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Political intervention in economic activity

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dc.creatorGilles, Enrique
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-17T15:30:44Z
dc.date.available2015-09-17T15:30:44Z
dc.date.created2010
dc.date.issued2010
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.eng
dc.format.extent36 páginasspa
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.citationGilles, E. (2010). Political intervention in economic activity. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10810
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10810
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 83
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo. No 83 (Junio 2010)spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/007180.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiaspa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1996). “The determinants of success of special interest in redistributive politics”. The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4, 1132-1155.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1995). “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, December, pp 856-866.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKornai, J´anos; Eric Maskin and G´erard Roland (2003). “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint”. Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 41, No. 4, December, pp 1095-1136(42).
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRobinson, James A. and Ragnar Torvik (2005). “A Political Economy Model of the Soft Budget Constraint”. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4274, October
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcProducción
dc.subject.keywordprobabilistic votingeng
dc.subject.keywordredistributioneng
dc.subject.keywordsurvival of inefficient firmseng
dc.subject.keywordpork barrelseng
dc.subject.lembEconomíaspa
dc.subject.lembPolítica económicaspa
dc.subject.lembClientelismospa
dc.subject.lembDistribución de la riquezaspa
dc.titlePolitical intervention in economic activityspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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