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Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

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Autores
Jaramillo Vidales, Paula
Kayi, Cagatay
Klijn, Flip

Fecha
2012-03

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Universidad del Rosario

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Resumen
Abstract
We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.
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Keywords
Fairness , Strategy-proofness , Indivisible good , Land restitution
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Jaramillo Vidales, P., Çâğatay, K., & Klijn, F. (2012). Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.