Ítem
Acceso Abierto
Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities
| dc.creator | Bardey, David | |
| dc.creator | Cremer, Helmuth | |
| dc.creator | Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-10-02T17:12:54Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-10-02T17:12:54Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2011 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients. | eng |
| dc.format.extent | 40 páginas | spa |
| dc.format.medium | Recurso electrónico | spa |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.format.tipo | Documento | spa |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10952 | |
| dc.identifier.editorial | Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10952 | |
| dc.language.iso | spa | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.publisher.department | Facultad de Economía | spa |
| dc.relation.citationIssue | No. 105 | |
| dc.relation.citationTitle | Serie Documentos de trabajo. Economía | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Serie documentos de trabajo. No 105 (Agosto 2011) | spa |
| dc.relation.uri | https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/008848.html | |
| dc.rights.accesRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.acceso | Abierto (Texto completo) | spa |
| dc.rights.cc | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | spa |
| dc.source.instname | instname:Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.source.instname | instname:Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.source.reponame | reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR | spa |
| dc.subject.ddc | Administración general | |
| dc.subject.keyword | Two-Sided markets | eng |
| dc.subject.keyword | Common Network Externality | eng |
| dc.subject.keyword | Providersí remuneration schemes | eng |
| dc.subject.lemb | Economía del trabajo | spa |
| dc.subject.lemb | Médicos::Aspectos Económicos | spa |
| dc.subject.lemb | Salarios | spa |
| dc.subject.lemb | Administración hospitalaria | spa |
| dc.title | Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities | spa |
| dc.type | workingPaper | eng |
| dc.type.hasVersion | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | |
| dc.type.spa | Documento de trabajo | spa |
