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Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach

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dc.creatorZuleta, Hernando
dc.creatorVillaveces-Niño, Marta-Juanita
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-05T15:29:23Z
dc.date.available2015-10-05T15:29:23Z
dc.date.created2008-11
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractWe study economic conflicts using a game theoretical approach. We model a conflict between two agents where each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or neglect the truce. Under this setting, we use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game where agents commit to transfer a share of their output to the other agent (Sertel, 1992), and explain under which conditions a system of pre-donations can facilitate a truce. We find that for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, such that, the best strategy for both parties is Cease-Fire. However, in many cases there are no sufficient conditions for the scheme or pre-donations to be effective. We also analyze some limitations of this framework and extend the model in order to deal with some of these flaws. Finally, in order to illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results we briefly describe some of the circumstances that characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and different illegal groups.eng
dc.format.extent32 PÁGINASspa
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10963
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economíaspa
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10963
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 54
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.ispartofSerie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 54spa
dc.relation.isversionof1spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/005148.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiaspa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcEconomía
dc.subject.keywordConflicteng
dc.subject.keywordDistributioneng
dc.subject.keywordCease-Fireeng
dc.subject.keywordColombiaeng
dc.subject.lembSolución de conflictos::Modelos Matemáticosspa
dc.subject.lembTeoría de los juegosspa
dc.subject.lembEconomía::Modelos Matemáticosspa
dc.titleConflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approachspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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