dc.creatorRoig, Guillem 
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-11T16:53:41Z
dc.date.available2017-10-11T16:53:41Z
dc.date.created2017-10-19
dc.date.issued2017-10-19
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/13810
dc.description.abstractIn many markets, firms produce and sell complementary components that form a product system. This paper studies the effects of compatibility in product advertisement and entry decisions in a differentiated product market. While advertising enhances the ability of consumers to mix and match components closer to their preferences, more advertising does not always generate larger welfare. In my model, an incumbent uses advertising to increase the prospects of market competition with the objective to deter potential entry. However, under some parameters, entry deterrence does not occur when products are made compatible. With compatible products, the incumbent either obtains large benefits from accommodation or equilibria when all consumers are aware of the existence of the available products emerge. In this latter case, the amount of advertising cannot be further expanded to protect the incumbent's monopolistic position. As a result, policies in favor of compatibility may encourage entry and generate larger levels of advertisement.
dc.format.extent45
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/015774.html
dc.subjectCompatibilidad del producto
dc.subjectPublicidad informativa
dc.subjectDisuasión de entrada
dc.subjectEstructura del mercado
dc.subject.ddc658.575
dc.subject.lembComportamiento organizacional
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo de nuevos productos
dc.subject.lembAnálisis de mercadeo
dc.subject.lembCampañas publicitarias
dc.subject.lembCompetencia económica
dc.subject.lembModelos econométricos
dc.titleProduct Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.subject.keywordProduct compatibility
dc.subject.keywordInformative advertising
dc.subject.keywordEntry deterrence
dc.subject.keywordMarket structure
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBagwell, K. and G. Ramey, 1987, Advertising and limit pricing, The Rand Journal of Economics. 19 59-71.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBagwell, K. 2007. The economic analysis of advertising. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. 3, Chapter 28
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBain, J. 1956 Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBaldani, J. P. and and R. Masson. 1981. Economies of Scale, Strategic Advertising and Fully Credible Entry Deterrence. Mimeographed. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationButters, G. 1977. Equilibrium distribution of sales and advertising prices. Review of Economic Studies 44(3) 465-491.
dc.subject.jelD21
dc.subject.jelD43
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL15
dc.contributor.gruplacGRUPO DE INVESTIGACIONES. FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA. UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO


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