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Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism

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dc.creatorCortés Cortés, Darwin
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-18T16:59:21Z
dc.date.available2015-09-18T16:59:21Z
dc.date.created2010-09
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I investigate the optimal level of decentralization of tasks for the provision of a local public good. I enrich the well-known trade-off between internalization of spillovers (that favors centralization) and accountability (that favors decentralization) by considering that public goods are produced through multiple tasks. This adds an additional institutional setting, partial decentralization, to the classical choice between full decentralization and full centralization. The main results are that partial decentralization is optimal when both the variance of exogenous shocks to electorate’s utility is large and the electorate expects high performance from politicians. I also show that the optimal institutional setting depends on the degree of substitutability / complementarity between tasks. In particular, I show that a large degree of substitutability between tasks makes favoritism more likely, which increases the desirability of partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism.eng
dc.format.extent34 páginasspa
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.citationCortés Cortés, D. F. (2010). Partial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritism. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10827
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economíaspa
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10827
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 89
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.ispartofSerie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 89spa
dc.relation.isversionof1spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/007933.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiaspa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcDe gobiernos locales
dc.subject.keywordAccountabilityeng
dc.subject.keywordMultitaskeng
dc.subject.keywordInternalization of spilloverseng
dc.subject.keywordSubstitutioneng
dc.subject.lembGobierno local::Modelos Econométricosspa
dc.subject.lembDescentralización en la gestiónspa
dc.titlePartial decentralization as a safeguard against favoritismspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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