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Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

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dc.creatorJaramillo Vidales, Paula
dc.creatorKayi, Cagatay
dc.creatorKlijn, Flip
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-21T14:39:22Z
dc.date.available2015-09-21T14:39:22Z
dc.date.created2012-03
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWe study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.eng
dc.format.extent30 páginasspa
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.citationJaramillo Vidales, P., Çâğatay, K., & Klijn, F. (2012). Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10842
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economíaspa
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10842
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 119
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.ispartofSerie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 119spa
dc.relation.isversionof1spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009381.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiaspa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcEconomía de la tierra
dc.subject.keywordFairnesseng
dc.subject.keywordStrategy-proofnesseng
dc.subject.keywordIndivisible goodeng
dc.subject.keywordLand restitutioneng
dc.subject.lembDistribución de tierras::Aspectos Económicosspa
dc.subject.lembTenencia de la tierra::Aspectos Económicosspa
dc.subject.lembEconomía políticaspa
dc.titleAsymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraintspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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