dc.creatorRoig, Guillem
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-11T16:53:41Z
dc.date.available2017-10-11T16:53:41Z
dc.date.created2017-10-19
dc.date.issued2017-10-19
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/13810
dc.description.abstractIn many markets, firms produce and sell complementary components that form a product system. This paper studies the effects of compatibility in product advertisement and entry decisions in a differentiated product market. While advertising enhances the ability of consumers to mix and match components closer to their preferences, more advertising does not always generate larger welfare. In my model, an incumbent uses advertising to increase the prospects of market competition with the objective to deter potential entry. However, under some parameters, entry deterrence does not occur when products are made compatible. With compatible products, the incumbent either obtains large benefits from accommodation or equilibria when all consumers are aware of the existence of the available products emerge. In this latter case, the amount of advertising cannot be further expanded to protect the incumbent's monopolistic position. As a result, policies in favor of compatibility may encourage entry and generate larger levels of advertisement.es
dc.format.extent45es
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/015774.html
dc.subjectCompatibilidad del productoes
dc.subjectPublicidad informativaes
dc.subjectDisuasión de entradaes
dc.subjectEstructura del mercadoes
dc.subject.ddc658.575es
dc.subject.lembComportamiento organizacionales
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo de nuevos productoses
dc.subject.lembAnálisis de mercadeoes
dc.subject.lembCampañas publicitariases
dc.subject.lembCompetencia económicaes
dc.subject.lembModelos econométricoses
dc.titleProduct Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrencees
dc.subject.keywordProduct compatibilityes
dc.subject.keywordInformative advertisinges
dc.subject.keywordEntry deterrencees
dc.subject.keywordMarket structurees
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)es
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBagwell, K. and G. Ramey, 1987, Advertising and limit pricing, The Rand Journal of Economics. 19 59-71.es
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBagwell, K. 2007. The economic analysis of advertising. Handbook of Industrial Organization. Vol. 3, Chapter 28es
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBain, J. 1956 Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.es
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBaldani, J. P. and and R. Masson. 1981. Economies of Scale, Strategic Advertising and Fully Credible Entry Deterrence. Mimeographed. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University.es
dc.source.bibliographicCitationButters, G. 1977. Equilibrium distribution of sales and advertising prices. Review of Economic Studies 44(3) 465-491.es
dc.subject.jelD21es
dc.subject.jelD43es
dc.subject.jelL13es
dc.subject.jelL15es
dc.contributor.gruplacGRUPO DE INVESTIGACIONES. FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA. UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIOes


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