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Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations

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Colonnelli, Emanuele
Prem, Mounu
Teso, Edoardo

Fecha
2018-09-24

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Abstract
In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public em- ployment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.
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Patronage , Bureaucrats , Political connections , Public sector
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