchekon, Leonard
    Formal models of political clientelism tend to focus on vote buying, the exchange of cash and goods for votes on election day. However, other components of the phenomenon, such as patronage, the exchange of public jobs and ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Killing social leaders for territorial control : The unintended consequences of peace 

    Prem, Mounu; Rivera, Andrés F.; Romero, Dario A.; Vargas, Juan Fernando
    We study the unintended consequences of the recent peace process in Colombia, that ended over five decades of internal armed conflict with the FARC insurgency. Using a triple differences empirical strategy, we show that ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • The Privatization Origins of Political Corporations 

    González, Felipe; Prem, Mounu; Urzúa I., Francisco
    We show how the sale of state owned firms in dictatorships may lead to the creation of political corporations operating in democracies. Using several novel datasets, we characterize the privatizations of the Pinochet regime ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Blessing a Curse? Institutional Reform and Resource Booms in Colombia 

    Gallego, Jorge A.; Maldonado, Stanislao; Trujillo, Lorena
    Is it possible to revert the resource curse through institutional reform? Evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between abundance of natural resources and economic growth, political stability, democracy, ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Investment and Market Structure in Common Agency Games 

    Roig, Guillem
    I study the incentives of a common buyer to undertake cooperative investment with a group of suppliers providing a homogeneous input. In my model, investment is not directed to increase the gains from trade but to enhance ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • A Theory of Armed Clientelism 

    Gallego, Jorge A.
    Armed clientelism is a particular form of patronage in which politicians and non-state armed groups establish a symbiotic relationship where the former provides economic resources, judicial protection, or other benefits, ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • The Value of Political Capital : Dictatorship Collaborators as Business Elites 

    González, Felipe; Prem, Mounu
    What is the value of political capital for individuals? Towards the end of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, military and civilian collaborators entered the business elite, controlling the largest and most important firms ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2018
  • Losing Your Dictator : Firms During Political Transition 

    González, Felipe; Prem, Mounu
    Can firms transfer distortions across political regimes? To answer this question, we use a novel dataset and a network analysis to study firms during Chile's transition to democracy. We find that firms with links to the ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2017
  • Does the market model provide a good counterfactual for event studies in finance? 

    Castro, Carlos
    Proporcionamos un marco de referencia que relaciona los métodos de estimación tradicionales de estudios de eventos en finanzas con una aproximación moderna a los estudios de eventos causales. Esta familia de estimadores ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2017
  • Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency 

    Roig, Guillem
    I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2017
  • Overlapping Networks of Credit and Control 

    Buchuk, David; Larrain, Borja; Prem, Mounu; Urzua I., Francisco
    Business groups are networks of firms connected by ownership links. We study the reaction of these networks to the 2008-9 crisis using a unique dataset of Chilean intra-group loans. Internal credit increases swiftly during ...
     Documento de trabajo. 2017