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Research question of the Master's thesis

"Can the Effectiveness of the European Union's Military Crisis Management be Increased through Mechanisms of Pooling and Sharing?"

A single-case and concordance analysis of the European Union's military crisis management in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina".

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I. List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
AFBiH	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
AIFV/AAV/LAV	Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/ Amphibious Assault Vehicle/ Light Armoured Vehicle
Althea	EUFOR Althea: European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Amisom	African Union Mission in Somalia
AoO	Area of Operations
Atalanta	EUNAVFOR Somalia: European Union Naval Force Somalia
AU	African Union
AVPDs	Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachments
BAM	Bab El Mandeb
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Big Three	Germany, France and the United Kingdom
BMVG	Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Germany)
BPA	Berlin-Plus-Agreement
BpB	Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Germany)
CA	Concordance Analysis
CAR	Central African Republic
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CCM	Civil Crisis Management
CCMC	Comprehensive Crisis Management Concept
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CTF	Combined Task Force
CM	Crisis Management
DG MARE	Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DM-DRCP	Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
DW	Deutsche Welle (Germany)
EC	European Commission
ECoWAR	European Union Collaborative Warfare Capabilities
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EHAAB	European High Atmosphere Airship Platform
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Patrol Corvette
EPCo	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
ETCCEA	European Training Certification Centre for European Armies
EU	European Union
EUCAP Somalia	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
EUFOR	European Union Force

EUFOR CROC	European Union Force Crisis Response Operation Core
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Military Staff
EU NAVCO	European Union Naval Coordination Cell
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUPM BiH	European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Eurodrone	European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft System - MALE RPAS
EUROGENDFOR	European Gendarmerie Force
EU TMCC	European Union Training Mission Competence Centre
EUTM Somalia	European Union Training Mission in Somalia
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FSP	Foreign and Security Policy
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HARMSPRO	Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection
HoA	Horn of Africa
IC	International Community
IFOR	Implementation Force
IMI	Informationsstelle Militarisierung (Germany)
IRTC	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
IS	International Security
ISPA	International Security Policy Actor
IV	Independent Variable
JEIS	Joint European Union Intelligence School
LOTs	Liaison and Observation Teams
MCM	Military Crisis Management
MDSD	Most Different System Design
MF	Mandate Fulfillment
MM	Military Mobility
MNBN	Multinational Battalion
MPRA	Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft
MS	Member States (of the European Union)
MSCHOA	Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
MSTC	Maritime Security Transit Corridor
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NetLogHubs	Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations
OC	Organized Crime
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OI	Operational Involvement
P&S	Pooling and Sharing
PEM-MS	Politically, economically and militarily strong or ambitious member states (of the European Union)
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PC/RS	Republika Srpska
PCS	Political and Security Committee

RI-ESS	Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy
RS	Reaction Speed
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SeSi	Security Situation
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHADE	Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SP	Security Policy
TEU-L	Treaty of Lisbon
Thesis	Master's Thesis
UAS	Unmanned Aerial System
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UK	United Kingdom
UMS	Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
U.S.	The United States (noun)
US	United States (adjective)
WFP	World Food Programme
WKO	Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (Austria)

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IV. Summary in English

Since 2003, the European Union has the capability to conduct civilian and military crisis management operations. Within the last 18 years, it has succeeded in developing into a reliable international security policy actor. However, due to the persistence of international security threats and the ever-changing global security situation, the European Union is forced to constantly evolve and adapt in order to not lose its status and global influence. For this reason, this master's thesis addresses the following question: "Can the Effectiveness of the European Union's Military Crisis Management be Increased through Mechanisms of Pooling and Sharing? A single-case and concordance analysis of the European Union's military crisis management in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina". In order to answer this question comprehensively, the research design of the thesis is based on the combination of two different research concepts: multiple single-case study and comparative case study.

The multiple single-case study examines the EU's military crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia on the basis of four effectiveness factors - reaction speed, operational involvement, mandate fulfillment and sustainability. The focus is on the respective core military operations Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Atalanta (Somalia). However, since civilian and military crisis management cannot be sharply separated in practice, the embedding of both operations in the respective comprehensive crisis management concept of the EU will also be considered in the interest of a comprehensive coverage of both cases. In addition, the respective sister operations will also be included in the analysis. Based on this in-depth and comprehensive analysis, case-specific conclusions can be drawn on how to improve the effectiveness of EU military crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.

The comparative case study follows the logic of concordance comparison according to John Stuart Mill and is based on the results of the single case analyses on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. This analysis aims to identify those factors (independent variables) that had an influence on the dependent variable - effectiveness operationalized on the basis of reaction speed, operational involvement, mandate fulfillment and sustainability - in both cases under consideration. Based on this comparative analysis, conclusions can be drawn on how to improve the effectiveness of EU military crisis management as a whole.

Together, the multiple case analysis, which allows for case-specific conclusions, and the concordance analysis, which allows for generalizable conclusions, provide a complete and comprehensive answer to the research question underlying this master's thesis. In this context, I will elaborate that the EU is already using numerous 'Pooling and Sharing' mechanisms that have

positively influenced the effectiveness of its military crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. In addition, I will show that the EU is aware of the persistent problems in its comprehensive crisis management concept for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia and is already working on 'Pooling and Sharing' projects in the framework of PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) through which these problems can be alleviated. Finally, based on the results of the two single case studies and the concordance analysis based on them, I will propose a number of 'Pooling and Sharing' measures that could further increase the effectiveness of the EU's current military crisis management in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia as well as the effectiveness of EU's military crisis management as a whole.

V. Summary in Spanish

Desde 2003, la Unión Europea tiene capacidad para llevar a cabo operaciones civiles y militares de gestión de crisis. En los últimos 18 años, ha conseguido convertirse en un actor fiable de la política de seguridad internacional. Sin embargo, debido a la persistencia de las amenazas a la seguridad internacional y a la siempre cambiante situación de la seguridad mundial, la Unión Europea se ve obligada a evolucionar constantemente para no perder su estatus e influencia mundial. Por ello, esta tesis de máster aborda la siguiente cuestión: "¿Puede aumentarse la eficacia de la gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea mediante mecanismos de Pooling and Sharing? Un análisis de caso único y de concordancia de la gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea en Somalia y Bosnia-Herzegovina". Para responder a esta pregunta de forma exhaustiva, el diseño de la investigación de la tesis se basa en la combinación de dos conceptos de investigación diferentes: análisis de múltiples casos y estudio comparativo.

El 'análisis de múltiples casos' examina la gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea en Bosnia-Herzegovina y Somalia sobre la base de cuatro factores de eficacia: velocidad de reacción, implicación operativa, cumplimiento del mandato y sustantividad. La atención se centra en las respectivas operaciones militares centrales Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina) y Atalanta (Somalia). Sin embargo, dado que en la práctica la gestión de crisis civil y militar no pueden separarse tajantemente, la inclusión de ambas operaciones en el respectivo concepto completo de gestión de crisis de la Unión Europea también se considerará en aras de una cobertura completa de ambos casos. Además, se incluirán en el análisis las respectivas operaciones hermanas. Sobre la base de este análisis profundo y exhaustivo, pueden extraerse conclusiones específicas para cada caso sobre cómo mejorar la eficacia de la gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea en Bosnia-Herzegovina y Somalia.

El estudio comparativo de casos sigue la lógica de la comparación de concordancia según John Stuart Mill y se basa en los resultados de los análisis sobre Bosnia-Herzegovina y Somalia. En el marco de este análisis, se van a identificar los factores (variables independientes) que han influido en la variable dependiente – la eficacia operacionalizada sobre la base de la velocidad de reacción, la implicación operativa, el cumplimiento del mandato y la sustantividad – en los dos casos considerados. A partir de este análisis comparativo, se pueden extraer conclusiones sobre cómo mejorar la eficacia de la gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea en su conjunto.

Juntos, el ‘análisis de múltiples casos’, que permite obtener conclusiones específicas para cada caso, y el análisis de concordancia, que permite obtener conclusiones generalizables, proporcionan una respuesta completa y exhaustiva a la pregunta de investigación que subyace a esta tesis de máster. En este contexto, explicaré que la Unión Europea ya está utilizando numerosos mecanismos de ‘Pooling and Sharing’ que han influido positivamente en la eficacia de su gestión militar de crisis en Bosnia-Herzegovina y Somalia. Además, mostraré que la Unión Europea es consciente de los problemas persistentes en su concepto de gestión completo de crisis para Bosnia-Herzegovina y Somalia y que ya está trabajando en proyectos de ‘Pooling and Sharing’ en el marco de la PESCO (Cooperación Estructurada Permanente) a través de los cuales se pueden paliar estos problemas. Por último, basándome en los resultados de los dos estudios ‘single-case studies’ y en el análisis de concordancia basado en ellos, propondré una serie de medidas de puesta en común y reparto que podrían aumentar la eficacia de la actual gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea en Bosnia-Herzegovina y Somalia, así como la eficacia de la gestión militar de crisis de la Unión Europea en su conjunto.

1 Introduction

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) undertakes civil and military crisis management (CM) operations. Especially the civil crisis management (CCM) developed fast and gained great importance, but military crisis management (MCM) is the key to ensure international security (IS) (Reichinger, 2009: 141-143). In case a conflict escalates violently, it is crucial for any international security policy actor (ISPA) to be able to intervene militarily. That is why MCM capacities are essential for being recognized as a reliable ISPA (ibid.: 147-149). By now, the EU developed into such an ISPA alongside NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the UN (United Nations) (Gebhard, 2010: 14). However, being and remaining an ISPA are two different things as the IS situation and requirements keep changing. Therefore, remaining a reliable ISPA requires the constant adaptation of CCM and MCM to new challenges. The objective of this master's thesis (thesis in the following) thus is to evaluate in which ways the effectiveness of the EU's MCM can be increased. A feasible way to do so is Pooling and Sharing (P&S). At present, the EU is already practicing P&S, even though on a very limited level. However, the concept has a far bigger potential for the EU's MCM (European Parliament (EP), 2015: 5), hence the research question of this thesis is going to be: *"Can the Effectiveness of the European Union's Military Crisis Management be Increased through Mechanisms of Pooling and Sharing? A single-case and concordance analysis of the European Union's military crisis management in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina"*.

Both the research topic and the specific research question are highly relevant as the EU (not only in times of tight budgets) has an economic interest in conducting its MCM as effectively as possible in order to not strain the very limited resources. The research question is also topical. Due to Brexit, the EU has lost one of its militarily strongest members: the United Kingdom (UK). At the same time, one of the strongest opponents of further integration in the area of 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' (CFSP) and 'Common Security and Defence Policy' (CSDP) has left the EU. Hence, the Brexit is going to have a strong effect on the effectiveness of the EU's MCM (Brettner-Messler & Hauser, 2016: 8f & 14). Thus, an evaluation of the EU's MCM is not only unavoidable, but also the opportunity for reform. Former US President Donald Trump reduced the U.S. (United States) international military engagement (Krüger, 2019: n.p.) and demanded the EU to increase its autonomous military capabilities to be less dependent on US security guarantees under NATO (Beckmann & Kempin, 2017: 1-3). Under the newly elected US President Joe Biden (03.11.2020), the transatlantic tone has improved significantly (Deutsche Welle (DW), 2021: n.p.). Nevertheless, even under Biden, the U.S. will still have a strong interest in the EU increasing its autonomous military capabilities (DW, 2020a: n.p.). In addition, there are several further

incentives for the EU to increase its military capacities and international commitment such as the increasingly aggressive behavior of NATO member Turkey against Kurds in Syria. Considering the importance of this region for European security, the contemporary development threatens the EU's security interests (Krüger, 2019: n.p.) as does the Russian annexation of Crimea (Markedonov, 2015: 2). In short, the threats to the EU's security are increasing. At the same time, the EU loses to some extent the support of external (U.S.) and internal (UK) allies.

On top of that, the contemporary coronavirus pandemic might have similar effects on the EU's military expenses as the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Right now, all EU member states (**MS**) are facing high expenditures in the field of healthcare in order to combat the propagation of the virus. Furthermore, the national social systems are facing high expenditures as well in order to cushion the pandemic's social effects. At the same time, the tax revenues are falling as the economic damage has a direct impact on the available amount of taxes (European Commission (**EC**), 2020a: n.p.). In sum, all MS face higher expenditures and lower revenues. The financial crisis of 2008 had quite the same effects (Mölling, 2013: 5) and caused massive cuts in national defense spending (Faleg & Giovannini, 2012: 9-13). Considering that the economic effects caused by the pandemic are estimated to be even higher than the ones caused by the financial crisis (Roland Berger, 2020: n.p.), the current pandemic could have an even greater impact on the EU's military capabilities and capacities. The many external and internal impulses are strong incentives to increase EU's military cooperation, deepen integration within CFSP & CSDP and improve the effectiveness of the MCM. If the EU wants to overcome the afore-mentioned threats and remain a reliable ISPA, these steps are inevitable.

In order to answer the research question both for individual cases and in general, I will first conduct two single-case studies on the EU's MCM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (**BiH**) and Somalia. The results of these studies will then form the basis of a concordance analysis (**CA**). A combination of these research concepts (multiple single-case studies & comparative case study) seems to be a very promising way for achieving results that are both highly case-specific and generalizable (cf. chapter 2.1). In this context, I will elaborate that the EU is already using numerous P&S mechanisms that have positively influenced the effectiveness of its MCM in BiH and Somalia¹:

- **BiH:** Multilateral troop generation, Athena mechanism, LOTs, BPA
- **Somalia:** Multilateral troop generation, Athena mechanism, EU NAVCO, MSCHOA, AVPDs, IRTC and MSTC, SHADE

¹ The following abbreviations will be introduced later in the paper. For the moment, see list of abbreviations.

In addition, I will show that the EU is aware of the persistent problems in its comprehensive crisis management concept (CCMC) in BiH and Somalia and is already working on P&S projects in the framework of PESCO through which these problems can be alleviated.

- **BiH:** ETCCEA, JEIS, AIFV/AAV/LAV, MM, ECoWAR, NetLogHubs, EUFOR CROC
- **Somalia:** EU TMCC, HARMSPRO, UMS, EPC, Eurodrone, EHAAP

Finally, based on the results of the single-case studies and the CA based on them, I will propose a number of P&S measures that could further increase the effectiveness of the current MCM in BiH and Somalia as well as the effectiveness of EU's MCM as a whole.

- **BiH:** Activating the EU Battlegroups, updating the now cumbersome BPA, extending the existing Athena mechanism, institutionalization of the LOTs.
- **Somalia:** Revision of the cooperation agreements with Mauritius and Seychelles, increasing the support to both countries but with focus on the Seychelles, expanding EU – CTF 150 cooperation
- **MCM:** Improving the EU's early warning system by basing the situation assessment of the EUMS on the four identified independent variables (primary: affected EU values and economic interests; secondary: profiling opportunities and security doubts – internal/ external) as well as the intervening variable (conflict dynamics – positive/ negative), activating the already existing EU Battlegroups, speeding the PESCO project "EUFOR CROC", extending the existing Athena mechanism, creation of a permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group, creation of a Permanent Civilian-Military Networking Platform, institutionalization of the LOTs.

The present thesis is divided into eight chapters. The following chapter two will first give an overview of the current state of research on the EU's CFSP and CSDP. In a second step, the state of research on the topic of effectiveness will be summarized. Finally, the present thesis will be put in context with the already available state of research. The third chapter will then deal with a topic of central importance for further proceedings, namely the quality of the EU as an ISPA. In chapter four, the concept of P&S will be analyzed i.e., the general idea of P&S and its development within the EU will be described with focus on the Ghent initiative and the recently adopted 'Permanent Structured Cooperation' (PESCO). In the fifth chapter, the theoretical framework of the thesis is presented, the research method (i.e., CA) explained, the case selection (namely BiH and Somalia) substantiated, complex concepts defined and operationalized and the presumed validity of the present thesis evaluated. In chapter six, the selected cases are first examined separately for their effectiveness in order to uncover existing weak points and identify starting points to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM. Based on the findings obtained, the cases are then

subjected to a CA. In chapter seven, the results of the single-case analyses and the CA are then used to identify case-specific and general strategies for increasing the effectiveness of the EU's MCM by means of P&S. The eighth chapter will summarize the central results of the study and answer the underlying research question comprehensively.

2 Current state of research

2.1 The EU's CFSP and CSDP

The EU is a highly complex and unique political system (*sui generis*), which is why it is such an interesting research object, which explains the extensive body of research already generated. 'Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragan' (2016) give a comprehensive insight into several EU policy areas with focus on its varying decision-making processes. In contrast, 'John Peterson and Michael Shackleton' (2012) concentrate on the tasks and competences of the different EU institutions. Other scientists rather deal with specific policy areas, exploring them in detail. Amongst them are 'Christoph Knill and Duncan Liefferink' (2007). They focus on the environmental politics of the EU with particular interest in the articulation of interest, process of decision-making and implementation on the national level.

The comparatively new policy areas CFSP and CSDP have been investigated intensively, as well. In his book, 'Stefan Fröhlich' (2008) analyzes the formation and development of the EU in the field of foreign politics. He does so by analyzing the progress the EU constitutions from Maastricht to Lisbon made. Different to that, 'Franco Algeri' (2010) describes the state-of-the-art of CFSP and CSDP rather than its development. His work is based on a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the Lisbon EU constitution. A broader approach is followed by 'Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler' (2006). They analyze all policy areas making the EU a political global player. Besides CFSP, they investigate the EU's development and environmental politics as well as its economic power. Unlike the afore mentioned authors, 'Udo Diedrichs' (2012) and 'Jolyon Howorth' (2014) focus on how the EU practices foreign policy. Their focus lies more on the CSDP as a subfield of CFDP. In this context, they analyze CSDP's institutional framework, competences of the institutions involved, processes of decision making and civil and military capacities and capabilities of the EU.

In comparison to other policy areas, the practice of military crises management is underrepresented in scientific research. Many authors like 'Sebastian Mayer' (2009) base their analyses on the evaluation of the EU constitution and the general legal frame for CFDP and CSDP. Only few authors include the practice of MCM in their research. However, they usually conform with a superficial description and do not conduct a detailed analysis. Examples for this are the books

published by ‘Martin Reichard’ (2006) and ‘Steven Blockmans’ (2008). As this thesis focuses on the EU's MCM in BiH and Somalia, I will now briefly resume some literature published on these two cases. The EU's MCM in BiH has been analyzed by ‘Frank Kupferschmidt’ (2006) and ‘Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, Meliha Muherina & Nina Pejič’ (2016). While Kupferschmidt concentrates on the cooperation between EU and NATO during operation **Althea**², Pulko et al focus on the internal and external effectiveness of this operation. The EU's MCM in Somalia has been investigated by ‘Hylke Dijkstra’ (2016) who analyzed the EU's contribution to the solution of the overall conflict in Somalia with special focus on operation **Atalanta**³. First, she looks into the Somali state failure in the 1990s, then on the emerge of Somali piracy and finally on the several international interventions to stop Somali piracy and to recreate a functioning state. Central to her argumentation is the strong connection between national instability and piracy. Just like ‘Adaye Orugbani’ (2010), she opts for a comprehensive approach to overcome Somali piracy and national instability. Both authors agree on the tight tie between national instability and piracy. According to them, these problems condition each other reciprocally and must therefore be tackled simultaneously.

This very brief roundup on existing literature points out the extensive state of research. A lot of different authors worked on different EU policy areas using different research strategies and several different authors analyzed the EU's MCM operations from various perspectives. However, all the publications mentioned so far were single-case studies. Comparative analyses of different EU operations are quite rare. Yet, there are some such as ‘Katarina Engberg's’ (2014) systematic comparison of several military EU operations. The objective of her work is to determine “[...] under what circumstances [...] the EU [does] undertake military operations” (Engberg, 2014: 3). A second example is the publication of ‘Annemarie Peen Rodt’ (2014). Her aim is to identify factors that determine the success of EU MCM operations. The results of both investigations can be generalized given the systematic comparison of heterogeneous cases. However, the results just own a time-specific viability as the EU and especially its policy areas CFSP and CSDP persistently develop (Engberg, 2014: 182). A third comparative case study was published by ‘Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin’ (2009). Their work evaluates the effectiveness of twelve civil and military operations. However, it is not a systematic comparison of the cases. Each case is analyzed separately, leading to case-specific policy recommendations for the incensement of effectiveness. In this way, it is less a comparative analysis, but rather a multiple single-case study. Even though the case-specific policy recommendations are highly valid for the specific operation, they cannot be generalized. Of course, the generalizable results presented by Engberg and Rodt are not final

² EUFOR Althea: European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

³ EUNAVFOR Somalia: EU Naval Force Somalia

either, but given the systematic comparison, the results are more resilient than the ones of a (multiple) single-case study.

A combination of these research concepts – multiple single-case study and comparative case study – seems to be a very promising way for achieving results that are both highly case-specific and generalizable. Therefore, this thesis will be based on both single-case analyses (to obtain case-specific results leading to case-specific policy recommendations) and a comparative analysis (to obtain generalizable results leading to general long-term policy recommendations).

2.2 Concepts of ‘Effectiveness’

Generally spoken, effectiveness is "the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result" (Oxford Dictionary, 2021: n.p.). A more specific definition might be "the degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent to which targeted problems are solved" (Banister-Hazama & Moreci & England, 2012: n.p.). Those general definitions reflect the size and manifold dimensions of this brought concept. Before being able to apply it to the planned case studies, it still must be operationalized. In literature on international security, there are already some elaborated concepts on how to measure the effectiveness of MCM. When transferred from the general sphere to the sphere of political sciences, effectiveness can be understood as ‘doing the right thing’. Consequently, effectiveness measures the achievement of objectives and compares the current situation to the initial one – the necessary means and attached costs are of no interest (Gallhöfer, 2013: 205).

In 2005, ‘Alexander Siedschlag and Franz Eder’ analyzed the different actors involved in CFSP and their interaction (Siedschlag & Eder, 2005: 61). They choose this actor-based analysis because of the multitude of actors, institutions and policy areas involved in the ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ (**ESDP** now CSDP). They found that the civil and military capabilities of the EU are insufficient due to a lack of cooperation between the actors (ibid.: 68). In order to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM, the authors opt foremost for a better coordination of the actors involved in the EU's MCM and second for a better institutional interconnection of the involved policy areas (ibid.: 87). Five years later, ‘Florian Walter’ analyzed the effectiveness of the EU's CM investigating its military and civilian capabilities. In order to do so, he first identified the military headline goals of the years 2003 and 2010 (Walter, 2010: 14-17) and second, the then existing deficits (ibid.: 18-22). He did likewise for the civilian headline goals (ibid.: 23-28). Having finished the analysis of existing capabilities and deficits, he turns from the institutional part of CSDP to the active part by analyzing both terminated and still ongoing EU CM operations in Africa (ibid.: 45f). Based on this split analysis (institutional/practical), he finds that the

effectiveness of the EU's MCM improved immensely since its beginnings. But there are still financial shortcomings as well as capability shortfalls such as air transport. In order to increase the effectiveness of the EU's CM, he opts for a better distribution of the operational costs, the increase of basic capabilities (air transport and satellite surveillance), and the embedding of operations into a comprehensive crisis management concept (**CCMC**) (ibid.: 152f). A different analysis was done by 'Matthias Dembinski and Dirk Peters' in 2018. Their analysis is based on a theoretical evaluation of different development scenarios of CFSP/CSDP. According to them, the main reason for the contemporary ineffectiveness of MCM operations is the voting procedure in the EU's council. This procedure is based on national sovereignty and corresponding veto-rights (Dembinski & Peters, 2018: 14). Therefore, the voting procedure should be changed if the effectiveness of the EU's MCM is to be increased. (ibid.:15). There has also been a lot of research on the effectiveness of specific EU operations. One of the first to analyze specific operations was 'Frank Kupferschmidt'. In 2006 he analyzed the effectiveness of the EU-NATO cooperation during the operative handover from SFOR⁴ to Althea in BiH. The mayor problem he found was the long time the handover process took. In order to make the EU's MCM more effective, he found it necessary to increase the reaction speed (**RS**) as fast reaction is essential for an effective MCM (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 25).

The afore-mentioned effectiveness analysis by Asseburg and Kempin (2009) is based on three factors: (1) interest, (2) provision and participation and (3) sustainability: The first is used to identify what is behind the decision to intervene into a certain crisis. The second analyzes the available resources (financial, personnel, materiel) whereas the third verifies the short and long-term impacts of a specific operation on the crisis it seeks to end (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009: 15). This last factor was also adopted by Sibylle Lang (2007). According to her, an operation must have a sustainable effect on stability to be considered effective (2007: 189-191). Some of the factors used by Asseburg and Kempin are also part of Annemarie Peen Rodt's analysis on the effectiveness of the EU's MCM. Just like Asseburg and Kempin, Rodt evaluates the financial, materiel and personnel supply of operations in order to identify shortcomings. Rodt finds that internal support is essential for the effectiveness of an operation: "If an EU military conflict management operation does not secure sufficient support, it cannot succeed" (Rodt, 2014: 51). Furthermore, external support by non-EU states and international organizations has positive effects on an operation's effectiveness. Besides internal and external support she uses a third factor: fulfillment of the operation's mandate. According to Rodt, mandate fulfillment (**MF**) is a key-

⁴ Stabilisation Force

requirement for effectiveness. However, she is not just interested in the mandate's mere fulfillment, but also in the way it was fulfilled. Therefore, she only considers an operation effective if it has achieved its goal in "an appropriate manner from both an internal and external perspective. The four success criteria developed are: internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness" (Rodt, 2014: 33).

3 Quality of the European Union as an international security actor

In order to answer the research question of this thesis, it is essential to examine the quality i.e., the distinctive characteristic of the EU as an ISPA.

3.1 Development of the EU as an international security actor

The integration of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (**FSP**) already started decades before the end of the East-West conflict. The "Pleven Plan" can be seen as the first step towards the integration of the EU's FSP. Following the then recently drafted European Coal and Steel Community, France's former Prime Minister René Pleven recommended the establishment of a joint European army as early as 1950. Based on this proposal, the treaty on the European Defence Community (**EDC**) was negotiated and signed by France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany on May 27, 1952. However, the treaty never came into force, as it was rejected by the French parliament in 1954 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (**BpB**), 2019: n.p.). After the failure of the EDC, European heads of state and government did not take up the idea of enhanced foreign policy cooperation again until 1970, when the European Political Cooperation (**EPCo**) was launched. Initially, there was no contractual basis to EPCo, rather it was based on exclusively voluntary cooperation between the governments involved. It was not until 1986 that the purely intergovernmental EPCo (the precursor of today's CFSP) was given a formal basis with the adoption of the Single European Act. Despite this formal basis, cooperation continued to be purely intergovernmental (Bundesregierung, 2021: n.p.).

With the end of the Cold War, the development of the EU's FSP gained considerable momentum. In the Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992, the MS agreed on a political union. In addition, the EPCo was officially incorporated into the newly established CFSP (EU-Info, 2021: n.p.). The Maastricht Treaty also provided a follow-up intergovernmental conference for further development of the treaty. The result of this intergovernmental conference was the Treaty of Amsterdam which was adopted in 1997 and finally came into force in 1999 (Pfarr, 2021: 3). Between 1997 and 1999, the basis of European security policy (**SP**) changed drastically. On the one hand, at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, the UK gave up its vehement opposition towards SP integration and, on the other, it became all too clear in the wake of the Balkan and Kosovo crises (Rehl, 2015:

15f) that the EU's SP had failed. Both developments paved the way for the ESDP as part of the Treaty of Nice which was signed in 2001 and came into force in 2003 (EU-Info, 2021: n.p.). After the failed attempt for a treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU-L) was negotiated and came into force on December 12, 2009 (Pfarr, 2021: 3f). With the TEU-L, the EU was based on a common value base – respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights (TEU-L, 2012: Art. 2) – and the ESDP was transformed into the CSDP (Pfarr, 2021: 9).

3.2 EU values in CFSP and CSDP and the functioning of CFSP

The EU's CFSP and CSDP are based on the same joint values defining the EU's central objectives e.g., to safeguard EU values, interests, security, independence and integrity; to consolidate and promote democracy, the rule of law and human rights; to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen IS and to assist the peoples, countries and regions affected by natural or man-made disasters (TEU-L, 2012: Art. 21). On the basis of these principles and objectives, the European Council defines the EU's strategic interests and objectives (ibid.: Art. 22). Decisions of the European Council are generally taken unanimously. However, the heads of state or government often follow the recommendations of the committee which helps to prepare their meetings. In addition, there is the possibility of constructive abstention (ibid.: Art. 31).

The following chart summarizes the general structures of the CFSP and the competencies and responsibilities of the individual institutions involved:




Chart 1: Structures of the CFSP (presentation according to TEU-L (2012) and BpB (2010))

3.3 Quality of the EU as an international security policy actor

Since the introduction of the ESDP (now CSDP), the EU has conducted 36 operations: The very first EU operation was a civil one, namely the 'European Union Police Mission' (**EUPM BiH**) in BiH (EEAS, 2012: 1), the first military operation was conducted in cooperation with NATO (Schneider, 2010: 86) under the Berlin-Plus-Agreement (**BPA**), the first autonomously conducted MCM was operation ARTEMIS (János, 2015: 1). 24 out of the 36 operations were civil operations, 12 military ones. 17 operations are currently active and 19 have been completed. Six of the active operations are military and eleven are civil (EEAS, 2020a: 2). According to these figures, the EU would be a civil power to approx. 66% and a military power to 33%. In research, the EU's propensity to conduct civil rather than military operations have already been the subject of many creative evaluations. Subsequently, the EU was described as a peace power or a civil power with teeth (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet & Pietzko & Zürn, 2018: 10). And in view of its economic power but severely limited **FSP** influence, it was described as an 'economic giant', but 'political dwarf' (Fröhlich, 2008: 11).

Well, in order to assess the quality or distinctive characteristic(s) of the EU as an ISPA, it is not enough to simply look at the operations carried out and divide them into civil and military ones. On the one hand, the EU has always been a community of values which is why CFSP/ CSDP are also based on common values, and on the other hand, the EU also has economic and diplomatic instruments to enforce its SP interests in addition to military power (Gebhard, 2010: 14). At this point it is worthwhile recalling the work of 'Trineke Palm and Ben Crum' according to which there are four conceptions of identity in international SP (Palm & Crum, 2019: 5f):

- **Pacifist Normative Power:** The ability to establish/ change normative values on an international level without the need to underpin these values militarily.
- **Interventionist Normative Power:** The ability to defend established values, if necessary, by the use of military means – responsibility to protect.
- **Realist Power:** This conception states that SP can only be pursued through the possession of military power. Accordingly, values are at best of secondary interest, since everything must be subordinated to the pursuit of security in order to ensure the survival of a state.
- **Liberal Power:** The ability to use military power to defend economic interests - protecting a single market from external threats. In contrast to the concept of (interventionist) normative and realist power, economic considerations rather than normative values and geopolitical interests are the decisive factors for international SP.

Based on these four conceptions, the two authors found that, especially in the initial phase of CSDP, the majority of operations such as Artemis and Concordia had a clear reference to EU values. Since 2010, however, the operations are more utility-oriented. The initial pure value-orientation was gradually joined by economic considerations as was the case with Atalanta and Althea (Palm & Crum, 2019: 14-16). It can thus be concluded that the EU was initially a pure interventionist normative power which over time developed into a hybrid ISPA that combines elements of both interventionist normative power and liberal power (Palm & Crum, 2019: 16).

3.4 The EU as an international security policy actor between ambition and reality

Now that the development of the EU into an ISPA has been contemplated from a historical and theoretical perspective, the EU's claim and reality in the field of SP are to be compared. In 2003, for the first time in its history, the EU formulated a common security policy strategy - the European Security Strategy (**ESS**) which was reviewed and updated by the 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy' (**RI-ESS**) in 2008 (Concilium, 2009: 4). In 2016, the ESS was finally replaced by the 'European Union Global Strategy' (**EUGS**) (Bendiek, 2017: 5).

Based on the EU's self-perception as an ISPA, the ESS analyzed the security threats with which the EU was confronted, identifying terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, the failure of states and organized crime (**OC**) (ESS, 2003: 4-6). Later on, the RI-ESS added new threats to this list e.g., internet security, energy security and climate change (RI-ESS, 2008: 5f). In order to counter these threats, the EU had to develop into an active and capable ISPA using all civil and military measures at its disposal for CCM an MCM (ESS, 2003: 12). To achieve this goal, the RI-ESS presented burden-sharing as the silver-bullet, seeking to expand capabilities and capacities through increased cooperation (RI-ESS, 2008: 9f). Anyway, the claims and ambitions formulated in the ESS and RI-ESS were in clear contradiction to the reality of CFSP and CSDP (Helwig & Tannous, 2016: 1). Although the EU succeeded in developing its civil and military capabilities since the adoption of the ESS, the overall capacities available to the EU allow for uniform, rapid and decisive action to only a very limited extent (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al, 2018: 10f). Points of criticism are accordingly numerous. Here are just four: First, the CFSP/CSDP continues to be characterized by a strong discrepancy between overall defense expenditure and the defense capabilities achieved as a result. The EU as a whole spends far more on defense than Russia, but has comparatively low military capabilities (Dembinski & Peters, 2018: 11). Second, the EU's CM in Congo contradicts the self-claim formulated in the ESS to act as a comprehensive crisis manager (ibid.: 12). At best, the EU's engagement in Congo can be called limited in both time, geography and tasks (Vlassenroot & Arnould, 2016: 9f). Third, in many cases in which the EU should have acted in accordance with its values and ambitions, it

remained inactive, acted passively or reacted only hesitantly. Fourth, the EU Battlegroups (v.i.) have not been used even once, although numerous crises would have lent themselves to testing them (Dembinski & Peters, 2018: 12).

The EUGS, partially eliminated this discrepancy, by following a less normative and more pragmatic approach than the ESS: While the ESS defined headline-goals and created a positive vision for the future, the EUGS actually deals with how these goals can be achieved and visions may be realized (Nicosia, 2019: 2f). On the one hand, the EUGS focuses on the increasing intertwining of internal and external security: "Our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighboring and surrounding regions" (EUGS, 2016: 17). On the other hand, the EUGS balances European values with European interests: "Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests" (ibid.: 17). In addition, the EUGS places greater demands on resilience (ibid.: 26-30). A resilient EU is characterized by two factors: firstly, the ability to ward off external threats all by itself and secondly, the ability to have a stabilizing effect on the EU's neighboring states (ibid.: 22-24). The EU should thereby gain strategic autonomy and the ability to act independently of the U.S. and NATO, but at the same time, the abilities thus gained should also be able to be used within the framework of NATO (ibid.: 27-29). This dual concept of resilience (internal & external) again reflects the increased interlocking of internal and external security (v.s.). The EUGS last chapter – From vision to action – is of particular importance. Here, the EU proposes to develop into a credible (ibid.: 46-49), responsive (ibid.: 49-52) and joined-up (ibid.: 52-54) union. A number of practical measures to achieve this goal have been listed, such as **PESCO** i.e., the Permanent Structured Cooperation (ibid.: 50). The use of PESCO, which is already anchored in the TEU-L (2012: Art. 42 & 46), is an effective way to gain "full-spectrum land, air, space and maritime capabilities" (EUGS, 2016: 48), thus obtaining strategic autonomy and becoming the aspired credible, responsive and joined-up union (Dembinski & Peters, 2018: 24f). The activation of PESCO in 2017 by 25 of the then 28 MS - with the exception of the UK, Denmark and Malta - can therefore be seen as an important step towards the realization of the EUGS (Wientzek, 2018: 2).

4 Pooling and sharing

The purpose of P&S is to benefit an overall system and all the participating actors (Reichinger, 2009: 42) – in this case the EU and all its MS participating in P&S. Nonetheless, P&S is a very vague concept "that cover[s] a broad spectrum of cooperation fields as well as projects at very diverse levels of ambition" (Möckli, 2012: 2). Unfortunately, this vagueness is making it hard to define what exactly P&S is. According to 'Thomas Overhage', the concept of P&S should be

understood as follows: "While pooling means the merging of capabilities, whereby the national power of disposition stays national and all member states still have access to their own assets, sharing means the eschewal of one's own national capabilities and is possible in two ways: the building of common, multinational capabilities, or reliance on the capabilities of other nations" (2012: 17). Accordingly, pooled assets are no longer separate, but still separable which is not the case with shared assets which are neither separate nor separable (Overhage, 2013: 3). Hence, sharing projects are characterized by a higher level of ambition than 'mere' pooling projects as the participating states depend on each other to a higher degree (Möckli, 2012: 2). However, P&S usually go hand in hand (Mölling, 2012: 3).

The EU first adopted P&S following the 'Ghent Initiative' of 2010. After a two-decade decline in defense budgets and the financial crisis (2008), the EU was partly losing its capability to act militarily beyond its borders (Mölling, 2012: 1). In order to preserve the EU's status as a reliable ISPA, the MS welcomed the initiative and presented P&S as the "silver-bullet solution to [overcome] this defense crisis" (ibid.). "The goal of the initiative is to preserve and enhance national operational capabilities – with improved effect, sustainability, interoperability and cost efficiency as a result" (Ghent initiative: 2010: 1). In order to reach this goal, the initiative proposes to identify possible future areas of cooperation due to three analytical categories: (1) **operational effectiveness**; (2) **economic efficiency** and (3) **political implications** (ibid.: 2). Based thereon, the following areas of cooperation could be identified: (a) harmonization of military requirements; (b) research and development; (c) acquisition; (d) training and exercise; (e) command structures and procedures; (f) operating costs (ibid.: 2f). After identifying specific cooperation projects for P&S, all participating MS have to agree upon pooled "assets, command structure, processes and national caveats. [...] The aim [of P&S] is to create synergies for all partners without creating dependencies for any single MS" (ibid.: 2).

4.1 The current practice and pitfalls of P&S at the European level

In the EU, the European Defence Agency (**EDA**) represents an open discussion forum for P&S, but only the MS have the authority to make binding decisions (Algieri & Kammel & Pfarr, 2013: 22). In general, its task is to identify resource and capability gaps and propose solutions, thus providing scientific, technical, operational and legal expertise to the MS (EDA, 2013: 1). Furthermore, the EDA is required to both design cooperation programs between the MS, which will help fill capability gaps, to coordinate the programs already implemented and to manage specific cooperation programs. The EDA is fulfilling those tasks by evaluating measures of cooperation in the operational sphere; proposing and promoting multilateral cooperation projects; working

towards the coordination of existing cooperation programs and assuming responsibility for specific cooperation programs at the request of the MS (Algieri et al, 2013: 22f).

Apart from the EDA, there are further bi- and multilateral formats of P&S as "inside the EU, pooling and sharing are possible when as few as two or as many as all 27 states join together" (Overhage, 2013: 3). Here are a few examples of those bi- and multilateral P&S programs:

- *Baltic states* – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; *Benelux* – Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg; *Visegrad* – Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary; *French-British* defense cooperation and the *German-Dutch* defense cooperation (Möckli, 2012: 4):

These regional defense cooperations already existed before the formal introduction of P&S through the adoption of the Ghent initiative and are based on regional proximity, similar strategic culture and successful accomplishments in the past (Mölling, 2012: 2). Within this "cluster approach to Pooling and Sharing" (Dickow & Drent & Landman & Overhaus & Zandee, 2013: 3) it is generally possible to fill capability gaps by improving existing and creating new national capabilities. However, this approach has a strong weak point: the P&S projects are not coordinated and run the risk to duplicate each other. To minimize this negative effect, it is part of the EDA's responsibilities to coordinate existing bi- and multilateral P&S projects and to give advice for improvement, thus avoiding unnecessary duplications (Algieri et al, 2013: 23).

Theoretically, P&S reduces national military expenditures while increasing the common military capabilities. On the one hand, P&S makes it possible to use always tighter defense budgets more cost-efficiently, acquire or develop military resources and capabilities in cooperation with others at a lower price or to further develop them by combining training and education or learning from partners. What is more, P&S can also be used for better coordination of civilian and military activities (Algieri et al, 2013: 26-28). Unfortunately, P&S has been practiced a very long time on a very low level with few ambitions and therefore limited effects (EP, 2015: 17), which is partly due to the nature of this primarily intergovernmental policy area (Algieri et al, 2013: 28). Furthermore, the coordination of the above-mentioned patchwork of bi-/ and multilateral islands of defense cooperation is a Sisyphean work for the EDA, given its limited authority (v.s.). Another factor that inhibits the full potential of P&S is that most MS use it mainly to reduce their own national military expenditure and not to increase the general effectiveness of the EU's MCM (Mölling, 2012: 3).

However, the central problem opposing extensive P&S is the fear of making oneself dependent on others through extensive cooperation (EP, 2015: 17). After all, P&S affects the FSP of the MS and thus a core area of their sovereignty (Algieri et al, 2013: 19). Therefore, despite the reliable prospect of improving the effectiveness of their FSP through extensive cooperation, the MS are

reluctant to do so. It is thus an effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma that prevents extensive P&S. So far, MS seem to value sovereignty much more than effectiveness: the fear of losing sovereignty - the ability to decide - is greater than the prospect of a more effective FSP - the ability to act (Overhage, 2012: 41). The central prerequisite for fully exploiting the potential of P&S is to overcome the effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma. In addition, it is also necessary to overcome the state-centered bottom-up approach to P&S and replace it with a European top-down approach. However, this new approach must still have an intergovernmental character in order to have a chance to success (Algieri et al, 2013: 19f). To achieve this goal, it helps to realize that in the current globalized world, the old concepts of sovereignty are no longer valid. No state in the world is able to guarantee national security on its own. For this reason alone, cooperation in the security sector is necessary. Sovereignty – in terms of security policy (**SP**) – should therefore be understood less as the ability to decide and act alone, but rather as the ability to continue to be able to act in a globalized world (Overhage, 2012: 41). P&S is an instrument that enables states to maintain their ability to act in the field of SP and even make it more effective through cooperation. In this sense, P&S is not a contradiction to state sovereignty. Rather, P&S enables the preservation of sovereignty (Overhage, 2013: 5-7).

4.2 PESCO in the general framework of European P&S

When taking the Ghent initiative as a general framework for intra-European defense cooperation (Möckli, 2012: 2f), PESCO, represents a concrete and practicable form of P&S by which the complex patchwork of bi- and multilateral defense cooperation can be organized more effectively (Angelov, 2019: 5). However, this 'Sleeping Beauty' was only awakened by the Brexit opening the way for the use of this P&S instrument in 2017 (Beckmann & Kempin, 2017: 1-3). PESCO offers the framework for defense cooperation between 25 of the 27 MS (Denmark and Malta do not participate) remaining after the UK's withdrawal (PESCO, 2021: n.p.), cooperating closely in the fields of CFSP and CSDP and in the planning/ development of capabilities (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (**BMVG**), 2021a: n.p.). "The difference between PESCO and other forms of cooperation is the legally binding nature of the commitments" (EEAS, 2020b: 1).

PESCO has two organizational levels, the Council and the project level. At the Council level, basic directional decisions are made and it is verified whether the participating MS are fulfilling their respective obligations. In addition, the Council decides on the adoption of new PESCO projects (EEAS, 2020b: 2) by qualified majority (TEU-L, 2012: Art. 46(2)). This decision is influenced by, among others, **CARD** (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) and the **CDP** (Capability Development Plan). The CDP is an instrument that defines a target status for the EU's defense capabilities. CARD, on the other hand, evaluates the current state of European defense capabilities. At the

project level, in turn, the projects the Council decided on are implemented by the participating states on their own responsibility (EEAS, 2020b: 2). Both the Council and the participating MS are supported in their work by the PESCO Secretariat which is composed of the EDA, the **EEAS** (European External Action Service), and the **EUMS** (European Military Staff). The tasks of the PESCO Secretariat comprise the assessment of existing and planned PESCO projects in terms of capacity and capability development (EDA, 2021a: n.p.). Chart 2 vividly summarizes the structure of PESCO, as well as its interaction with other European defense initiatives:




Chart 2: The structure of PESCO (own presentation according to EEAS, 2020b: 2 & TEU-L, 2012 & EDA, 2021a: n.p)

PESCO can be seen as a P&S initiative of the EU which partly overcomes the existing problems of P&S (cf. chapter 4.4.). On the one hand, it is a top-down rather than a bottom-up approach. The individual countries or a group of countries can still propose projects, but their adoption will be decided by the Council (v.s.) with qualified majority. Furthermore, PESCO is more integrated than the cluster approach to P&S, as more countries tend to be involved in the projects than the immediate neighbors. According to 'Jo Coelmont', PESCO is the key element to finally practice P&S on a more effective level: "PESCO is about 100% national sovereignty coupled with 100% European solidarity" (Coelmont, 2017: 4).

Since the start of PESCO, the project list has been continuously extended to currently 47 projects (PESCO, 2021: n.p.) which I summarized in a list (cf. Appendix). I hope to be able to use this list after completion of my case studies to identify projects that could be used to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM. If identified weaknesses cannot be addressed by existing PESCO projects, I will try to formulate my own project proposals. In this context, I am to some extent assuming the role of the EDA as a member of the PESCO Secretariat. On the one hand, I evaluate the effectiveness of the EU's current MCM and aim to improve it. On the other hand, I examine the extent to which the effectiveness the EU's MCM could be increased through a better coordination of existing projects and those currently in planning. In case identified gaps cannot be closed by these projects, I plan to make additional proposals for future P&S projects.

5 Theoretical frame

In order to be able to make statements about whether and how the effectiveness of the EU's MCM can be improved through P&S, it is necessary to define and operationalize key terms such as 'MCM' and 'effectiveness', to develop a research model that enables the research question to be answered in a scientifically correct way and to make a well-founded case selection.

5.1 Definition and operationalization of key terms and concepts

EU's military crisis management: Crisis management (**CM**) is an elusive, extremely broad and sometimes flexible concept. The scope and nature of what a state or international organization understands by CM changes in accordance with the security culture and the status of military power (Tardy, 2015: 11). In general, CM refers to all measures, means (military and civil) and activities:

- preventing a conflict from escalating (conflict prevention),
- allowing intervention in an existing conflict (peacemaking and peace enforcement)
- promoting peace after the end of a conflict (peace building) (UN, 2021: n.p.)

It is important to understand that CM is not necessarily conflict resolution. However, conflict resolution is sometimes the key to effective and sustainable CM (Tardy, 2015: 11). The immediate purpose of CM is to enable an actor (private, state or international) to intervene in a conflict autonomously or at the request of a third party. The aim of this external intervention in the conflict is to de-escalate it and to contribute to strengthening peace in the long term (Tardy, 2015: 11). This external intervention can take place at any stage of the conflict. However, it is necessary to precisely determine the exact stage of the conflict at the time of the intervention in order to develop an effective conflict management concept, provide the necessary resources and implement the necessary measures (Glasel, 2017: 90). In international CM, a conflict can be addressed by military or civil means. In practice, however, these two means are often combined, as this has proven to be the most practicable approach (Tardy, 2015: 12).

Within the framework of the CSDP, the EU is provided with resources and capabilities by its MS (TEU-L, 2012: Art. 42(3)). This enables the EU to internationally conduct military and civil CM operations (TEU-L, 2012: Art. 42(1)). In the context of this thesis, only the EU's military crisis management (**MCM**) operations will be examined which Rodt defines as follows: "[...] military operation[s] launched under the auspices of the EU, within the framework of the CSDP (previously ESDP) and undertaken by EU forces (EUFOR) [...], in order to facilitate the management of the violent aspect of a conflict" (2014: 13). However, in order to assess the effectiveness of MCM, it is also necessary to consider possible civilian sister operations. The focus still is on the EU's MCM, but to answer the research question, it is also necessary to include relevant civilian operations.

Effectiveness: According to chapter 2.2, the following factors seem appropriate to analyze the effectiveness of the EU's MCM:

1. Speed of the EU's reaction to a certain crisis (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 25).
2. Operational involvement (**OI**) (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009: 15).
3. Fulfillment of the operation's mandate (Roldt, 2014: 14).
4. Sustainability of the operation (Lang, 2007: 189-191).

In order to evaluate a MCM operation's effectiveness, it is important to analyze its reaction speed (**RS**). We all know from personal experience that a delayed reaction does not help anyone: fast reaction is essential for an effective MCM (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 25). So, the first step of analysis must be the evaluation of the time needed by the EU to come to a joint decision upon the initiation of a military operation. It is then necessary to also evaluate the time that passed until the planned military mission actually started. According to Asseburg and Kempin, the effectiveness of MCM operations depends on an adequate provision with both financial, materiel and human resources.

Furthermore, the support and participation of a wide range of EU MS is essential (Asseburg & Kempin, 2009: 15). Therefore, it is necessary to look into the financial, materiel and human resources provided as well as the number and composition of participating MS. Mandate fulfillment (MF) is a core requirement for effectiveness (Rodt, 2014: 14). It is thus necessary to conduct a split analysis in each case: the first part shall comprise a detailed analysis of each operation's initial mandate and its later modifications and adaptations, while the second part then evaluates if the operation has been able to fulfill the underlying mandate. Finally, a military operation must be sustainable in order to be considered effective (Lang, 2007: 189-191). In a last step, it is therefore necessary to evaluate how sustainable the achievements of MCM operations are.

5.2 Methodology of research

In order to evaluate how P&S can increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM, it is necessary to conduct a two-part analysis. First, it is necessary to identify current weak points and ineffectiveness in ongoing MCM operations. Following this step, it is necessary to discuss the potential of P&S to overcome those weak points and ineffectiveness.

The first part of analysis (i.e., chapter 6) will thus comprise a detailed analysis of the selected cases (BiH, Somalia). In order to identify case-specific weak points and ineffectiveness, the two cases will first be analyzed separately, using the four factors identified in chapter 5.1 that determine an operation's effectiveness. In a second step, the two cases will then be compared using John Stuart Mills Concordance Analysis (CA) Method. According to this method, similar attributes in different cases are causing similar outcomes. When analyzing the causalities of similar outcomes in different cases, those attributes appearing in all cases, despite otherwise totally different contexts, are considered "causation" (Jahn, 2013: 170). The aim of this comparative analysis is to identify the causes (independent variables: IV) for similar outcomes (depending variables) (Jahn, 2013: 169&241). In the context of this thesis, the independent variables are going to be the factors that appeared in both MCM operations despite different contexts.

The second part of the analysis (i.e., chapter 7) builds on chapter 6. It starts by taking up on the results of the single-case analyses of the EU's MCM in Somalia and BiH and discusses the potential of P&S to overcome the identified case-specific ineffectiveness. Based on this discussion, it will be possible to give a case-specific answer to the underling research question. The analysis then continues with the results of the CA. The identified factors that caused ineffectiveness in both cases are considered IVs for the (in)effectiveness of the EU's MCM in general and again the potential of P&S to overcome the identified general ineffectiveness in the EU's MCM will be discussed finally allowing to give a general answer to the underling research question.

5.3 Case selection

The selection of cases has big influence on both the result of the single-case and concordance analyses as well as the answer to the underlying research question. It is thus necessary to make the case selection transparent and to give good reasons for the specific case selection (Jahn, 2013: 344f). In general, there are two different case selection methods. With the ‘Most Different System Design’ (**MDSD**) the cases selected are very similar with regard to the dependent variable but otherwise totally different (Blatter & Janning & Wagemann, 2007: 143). Consequently, a heterogeneous case selection is required. In contrast to the MDSD, the ‘Most Similar System Design’ (**MSSD**) requires a homogenous case selection (ibid.). Both methods have a strong influence on the validity and reliability of the analysis (Jahn, 2013: 215-217). In order to produce a result of high validity, I will use the MDSD. The external validity of comparative case studies based on heterogeneous cases is higher than those based on homogenous cases as the results can be transferred more easily to future cases or cases which have not been included into the analysis. However, the reliability of a MDSD analysis is lower than that of a MSSD analysis, because the results depend a lot on the specific case selection (ibid.: 137 & 238f).

At present, the EU is undertaking six military operations in four different countries - BiH, Somalia, Central African Republic (**CAR**), and Mali (EEAS, 2020a: 2). As the extend of the thesis is limited to 80 pages, it is not possible to analyze all of them. However, it is not necessary to conduct a full survey to achieve a valid result. It is also possible to achieve a valid result based on just some cases. Taking into account the requirement of a most heterogeneous case selection, I will therefore only analyze the EU's MCM in Somalia and BiH. Those two cases differ in size, area of operations (**AoO**), type of operation, and embedding in further operations. Furthermore, they are a lot larger and more comprehensive than the EU's MCM in Mali and CAR. Additional reasons to choose Somalia and BiH over Mali and CAR are the timespan of the operations and their size. Compared to BiH and Somalia, the MCM conducted in Mali and CAR is of recent date and quite limited which is why less data is available in primary and secondary literature. In contrast, the data available on the MCM in Somalia and BiH is bigger allowing a deeper and more precise analysis of the operations' effectiveness.

6 Analysis of the effectiveness of the EU's MCM

Before statements can be made on how the effectiveness of the EU's MCM can be improved through P&S, the effectiveness of the selected cases themselves must be examined (v.s.) and ineffectiveness and weak points identified. In this chapter, the effectiveness of EU's MCM in BiH (Althea – 6.1) and Somalia (Atalanta – 6.2) will therefore be examined separately in terms of reaction speed (RS), operational involvement (OI), mandate fulfillment (MF) and sustainability.

Later (i.e., in chapter 6.3), the results of these two single-case analyses serve as the basis for the concordance analysis (CA).

6.1 Operation Althea

This chapter examines the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH with focus on its military core operation Althea. Since Althea is an ongoing operation, its effectiveness cannot yet be conclusively assessed, but a preliminary assessment is possible.

6.1.1 Background to the crisis in BiH

In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia, then constituent republics of Yugoslavia, declared themselves independent (Informationsstelle Militarisierung (**IMI**), 2007: 5). Till then, in BiH, another constituent Yugoslav republic, the ethnic groups of Serbs, Croats and Bosnians had lived together peacefully. The independence movements in neighboring regions, however; had a destabilizing effect on their coexistence. The majority of the Serbs were in favor of remaining in Yugoslavia, while the Bosnians were striving to found their own independent state. The Croats, in turn, called for annexation to the already independent Croatia (Koslowski, 1995: 19-21). Therefore, an independence referendum was held in BiH at the end of February 1992, in which the majority of eligible voters (65%) voted for BiH's independence. After the referendum, the Serbs, who wished differently (v.s.), proclaimed autonomous Serbian provinces (IMI, 2007: 5). The intensity of ethnic struggles increased steadily thereafter. With the recognition of the sovereign statehood of BiH by the EU and the U.S. on April 7, 1992, the fighting spread to the entire country. Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian militias were formed that attempted to create 'ethnically pure' areas through murder and expulsion (ibid.). In the course of the secessionist movements budding along the ethno-nationalist lines of conflict, a total of about 250,000 people died on the Serbian-Orthodox, Croatian-Catholic and Bosnian-Muslim sides (Reichinger, 2009: 346).

Neither the EU nor its MS were in a position to respond adequately to the civil war on the EU periphery (Engberg, 2014: 59), only NATO's military intervention was able to end it (Rodt, 2011: 48). With the mediation of the U.S., the Dayton Peace Agreement (**DPA**) was signed on December 14, 1995, thus sealing peace in BiH (IMI, 2007: 6). This agreement divided BiH into two largely autonomous entities which are vaulted by a politically weakly equipped common central state level (Diedrichs, 2012: 118). "NATO remained in BiH for nine years, ensuring the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords" (Pulko et al, 2016: 88). NATO's involvement in BiH

ended on December 2, 2004, when the EU took over (Engberg, 2014: 54). The development of NATO and EU troop strengths within IFOR⁵, SFOR and Althea are summarized in table 1:

Operation	IFOR	SFOR				SFOR → Althea
Year	1995	1996	1998	2002	2003	2004
Troops	63.000	32.000	26.000	19.000	12.000	7000

Table 1: Troop strength of IFOR, SFOR and Althea from 1995 until 2004 (own presentation according to 'HQ EUFOR BiH, 2018: 7f')

6.1.2 Reaction speed

At the European Council in Copenhagen (December 12-13, 2002), the EU declared willingness to replace the SFOR with an EU-led military operation (Tolksdorf, 2012: 156). The handover process from SFOR to Althea was protracted for two years because of the large number of organizations (UN, NATO and EU) and nations to be involved: NATO and EU members, BiH and the other states participating in the DPA (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 13). Moreover, the U.S. had reservations about assigning responsibility for BiH's security to the EU which at that time had no experience in MCM. Without the approval of the U.S., the takeover of SFOR by the EU was not possible in 2002 (ibid.). Due to the U.S. reluctance, the BPA which gave the EU the first chance to take over an operation of considerable magnitude (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 7), was signed only on 17 March 2003 (Heß, 2011: 22). Finally, at the NATO summit in Istanbul on June 28/29, 2004, it was decided to end SFOR at the end of 2004 (Engberg, 2014: 54). On July 12, the EU then decided to launch an EU-led military operation in cooperation with NATO as the legal successor to SFOR (Concilium, 2004a: 1). On December 2, the EU (Althea) took over the NATO operation SFOR (Baluch, 2010: 181). Despite all problems (v.s.) Althea came about. This is due to the following developments:

I. Stabilization of the situation, thereby reduced risk

According to general opinion, the situation had improved in the course of 2004 to such an extent that the remaining risks could be controlled with a smaller military presence (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 9). However, the ethnic tensions underlying the conflict persisted, and BiH's state institutions were still weak and not very assertive. It was internationally feared that a complete withdrawal of troops could lead to a resurgence of the old conflicts (Rodt, 2014: 86).

II. Overcoming US concerns

The U.S. doubts about the EU's military capability to act were dispelled by the fact that the BPA was successfully tested in the course of operation Concordia (2003) (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 12).

⁵ Implementation Force

Moreover, the EU had demonstrated the quality of its MCM with operation Artemis (Homan, 2007: 3). In addition, US forces were increasingly needed in Iraq and Afghanistan (Engberg, 2014: 56). Against the backdrop of the improved SP situation in BiH, the EU's enhanced military capabilities and the U.S.' interest in substantial relief (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 11), the U.S. agreed to terminate the NATO operation SFOR and launch an EU-led operation in its legal succession.

III. Continued EU interest in Althea

The EU's interest in an EU-led military operation in BiH is explained by its historical responsibility towards the country: "Bosnia was the painful crucible of the European foreign policy in the 1990s demonstrating all too clearly its gravest weakness. The EU has a strong commitment - moral, financial and political, to do better this time" (Rodt, 2014: 107). Althea offered the EU the opportunity to make amends for its failures during the war in Yugoslavia (Diedrichs, 2012: 118). The EU's economic interest in the stability of the region adds to its historical responsibility. Since BiH is in direct geographical proximity to the EU, its destabilization would have had negative economic effects on the EU (Rodt, 2014: 107). Furthermore, the EU hoped that Althea would once again raise its profile as an ISPA (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 12). In contrast to the narrowly limited operation Artemis, Althea represented a qualitative quantum leap in the EU's MCM. With this operation, the EU wanted to prove that it can also effectively conduct complex and protracted military peacekeeping operations (Baluch, 2010: 182f).

Based on this analysis, the EU's reaction speed in the case of Althea was rather slow. However, since it was not a peacebuilding operation but a follow-up to a still active NATO operation, the slow reaction speed had only minor impact on the operation's effectiveness.

6.1.3 Operational involvement

Thanks to the improving security situation (**SeSi**), SFOR's troop strength was gradually reduced to 7,000 soldiers by 2004 (cf. table 1). A total of 33 states - 22 of them EU members - participated in Althea, which also had 7,000 soldiers at the beginning (Reichinger, 2009: 345). This makes Althea the EU's largest MCM operation to date. It is also the most protracted one, as it has not yet been terminated (Rodt, 2014: 63). The greatest challenge in the course of operational handover was the substitution of the 1,000 withdrawing US soldiers, which the EU succeeded in replacing quite quickly (Diedrichs, 2012: 120). At the beginning, the by far biggest force contributions were made by Germany and Italy, with around one third of the total each (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 20). In addition to these main force contributors, the UK (590), France (524), Spain (495) as well as Austria (300) and the Netherlands (300) made significant contributions. Almost 1,000 soldiers from 10 third countries were provided, as well (IMI, 2007: 3).

In view of the even further improved SeSi, an internal EU debate began in 2009 on the need to continue Althea (Engberg, 2014: 55). The UK took the view that Althea should remain in BiH with the same strength in order to be able to continue to provide military security for the DPA (basis for peace). This position was supported above all by the Eastern European EU MS (Engberg, 2014: 55f). In addition, the UK had a national interest in the continuation of the operation: Althea is a prime example of successful EU-NATO cooperation with great symbolic significance for the EU and the NATO. Maintaining this symbolic significance was in the national interest of the UK (Engberg, 2014: 56). France also advocated a continuation of Althea, but with reduced strength. It hoped that the two entities and the central government would take on more responsibility for BiH's stability in the course of the reduction (ibid.). It also intended to force the central government to resume the reform process that had stalled after signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008 (Kather, 2011: 388). Unlike France and the UK, Germany did not support the extension of Althea, but advocated its further development into a non-executive advisory and support operation (Bundestag, 2009: 3). It justified its position by stating that the military-security situation in BiH was fundamentally stable. Only the domestic political structures were unstable. This problem could be better solved in a civilian operation than in a military operation like Althea (Bundestag, 2009: 2).

After the debate was concluded, Althea was adapted in 2012 to the new security conditions, taking into account the interests of the 'big three' (i.e., France, the UK and Germany). The UK's wishes to retain the symbolic effect of the operation and to be able to continue to provide military security for the DPA were met, as was France's interest in continuing the operation with reduced force (Engberg, 2014: 56). The German interest was taken into account in that, in addition to securing peace and stability, greater emphasis was placed on the development of local security forces (Pulko et al, 2016: 92). The exact development of Althea's troop strength can be seen in the following table:

Year	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2019
Troops	7000	6300	2500	1500	800	670

Table 2: Troop strength of Althea between 2004 and 2019 (own presentation according to 'HQ EUFOR BiH, 2018: 7f' & Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, 2019: n.p.')

A total of 15 EU states and five non-EU states are currently participating in Althea, together providing 670 soldiers. Althea is currently commanded by Major General Reinhard Trischak (Austria) who assumes the function of commander. This is the eighth time in a row that Austria has been in command of Althea. In addition, Austria's commitment is also noticeable in the number of troops provided. Of the current 670 soldiers, 300 are provided by Austria, which

corresponds to approx. 44% of the total troop presence. The second largest troop provider is Turkey with 150 soldiers, which corresponds to a troop share of approx. 22% (Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, 2019: n.p.).

In view of the scope of the mandate (v.i.), the adaptation of the operation to the new security situation and the EU's continuing interest in continuing the operation, the operational involvement can be assessed as 'appropriate to the mandate'. The following factors contributed to this:

I. Cost allocation

As a lesson learned from Artemis, a new financing mechanism for the common costs of military operations was developed. The ad-hoc procedure by which common costs were subsequently distributed among the participants was replaced by the Athena mechanism (Lindstrom, 2004: 149). Nevertheless, shortcomings remained in the financing of EU military operations. Troop-contributing states still have to bear a large part of the costs themselves, as these do not fall under the Athena mechanism. Against this background, the support and participation of the 'big three' is of fundamental importance for the effectiveness of the EU's MCM (Diedrichs, 2012: 96) and thus for the effectiveness of Althea.

II. Congruence of interests

The national interests of the 'big three' in launching a military operation in BiH as the legal successor to SFOR coincided with the pan-European responsibility toward BiH. Germany, the UK and France hoped that the operation would make up for the failure of the EU's crisis diplomacy during the Balkan war. Added to this was the economic interest in the stability of the region. The negative consequences that a renewed destabilization of BiH would have for the EU also explain the EU's continuing involvement to this day.

III. Relocation of forces required only to a limited extent

The EU had to deploy only few forces, since the majority of SFOR forces were already recruited from EU MS (80%) which just had to be placed under EU command (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 20). Only the withdrawing US soldiers had to be substituted (v.s.).

6.1.4 Mandate fulfillment

At the beginning of the operation, Althea's mandate was to ensure the implementation of and compliance with the DPA, to strengthen security and stability in BiH, and to promote BiH's Euro-Atlantic rapprochement (Concilium, 2004b: 1). Although Althea was conceived as a military operation, it was embedded in the EU's CCMC for BiH and the Balkans as a whole. This comprehensive approach enables the EU to make use of the military instruments inherent in Althea as

well as additional political and economic instruments in order to advance the Euro-Atlantic integration process in the best possible way (Rodt, 2014: 63).

Through regular patrols, the display of military capabilities and close networking with both local elites and the civilian population, the EU quickly succeeded in linking up with the activities of SFOR within the framework of Althea (Diedrichs, 2012: 122). By showing military presence in various parts of the country, the EU has succeeded in maintaining the peace established by NATO within the framework of IFOR and SFOR (Rodt, 2014: 65f). In addition to general stability, the most important military success was the merging of the two entity forces into a joint army (Baluch, 2010: 204). Two essential mandates were thus successfully implemented: the preservation of peace and stability in BiH and military safeguarding the DPA. The third component of the original mandate, the Euro-Atlantic integration of BiH, was carried out by the EU within the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process (**SAP**), which is linked to a long-term accession perspective (Baluch, 2010: 193f). Within the framework of the SAP, the EU requires aspirants to fulfill the EU accession conditions i.e. to meet the Copenhagen criteria (Tolksdorf, 2012: 114). An important principle of the SAP is that the potential accession candidates act on their own responsibility. This means that although the EU supports the reform processes through consultations and (reform) projects, decisions on reforms are made by local politicians and must be implemented by local authorities. Instead of being passive recipients, local politicians and authorities should act as active shapers (Tolksdorf, 2012: 116).

Although most of BiH's political decision-makers regard accession to the EU as the only forward-looking option for their state, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (**SAA**) with the EU, which was signed on June 16, 2008, did not enter into force until June 6, 2015. The main reason for this delay were disputes regarding the fulfillment of the conditions set by the EU: For example, there had been calls for the decentralized structures to be streamlined. The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs in particular refused to accept this, because it saw the autonomy of its partial entity threatened. The demand was eventually dropped (Reljic & Varcic, 2015: n.p.), instead the EU demanded that the country's decision-makers commit themselves in writing to institutional reforms. And indeed, the three-member state-presidium thereupon adopted a joint declaration on the country's European path and a reform agenda. The goal is to strengthen the functionality of state institutions and the rule of law, as well as to promote socio-economic development. Although hardly specified and without a precise timetable, the reform of the DPA constitutional system has thus been tackled. This time, the responsibility lies primarily with the local elites, who can no longer justify their reluctance to embrace forward-looking changes by saying that the concepts were imposed from outside (ibid.).

Based on the progress achieved, the operation was reconfigured in 2012 (v.s.). It was considerably scaled down and given a new mandate which essentially comprises the following points: "To provide capacity-building and training support to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina [AFBiH]; to support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment [and] to provide support the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH" (EEAS, 2015: 1). In addition, Althea's tasks include supporting international organizations and non-governmental organizations in BiH and monitoring mine clearance (RIS, 2020: 1). The EU fulfills the tasks of training and support through various training programs for the AFBiH and joint operations (Pulko et al, 2016: 93). The most important of these training programs was the 'Capacity Building and Training Program' that existed from 2010 to 2018. During this period, the AFBiH were trained by specialized teams provided by the troop-contributing countries participating in Althea. Since the end of 2018, AFBiH has been training independently, which speaks for the success of the program. Nonetheless, an agreement on combined and collective training between AFBiH and Althea was signed in December 2018. This agreement will ensure that AFBiH and Althea continue to work together in the area of military training and education (EEAS, 2021: 2). Althea also provides the BiH authorities with valuable expertise in the field of arms control and demining. Althea also actively supports the 'Ammunition, Weapon and Explosive Plan' and the 'BiH Mine Free by 2025' scheme (ibid.). BiH is still one of the most mined countries in the world: "The country remains heavily mine-affected area with approximately 2.2% or 1,091Km² of the total country size affected with an estimated 80,000 mines and unexploded ordinance still to be found and recovered/destroyed." (Weller, 2017: 21). Within the framework of this demining program, Althea works closely with the AFBiH Mine Action Command and informs those sections of the population particularly vulnerable to mines about the dangers that still exist and how they can be avoided (EEAS, 2021: 2). An important milestone in the EU's comprehensive approach to long-term BiH membership was reached on February 15, 2016, when BiH officially applied for EU membership. While it should be noted that there is still a long way to go before the country can actually be admitted, this application revives the previously stalled EU rapprochement process (v.s.). After a series of simple but lengthy administrative evaluation processes, the EU submitted a list of 14 core areas in need of improvement to the BiH government in February 2019 (Meindl, 2020: 8f). These include legal certainty, legislative and institutional structures and economic issues:

- Adaptation of the constitutional framework to EU standards; improving institutional functionality, the electoral system/ education system; strengthening the judiciary; intensified fight against corruption and organized crime; establishment of a stable and functioning

market economy; improvement of the general business environment; improvement of the infrastructure (EC, 2019a: 1).

According to the EU, further steps regarding BiH's specific candidate status could only be taken after these and some other criteria have been met. However, since these adaptations require changes to the constitution, they cannot be expected in the short term, although all political forces in the country have set themselves the goal of EU accession (Meindl, 2020: 8f). Althea is still active, but its mandate has been realigned several times more. Currently, Althea's mandate again focuses on its original core mission - the preservation of a safe and secure environment in the country (SHAPE, 2021: n.p.) by (1) supporting the EU's CCMC for BiH; (2) supporting BiH's authorities and (3) training/ exercising with the AFBiH (EEAS, 2021: 1). Many of the tasks which were performed by Althea within the last 16 years have now been transferred to the area of responsibility of the established and trained security forces of BiH. Furthermore, there is still close contact and regular training between AFBiH and Althea. However, EUFOR retains full responsibility and authority to re-take control, if the situation so requires (EEAS, 2021: 1).

In summary, a secure and stable environment has been created, the DPA secured militarily and BiH brought closer to the EU within the framework of the SAP and SAA (Kather, 2011: 387f). Although a resurgence of the conflict cannot be ruled out, the probability of this happening has decreased considerably. It is generally believed that the continuation of the operation, even in its greatly reduced state, is essential for BiH's current stability (Rodt, 2014: 84f). "[Thus] Althea maintains its presence throughout BiH through Liaison and Observation Teams" (LOTs) (Pulko et al, 2016: 92). In 2004, the LOTs "were initially deployed in roughly 40 locations throughout the country" (Bassuener, 2015: 8). Currently, there are 17 LOTs operating in BiH (EEAS, 2021: 2). Their task is to monitor the general situation in BiH, oversee local issues and identify problems that could negatively affect the peace process. In order to do this, the individual LOTs are networked regionally and locally and are in constant contact with both the local population and the relevant authorities (ibid.). Althea also has a Multinational Battalion (MNBN) stationed at Camp Butmir near Sarajevo. This MNBN is mobile, well equipped and trained to respond to a wide variety of situations that could jeopardize the peace process. If the current security situation (SeSi) were to erode, Althea would be able to use this instrument to initiate the first countermeasures for re-stabilization. The soldiers of the MNBN regularly train with the AFBiH so that in case of an erosion of the current SeSi or in case of an emergency, the MNBN can easily step in (EEAS, 2021: 2). However, due to the large reduction of troops, Althea suffers from a serious capability gap: "The force in BiH lacks helicopterlift to move reaction forces to some predictable potential

conflict areas, such as Mostar and Brčko" (Bassuener, 2015: 12). Should the currently stable SeSi deteriorate, this capability gap would make it difficult for the MNBN to intervene quickly.

In conclusion, the EU has been able to fully fulfill both its original and reconfigured mandate. The following factors influenced the up until now complete fulfillment of the mandate:

I. Cooperation with NATO

Operation Althea is not an autonomous EU operation, but an EU-led operation based on the BPA (Hauser, 2010: 150), which allows the EU to draw on NATO capacities and capabilities (SHAPE, 2018: 1). In the case of Althea, this meant that the 'Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe' (**SHAPE**) drew up the operation plan on the basis of instructions from the EUMS (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 20). The EU was also able to draw on NATO's experience during the execution of the operation, since the operation's headquarters (**OHQ**) was located with SHAPE, the military headquarters of NATO in Europe (Baluch, 2010: 196). Without the support of NATO, the EU would not have been able to adequately plan and conduct an operation of this magnitude at that time (Kupferschmidt, 2006: 13). One reason for fulfilling the mandate was therefore the close EU-NATO cooperation: "Detailed joint planning and preparation helped the two organizations avoid misunderstandings and overlap at the practical level and facilitated an [...] successful implementation of Althea so far" (Rodt, 2011: 49).

II. Building on the successes of the NATO operation SFOR

Furthermore, the EU was able to build on the successes achieved by SFOR. When the EU took over, it already found a relatively stable security environment which had been created by NATO in nine years (1995-2004) and which now 'only' had to be safeguarded (Rodt, 2014: 86).

III. LOTs and MNBN

The LOTs allow Althea to better monitor the current political situation in BiH and to perceive any dissatisfaction with the current situation or current political decisions at the local or regional level. The LOTs have proven to be an excellent information tool in this context. In addition, the deployment of Althea was made easier because the local population got to know the soldiers personally. The impression of a foreign occupying power was thus avoided. Similarly, initial doubts about the EU's capabilities were quickly dispelled after the NATO mission ended.

At present, the SeSi is stable, but in case the situation should suddenly deteriorate, the EU has an effective instrument at its disposal to remedy the situation quickly: the MNBN. Since the MNBN are in constant contact with the AFBiH and regularly train with them, the small troop strength (v.s.) is not a major problem. After all, the goal is to hand over responsibility to BiH and only support the authorities and security forces. This task can easily be accomplished within the

framework of Althea's current strength. However, "if the situation requires, EUFOR can be reinforced by reserves provided by EU nations and NATO. This is exercised on a yearly basis through the exercise series 'Quick Response'" (HQ EUFOR BiH, 2018: 20).

6.1.5 Sustainability

As the previous chapter has shown, the EU has so far succeeded in fulfilling both the original and the reconfigured mandate(s) within the framework of Althea. From a military point of view, Althea can thus be considered a success. Whether it is a lasting one, depends on the success of the EU's CCMC (Rodt, 2014: 65f). At present, the sustainability of Althea can only be assessed to a limited extent. A clear diagnosis is difficult: there are good reasons to regard the successes achieved as sustainable, while others allow for the opposite conclusion. As an indication of the sustainability of the successes achieved, BiH's reaction to Kosovo's declaration of independence can be cited (Rodt, 2011: 49): Internationally, there were fears that this could have a destabilizing effect on BiH. However, the SeSi in BiH remained stable even after this external influence. The core military tasks of the original mandate on which the operation was based were thus both fulfilled and sustainably secured. In addition, BiH has pursued reforms on its own initiative in recent years (Musioł, 2018: 11), which suggest that the political situation has stabilized more than superficially. On the one hand, the national police authorities have been strengthened (ibid.) which facilitates the fight against organized crime (OC). On the other hand, the nation-state judiciary and the state administration as a whole have also been strengthened. In addition, BiH has made great progress in self-reliant border surveillance and border protection. Great progress has also been made in the protection of human rights, especially the protection of women's rights (ibid.). Despite all these successes and the resulting sustainability of Althea, there are still major problems that stand in the way of a lasting peace in the country. The two most important of these being threats to BiH's stability from the complex state structure (Riedel, 2017: 3-5), which was enshrined in the DPA, and OC which again is on the rise (Council of Ministers BiH, 2017: 7).

The latter is directly addressed by Althea due to its embedment in a CCMC for BiH and the two sister operations which support Althea in fulfilling its mandate and securing its long-term sustainability. The EU's CCMC for BiH is based on (1) strengthening resilience (EUGS, 2016: 12); (2) promoting human rights and countering terrorism (EUGS, 2016: 24); (3) cooperating in the areas of energy security, migration, and in the fight against OC (EUGS, 2016: 27); and (4) supporting political reform, strengthening the rule of law, promoting economic development, and generally developing good neighborly relations (ibid.). Therefore, in addition to the military instruments of Althea, the EU also has political and economic instruments at its disposal for its CCMC in BiH (v.i.). Amongst these are the civilian police mission EUPM BiH and the European

military police force **EUROGENDFOR** (European Gendarmerie Force, 2021a: n.p.). Both EUPM BiH (EEAS, 2012: 1) and EUROGENDFOR (EUROGENDFOR, 2021b: n.p.) were mandated to fight OC in BiH. For years, Althea (2004 - today), EUPM BiH (2003 -2012) and the EUROGENDFOR (2007-2010) were simultaneously active in BiH. It is true that during this time each operation focused on its specific area of activity, but they also cooperated. The fight against OC by the EUROGENDFOR in cooperation with EUPM BiH was a prerequisite for the successful and so far sustainable stabilization of BiH (Tolksdorf, 2012: 160). After a renewed strategic analysis of the SeSi (2017), Althea refocused on the core of its original mandate – the preservation of a safe and secure environment in the country (SHAPE, 2021: n.p.) by (1) supporting the EU's CCMC for BiH; (2) supporting BiH's authorities and (3) training/ exercising with the AFBiH (EEAS, 2021: 1). The same year, it was decided to reinstate EUROGENDFOR to fight the again upsurging OC (EUROGENDFOR, 2021c: n.p.). This was in line with the interests of BiH's national government which considers OC one of the most serious threats to peace and stability (Council of Ministers BiH, 2017: 7).

The other problem - the complex state structure of BiH created by the DPA – is a lot more complex than that of OC and also a lot more difficult to solve (Riedel, 2017: 3-5). Till 1992, BiH was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society which the war turned into an ethnically and religiously divided one. The DPA stipulates that BiH consists of two 'entities', the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (**FBiH**) and the Republika Srpska (**PC/RS**). Both entities have strong competencies of their own and together form the state BiH with common presidium, bicameral legislation, constitutional court and central bank (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (**WKO**), 2018: 5). While the PC/RS retained the former centralized structure, the FBiH is divided into ten cantons (Riedel, 2017: 3). This results in 14 "governments" at three levels (state, entity and cantonal), sometimes with unclear areas of responsibility. At the head of the state, there is the presidium with one Bosnian, one Serbian and one Croatian representative, and its presidency rotates every eight months among the three. The parliament of BiH consists of a Chamber of Deputies (one-third of the total of 57 deputies are elected in the PC/RS, the rest in the FBiH) and the Chamber of Peoples (five representatives from each ethnic group). The FBiH has a parliament consisting of a Chamber of Deputies and a Chamber of Peoples, while the PC/RS has a unicameral parliament and a president directly elected by the people (ibid.).

This complex state structure which is inefficient, expensive and extremely unstable (WKO, 2018: 5), promotes BiH's precarious (overall) statehood. The reason for this is not the federal state structure per se, but rather the fact that it encourages the ethnic division of Bosnians, Croats and Serbs (Riedel, 2017: 1). The complex state structure is due to the political situation of 1995 when the

DPA was signed. Then, the international community (IC) was under great pressure to end the civil war as quickly as possible: more than 2 million people were displaced and about 250,000 killed. To get the parties to sign the treaty, extensive concessions and compromises were necessary (Riedel, 2017: 3). This is why the two territorial entities that originally sought statehood, namely the (Bosnian-Croat) FBiH and the (Serbian) PC/RS were merged into one state based on ethnic parity, as the architects of the DPA hoped for a system of "checks and balances" between the ethnic groups that would ultimately stabilize the state as a whole. With this pragmatic approach, the IC accepted a series of contradictions that today stand in the way of BiH's state structure problem: Various demands for state reform voiced by politicians of the three major ethnic groups having completely different goals root in the conceptual shortcomings of BiH's state structure (ibid.). Although this state structure made it possible to end the civil war in 1995, it now poses a threat to stability and security in BiH, which a nine-year NATO mission established and a sixteen-year EU operation secured (Babuna, 2014: 24).

In contrast to the problem of organized crime, the EU has relatively limited room for maneuver in the state structure problem: BiH is a sovereign state which must solve the problem of its general state structure itself. Although both the EU (EC, 2019a: 1) and BiH (Riedel, 2017: 3) are aware of the unfavorable state structure, a successful comprehensive reform has been blocked to date by the lack of inter-ethnic consensus (Babuna, 2014: 24). The three major ethnic groups in BiH and the two entities have different ideas about how these reforms should look like (WKO, 2018: 8). However, there is a consensus among all parties in favor of rapprochement towards the EU. The prospect of full EU integration may be the key for resolving this deadlocked situation (ibid.). As explained above, BiH still has a long way to go to achieve EU membership: BiH "[...] needs to bring in line its constitutional framework with European standards and ensure the functionality of its institutions to be able to take over EU obligations. While a decentralized state structure is compatible with EU membership, BiH will need to reform its institutions to be able to effectively participate in EU decision-making and to fully implement and enforce the *acquis*" (EC, 2019a: 1). Provided that the current interest of all ethnic groups and entities in joining the EU is maintained, the EU has an effective instrument at its disposal to gently push BiH towards the internal reforms necessary for EU accession. In doing so, the EU would in parallel strengthen the sustainability of Althea, as this would also solve the second sustainability problem.

The 2020 coronavirus pandemic and the odds of an economic depression might pose a further risk. As already mentioned in the introduction, the pandemic poses enormous challenges even for economically well-positioned countries such as Germany. BiH has also been significantly affected by the economic impact of the pandemic (WKO, 2021: n.p.). In BiH, however, economic

losses have a disproportionately higher destabilization potential, as economic problems might quickly turn into ethnic conflicts (Babuna, 2014: 13). As mentioned above, a resurgence of the ethnic conflicts has been successfully avoided so far but still cannot be ruled out. The pandemic and its economic impact have increased the risk of a resurgence of these conflicts in a disturbing way. The pandemic thus poses an undeniable threat to the progress achieved by Althea.

Despite fulfilling its mandate, Althea remains active in BiH, albeit with reduced staff (Pulko et al, 2016: 92). This continued commitment is considered necessary to secure the successes achieved and to support the central government if the security situation (SeSi) deteriorated (Rodt, 2014: 86). The EU's continuing interest in Althea even after 16 years underscores its strong political and economic interest in the stability of this region (Engberg, 2014: 59). It can be noted that Althea has considerably improved the SeSi in BiH and that the successes achieved can be considered sustainable for the time being thanks to two key factors:

I. Embedding in a comprehensive spatial development concept

From the outset, Althea has been embedded in a comprehensive development concept for BiH (Kather, 2011: 388): "The operation is explicitly framed as part of the EU's 'comprehensive approach' towards BiH, which also comprises political, economic, commercial, cultural and policing instruments intended to support the country's journey towards further European integration" (Rodt, 2014: 63). The most important element of this CCMC is the SAP in which the candidate has to fulfill various accession conditions on its own responsibility (Tolksdorf, 2012: 116) and which culminated in the official application for EU membership in 2016. Whether BiH can be accepted into the EU in the long term cannot be conclusively answered yet.

II. EUROGENDFOR and EUPM BiH

Together, the EUPM BiH and EUROGENDFOR fought OC effectively, thus enabling the military component of Althea to both maintain and further stability and security in BiH. However, there are still threats to sustainability:

- a.* With the termination of EUROGENDFOR in 2010 and EUPM BiH in 2012, organized crime in BiH was considered defeated or controllable by regional police units. However, the resurgence of organized crime poses a renewed threat to BiH's security and stability. For this very reason, EUROGENDFOR was re-established in 2017.
- b.* In addition, the sustainability of Althea is hampered by the DPA itself. Although the agreement helped ending the civil war, the division of BiH into two entities, as set forth in the agreement, solidified the ethnic tensions underlying the conflict. These tensions continue to prevent the establishment of a stable and assertive state in BiH.

6.1.6 Evaluation of the effectiveness of operation Althea

In summary, it can be said that operational involvement was appropriate to the mandate, mandate fulfillment was complete, sustainability was given, but the reaction speed was extremely low. The latter does not significantly impair effectiveness, since the objective was not to establish security but to preserve the security established by NATO. Overall, Althea, which has not yet been completed, can therefore be assessed as 'effective'. The following table summarizes all factors that so far influenced the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH. Based on this set of factors, case-specific conclusions can be drawn on how to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH through P&S (cf. chapter 7.1).

Althea	Factors with positive effects	Factors with negative effects
Reaction speed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stabilized SeSi by 2004 → reduced risk - Successful test of the BPA (Concordia) - EU experience gained in Artemis - Changed security interests of the U.S. - Continued EU interest in Althea - Economic interests of the EU - Affectedness of EU values - Historic responsibility - Opportunity for profiling in SP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Number of ISPAs involved in the handover process - Lack of EU experience in CM - Initial US veto against the handover
Operational involvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Athena mechanism - Costs lie where they fall: participation of the big three in the operation - Only few troops had to be transferred, as SFOR and Althea largely overlapped - MF allowed for reorientation and downsizing of the operation. - Appearance of new, strong ISPAs within the EU (e.g., Austria) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Differences in interest between the 'big three' - Withdrawing US troops
Mandate fulfillment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Close cooperation with NATO - Building on the success of SFOR - Peacekeeping instead of peacebuilding - SAP and SAA - 'Capacity Building and Training Program' - Close cooperation with the AFBiH - LOTs and MNBN 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capability gap: helicopter lift
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthening BiH's national authorities and security forces - Strengthening the rule of law - Continuous transfer of responsibility - EUPM BiH and EUROGENDFOR - EU's CCMC - EU accession perspective: SAP and SAA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organized crime - General state structure of BiH established by the DPA: expensive, inefficient and unstable.

Table 3: Summary of all factors which influenced the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH

Based on the results of chapter 6.1 and table 3, the below inefficiencies can be identified that may serve as starting points to further increase Althea’s effectiveness by P&S.

Weak points and inefficiencies identified = Starting points for P&S projects
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capability gap: helicopter lift
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Currently low troop strength: If the security situation were to deteriorate unexpectedly, the EU's ability to respond would be severely limited, even though it can fall back on the MNBN and "Quick Response".
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil-military cooperation

Table 4: Identified weaknesses = Possible starting points for P&S in BiH (Althea)

In chapter 7.1.2, I will identify promising P&S tools in the list of PESCO projects (cf. Appendix) that will address the listed weaknesses. In addition, I aim to do the same for some further general starting points for P&S that might appear in the discussion on the P&S tools already used with operation Althea (cf. chapter 7.1.1). In case there is no appropriate tool for a certain weakness in the list of PESCO projects, I will try to give recommendations for future PESCO projects (cf. chapter 7.1.3).

6.2 Operation Atalanta

This chapter will examine the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in Somalia with focus on its military core operation Atalanta. Just like Althea, Atalanta, has not yet been completed, so only a preliminary assessment of its effectiveness is possible.

6.2.1 Background to the crisis in Somalia

Somalia was founded in 1960 by uniting British and Italian colonial territories. Until 1969, it was governed democratically, but the high level of corruption and nepotism caused resentment in the population. After President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated on October 15, 1969, Siad Barre seized power aided by military and police. He remained in office until 1991 and ruled the country dictatorially (Balthasar, 2020: 6). During his 'term of office', Barre introduced a system based on the principles of 'scientific socialism'. In this context he implemented various reforms, some of which were extremely popular. During this time, the Soviet Union acted as Somalia's protective power. However, after Somalia attacked Ethiopia in 1977 (Ogaden War) to create 'Great Somalia', the Soviet Union withdrew all support from the Somali government, which turned to the U.S.⁶. What followed was one of the greatest proxy wars of the Cold War, which ended with the defeat of Somalia in 1978 (Balthasar, 2020: 6). In the wake of this extremely exhausting war, the Somali economy was permanently damaged, which is why Barre's power

⁶ The interest of the Soviet Union and the U.S. in Somalia during the Cold War can be explained by the strategically favorable geographical location of this country.

base began to crumble. The end of the Ogaden War marked the beginning of an opposition-led guerilla war that escalated in 1988 and led to Barre's overthrow in January 1991. Thereafter, however, the various opposition forces were unable to establish a new, functional government (Pabst, 2012: 161). A civil war began that continues to this day.

The figures paint a depressing picture. The first year of civil war claimed about 350 000 victims, almost one million Somali fled abroad and more than 50% of the population suffered from malnutrition (Etzendorfer & Janik, 2016: 230). In order to stabilize Somalia and prevent a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation, the UN and the U.S. got involved in Somalia: In the framework of UNOSOM I and II under UN leadership and UNITAF under US leadership, the international community (IC) attempted to establish functioning state structures between 1992 and 1995 (Dijkstra, 2016, 181). After various armed conflicts with Somali militias, however, the IC's willingness to continue its military involvement in Somalia declined. After the shooting down of two US combat helicopters, first the U.S. and one year later also the UN withdrew from Somalia (ibid.). The traumatic experiences during this military intervention continue to have an impact today, which is called the Mogadishu effect (Etzendorfer & Janik, 2016: 232). As a result of the withdrawal of the IC, the disintegration of statehood progressed further. Today, Somalia is the prime example of disintegrated statehood (Fontaine, 2018: 100f). One problem of disintegrated statehood is the establishment of criminal economic sectors – piracy in the case of Somalia (Petrovic, 2012: 86). Although Somali piracy is primarily damaging the economy of the industrialized nations, which depend on safe sea routes for international trade (Petrovic, 2012: 83), it is also damaging Somalia itself. On the one hand, humanitarian aid deliveries are hampered by piracy, and on the other hand, parts of the revenues generated by piracy are used to finance the ongoing civil war, which stands in the way of a lasting peace in Somalia (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 74). Alongside piracy and state instability, the greatest security threat emanates from al-Shabaab (Abdulle & Gürpınar, 2019: 2), an Islamic terrorist organization that emerged after the break-up of the 'Union of Islamic Courts' (UIC). al-Shabaab's declared goal is to establish an Islamic Somali state (Petretto, 2010: 4). Despite all efforts to curb al-Shabaab's influence, it still poses a central security threat to Somalia, as it repeatedly attacks **Amisom** (African Union Mission to Somalia), the Somali army, the police and civilians (EC, 2019b: 2) and controls large parts of southern Somalia (Balthasar, 2020: 5).

6.2.2 Reaction speed

In 2008, the extent of Somali piracy turned into an economic threat for the EU (Stehr, 2011: 52). One reason for the explosive increase in piracy was the break-up of the UIC (ibid.), that succeeded in seizing the capital Mogadishu in early June 2006 and effectively controlling the resident clan

militias. This was the first time in 15 years that one group controlled the entire capital. By August 2006, the UIC had also gained territory in the rest of Somalia (Weber, 2021: n.p.). For fear of a complete Islamization of Somalia, Ethiopian troops marched into Somalia in December 2006 and installed an extremely unstable transitional government (Dagne, 2010: 9f). With the break-up of the UIC, which was always hostile to piracy because it considered it incompatible with the Koran, a power vacuum was created which was filled by the pirate groups who, till then, had been kept in check by the UIC (Dijkstra, 2016: 184). As can be seen in table 5, with the seizure of power by the UIC, Somali piracy decreased significantly i.e., the number of pirate attacks was more than halved from 2005 to 2006. However, with Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia and the break-up of the UIC, piracy increased significantly and even exceeded the 2005 figures. With 111 attacks in 2008, piracy became a problem of global relevance that grew even more urgent in 2009. Conversely, the increased number of attacks by pirates following the break-up of the UIC indicates that the key to the long-term elimination of criminal economic sectors such as piracy lies in stabilizing Somalia itself and creating a functional government system that guarantees nationwide control.

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Acts of piracy	22	19	19	21	10	48	22	51	111	217

Table 5: Acts of piracy from 2000 to 2009 (own presentation according to UNODC, 2009: 3)

In view of the deteriorating maritime security situation off the coast of Somalia, the UN Security Council (**UNSC**) adopted Resolution 1816 on June 2, 2008, expressing its deep concern about "the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and to international navigation" (UN Security Council, 2008: 1). According to the UN Convention 1982 on the Law of the Sea, any warship is entitled to fight piracy on the high seas (German Foreign Office, 2009: 30), but not in territorial waters. The UNSC resolution 1816, however, authorized the maritime powers to combat piracy in Somali territorial waters, too (UN Security Council, 2008: 2). On August 5, the EU approved on a MCM concept based on those Resolutions (Bund, 2010: 136) and with the Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP of September 19 also on the 'European Union Naval Coordination Cell' (**EU NAVCO**) which did not control military forces, but coordinated ships of MS (France, Denmark, Netherlands) already in the area of operation (AoO) (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 102). After extensive work, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP was adopted on November 10 (German Foreign Office, 2009: 30), the major point being the transformation of EU NAVCO into the broader MCM operation Atalanta (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 102). On December 8, 2008 Atalanta was finally launched.

Six months passed between the issuing of the UN mandate and the start of Atalanta. Considering the scope of planning and the need to relocate combat ships from various MS, reaction speed (RS) can be considered 'reasonable', but this verdict is upgraded by the fact that the military coordination action EU NAVCO was initiated already three months after the UN-mandate was issued and three months before Atalanta started. This made it possible to coordinate capacities already available in the region (v.s.) until additional forces could be deployed in December. The following factors influenced the EU's reaction speed:

I. Economic interest

Despite its geo-strategically favorable location, Somalia is considered economically rather uninteresting (Petretto, 2010: 5). It has no significant industrial capacity. Most of Somalia's legal economy is based on cattle breeding, agriculture and fishing (Stuke, 2011: 31f). While livestock breeding is mainly for export to the Arabian Peninsula, fishing and agriculture are mainly subsistence economies for self-sufficiency (Weidner, 2012: 142f). However, piracy does have serious economic effects on the EU, since one of the world's most important trade routes runs along the Somali coast. It connects Europe with the Arabian Peninsula through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. Approximately 20% of the sea-based trade in goods and 12% of the oil transport runs along this trade route (Petrovic, 2012: 83), which is the shortest and therefore most cost-effective connection between Europe and Asia. Although there is an alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope, this route takes 14-20 days more, causing (according to the shipping company Hapag Lloyd) additional costs of 25% to 30% which would lead to an increase in the price of the transported goods in the destination country (Weidner, 2012: 187). Taken together, the primary and secondary costs of Somali piracy cause an annual damage of around 13 billion euros. The majority of the costs can be attributed to the secondary costs: longer transport routes, higher insurance premiums, higher prices of transported goods, investments to protect against robbery. The primary costs (ransoms, spoiled or stolen cargo) usually amount to a few hundred million euros (Pross, 2018: 47). The EU, 90% of whose foreign trade is conducted by sea, is particularly affected by this and consequently has a fundamental economic interest in the security of the sea routes off Somalia (Weidner, 2012: 28f). To make matters worse, Somali piracy is a self-perpetuating problem. As noted earlier, Somalia's unstable statehood has been a critical factor in the emergence and spread of piracy. Since part of the profits made from piracy are used to keep the civil war alive, the problem of Somalia's unstable statehood is perpetuated (v.s.). Thus, it can be concluded that Somali piracy keeps itself alive by financing the Somali civil war. This destructive connection between state instability and piracy also explains the interest of the Somali government in an international presence to combat piracy then and today.

II. Value orientation

Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Due to civil war and environmental disasters, the supply of food, drinking water and medical products to the Somali population is largely dependent on foreign aid. Overall, Somalia's humanitarian needs are estimated at USD 1.03 billion for 2020 (Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, 2020: 1). The humanitarian situation is particularly precarious in those parts of the country where civil war continues: aid supplies cannot be distributed and frequently civilians are killed in fights between Amisom and al-Shabaab (v.i.). Moreover, in the areas controlled by al-Shabaab, whose rule is based on a radical interpretation of Sharia law (BBC, 2017: n.p.), people's freedom, especially that of women, is considerably restricted. By the end of 2017, al-Shabaab controlled almost the entire Somali territory south of Beledweyne, i. e. almost a third of Somalia's total territory. The other two thirds are controlled by the authorities of Somaliland (self-declared but internationally not recognized independence), pro-governmental administrations and Amisom who supports the Federal Government of Somalia, **FGS** (ibid.). In the 1990s, the (in some regions) catastrophic humanitarian situation of the population led to local resurgence of piracy: high unemployment and food shortages eventually led many young men to joining armed groups or pirate groups as the only option for providing for their families. Over time, piracy 'out of desperation' developed into the most important pillar of the Somali war economy (Stuke, 2011: 38). However, the sharp rise in the number of robberies added to the shortage of supplies. Between 2005 and 2008, **WFP** (World Food Programme) ships were attacked several times and only returned after paying ransom (Stehr, 2011: 53). As a result of the hijackings, costs for the always scarcer food and goods rose exorbitantly. Furthermore, piracy has led to legal economic sectors losing influence and even being ousted regionally (Puntland) (Kuchler, 2010: 49). In addition, piracy further destabilized the country and consolidated the influence of warlords and clan leaders in Somalia (Petrovic, 2012: 94f). The beginnings of Somali piracy can thus be attributed to the political instability of Somalia and the resulting precarious humanitarian situation of the population. In its current form, however, piracy is causing a deterioration in supplies and political and economic stability. This development also affects the EU as a community of values, which committed itself, among other things, to the protection of freedom, the rule of law and human dignity (cf. chapter 3.2).

III. Existing commitment

To improve the humanitarian situation, the EU has been actively involved in Somalia's peace and reconstruction process since 1991 (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 87). In view of the continuing political instability and recurring natural disasters, this commitment represents a key contribution to the basic provision of supplies to the suffering population (EC, 2018: 2). Currently, the EU and

its MS provide 60% of the total humanitarian aid provided to Somalia (ibid.) and are the largest development aid donors in the region. In 2018 alone, EU funds for humanitarian and development support for Somalia amounted to €200 million. The funds were used for economic development (€100 million) and promoting both living standards (€83 million) and regional stability (€14 million) (EC, 2018: 2). Due to the current coronavirus pandemic, the EU provides the Somali health care system with €48 million extra (EC, 2020b: n.p.). Furthermore, the EU cooperates with development aid organizations such as **GIZ** (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) by financing projects that aim at improving medical care, access to water and sanitation services and reintegrating Somali refugees (GIZ, 2019: n.p.). The EU also finances the construction of schools and roads (Corner, 2014: 190). So far, however, the reconstruction projects were in vain (ibid. 189) as they only led to local improvements. This is due to the still precarious SeSi (EC: 2019b: 2) and the ongoing fighting which hamper infrastructure and economic projects (Corner, 2014: 190f). The flare-up of piracy as well as the parallel establishment of al-Shabaab and the resulting negative consequences for Somali stability posed a threat to the progress achieved by the EU's commitment to Somalia. In order to safeguard what has been achieved so far, it was in the EU's interest to step up its military involvement in Somalia.

IV. *Possibility of profiling*

Atalanta once again offered the EU the opportunity to distinguish itself as an ISPA capable of planning and conducting autonomous maritime military operations. At the same time, a significant contribution was made to securing one of the most important sea-based trade routes (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 131).

V. *UK's position on the operation*

The UK, which was initially hostile to the operation, deliberately prolonged the planning process by adding budget and detail questions on cooperation with other actors on the ground, which slowed down the reaction speed (Dijkstra, 2016: 188).

6.2.3 Operational involvement

At the beginning of the operation, Atalanta comprised six warships and three reconnaissance planes (Orugnabi, 2010: 568). The 'big three' and also the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Greece made significant contributions to the establishment and continued participation in the operation. Smaller EU members such as Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden also participate by providing personnel for the multi-nationally-composed OHQ (Ehrhart & Peretto, 2013: 107). "EU Member States have constantly demonstrated strong support for the EU Naval Force and remain committed to fight piracy" (Sherriff, 2015: 7). In addition to the EU's MS, a number

of third countries participated in Atalanta. These include Norway, which contributed a warship in 2009, as well as Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine, which sent personnel to the OHQ (EUNAVFOR, 2021a, n.p.). "The composition of EU NAVFOR changes constantly due to the frequent rotation of units and varies according to the monsoon seasons in the Indian Ocean. However, it typically comprises approximately 600 personnel, 1-3 Surface Combat Vessels and 1-2 MPRA" (ibid.). The OHQ of the operation is currently located at Rota, in the Spanish province of Cádiz (ibid.: 9). Initially, the OHQ was located in Northwood, UK, but was moved to Spain on July 30, 2018. The same day, **MSCHOA** (Maritime Security Centre- Horn of Africa) was moved from Northwood to Brest, France. Both decisions are the direct result of Brexit (Concilium, 2018: 1). The Force Headquarters (**FHQ**) is established on the lead ship of the country currently in charge of operational coordination (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.). At present (April 2021) this is Italy, the Force Commander of Atalanta being Rear Admiral Roberto Messina (EUNAVFOR, 2021b: n.p.) on board the flagship F 593 ITS Carabinieri. As can be seen in table 6, the main burden of the operation is currently borne by Spain which provide most staff and the most expensive assets. Italy and Montenegro (third stare) support Atalanta with equipment and additional personal in the field.

Surface Vessels	MPRAs⁷	UAS⁸	Helicopters	AVPDs⁹
Italian Frigate F 593 ITS Carabinieri - Flagship - Hosts FHQ	Spanish P-3M Orion	Spanish Scan Eagle	Spanish Augusta Bell AB-212	Team of 12 from Montenegro
Spanish Frigate ESPS Castilla				
(EUNAVFOR, 2021c: n.p.)	(EUNAVFOR, 2021d: n.p.)	(EUNAVFOR, 2021e: n.p.)	(EUNAVFOR, 2021f: n.p.)	(EUNAVFOR, 2021g: n.p.)

Table 6: Overview of the assets currently used by the EU in Atalanta (own presentation)

Over time, the EU's military operation Atalanta has been embedded in a CCMC and later complemented by sister operations – EUCAP Somalia¹⁰ and EUTM Somalia¹¹. EUTM Somalia is a military training mission initiated in 2010 (EUTM Somalia, 2019: 1). Its goal is to both train Somali security forces and provide strategic advice to the Somali General Staff and the Ministry of Defense (German Foreign Office, 2021: n.p.). For security reasons, the training of Somali security forces did not take place in Somalia itself during the first years of the operation, but in Entebbe, Uganda. Due to the considerably improved SeSi since 2012, the headquarter was finally

⁷ Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircrafts

⁸ Unmanned Aerial System

⁹ Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachments

¹⁰ European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia

¹¹ European Union Training Mission in Somalia

transferred to Mogadishu, Somalia, in 2014 (ibid.). This relocation had great symbolic significance, as it was a tribute to the progress made in the domestic stabilization of the country. The security forces trained this way - about 5 600 (Bundeswehr, 2021: n.p.) - will strengthen the authority of the FGS which is enabled to take autonomous action against terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab and criminal organizations such as pirate gangs (EUTM Somalia, 2019: 1). At long term, EUTM Somalia should gradually enable the Somali authorities and institutions to continue its tasks under their own responsibility (EUTM Somalia, 2019: 1f). EUCAP Somalia (initiated in 2012) is a civilian training mission aiming at strengthening regional maritime capabilities. Various countries such as Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia have been supported in the establishment/ expansion of their coastguards (EUCAP Somalia, 2021: n.p.). The states near the Horn of Africa (**HoA**) shall thus be enabled to protect both their territorial waters and internationally important sea routes against piracy on an increasingly autonomous basis (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 92). Due to the progress achieved since 2012, the mission was given a new mandate in 2016 and has since focused exclusively on strengthening Somali coastal protection capacities. In doing so, the operation also includes Somaliland and Puntland and cooperates with the respective local police authorities. In December 2020, the operation was allocated a budget of €86.78 million and extended until the end of 2022 (EUCAP Somalia, 2021: n.p.). In addition to the EU, further (multi)national ISPAAs are active off the coast of Somalia:

Actor	Operation	Goals
NATO	Allied Provider (October 2008 to December 2008)	Escort of WFP ships for protection against piracy and patrolling the territorial waters of Somalia (NATO, 2016: n.p.)
	Allied Protector (March 2009 to August 2009)	Deter, defend against and disrupt piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the HoA (NATO, 2016: n.p.).
	Ocean Shield (August 2009 to December 2016)	At-sea counter-piracy activities off the HoA, in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (NATO, 2016: n.p.)
U.S.	Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 (since February 5, 2002)	Multinational maritime operation off the HoA led by the U.S. to combat terrorism and organized crime (Combined Maritime Forces, 2021a: n.p)
	CTF 151 (since January 11, 2009)	Multinational maritime operation off the HoA led by the U.S. to combat regional piracy (Combined Maritime Forces, 2021b: n.p)
AU	Amisom (since March 2007)	Supporting the Somali security forces and fighting al-Shabaab with the aim of the sustainable stabilization of Somalia (EC, 2019b: 1)

Table 7: Further international engagement in Atalanta's AoO (own presentation)

NATO's commitment to combat Somali piracy ended on December 15, 2016, with the termination of operation Ocean Shield (NATO, 2016: n.p.). Unlike the NATO operation, the US-led operations CTF 150 and CTF 151 are still active. Operation CTF 151 is dedicated to fighting piracy off the HoA, while operation CTF 150 fights terrorism and organized crime in general (MacLeod & Wardrop, 2015: 1). Amisom, in contrast to the listed NATO and US operations, is not a maritime, but a land-based operation with operational focus on Mogadishu, the capital and seat of government of Somalia (EC, 2019b: 1). Its mandate consists in providing military support to the FGS. Therefore, Amisom's security policy counterpart is al-Shaabab, not the pirate gangs. While EU, NATO, the U.S. and other states fight piracy at sea, Amisom fights al-Shaabab on land receiving financial support from the IC, especially from the EU (EC, 2019b: 2). In addition to the listed operations, there are numerous national security forces from China, India, Japan, Russia and South Korea active off the HoA, which also aim to combat piracy (Pabst, 2012: 174). The EU's commitment, however, far exceeds the commitment of all these actors, which is why the EU coordinates all anti-piracy operations in the AoO (Dijkstra, 2016: 193). In general, the operational involvement (OI) was influenced by the following factors:

I. Costs-lie-where-they-fall principle

According to the basic rule 'Costs lie where they fall', the costs attributable to a nation are also borne nationally (Reininghaus, 2012: 208). The majority of the total costs are thus borne by the contributing MS, which is why the involvement of the 'big three' in Atalanta, as is the case with Althea, was a prerequisite for adequate OI (Diedrichs, 2012: 96). However, even though the 'big three' were involved, the OI was not appropriate according to the mandated tasks and the size of the operational area (v.i.).

II. Existing French commitment

In view of increasing piracy and the precarious humanitarian situation, France initiated the military operation 'Alcyon' in 2007 to protect WFP ships (Larik, 2013: 1). Denmark and the Netherlands were later integrated into the operation on an ad hoc basis, giving it a multilateral character (Dijkstra, 2016: 185). In the course of the establishment of EU NAVCO, operation Alcyon was Europeanized and finally transformed into Atalanta (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 102), which was in line with France's national interest (Larik, 2013: 2).

III. Economic impact on Germany

Germany supported Atalanta because piracy was increasingly damaging German economy: Germany has the largest container fleet and the third largest merchant fleet in the world (Ehrhart et al, 2013: 11). Moreover, German companies are dependent on the stable supply of raw material

s, finished and semi-finished products by sea. Disruptions to this route hit the German economy at its lifeblood (Czenskowsky & Böttchner, 2015: 10). To defend its economic interests, Germany had the choice between an EU and a NATO operation. Since German anti-piracy policy is mainly organized within the EU, an EU operation was more in line with Germany's interests (Ehrhart et al, 2013: 14). The current pandemic again illustrates Germany's interest in secure and stable supply chains: In the pandemic's course, international supply chains were interrupted, causing damage worth billions of dollars to the German economy (DW, 2020b: n.p.). Based on this observation, Germany's immense dependence on reliable supply chains can be identified as a fundamental reason for the past and present engagement in Atalanta. Only recently, on May 27, 2020, the German Bundestag extended the Bundeswehr's participation in Atalanta (Hausding, 2020: n.p.).

IV. Increasing isolation of the UK

The UK initially spoke out against an autonomous EU operation because the EU had no experience in maritime military operations. It also feared that a further strengthening of the CSDP could be at the expense of NATO. After France and Germany had spoken out in favor of Atalanta and against a NATO operation, the UK became increasingly isolated (Dijkstra, 2016: 189). In view of its political isolation, the UK finally made a U-turn and declared itself ready to support and lead Atalanta (ibid.). The reason for this was not least the insight that the UK would not be able to prevent Atalanta, but that it could gain a certain degree of control and more easily assert its interests (NATO cooperation) during the operation if it took over operational command. In addition, the UK did not incur any direct costs by providing the OHQ, since these fall under the Athena mechanism and are jointly financed (Dijkstra, 2016: 189f).

V. The Brexit's influence on the operational involvement in Atalanta

With the UK having left, the EU lost a member of the 'big three', which has a direct impact on the CFSP/ CSDP and also on the implementation of concrete operations. Within the framework of Atalanta, the UK provided the OHQ for a decade and thus had influence on operational conduct (v.s.). With the Brexit approaching, the OHQ was transferred to Spain and MSCHOA to France. The withdrawal of the UK is an opportunity for France to strengthen its position as the EU's military leader (Lavinder, 2018: n.p). In view of Germany's restraint in military matters, France is likely to become the EU's central military actor in the foreseeable future. For smaller and militarily less powerful MS, the Brexit is an opportunity to expand their own military capabilities and establish themselves as new major ISPA within the EU. Spain appears to be pursuing this goal at present. In the run-up to the decision on the relocation of the OHQ, Spain made its intentions clear: it wants to get more involved in the context of the CFSP/CSDP and develop into a major EU ISPA. Spain is herein supported by France which recognized the need for new, strong

ISPAs within the EU. The current French-Spanish cooperation in substituting the UK's share in the context of Atalanta can thus be seen as the starting signal for the reorganization of the inner-European security architecture (ibid.). Within a few months, France and Spain succeeded in minimizing the effects of the Brexit on other ongoing operations by assuming more military responsibility in the context of the CSDP (Lavinder, 2018: n.p).

Considering all the afore-mentioned, the operational involvement (OI) was high (in absolute terms). Substantial resources (personnel & materiel) were made available and the 'big three' were also involved. Nevertheless, given the mandate's scope and the size of the AoO, the OI in Atalanta was not appropriate. Over time, this could be remedied through increased international cooperation (Engberg, 2014: 150). In addition to the EU, further ISPAs are active off the HoA (v.s.). Viewed separately, none of the operations (cf. table 7) had the necessary strength to curb piracy and secure the sea routes on its own. These tasks could only be accomplished by coordinating the individual national and multinational operations (Reininghaus, 2012: 205). The EU, whose commitment exceeds that of the other actors, played the key role in this coordination process (v.s.).

6.2.4 Mandate fulfillment

Atalanta's mandate covers a wide range of tasks to be carried out "in an Area of Operations covering the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros" (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.), an area of approximately 8,700,000 km² (ibid). According to the Joint Action of the Council of the EU (2008/851/CFSP), last extended on December 22, 2020 until December 31, 2022 (Concilium, 2020a: 5), the mandate of Atalanta consists of the following tasks: (1) "Protection of vessels of the WFP" (Concilium, 2008: 2); (2) "Protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast" (ibid.); (3) "Arrest, detain and transfer persons who have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery" (Concilium, 2008: 3); and (4) "Cooperation with other operations in the field" (ibid.). Furthermore, two additional tasks were added to the mandate during the course of the operation: (5) "Monitoring of fishing activities in Somali territorial waters"; and (6) "Protection of Amisom vessels" (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.). To fulfill these tasks, international cooperation is considered fundamental:

a. Protection of ships and shipping routes (mandate tasks (1), (2), (4) and (6))

One of the most important achievements of Atalanta is that no Amisom nor WFP ship has been seized since the beginning of the operation (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.). The latter enabled 1.8 million tons of food aid to be delivered safely to Somalia by 2018 (EUNAVFOR, 2018a:

n.p.). As the land-based delivery routes via Ethiopia or Kenya are mostly controlled by Somali militias and criminal groups, the protection of WFP ships is a considerable success (Novaky, 2018: 134). This success is due to escorts and the use of AVPDs (v.s.) on board WPF ships. The AVPD is a security team integrated into the crew and is responsible for the self-protection of the ship (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.). At present, the AVPD is provided by Montenegro (cf. table 6). In the past, this task has also been performed by other non-EU states such as Lithuania and EU MS like Croatia (ibid.). Within the 2008 EU-created 'Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor' (IRTC), it was also possible to protect merchant ships (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.). In 2017, the CTF 151 created an expanded transit corridor: The Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC). The MSTC consists of the IRTC and the 'Bab El Mandeb' (BAM), which connects the Gulf of Aden with the Red Sea. For shipping, the BAM has about the same importance as the Suez Canal. The creation of the MSTC became necessary due to the increased number of attempted seizures and other suspicious activities since 2016 (Solace, 2017: 1f). However, effective protection requires prior notification of the MSCHOA (EUNAVFOR, 2021h: n.p.). The MSCHOA tracks ships in Atalanta's AoO. All ships about to pass the IRTC or MSTC have the possibility to register with MSCHOA. This both facilitates the protection of the vessels and gives the ships' captains access to the daily updated risk report (EUNAVFOR, 2021h: n.p.). The protection of WFP ships and supply vessels of Amisom can be credited to Atalanta and was made possible by escorts and the formation of hard-to-attack convoys. The success in protecting merchant ships in the IRTC and MSTC is not due to the EU alone, but also to the NATO, the U.S., and several other national operations/actors (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013, 105).

b. Combating piracy (mandate task (3))

Acts of piracy		
Source	Year	Number of incidents (attacks & attempted attacks)
(UNODC, 2009: 3)	2007	51
	2008	111
	2009	217
(Saw, 2017: n.p.)	2010	219
	2011	237
	2012	75
	2013	15
	2014	11
	2015	0
	2016	2
(International Maritime Bureau, 2021: 6)	2017	5
	2018	2
	2019	0
	2020	0

Table 8: Acts of piracy from 2007 to 2020 (own presentation)

In 2008, pirate attacks more than doubled to a total of 111 incidents. As pointed out above, this posed an essential economic threat to the EU and affected deeply its common values (v.s.). When Atalanta started in December 2008, the number of attacks did not decrease – on the contrary. In 2009 again, the number of robberies almost doubled to 217, remained high in 2010 (219) and slightly increased in 2011 (237). Only in 2012, after more than 4 years of military presence, did the number of robberies decrease significantly for the first time (237 → 75). This positive trend continued in the following years and reached its temporary low in 2015 with zero reported incidents. In the following years, there was again a temporal increase in the number of attacks, but these are far from the previous peak values. Based on the continuing decline in the number of robberies since 2012, it can be concluded that Atalanta has probably succeeded in combating piracy. However, this reduction must be attributed to the overall increase in military presence. Apart from the EU, a large number of further (multi)national ISPA's fought piracy off the coast of Somalia (v.s.). Therefore, it's only partly Atalanta's success. The same applies to the decreased success rate of pirate attacks: while it was still 1:3 in 2008, it was only 1:8.5 in 2009 (Reininghaus, 2012: 221). Despite the sharp drop in the number of robberies by 2020 and the equally sharp drop in the pirates' success rate, Somali piracy has not yet been eradicated. For this reason, it is not possible to substantially reduce the military presence in the foreseeable future as the progresses made over the recent years would be endangered. Chapter 6.2.5 further elaborates this point.

c. Embedding Atalanta in a comprehensive crisis management concept (mandate task (4))

In the wake of Atalanta, the EU initiated two further operations (EUCAP Somalia; EUTM Somalia) with the aim of strengthening Somali state structures. In the long term, the interaction of all three EU operations is intended to eradicate Somali piracy and strengthen Somali state stability. A stabilized Somalia would be able to protect the sea routes in its territorial waters on its own, which in turn would provide the EU with an exit strategy to Atalanta.

Until this still distant goal is achieved, the protection of the sea routes off Somalia remains a permanent task. In order to fulfill it, the EU has been cooperating with several (multi)national ISPA's. In addition, the EU provides financial support to the land-based Amisom which is another important means of stabilizing Somalia in the long run (EC, 2019b: 2). Furthermore, the EU's MCM for Somalia is embedded in a CCMC which comprises "building robust and accountable political structures; contributing to conflict resolution and prevention; mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth and supporting regional economic cooperation" (EP, 2012: 15).

d. Monitoring of fishing activities in Somali territorial waters (mandate task (5))

The reason why monitoring fishing activities in Somali territorial waters is part of Atalanta's mandate is twofold. On the one hand, illegal fishing is seen as one reason for the sharp rise in piracy in 2008 (Staude, 2016: n.p.) and on the other hand, pirate groups often disguise their attack boats and mother ships as supposedly harmless fishing boats (Kuchler, 2010: 47). However, this is a relatively small task which is mainly fulfilled "by the fly" during the regular patrol trips on the basis of friendly, voluntary inspections of conspicuously behaving vessels (EUNAVFOR, 2018b: n.p.). All suspicious fishing activities are reported to the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (**DG MARE**) which can then initiate investigations, inspect suspicious vessels and take legal action if necessary (ibid.). Atalanta's task is therefore limited to monitor fishing activities and report them to DG MARE, but it is not part of its mandate to actively combat illegal fishing.

As explained, Atalanta was able to fulfill its underlying mandate despite inadequate operational involvement (v.s.). This is due to the following factors:

I. Cooperation with multi(national) ISPA's in the operational area

The fight against piracy and the protection of merchant ships as well as WFP and Amisom vessels is a task that the EU could not accomplish on its own. The classic sea surveillance by patrolling combat ships and air surveillance by drones simply reaches its limits due to the size of the operational area (Stehr, 2011: 78) of 8,700,000 km². This may also be the reason why piracy still rose in the first years of Atalanta. One reason why piracy has declined so sharply since 2012 is the EU's increased cooperation with other (multi)national ISPA's in the area. An example of this cooperation is the IRTC and the newly created MSTC. These secure transit corridors are not monitored by the EU alone, but also by the NATO, the U.S. and other nations.

II. Introduction of MSCHOA

Another reason for the decrease in piracy is the creation of MSCHOA. Registered ships are much better protected, because more difficult to attack convoys can be formed. In addition, endangered ships can be identified rapidly and thus protected more easily. Furthermore, MSCHOA enables communication between different naval forces and civilian ships via an internal communication system. In the event of an attack, military assistance can thus be provided quickly. All in all, the risk for the ships to become victims of an attack has been minimized.

III. Creation of coordination forums

To ensure the coordination of the military forces present in the region (v.s.), various forums for regular consultation have been created (Reininghaus, 2012: 205). The most important one is the 'Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Mechanism', **SHADE** (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 105),

which serves to exchange information and coordinate activities (Kather, 2011: 390). Over time, coordination of the available capacities was perfected and surveillance gaps considerably reduced (Stehr, 2011: 90), which is the reason for the significant decline in attacks since 2012.

6.2.5 Sustainability

As the previous chapter has shown, the EU has succeeded in fulfilling Atalanta's mandate. However, in discussing this success, two major factors that cast doubt on the sustainability of the successes achieved to date appeared: (1) insufficient resources given the size of the operation area and mandate; (2) piracy was only suppressed, but not defeated. Considering these factors, the EU's successes appear to be only slightly sustainable. A withdrawal of military forces is not possible in the foreseeable future, as this would endanger the progress made. Consequently, the protection of the sea routes will become a permanent task. This conclusion, which appears to be thoroughly negative at first, is deceptive and not correct in all respects. As already mentioned in the chapter on operational involvement (OI), the participation of MS and non-EU states and the resources of Atalanta are high in absolute figures. The conclusion that resources are insufficient is due to the size of the AoO and the mandate's scope. This deficiency is attributable not only to the EU, but to all (multi)national ISPA's off the coast of Somalia. Viewed individually, none of them has the resources and capabilities to solve the piracy problem on its own (Reininghaus, 2012: 205). And yet, through close cooperation between the individual anti-piracy operations within the framework of SHADE and the coordination of available resources, together they have been able to reduce piracy since 2012. In summary, through cooperation and coordination they were able to overcome the problem of inadequate OI and fulfill their mandate. And yet, Somali piracy has not been defeated. It has been merely suppressed and still is a latent threat to international shipping for three reasons: piracy is only fought at sea even though its causes can only be solved on land, the pirate groups took countermeasures and prosecution of piracy is still inadequate.

I. Fighting piracy only at sea

The reason for Atalanta's lack of sustainability is that it is aimed at combating a symptom (i.e., piracy), but not at solving the actual problem, namely Somalia's collapsed statehood: So, within its mandate, the operation only combats the effects of piracy at sea, but not its causes on land (Kather, 2011: 391), which is why constant pressure and a longer-lasting presence of naval forces off the HoA are required (Stehr, 2011: 93). Piracy will remain a highly attractive business model for as long as the pirates are allowed to carry on relatively unharmed and acquire horrendous sums of ransom (Petrovic, 2012: 91). The protection of sea routes is thus becoming a permanent task. Though military intervention on land is possible on the basis of Resolutions 1846 and 1851,

the EU and the U.S. show little interest in it because of the negative experiences (v.s. "Mogadishu effect") in Somalia during the 1990s (Stehr, 2011: 131) Yet, a 2 000-meter-wide coastal strip of the Somali coast has been part of Atalanta's operational area since 2012. This is not monitored by ground troops, but by helicopters from the air (Ehrhart et al, 2013: 22). It is basic consensus that Somalia must be stabilized first in order to solve the piracy problem. Furthermore, it is widely agreed that this long-term goal can only be achieved by comprehensive commitment to water and land (German Foreign Office, 2012: 6). The EU shares this view, which is why it is not only engaged off the HoA within the framework of Atalanta, but has embedded this operation in a CCMC (v.s.). Moreover, the EU is training Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia), strengthening Somalia's maritime capabilities (EUCAP Somalia) and providing financial support to Amisom (which directly supports the FGS and fights al-Shabaab). Apart from this, the EU promotes the economic reconstruction of Somalia (EC, 2018: 1). All measures serve to stabilize Somalia in the long term. The allegation that the EU's approach is unbalanced, is thus refuted. Through Atalanta and the accompanying measures detailed above, the EU is making a wholistic contribution to the long-term solution of the underlying problem (Somali state instability), the by-product of which is Somali piracy.

II. *Countermeasures of the pirate groups*

Despite Atalanta and its integration into a CCMC, it cannot be denied that Somali piracy continues to pose a threat. One of the reasons for this are the countermeasures taken by the pirate groups enabling them to continue their business despite the sharp increase in international military presence. In the first years, the pirates' countermeasures consisted in expanding their area of operations, AoO (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 111) and increasing their ransom demands (Stehr, 2011: 78). This counterstrategy was successful until 2012. In absolute terms, the pirate groups carried out more raids, but their success rate declined in parallel. The increased number of robberies can be explained by the larger AoO, the lower success rate due to increased military presence. However, this reduced success rate had only a marginal effect on the profits made, as the ransoms rose sharply: The average ransom per hijacked ship rose from \$150,000 (2005) to \$5.2 million (2010). This additional income enabled the pirates to compensate for economic losses resulting from the lower number of successful robberies (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 113f). The EU and other actors in the area reacted by also expanding their AoO, increasing their military presence by enhancing cooperation and closing surveillance gaps by starting to coordinate all resources available in the area (v.s.). This explains the sharp decline in pirate attacks since 2012, but the pirate groups still exist and pose a threat as they simply shifted their criminal activities to other, less heavily monitored sea routes and 'economic fields': smuggling of weapons, drugs and people (Dijkstra, 2016:

184). Due to the pirates' changed economic field, piracy decreased in absolute numbers while other sea-based crimes like smuggling gained importance. As a result, the pirate groups pose a less serious threat to the IC than in 2008, at least for the time being, but their criminal proceeds continue to finance and keep going the Somali civil war. Therefore, they continue to pose a major threat to the stability and security of Somalia.

III. *Insufficient prosecution of piracy*

Atalanta's central weakness was and is the criminal prosecution of pirates. Since the Somali authorities are not able to ensure effective prosecution and the participating MS did not want to burden themselves with this task, alleged pirates were often released without trial at the start of the operation (Sandawi, 2010: 252). This circumstance could only be countered with the conclusion of the extradition agreement with Kenya on March 6, 2009 (Stehr, 2011: 115). Unfortunately, Kenya cancelled this agreement only one year later, as it felt overwhelmed with the criminal prosecution of the transferred pirates and considered the financial support of the EU insufficient (Leposo, 2010: n.p.). For this reason, the EU concluded further justice agreements with the Seychelles and Mauritius (EUNAVFOR, 2021a: n.p.). However, prosecution is still insufficient. Even though the pirates are prosecuted in these countries, this does not necessarily result in a conviction which is then implemented. Many convicted pirates are released either directly after the trial or after a short prison sentence as the prisons in the named states are overcrowded. The inadequate prosecution led to the new "catch and release" approach of the IC, meaning the seizure of resources from persons suspected of piracy at sea (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 121-123). If a suspicious ship is seized that has loaded large quantities of fuel, weapons and ammunition and also has boarders and grappling hooks, it is likely that it is a pirate ship looking for a suitable target and not a harmless fishing boat. With the exception of the Seychelles, the intention to commit an act of piracy is not punishable in most countries of the world, which explains the EU's interest in a judicial cooperation agreement with this country. Regardless of the amount of financial support, the transfer of all persons suspected of piracy to the Seychelles would overburden its judicial and detention system within a very short time. For this reason, the EU has decided on catch and release: weapons, ammunition, grappling hooks and most of the fuel are confiscated, the suspicious ship and its crew are then released (Ehrhart & Petretto, 2013: 121f). The advantage of this procedure is that acts of piracy can be prevented, but the disadvantage is that the profit-risk balance is not affected. As long as pirates are not caught in the act, there is no risk of criminal prosecution - and even if they are caught, the actual criminal prosecution and the expected punishment are nothing compared to the possible earnings (Stehr, 2011: 128). The criminal prosecution in the context of Atalanta thus represents a blatant weakness that cannot be glossed over. One

way to counter this weakness is to strengthen the Somali judicial and detention system. Due to the weakness of the FGS and its dependence on Amisom, however, this approach that can only be pursued in the future, as it requires the previous stabilization of Somalia - security first approach (Weidner, 2012: 277). According to this approach, the restoration of basic security is the central prerequisite for the reconstruction of functioning state structures. The focus here is on restoring physical security in the conflict area. Without a minimum of security, all measures aimed at strengthening the economy, rebuilding the infrastructure or the like are doomed to failure (Weidner, 2012: 277-279). For this reason, it is of crucial importance to first establish a minimum of security in Somalia. Only on the basis of this security can effective economic, institutional and civil reconstruction projects be initiated through which a sustainable stabilization of Somalia can be achieved. In short, the key to the long-term and comprehensive stabilization of Somalia is to first restore basic security.

From what was said above, it is clear that the EU's CCMC for Somalia has not yet produced sustainable results, although the EU succeeded in fulfilling the mandate on which Atalanta is based. A withdrawal or reduction of the current engagement would inevitably destroy the successes achieved. The protection of sea routes will thus remain a permanent task in the foreseeable future. However, this negative conclusion is brightened up: With ATLANTA, EUCAP Somalia, EUTM Somalia, financial support for Amisom and economic support for Somalia, the EU pursues a wholistic approach that has the potential to solve the fundamental security problems in Somalia in the long term. As soon as an elementary level of security has been established throughout Somalia (a stable government system that respects the cultural reality of clan life and a victory over al-Shabaab), this can be built upon. The conclusion regarding the sustainability of Atalanta in light of the EU's CCMC must therefore be that, so far, the operation has been successful but not yet sustainable. In the long run, however, sustainability might be ensured within the framework of the currently pursued wholistic EU approach.

6.2.6 Evaluation of the effectiveness of operation Atalanta

In summary, it can be said that reaction speed was adequate, mandate fulfillment complete, operational involvement (OI) inadequate, but sustainability not yet given. Over time, the inadequate OI could be compensated by cooperation and coordination, which enabled the mandate to be fulfilled, but this does not apply to the sustainability of the operation. Although the safety of ships in the area could be considerably improved, securing the sea routes became a permanent task of the IC. Only the stabilization of Somalia could lead to a sustainable solution to the piracy problem. All in all, Atalanta, which has not yet been completed, can thus be assessed as 'conditionally effective'. The following table summarizes all factors that have influenced the effectiveness of

the EU's MCM in Somalia. The identified factors allow for case-specific conclusions on how to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in Somalia by P&S (cf. chapter 7.2).

Atalanta	Factors with positive effects	Factors with negative effects
Reaction speed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of EU NAVCO - Economic interests of the EU - Affectedness of EU values - Already existing commitment - Opportunity for profiling in SP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Initially hostile attitude of the UK towards planning an anti-piracy operation within the EU
Operational involvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Athena-mechanism - Costs lie where they fall: participation of the 'big three' in the operation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Existing French commitment in the region ■ Economic impact of piracy on Germany ■ Increasing isolation of the UK - Rise of new, strong ISPAs within the EU (Spain) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brexit
Mandate fulfillment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cooperation with (multi)national ISPAs in the AoO, mainly on sea - Creation of coordination forums (SHADE) - Introduction of MSCHOA - Patrolling IRTC and MSTC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Large AoO - Insufficient resource allocation
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cooperation with (multi)national ISPAs in the AoO including Amisom on land - Atalanta's embedment into a CCMC - EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia - Extradition agreement with Kenya, the Seychelles and Mauritius 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Insufficient resources given the size of the AoO and the extensive mandate - Piracy only suppressed, but not defeated, OC still exists - Inadequate criminal prosecution - Anti-piracy-fight only at sea - Countermeasures taken by pirate groups

Table 9: Summary of all factors which influenced the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in Somalia

Based on the results of chapter 6.2 and table 9, the below inefficiencies can be identified that may serve as starting points to further increase Atalanta's effectiveness by P&S.

Weak points and inefficiencies identified = Starting points for P&S projects
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limitations to monitoring the entire AoO
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate criminal prosecution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Countermeasures taken by pirate groups

Table 10: Identified weaknesses = Possible starting points for P&S in Somalia (Atalanta)

In chapter 7.2.2, I will identify promising P&S tools in the list of PESCO projects (cf. Appendix) that will address the listed weaknesses. In addition, I aim to do the same for some further

general starting points for P&S that might appear in the discussion on the P&S tools already used with operation Atalanta (cf. chapter 7.2.1). In case there is no appropriate tool for addressing a certain weakness in the list of PESCO projects, I will try to give recommendations for future PESCO projects (cf. chapter 7.2.3).

6.3 Concordance analysis of the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH and Somalia

The preceding systematic investigation identified a number of factors which influenced the effectiveness of each operation. Now, the operations are compared with regard to their effectiveness in order to identify the independent variables (IVs), i. e. the factors that appear in all cases. All other factors, which occur in some examination cases but not in others, are excluded as causal conditions (Jahn, 2013: 170). The table below is a synthesis of the result tables on BiH and Somalia provided in chapters 6.1 and 6.2. It lists all factors that are believed to be IVs in matching colors. In order to confirm this assumption, these factors will be analyzed more deeply. Furthermore, 2 non-matching factors are given that are believed to be important for the analysis because of their opposing character.

Factors of effectiveness	Effect (+/-)	BiH – Althea	Somalia - Atalanta
Reaction speed	Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opportunity for profiling - Economic interest in the stability of BiH - EU values affected by historical responsibility for BiH - Low risk due to stabilized security environment before handover 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opportunity for profiling - Economic interest in safe maritime trade routes - EU values affected by the dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Somalia - Deterioration of the security environment before the start of the operation
	Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delay in operational handover due to US doubts about the EU's military capabilities/ experience. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delay in the start of the operation due to the initial refusal of the UK government
Operational involvement	Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Matching interests: national interests of MS including the 'big three' in the long-term stability of BiH - Athena-mechanism facilitated financing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Matching interests: national interests of MS including the 'big three' in protection of sea routes threatened by piracy - Athena-mechanism facilitated financing
	Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capability gap: helicopter lift 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity gap: too few resources for too large an AoO
Mandate fulfillment	Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Close cooperation with NATO 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Close cooperation with several (multi)national ISPA's
	Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -

Sustainability	Positive	- EU's CCMC for BiH ■ additional civil and military operations	- EU's CCMC for the HoA ■ additional civil and military operations
	Negative	- Main problem not yet solved: general state structure of BiH established by the DPA: expensive, inefficient and unstable. - OC	- Main problem not yet solved: Somalia's instability due to the continuing weakness of the FGS - OC

Table 11: Assumed independent variables (own presentation)

The independent and intervening variables that will emerge from the following analysis provide an excellent basis for identifying suitable P&S measures and strategies to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in general.

6.3.1 Comparing the reaction speed of Althea and Atalanta

The two operations differ significantly in terms of reaction speed (RS). With Atalanta, the RS was six months as the UK was initially hostile to the operation and dragged out the planning process. In view of the complexity of the operation with its extensive mandate and vast AoO, the RS can still be assessed as 'appropriate'. This positive conclusion is underlined by the fact that the EU NAVCO military coordination action was already initiated before the launch of Atalanta (v.s.). Here, the decisive factor were the EU's economies being strongly affected and their common interest in safe maritime trade routes. In addition, the crisis in Somalia affected the EU's values: The raids on WFP ships and the resulting increasingly precarious situation of the civilian population were not compatible with EU values. Besides, the EU was already involved in Somalia before piracy exploded and the progress achieved since the 1990s was threatened by this new facet of the Somali crisis. At the same time, it once again offered the EU the opportunity to distinguish itself on the international level as an ISPA that is capable of acting autonomously and taking a leading role in the coordination of forces from various (multi)national naval operations and making a decisive contribution to the security of the sea routes.

In contrast to Atalanta, the RS with Althea was extremely slow – almost two years. As opposed to Somalia, however, the crisis in BiH was neither an acute nor an escalating one. The slow RS did not significantly affect the effectiveness of Althea, since peacemaking and -keeping were successfully handled by NATO until the handover of the operation. In order to answer the underlying research question adequately, it is nevertheless necessary to analyze the factors that have influenced the RS. The RS was slowed down primarily by the large number of ISPAs to be involved as well as by the EU's then inadequate capabilities and lack of experience. The U.S. in particular refused to hand over responsibility for BiH to the EU, thus slowing down the handover

process for a long time. Only after the conclusion and testing of the BPA, was the EU put in a position to replace SFOR. Due to the qualitative progress made by the EU as an ISPA and the US security interests shifting towards Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. finally gave up their resistance to an operation handover and even actively sought it. The EU's continued interest in Althea can be explained by its historical responsibility towards BiH, which stems from the failure of EU crisis diplomacy in the wake of Yugoslavia's disintegration during the 1990s. Althea offered the EU the opportunity to make amends for this failure. In addition to this and its values being affected, the EU also had an economic interest in the stability of BiH which is located on its immediate periphery and has long-term prospects of EU accession. In addition, Althea once again offered the opportunity to profile as an ISPA capable of conducting complex and protracted operations in cooperation with NATO. Another factor with regard to the RS is the delay in the start of the operation due to the vehemently negative attitude of one of the states involved. With Althea, the U.S. blocked operation hand-over to the EU, with Atalanta, it was the UK which delayed operation planning, as both doubted the EU's suitability to carry out the respective operation (security doubts). According to the logic of the CA (v.s.), these four factors are therefore IVs.: (1) opportunity for profiling as a reliable ISPA; (2) economic impact of the crisis on the EU; (3) value-affectedness due to the crisis and (4) security doubts.

An inconsistent factor, namely the dynamics of the security environment in the AoO, should be addressed, as well. While the general security environment in BiH improved significantly in the run-up to operation Althea (positive conflict dynamics), it dramatically deteriorated in Somalia in the run-up to Atalanta (negative conflict dynamics). While with Althea the positive conflict dynamics had a positive effect on the RS, it was the negative conflict dynamics that speeded Atalanta. Due to the logic of the CA, the conflict dynamics - positive or negative - can therefore not be identified as an independent variable (IV), but it may well be an intervening variable that influences the relationship between the dependent variable, in this case effectiveness operationalized as RS, and the four identified IVs (Swaen, 2018: n.p).

6.3.2 Comparing the operational involvement of Althea and Atalanta

The operational involvement (OI) also differs significantly in the analyzed cases: At the beginning, Althea had 7,000 soldiers (currently 670), while Atalanta had and still has an average of 600 soldiers. In the case of Althea, the OI can be assessed as appropriate to the mandate, since the EU was able to fulfill the mandate with the above-mentioned participants. However, this does not apply to Atalanta, where mandate fulfillment is due to close cooperation with several (multi)national ISPAs also active in the AoO. The mere OI of EU states in Atalanta was thus not commensurate with the scope of the operation's mandate and may thus be called a capability gap.

Althea, even though furnished with sufficient staff, features a different capability gap which so far had no negative effects on mandate fulfillment or sustainability: helicopter lift.

The only constant regarding OI is the involvements of the 'big three'. Their participation was crucial for ensuring that the operations were adequately equipped, since the costs of the operations must be borne by the state that generates them. Only the 'big three' had the necessary military and economic resources to bear the costs involved over a longer period. Smaller MS can only make supplementary contributions. However, this only applies to the start of an operation. As the analysis of Althea and Atalanta has shown, the 'big three' participated to a high degree at the beginning of each operation, but reduced their involvement during the course of the operations. In each case, the reduction took place after the SP situation had clearly improved and was flanked by the hand-over of operation responsibilities to both smaller MS and to the respective national authorities. In the case of Althea, for example, Austria got increasingly involved after the 'big three' withdrew when the operation was restructured. Here, the EU also succeeded in strengthening BiH's national government and in transferring SP tasks back to it. In the case of Atalanta, France and Germany are still involved which is due to the latent threat of piracy. With the UK leaving the EU, Spain, which would like to make its mark in SP, stepped in. The close cooperation of France and Spain made up for the UK's departure. The Somalian national government was also strengthened, but it is still not in a position to perform security-related task independently nor exercise nation-wide control. As Atalanta has shown, it is possible to replace a member of the 'big three' like the UK with a security-ambitious EU member like Spain. In order to take into account both this finding and the Brexit that has taken place in the meantime, the remainder of this thesis will no longer refer to the now dissolved 'big three'. Instead, reference will be made in a more general sense to the group of politically, economically and militarily strong or ambitious MS (**PEM-MS**) that bear the main burden of MCM.

In order to ensure a fair distribution of the common costs, the Athena mechanism was created as a lesson learned from previous operations such as Artemis and Concordia. However, the common costs account for only ten percent of the total costs. The participation of the PEM-MS, especially at the beginning of a major operation, thus still is a prerequisite for adequate OI. As shown, the willingness of the PEM-MS to participate in a MCM operation and bear large parts of the associated costs, depends primarily on national interests. The same applies to the commitment of smaller EU states such as Austria, Spain and others which for practical research reasons were not specifically addressed in this study. These interests may be compatible with or contrary to the pan-European interests. With Althea, the interests of the PEM-MS and the EU were congruent. This unanimity is largely due to the EU's historical responsibility for BiH (v.s.). In addition,

economic interests in BiH's stability as well as the chance to raise the EU's profile also played an important role. It was only when the operation was restructured that diverging national interests of the PEM-MS became apparent: France wanted to downsize the operation, UK wanted to continue it unchanged and Germany wanted to transform it into a civilian operation. In contrast, there was an initial divergence of interests among the PEM-MS in Atalanta: While France always supported the operation and was already involved in the region before Atalanta, UK initially opposed the operation for the reasons described above. Germany supported the operation because of strong economic interests and consciously decided in favor of an EU and against a NATO operation. UK finally gave in, participated, provided the OHQ and took over the command of the operation - again out of national interest (v.s.). With the approaching and now completed Brexit, close cooperation between France and Spain and their increased respective commitments made up for the UK's withdrawal.

As the comparison has shown, the participation of the PEM-MS is in any case a prerequisite for an adequate operational involvement (OI). Their willingness to participate and bear a large part of the costs is in turn dependent on national interests. The 'participation of the PEM-MS' can thus be identified as an IV for OI and their respective national interests as an intervening variable. These national interests depend on things like security, economy, values and history. It can thus be concluded that the factors that have positively influenced reaction speed as IVs influence the OI as intervening variables. Even though the participation of the PEM-MS is a necessary condition for adequate OI, their participation alone does not grant sufficient manpower. Even though France, the UK and Germany were involved in both operations, OI can only be considered 'appropriate' for Althea, and insufficient for Atalanta, which, however, is mainly due to the extensive mandate and size of the AoO. Furthermore, the Athena mechanism can be identified as a second IV as it enabled a fairer distribution of the common costs. Due to the low share of common costs in the overall costs, this IV (at least in its present form) is only of secondary relevance as it provides too little financial incentive for smaller EU states to participate in operations. For an 'appropriate' OI, the participation of the PEM-MS, is decisive.

6.3.3 Comparing the mandate fulfillment of Althea and Atalanta

In contrast to the results on RS and OI, the results on mandate fulfillment (MF) are more consistent. However, the results for Althea and Atalanta are only preliminary, since the two operations are not yet concluded. The mandate of Althea can be considered fulfilled so far. The EU made a decisive contribution to BiH's security and stability, successfully prevented a resurgence of the conflict, provided military support for the DPA, initiated and implemented reform processes and successfully brought BiH closer to the EU within the framework of the SAP and SAA.

The latest success in this series was BiH's official application for EU membership in February 2016. Despite fulfilling its mandate and adapting the operation several times to the new SP conditions, the EU remains active in the region, but with a civilian rather than military focus. The continuation of the operation, even in its current greatly reduced scope, is intended to support the still weak central government. The EU's success in fulfilling its mandate can be attributed in part to the fact that BiH was already relatively stable at the beginning of the operation. After the conflicts of the 1990s, NATO started to stabilize and pacify the region. After handing over to the EU, it was thus not a matter of peace-making but of securing peace and stability, so the EU built on the successes of NATO. Moreover, Althea, unlike Atalanta, was not an autonomous operation, but an EU-led operation within the framework of the BPA. The EU was thus able to rely on NATO's capabilities and resources in planning and executing the operation. In addition, the major part of the SFOR troops could be taken over from NATO, only the withdrawing US soldiers had to be substituted. In the case of Althea, close cooperation with another ISPA (NATO) was decisive for fulfilling the mandate. The EU was even more dependent on cooperation with other ISPAs in the case of Atalanta. As has been shown, despite the participation of the PEM-MS, the OI was not appropriate with regard to the scope of the mandate and the size of the AoO. The fact that the EU was nevertheless able to fulfill the operation mandate so far is exclusively due to the intensive and close cooperation with other (multi)national operations (v.s.). The planning and distribution of resources was facilitated by MSCHOA. The resources of the numerous ISPAs involved were coordinated primarily within the framework of SHADE. In short, international cooperation made up for the inadequate OI in Atalanta.

'Cooperation with other ISPAs' can thus be identified as an IV with decisive influence on MF. The weight given to this variable varies from case to case. Although this variable was decisive for the so-far fulfillment of both operation mandates, the reasons that led to international cooperation were different: In the context of Althea, the dependence was mainly due to the EU's lack of experience at operation take-over in 2004 and the refusal of the U.S. to sign off on autonomous EU operation which is why Althea was organized under the BPA. The quality of the EU as an ISPA has undoubtedly improved a lot since then. In the case of Atalanta, the EU was dependent on international cooperation because the AoO was simply too large to be secured by a single ISPA. As a matter of fact, this applies to any anti-piracy operation in the region, not only to Atalanta. Based on these findings, the below conclusions on the EU's dependence on international cooperation with other ISPAs in the context of CSDP operations can be drawn:

- The EU's dependence was greater in the past than today, as it gained experience over time.
- The EU's dependence increases the more extensive the mandate is.

- The EU's dependence increases the larger the AoO is.
- The EU's dependence is greater the less appropriate its OI is.

Based on this, it can be concluded that the scope of the mandate, the size of the operational area and the appropriateness of the OI act as intervening variables.

6.3.4 Comparing the sustainability of Althea and Atalanta

As with MF, the sustainability of Althea and Atalanta cannot yet be assessed finally only provisionally, as both operations are still ongoing. Within the framework of Althea, the EU has succeeded in even expanding the level of security and stability created by NATO as indicated by the immense reduction of military forces from approx. 7,000 soldiers to 670 in 2019 in the course of the operation. Despite this 90.43% reduction, the SeSi in 2020 is significantly better than in 2004 and the probability of a renewed flare-up of the conflict is much lower. In addition, most SP tasks of Althea have been successfully transferred back to the national authorities. Despite this progress, Althea is regularly extended. The reason for this is that there are still two major problems that, should the EU withdraw from BiH, might lead to an erosion of the progress achieved since the 1990s within a very short time. These two problems are the persistence of organized crime (OC) and the 'problematic' government structure implemented by the DPA.

In order to overcome these problems, the EU is not only involved militarily in BiH, but embedded Althea right from the start in a CCMC combining military and civil approaches directed to stabilize BiH in the long run. At the beginning, Althea's focus was on the military components of the DPA. After these goals had been sufficiently secured and especially after 2012, the EU gradually shifted Althea's focus towards the civilian component, complementing it with the EUPM BiH and EUROGENDFOR. Through these operational adjustments, the EU moved from stabilizing BiH from the outside to stabilizing it from the inside. Within the framework of this approach, the AFBiH were strengthened by joint exercise and increasingly involved in the work of Althea, and the fight against OC, which currently represents the greatest SP threat, was intensified. Furthermore, the EU is pursuing the long-term goal of integrating BiH into the EU (v.s.). As the European Commission's comments following BiH's application for EU membership indicate, BiH may join the EU after having addressed the weaknesses in its system of governance (EC, 2019a: 1). This is a huge incentive to BiH to tackle the second major problem on its own, as the prospect of EU membership is the driving element of all political and ethnic groups in BiH. As of today, the results of Althea can thus be considered sustainable and the continuing problems can be resolved in the long term within the framework of the currently pursued CCMC.

Unlike Althea, Atalanta was not embedded in a CCMC from the outset, but was subsequently supplemented by one. This may be due to the fact that Somalia's piracy problem was an acute security, humanitarian and economic problem that required rapid action to prevent further negative effects. Atalanta was thus planned and deployed relatively quickly to combat the acute piracy problem and prevent further negative effects even though it was clear to the EU that direct action against piracy alone would not solve the cause of the problem, Somalia's disintegrated statehood, one of the effects of which is piracy. For this reason, and also because the number of pirate attacks continued to rise in the first four years of operation, Atalanta was subsequently embedded in a CCMC, including strengthening political structures, promoting conflict resolution and prevention, combating specific security threats such as piracy (Atalanta) and al-Shabaab (financing of Amisom), and economic development for Somalia and the entire HoA. In addition, the EU initiated two further operations in Somalia: EUTM Somalia (military) and EUCAP Somalia (civilian). These two operations are intended to address SP problems that cannot be tackled within the framework of Atalanta.

- Atalanta: combating piracy
- EUCAP Somalia: building and strengthening the Somali Coast Guard
- EUTM Somalia: training of Somali Security Forces
- Financing Amisom: strengthening the FGS and combating al-Shabaab

Within the framework of Atalanta and the CCMC, the EU has only succeeded in suppressing the piracy problem, but neither defeated nor eradicated pirate groups which simply changed their field of activity. The underlying problem of disintegrated statehood, which caused and originally encouraged the spread of piracy, still persists. Even though the FGS, with the support of Amisom, now controls some parts of the country, it cannot provide nation-wide control which is why pirate groups and warlords still control large parts of Somalia. The sustainability of Atalanta must therefore be rated as significantly lower than that of Althea. Terminating Althea while continuing the rest of the engagement in BiH would be associated with risks, but not inevitably lead to catastrophe. Conversely, terminating Atalanta while continuing the remaining engagement would undoubtedly lead to a renewed increase in piracy, as the remaining (multi)national anti-piracy operations would not be able to replace the lost resources. The progress achieved by Atalanta (suppression of piracy) is at present less immediate than the one achieved by Althea (stabilization of BiH), but once again, a long-term CCMC can help resolve the still persisting SP problems. By directly fighting piracy on sea (Atalanta), strengthening the FGS by EUTM Somalia and the Somali coast guard capability by EUCAP Somalia, by indirectly fighting al-Shabaab by financing

Amisom, and promoting the Somali economy, the EU pursues a strategy promising to eventually end Somalia's fundamental SP problem.

In summary, 'embedding MCM operations in a CCMC' can be identified as another IV. It is irrelevant whether the military operation was embedded in such a concept from the outset (Althea) or ad hoc (Atalanta). There are still deficiencies in sustainability in both operations, although these are more serious in the case of Atalanta. However, the respective CCMC in which they are embedded has the potential to solve the persisting SP problems in the long term and thus to ensure the sustainability of both Althea and Atalanta. Neither in BiH nor in Somalia will this happen in the foreseeable future, but both countries are 'on the mend'. In order not to jeopardize this process, both cases need to be analyzed regularly to dynamically adapt the respective operation and CCMC to the new circumstances. Due to the current coronavirus pandemic, which could have a destabilizing effect on both BiH and Somalia, especially the SeSi and the economic stability will have to be closely monitored in the next few months.

6.3.5 Summary of the results of the concordance analysis (CA)

After separately analyzing the effectiveness of the operations Althea and Atalanta on the basis of RS, OI, MF and sustainability, and performing a CA between them, the independent and intervening variables shown in table 12 can be identified. Chart 3 also illustrates the relationship of the identified independent and intervening variables with the dependent variable i.e., effectiveness. Based on this set of identified independent and intervening variables, conclusions can be drawn on how to improve the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in general. In contrast to the case-specific conclusions on BiH and Somalia, these are generalizable results, since the conclusions are based on the results of a CA rather than a case-by-case analysis. However, since the comparison is based on only two case studies, the generalizability of the results is limited.

Operation	Althea	Atalanta
Reaction speed	<u>Independent variable</u> - opportunity for profiling - economic interest - EU values affected - security doubts <u>Intervening variable</u> - conflict dynamics (positive or negative)	<u>Independent variable</u> - opportunity for profiling - economic interest - EU values affected - security doubts <u>Intervening variable</u> - conflict dynamics (positive or negative)
Operational involvement	<u>Independent variable</u> - participation of PEM-MS - Athena mechanism	<u>Independent variable</u> - participation of PEM-MS - Athena mechanism

	<u>Intervening variable</u> - matching national interests of PEM-MS (economy, security, values, history)	<u>Intervening variable</u> - matching national interests of PEM-MS (economy, security, values, history)
Mandate fulfillment	<u>Independent variable</u> - international cooperation <u>Intervening variable</u> - scope of the mandate - size of the operational area - appropriateness of OI	<u>Independent variable</u> - international cooperation <u>Intervening variable</u> - scope of the mandate - size of the operational area - appropriateness of OI
Sustainability	<u>Independent variable</u> - embedding the military operation in a CCMC - complementing the core operation with civil and military sister operations	<u>Independent variable</u> - embedding the military operation in a CCMC - complementing the core operation with civil and military sister operations

Table 12: Identified independent and intervening variables (own presentation)




Chart 3: Relation between identified independent and intervening variables with the dependent variable

7 Increasing the Effectiveness of the EU's Military Crisis Management due to P&S

After the effectiveness of the EU's MCM has been examined in the past chapters on the basis of reaction speed, operational involvement, mandate fulfillment and sustainability, it is now possible

to identify both case-specific strategies to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH (Althea) and Somalia (Atalanta) as well as strategies for improving the EU's MCM in general. As said above, the purpose of P&S is to generate benefits for an overall system (here the EU) through bi-/ multilateral cooperation. Pooling can be understood as the mere pooling of available resources, whereas the MS pooling their resources still may dispose of their shares. Sharing means the mutual use of resources and capabilities as well as the joint development of new capabilities and capacities (cf. chapter 4). The key difference between pooling and sharing is as follows: "pooled assets are no longer separate, but still separable which is not the case with shared assets which are neither separate nor separable (Overhage, 2013: 3)."

7.1 How to increase the effectiveness of the EU's military crisis management in BiH

In order to answer this question comprehensively, I will first examine the extent to which the EU already uses P&S as part of its MCM in BiH. I will then examine which of the P&S projects initiated within the framework of PESCO could improve the effectiveness and finally discuss some own proposals that might help increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH.

7.1.1 P&S in the contemporary EU's military crisis management in BiH

In BiH, the EU already employs the following P&S instruments sketched below:

Troop generation: At the beginning of the operation (2004), Althea had a troop strength of 7,000 soldiers, today, it has less than one-tenth of that (670). The forces were always provided by a variety of EU and non-EU countries. Currently, 15 MS and 5 non-EU states are actively participating in Althea. According to Thomas Overhage's P&S definition (cf. chapter 4.1.), force generation can be considered pooling. All states that have deployed troops provided the resource "forces" that the EU can dispose of, but the respective deploying states are still free to withdraw their forces. This is also true for troop generation for Atalanta.

Athena mechanism: Joint financing is an effective and relatively easy to establish P&S instrument. The basic idea here is that the costs incurred by an operation are borne jointly (i. e. distributed amongst the MS). Within the EU, joint financing is enabled by the Athena mechanism in which all MS except Denmark participate. The common costs of EU MCM operations in the framework of CSDP plus the costs borne by MS for accommodation, fuel, and comparable expenses for national contingents (Concilium, 2020b: n.p.) are jointly shouldered and broken down according to the EU's gross national product key. The contractual basis of the Athena mechanism can be found in Art. 41 (2) of the TEU-L. The crucial weakness of this financing instrument is that it covers only the extremely low common costs (v.s.). Accordingly, the Athena mechanism is a P&S instrument with potential for expansion.

Liaison and Observation Teams: The LOTs are multinational groups of about 12 soldiers stationed in different regions of the area of operation (AoO). Their central task is to observe the general development of the security situation (SeSi) and to actively contribute to the stabilization of the AoO through intensive contact with the civilian population (v.s.). Accordingly, the LOTs are a reconnaissance tool that was extremely useful in assessing the situation development. Furthermore, the LOTs enabled the improvement of civil-military cooperation in BiH (Bundesheer, 2006: n.p.). The LOTs can thus be identified as a P&S tool in the area of reconnaissance, situational awareness and coordination.

BPA: This agreement between the EU and NATO allows the EU to draw on NATO capabilities and capacities. In return, the **DSACEUR** (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) is given the overall command of the operation. Accordingly, this agreement can be seen as inter-agency P&S between the EU and NATO. When it came into force, it enabled the EU to conduct MCM operations beyond its own autonomous capabilities and NATO to concentrate on different tasks. Thus, the BPA provides a basis for the division of labor and tasks between the EU and NATO.

7.1.2 Potential of PESCO projects to increase the EU's military crisis management in BiH

In the appendix, there is a list of all 47 projects that are currently being pursued within the framework of PESCO. Based on the project descriptions, I will now try to identify those projects that could improve the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH. Regarding sustainability, the PESCO project "*European Training Certification Centre for European Armies*" (**ETCCEA**) aiming to improve the cooperation of civilian and military personnel (PESCO – 2, 2021: n.p.), seems to have the most potential for BiH. Here, military tasks were initially prioritized, but in the course of the operation, civilian aspects grew increasingly important. Therefore, this project could help to better coordinate the civilian and military aspects of the EU's comprehensive CM in BiH. A start was already made with the LOTs still being in operation. Due to their close contact with the population and the timely and closed-meshed assessment of the SeSi, concrete starting points can be developed. The LOTs just mentioned could also benefit from a course in the "*Joint EU Intelligence School*" (**JEIS**) currently being planned (PESCO – 4, 2021: n.p.). Although intelligence is not the LOTs' responsibility, intelligence skills can be used to facilitate general reconnaissance work which indeed is part of the LOTs' range of tasks. For the future planning of the EU's civil-military engagement in BiH, military personnel with improved reconnaissance skills working in the LOTs would certainly be advantageous, since their additional "civilian" input could also help increase sustainability.

As mentioned above, Althea currently has less than one-tenth of its original personnel strength and suffers a capability gap: helicopter lift. Should the SeSi unexpectedly deteriorate dramatically, the EU's options would be quite limited: the EU could draw on the MNBN (Multinational Battalion) stationed at Camp Butmir near Sarajevo, as well as on the AFBiH to which the EU military personnel maintain close relations. Nevertheless, instant intervention with adequate OI is essential in the event of a sudden and dramatic change for the worse. In the context of rapid reaction to either a deteriorating situation or a newly emerging conflict, there is a lot of potential in the following PESCO projects:

- "*Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/ Amphibious Assault Vehicle/ Light Armoured Vehicle*" (**AIFV/AAV/LAV**): These vehicles could be used for both the rapid deployment of troops and military reconnaissance and combat missions. Another advantage is the increase in interoperability between the various European military units (PESCO – 12, 2021: n.p.).
- "*Military Mobility*" (**MM**) aims to facilitate and speed the transport of military personnel and equipment across borders, which is a key prerequisite for rapid action and adequate OI. With BiH, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the EU, this capability is above all important to avoid spillover effects (PESCO – 29, 2021: n.p.).
- The "*EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities* (**ECoWAR**)" project aims to increase cooperation between the European armed forces themselves (PESCO – 36, 2021: n.p.) while the "*Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations*" (**NetLogHubs**) project focuses on the joint use of logistics hubs to facilitate the accumulation of materiel (such as helicopters) and the transfer of personnel (PESCO – 28, 2021: n.p.). Thus, both projects promote reaction speed (RS) and interoperability and fill a capability gap.

What makes the four afore-mentioned projects even more interesting is the fact that they can also be used to plan, equip and implement future military operations more quickly.

7.1.3 Recommendations for future PESCO projects

As shown in chapter 7.1.1, the EU already operates small-scale P&S initiatives as part of its MCM in BiH. However, regarding the benefits and opportunities of P&S (cf. chapter 4) these initiatives are extremely limited. Cooperation in the context of troop generation just meets the minimum requirements to be understood as any kind of pooling at all. The Athena mechanism, on the other hand, while useful in facilitating the financing of MCM, is hampered in its effectiveness by the fact that it only covers the common costs. The BPA, for its part, was necessary at the start of the operation to provide the then relatively inexperienced EU with the necessary capabilities to replace NATO's SFOR through Althea. Moreover, the U.S. would have refused to agree to the

handover of operations in 2004 had Althea not been realized within this framework. Today, however, the situation is completely different. The EU could easily conduct Althea autonomously and without NATO support. The LOTs, however, stand out positively as they made and continue to make a valuable contribution to Althea's success and proved to be an extremely useful tool for military reconnaissance and general situation assessment. As pointed out in chapter 7.1.2, the EU developed some promising projects in the framework of PESCO, which can be used to improve reaction speed and sustainability of the EU's MCM in BiH.

Based on these observations, some conclusions can now be drawn that can be used to improve existing PESCO projects and identify entry points for new projects. To raise force generation to a higher P&S level, there are several more or less feasible options, one of them being the creation of a standing, permanent EU army. Admittedly, this is an extremely unlikely scenario as the creation of such an army would inevitably fail due to the effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma (cf. chapter 4). A promising alternative to this idea is the PESCO project "*EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core*" (**EUFOR CROC**) which aims to "enhance the force generation preparedness, willingness and commitment of EU Members states to act and engage in operations and missions" (PESCO – 14, 2021: n.p.) and could complement the EU Battlegroups which up to now have never been deployed. Both the EU Battlegroups and EUFOR CROC represent viable and already existing alternatives to the utopia of a standing EU army. Both options would enable rapid troop generation, positively influence the RS and OI and thus increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM. However, should the SeSi deteriorate and Althea need rapid reinforcements, it would be easier to make use of the MNBN and to rely on cooperation with the AFBiH. Later on, it would be possible to send additional reinforcements on the basis of the afore mentioned PESCO projects. The EU Battlegroups could also be of use, but in the concrete case it would be more advisable to rely on existing cooperation's first and then make use of just developed PESCO projects and the so far not tested EU Battlegroups.

Another possibility to improve the effectiveness of the EU's MCM is to update the now cumbersome BPA which was only applied twice (operations Concordia and Althea). In the wake of the Crimea crisis (2014), EU and NATO again started to cooperate closely, but under different auspices. The goal of this closer cooperation was to develop complementary and supplementary capability profiles. To this end, a list of 42 concrete measures was developed in 2016 and supplemented by a further 32 measures in 2017. These 74 measures represent a form of inter-agency P&S between the EU and NATO and are aimed at improving cooperation between the two organizations in the field. So far, the highlight of this EU-NATO cooperation is the PESCO project "Military Mobility" mentioned above (BMVG, 2021b: n.p.).

The effectiveness of the EU's MCM may also be improved by expanding financial P&S by extending the existing Athena mechanism for covering the common costs. Currently, the common costs account for only about 10-15 percent of the total cost of a military operation. The bulk of the costs is still borne nationally. For this reason, the participation of PEM-MS such as Germany and France continue to be of central importance for the execution of MCM operations. Conversely, countries with useful military capabilities, but limited financial resources participate relatively rarely in military operations (Indrek Tarand, 2015: n.p.). Reform of this mechanism has been attempted many times, but has always failed due to opposition from the UK. So, the Brexit might offer an opportunity to revise this mechanism. Given that the defense spending has been declining for years, that many states are insufficiently aiming at the 2% target, and the current coronavirus pandemic, which is restricting financial leeway, a comprehensive expansion of the Athena mechanism is currently very unlikely. And even in the long term, the EU, whose self-image has changed somewhat in recent years (cf. chapter 3), will be wary of financing military operations entirely from the EU budget or through the Athena mechanism as this could create the image of a militarized EU foreign policy. An easy way round this problem could be to simply expand the catalog of common costs (Indrek Tarand, 2015: n.p.) and redefine what 'common costs' are.

Another quite promising way to improve effectiveness by P&S is the institutionalization of the LOTs which in BiH have proven to be an effective tool for military reconnaissance and general situation monitoring. In the course of a new PESCO project, for example, military personnel could be trained to quickly familiarize with the people and culture in a new AoO. During this training, the military staff of the LOTs should learn the basics of the language, improve their communication skills and obtain some cultural (and may be political) background knowledge. The training would therefore also have to include sociological and psychological content. The existing PESCO project "Joint EU intelligence School" could serve as a model for this project.

7.2 How to increase the effectiveness of EU's military crisis management in Somalia

Here again, I will first examine to what extent P&S is already used as part of the EU's MCM in Somalia, then analyze which of the P&S projects in the list of PESCO projects could improve the effectiveness of current operation and finally discuss some further ideas for increasing the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in Somalia.

7.2.1 P&S in the contemporary EU military crisis management in Somalia

Troop generation and Athena mechanism: As with Althea, a pooling mechanism was used to generate troops for Atalanta. The forces are deployed by various states which retain the power of

disposal over their forces. So, this mechanism only fulfills the minimum criteria for pooling. Here again, the Athena mechanism (cf. chapter 6.2.3) for financial P&S was used.

EU NAVCO: Originally a European coordination instrument for pooling and coordinating the maritime forces from France, Denmark and the Netherlands already in the AoO, which enabled the EU to tackle certain mandate tasks of Atalanta before it was even launched. Later, these provisionally pooled forces plus some more were incorporated into the actual MCM operation Atalanta. This ad hoc pooling measure was extremely useful, as it enabled the EU to get involved in the AoO three months before the start of its actual MCM operation.

MSCHOA: A P&S measure based on sharing available information, in particular location data and routes of ships. The provision of this information by vessels transiting the HoA is voluntary, even though providing such data gives the vessels real-time information on the current risk assessment of the maritime area and a direct communication channel for emergency calls should they find themselves in a dangerous situation. In summary, MSCHOA can thus be evaluated as an informative P&S tool that can be used for situational awareness, risk assessment, mission planning, and force coordination.

AVPDs: Small military response teams which are located aboard WFP vessels and are responsible for onboard security. In case of an emerging security threat, AVPDs ensure the safety of the vessel, its crew, and cargo until military support arrives. Since an AVPD team is usually provided by a single state, it is not multinational and can be considered a capability that one state makes available to the EU in the context of Atalanta. At the same time, it should be noted that almost every state has this basic capability and could theoretically share it. Currently, this particular capability is provided by Montenegro, but in the past, other non-EU states (Lithuania) and EU MS (e.g., Croatia and the Netherlands) provided it as well.

IRTC and MSTC: Strictly defined sea areas and shipping routes that are monitored and patrolled by the IC, thus ensuring relative security within them. However, a prerequisite for effective protection within these areas is registration of passage with MSCHOA. The task of monitoring this sea area and protecting declared transits is neither performed by one state nor by one ISPA alone, but rather a large range of ISPAs. Accordingly, both the IRTC and the MSTC are a complex form of international P&S: many states and organizations working together perform a task that ultimately benefits an overall system, in this case the IC. Together, MSCHOA (information pooling) and IRTC/ MSTC (task-sharing) can provide relative protection in a limited maritime area.

SHADE: A P&S instrument created by the EU for the regular exchange of information and coordination of actions of all forces present in the AoO. While MOSCHA collects information for

state-of-the-art risk assessment and short-term coordination of existing forces, SHADE enables longer-term operational planning and coordination through the discussion of SP interests and the resulting long-term commitment of the respective ISPAs. Accordingly, SHADE, like MSCHOA, can be assessed as a P&S instrument of the EU that serves to collect information on the basis of which both short-term and long-term operational decisions can be made. However, both instruments involve non-EU states. Accordingly, they are Inter-agency–European–Third-party P&S instruments.

7.2.2 Potential of PESCO projects to increase the EU's military crisis management in Somalia

A PESCO project with the potential to improve the EU's MCM in Somalia is the "*European Union Training Mission Competence Center*" (**EU TMCC**). This project aims to improve the capabilities, interoperability and overall availability of military personnel deployed on military training missions (PESCO – 1, 2021: n.p.). In the long term, this project is intended to standardize the training done by European military personnel which so far differs in dependency of the training nation. Future training missions could then be organized more quickly and the contents of the training standardized. Consequently, the security forces trained for the FGS would receive uniform training and would thus be more compatible.

As pointed out in the analysis on mandate fulfillment and sustainability, one of the greatest challenges for the EU in Atalanta is monitoring the entire AoO. Accordingly, the following PESCO projects, each having a different focus, show potential to overcome this challenge:

- *Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection* (**HARMSPRO**).
- *Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance* (**UMS**)
- *European Patrol Corvette* (**EPC**)

HARMSPRO would provide the EU with the capability to observe clearly defined sea areas in detail. As the still existing pirate strongholds are known, the known pirate bases, ports and other bases near the coast could be observed within the framework of this project (PESCO – 18, 2021: n.p.). Based on this information, the movements of pirates could be tracked and possible attacks anticipated. Attacks and other threats could then be addressed more quickly. Against the background of the EU's and the IC's reluctance to intervene militarily on land, monitoring known pirate ports is an attractive and effective alternative. *UMS* is based on the combination of land, water- and air-based surveillance systems with the aim of improving the surveillance of maritime space (PESCO – 19, 2021: n.p.). With Atalanta, those systems could be used to monitor the IRTC and the MSTC which cover a limited but still immense maritime area that cannot be monitored by patrolling alone. Moreover, the increase in piracy activity in the years 2016-2018 highlights the need for improved surveillance. Together, these two projects could significantly improve

maritime surveillance and contribute decisively to improving the effectiveness of the EU's MCM off the HoA. The development of an *EPC* would improve the interoperability of European forces and enable surveillance even in shallow coastal waters thanks to its shallow draught (PESCO – 22, 2021: n.p.). The *EPC*'s modern technical equipment would in turn offer to use them as "information interfaces" collecting, evaluating and forwarding information collected in the framework of projects *HARMSPRO* and *UMS* in the operational area, thus increasing the projects' reach (EDA, 2021b: n.p.).

In addition to projects aiming to improve maritime surveillance, there are other PESCO projects in the field of "Air and Systems" which could prove useful for Atalanta, one of them being the "*European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems - MALE RPAS*" (**Eurodrone**) project. Atalanta already uses drones to monitor the AoO. Spain, for example, currently provides a Scan Eagle of type AUS. According to the project description, the Eurodrone would be more versatile (surveillance, logistics and reconnaissance) and less expensive. From 2025, existing systems could be gradually replaced by Eurodrones (PESCO – 23, 2021: n.p.). The **EHAAP** (*European High Atmosphere Airship Platform*) project could have a similarly positive effect on the surveillance capability. This is a low-cost balloon-based surveillance and reconnaissance instrument that can be deployed flexibly (PESCO – 42, 2021: n.p.). Due to its immense operational altitude, it would excellently complement the *Eurodrone* (Medium Altitude) and the *EPC* projects.

7.2.3 Recommendations for future PESCO projects

In the analysis (cf. chapter 6.2), a number of factors were identified that positively or negatively influenced the EU's MCM in Somalia. These factors can be taken as a starting point to identify new P&S projects. The analysis found, among other things, that the size of the AoO and the relatively inadequate operational involvement dampened the effectiveness of the EU's MCM. However, it was also noted in chapter 7.2.1 that the EU already relies on numerous P&S measures (MSCHOA, SHADE, IRTC and MSTC) to limit the effects of these shortcomings. In terms of quality, these initiatives are clearly superior to those applied in BiH. In particular, the cooperation with other ISPAs is significantly better organized. Moreover, it was noted in chapter 7.2.2 that the EU is already working on numerous projects within the framework of PESCO, which are also aimed at tackling the problems. It can thus be concluded that the EU is already fully aware of the identified problems and has taken the correct measures to eliminate them. Another problem identified was that the EU only fights piracy at sea and does neither fight the causes of conflict on land nor the promoters of the conflict such as al-Shabab. However, there is a close cooperation between the different EU operations and Amisom – so to say a division of tasks between the EU

and Amisom, which could also be described as the P&S of tasks and financial burdens. While the EU is fighting against piracy at sea (Atalanta) and strengthening the FGS's autonomous capabilities within the framework of EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia, Amisom is dedicated to fight al-Shabab and directly support the FGS. In addition, the EU supports numerous projects for the reconstruction of Somalia, which, in accordance with the logic of the security-first approach, have had only limited effect to date. Again, the results of the analysis essentially suggest that the EU is aware of this problem and is already pursuing the necessary measures. However, two problems with a negative impact on the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in Somalia persist and are either not addressed at all or only inadequately.

- Inadequate criminal prosecution
- Countermeasures taken by pirate groups

The EU does not prosecute pirates itself, but has Seychelles and Mauritius do this with which the EU maintains extradition agreements. Unfortunately, prosecution of pirates remains inadequate, primarily due to the overburdened judicial systems of these countries. The financial support provided by the EU is insufficient for this purpose. Instead of either providing more support to the countries prosecuting pirates or prosecuting the pirates itself, the EU relies on the "catch and release" principle which is not at all deterring. This practice was understandable at the height of the piracy crisis, as in most cases there was hardly any solid evidence for prosecution and any trials would inevitably have been protracted. Given the sharp decline in piracy activity since 2011 (with less than 10 acts of piracy per year since 2015), the situation now is completely different. Even with protracted trials, adequate prosecution would be possible without overburdening the judicial system. For this reason, the EU should revise its cooperation agreements with Mauritius and Seychelles and provide more support to both countries. In particular, the cooperation agreement with Seychelles, where the mere attempt to commit an act of piracy is punishable, is an extremely promising instrument to considerably increase the deterrent effect of the prosecution of piracy. These cooperation agreements should be based on a division of tasks between the EU and its cooperation partners and the assumption of financial burdens by the EU. The cooperation agreements to be revised can therefore be seen as a form of Third-Party-European P&S of tasks and financial burdens.

The countermeasures taken by the pirate groups are another problem the EU still needs to tackle in Somalia in order to break the vicious circle of organized crime and civil war (cf. chapter 6.2.2). While the EU regularly responded to the expansion of the pirate's AoO, this was not the case when pirate groups swapped to other forms of organized crime, OC (smuggling of weapons, drugs, people, etc.). Of all the operations active in the AoO, only CTF 150 tackles OC in general.

All other operations focus on combating piracy. This is one of the reasons cited in the analysis why the IC has only succeeded in suppressing piracy, but not eliminating it. One way to address this weakness is to expand maritime surveillance. While the EU and the rest of the IC heavily monitor the IRTC and the MSTC, there are numerous less prominent shipping routes that are hardly monitored and make optimal smuggling routes. Given the limited resources, it is understandable that these are used to monitor the prioritized IRTS and MSTC. As pointed out in chapter 7.2.2, the EU is working on a number of PESCO projects that could be used to fully monitor the maritime space in the AoO. Once these projects are completed, the additional resources and capabilities generated could be used to also monitor known smuggling routes and the on-, near- and offshore bases of pirate groups and smuggling gangs. Therefore, in order to target resources, it would be prudent to expand cooperation with CTF 150 or provide the operation with the newly developed capabilities. This equals P&S in an advanced form.

7.3 How to increase the effectiveness of the EU's military crisis management in general

Chapters 7.1 and 7.2 examined the extent to which the EU already uses P&S in its MCM in BiH and Somalia, discussed the PESCO projects which might improve their effectiveness, and, based on the respective case analysis, made suggestions for complementary P&S measures that could further increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in the case in question. The suggestions made are therefore case-specific and can only be generalized to a limited extent. In order to be able to make generalizable recommendations for future P&S in the context of the EU's MCM, the results of the comparative analysis, CA (cf. chapter 6.3) need to be used. The independent and intervening variables that emerged from the comparison provide an excellent basis for identifying suitable P&S measures and strategies to increase the effectiveness of EU MCM in general.

7.3.1 Increasing the reaction speed (RS)

The CA found that the EU's RS was influenced by profiling opportunities, economic interests, affected EU values and security doubts (external/internal). However, some factors carry more weight than others. The most important factors seem to be economic interests and EU values. Since the EU is primarily an economic union and a union of values (cf. chapter 3), it usually only gets involved as an ISPA if a crisis massively affects both economic interests and values. If both are only marginally affected, it is more likely that the EU will react to a crisis with other means: diplomatic action, sanctions, development aid, humanitarian mission, et cetera. If, as with BiH and Somalia, both interests are sufficiently affected, the other two independent variables (IVs) will have an impact on the EU's ultimate RS. If, for example, a crisis offers the opportunity to make its mark on the international stage, this will have a positive effect on the RS, since more states (including smaller ones) are more willing to participate in a prospective operation with

personnel and materiel. On the other hand, doubts about the EU's ability to act expressed by internal (UK with Somalia) or external (U.S. with BiH) ISPAAs can slow down the RS. In addition to these IVs, an intervening variable influencing the RS was identified, namely conflict dynamics (positive/ negative): With Somalia, the negative conflict dynamics had a positive effect on the RS, while with BiH it was the other way around.

Based on these findings, it can be concluded that one way to improve the EU's RS in general is to improve the EU's early warning system and to base the situation assessment on the four identified IVs as well as the intervening variable. In the context of CSDP, both early warning and situation assessment are the responsibility of the EUMS (EEAS, 2020c: 1). In order to improve the EU's RS in the future, the EUMS should above all examine the potential impact of an emerging crisis on the EU's economic interests and investigate whether and to what extent this crisis affects EU values. This suggestion is not only due to the variables that emerged from the analysis, but also to the fact that the EU is a hybrid ISPA that combines the characteristics of an interventionist normative power and a liberal power (cf. chapter 3). Hence, the results of chapters 3.3 and 7 are mutually supportive. After analyzing how the EU's values and economy are affected, it is necessary to evaluate the profiling possibilities of a possible operation. Such an evaluation must take into account, for example, the risks of a military operation and possible opportunities for cooperation with other ISPAAs. In addition, any concerns that could affect the RS must be anticipated and, if possible, eliminated. Finally, the conflict dynamics must be considered. If it is negative and the impact on the EU's values and economy tends to increase, this makes EU intervention more urgent. If, on the other hand, conflict dynamics are positive, it is possible to engage in SP without major risks. In this case, it is important to weigh whether the expected costs are compatible with the profiling opportunities. The corresponding adaptation of early warning and situation assessment would be easy to implement and, moreover, entirely in line with the EUGS. The EUGS clearly states that internal and external security are interdependent and that the EU's economic interests are inseparable from its values (EUGS, 2016: 17). Be that as it may, the EUMS would simply analyze whether it was advisable for the EU to intervene in an emerging crisis by applying analytical criteria that had positive or negative effects on similar situations or decisions in the past. The final decision on intervention would still have to be taken by the Council of the EU - based on the information provided by the EUMS. However, decision-making in the Council would be positively influenced by a sober compilation of the above information.

7.3.2 Increasing the operational involvement (OI)

The CA found that the EU's OI was influenced by the participation of PEM-MS and the Athena-mechanism. As detailed above, the Athena mechanism is an EU P&S instrument for the financial

side of a military operation. However, since the mechanism only covers the common costs, the participation of PEM-MS such as Germany and France remains necessary to ensure adequate OI. This applies above all to the initial phase of MCM operations. At later stages (as the example of BiH has shown), it is possible to gradually involve militarily and financially less potent EU MS that in the long run substitute the more potent ones. Moreover, the analysis of Atalanta proved that the contributions of a potent EU state like the UK can be substituted by a less potent but ambitious state like Spain. Now that Brexit is complete and the EU has lost one of its militarily most potent and financially strongest MS, this is an especially valuable insight.

In both cases, the EU initially generated troops by drawing on forces already in the AoO. While troop generation in BiH consisted mainly in reassigning EU forces from SFOR to Althea, for Atalanta it consisted in coordinating forces already in the AoO through EU NAVCO. In the long run, however, the EU cannot rely on always having forces already available. Work needs to be done to develop procedures facilitating troop generation. As described in chapter 7.1.3, there are already several concepts serving this end. The most obvious option would be the creation of a standing EU army, which is utopian in view of the EU's self-image (cf. chapter 3) and the effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma (cf. chapter 4). Two more feasible options are the use of the already existing, but never deployed, EU Battlegroups and the EUFOR CROC planned under PESCO. Battlegroups are multinational, rapidly deployable task forces that can be used both for stand-alone operations and as part of a protracted and broader operation (EEAS, 2013: 2). Should the Council of the EU decide to conduct a MCM operation, these Battlegroups could be deployed promptly to temporarily stabilize the situation in the conflict area and to prepare for the arrival of additional and supplementary forces. The EU would be able to intervene quickly in emerging crises and work in parallel on a comprehensive solution. Conflicts could thus be defused before they escalate. To date, however, these Battlegroups, which have been fully operational since 2007, have never been deployed (BpB, 2020: n.p.). This is mainly due to both the high costs that their deployment would entail and their multinational composition (EEAS, 2013: 4). As each state contributing forces to the Battlegroups retains control over its forces, a single state can prevent activation and deployment of the entire Battlegroup. The reasons why states withhold forces are very diverse, but are often related to the immense costs involved in deploying this rapid reaction force within only 5-10 days (Bpb, 2020: n.p.) and a duration of deployment of 30 to 120 days (EEAS, 2013, 4). One way to address this problem is to finance the cost of deploying Battlegroups, or at least certain cost items, through the Athena mechanism. The way in which the financial regulations of the Athena mechanism had to be adapted, however, needs to be investigated in a separate analysis, as adaptation would require a detailed analysis of the European budgetary

law and the specific regulations of the Athena mechanism and should take into account philosophical considerations e.g., how the funding of explicit military expenditure can be reconciled with the normative self-image of the EU. In addition to the possible activation of the Battlegroups and the adaptation of the Athena mechanism, troop generation and thus OI can be improved through the EUFOR CROC project which aims to increase both the readiness and willingness of MS to engage in concrete military action (cf. chapter 7.1.3). Interestingly, EUFOR CROC aims to bridge the gap between the EU's Battlegroup concept and the ambitions expressed in the EUGS (PESCO – 14, 2021: n.p.).

7.3.3 Increasing the mandate fulfillment (MF)

The CA also showed that MF was essentially influenced by an independent factor - international cooperation. In turn, the scope of the mandate, the size of the AoO, and the adequacy of OI – available resources (personnel and materiel) – act as intervening variables. Based on this finding, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of MCM could be improved by deepening cooperation with other security organizations such as NATO and the UN. In the context of BiH and Somalia, cooperation has proven effective even though the quality and the basis of cooperation differed. Especially with Somalia, cooperation was less based on firm cooperation agreements, but rather on ad hoc cooperation established during the mission which only held for the respective AoO. In BiH, the EU relied on the BPA, which, as described in chapter 7.1.1 and 7.1.3, is more or less obsolete today.

In view of the results on RS and OI, the creation of a permanent contact group between these three ISPA's seems sensible in order to enable central and direct consultations on possible military cooperation. However, cooperation should not be negotiated in the run-up to a prospective military operation. The example of BiH showed that doing this with an external actor significantly slows down the EU's RS. Even if the EU only has to deal with internal actors, as was the case with Somalia, the preparation and deployment of an operation can take several months. Accordingly, the "Permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group" I propose should only be a forum to discuss cooperation and possible synergies for already initiated operations. Pre-negotiating cooperation agreements would unnecessarily prolong the planning of operations and, based on the premise that the EU only initiates military operations if its economy and values are significantly affected, add to the financial impact due to the negotiation time required. With ongoing operations, the Permanent Contact Group would be a useful coordination tool allowing for ad hoc cooperation projects saving costs in the medium term. The parallel deployment of forces by several security organizations results in a maximum of personnel and materiel in the AoO. So, at the beginning of an operation, each ISPA incurs relatively high costs. In the course of the operation, however,

there will inevitably be ad hoc cooperation between the individual ISPAs, which could be further promoted by the proposed Permanent Contact Group. At medium term, cooperation will enable the ISPAs to deploy personnel and materiel in a more targeted manner which reduces the costs. In the long term, the ISPAs involved will benefit from this cooperation and save even more. The prospect of largely minimizing the costs in the long term justifies the relatively high expenditures at the beginning of an operation. In addition, the rapid intervention of independent actors makes it possible to thoroughly deal with a crisis at a very early stage, which could shorten the duration of the crisis and increase the chances of success.

7.3.4 Increasing the sustainability

The CA found that the sustainability of the EU's MCM was positively influenced by complementing the military core operation with civil and military sister operations and embedding it into a CCMC. The most important conclusion that can be drawn from this observation is that conflicts cannot be resolved through MCM alone, but require a combination of military and civilian measures. Considering the embedding of the EU's MCM operations in BiH and Somalia in a CCMC and the deployment of additional military as well as civilian sister operations, the EU seems to be aware of this fact. As described in chapters six and seven, the respective CCMCs for BiH and Somalia have their weaknesses, but the EU is likely to stabilize the two countries within the framework of its existing engagement in the long run. Nevertheless, there are several options to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM by improving civil-military cooperation. Two of them will be discussed below:

- Creation of a permanent civilian-military networking platform within the EU
- Institutionalization of the LOTs

To ensure the sustainability of a military operation, it is not enough to have side-by-side military and civilian operations in one area of operation, AoO. Instead, civilian and military operations must be closely interlinked. So far, there is no platform in the EU that deals with interlinking civilian and military operations. In fact, the EU's overall CM in an AoO is organized by various agencies. In practice, this means that the respective military and civilian operations must regulate their cooperation in the AoO according to the principle of 'learning by doing'. Particularly in the case of longer missions, such as in BiH and Somalia, the reconfiguration of mandates can mean that there is no longer a clear delineation of competencies. In the case of BiH, for example, Althea was downgraded from a military operation to a de facto civilian operation that today falls into the category of 'military operation' in name only. Moreover, regarding the fight against organized crime, a clear demarcation between the different operations was no longer possible, which is partly due to the similarity between EUPM BiH and EUROGENDFOR. As far as the MCM in

Somalia is concerned, the EU seems to have learned its lesson. The two military operations (Atalanta and EUTM Somalia) and the civilian operation EUCAP Somalia have clearly separated areas of responsibility, but still there is no platform coordinating all the civilian and military EU (and non-EU) operations. The mandates of the afore-mentioned larger operations merely contain an article directing them to cooperate with each other, but this article gives no hints as to the way and the extent of cooperation or the cooperation with civilian projects of other ISPA's. As a result, in both BiH and Somalia there are a number of other civilian projects with different focuses (reconstruction, economic development, human rights, etc.) that are not or only insufficiently integrated into the respective EU operational plan.

For this reason, the creation of a permanent civil-military networking platform within the EU provides an excellent tool to coordinate both the EU's military and civilian operations as well as the EU projects with that of third-party ISPA's (governmental and non-governmental). The task of the networking platform would not be to create new projects or operations, but to compile all existing operations and projects ongoing in different areas of operation and to develop proposals on how they can be interlinked. These proposals would make it easier to coordinate the respective efforts, achieve synergy effects, save costs and even integrate third parties and their civilian engagement into the pan-European CM. Over time, based on the knowledge gained and the cooperation projects created, development aid or promotion projects could be directed in an even more targeted manner. In addition, it would help to set up a country-specific catalog of measures that specifies what is to be achieved in succession: security, rule of law, democracy, infrastructure, education, economy. In any case, the respective cultural background of a country needs to be taken into account. In the long term, the development aid ministries at the level of the states should also be involved, taking into account their respective historical commitments.

Taken together, the proposed Permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group and the Permanent Civil-Military Networking Platform offer the potential to coordinate the EU's military and civilian engagement with other security organizations such as NATO and the UN as well as non-governmental organizations engaged in civilian activities. This could improve the sustainability of the EU's CM and even save costs.

Another possibility to improve the sustainability of the EU's MCM is the institutionalization of the LOTs (cf. chapter 7.1.3). In the context of Althea, they proved an effective military instrument for reconnaissance and general situation monitoring. Institutionalizing this format would provide the EU or the participating MS with a useful capability for military reconnaissance. As explained above, the project would be about training military personnel and providing them with civilian

skills that would enable them to integrate more easily into the civilian society of a target country. Just as in BiH, these LOTs could be used in the AoO to observe the general situation and conduct reconnaissance. In addition, due to their training and role in the AoO, the LOTs could provide valuable input for better coordination of the EU's civilian and military engagement by the proposed Permanent Civil-Military Networking Platform. In this way, the proposed networking platform could build on the knowledge and experiences of the LOTs instead of having to start from scratch.

In the context of Althea, the LOTs had their finger on the pulse of the population and were thus able to identify burgeoning conflicts as well as general mood swings in public opinion in a precise and timely manner. The information gathered by the LOTs is therefore extremely accurate, multi-layered and, above all, practical. This allowed the LOTs in BiH to act as a kind of early warning system in the context of EU MCM. If the LOTs were institutionalized, it would be possible to obtain similar qualitative information for other crisis areas and to take region-specific action. This would offer an opportunity to move away from the watering-can principle and contribute to the formation of selective priorities. That this makes sense, is shown by the example of Somalia: Here, for example, civilian projects to rebuild Somalia and strengthen the economy have so far proved less sustainable, as the stability and security necessary for sustainability have not yet been achieved. Using LOTs would provide more region-specific information and allow for better coordination of such projects, which would significantly increase their sustainability: In the safe parts of Somalia, different measures could be taken (expansion of agriculture/cattle breeding and better marketing through infrastructure development => creation of jobs) than in the parts of the country that are still contested or dominated by gangs (protection of the population from attacks). In addition, a more targeted use of existing resources could counteract the waste of already scarce resources. To achieve this goal, close cooperation between the yet-to-be-created Civilian-Military Networking Platform and the institutionalized LOTs would be necessary.

7.3.5 Dealing with the current pandemic

Against the background that both BiH and Somalia are affected by the current coronavirus pandemic, I would like to briefly refer to another PESCO project in this chapter, namely the "Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package" (**DM-DRCP**). This project aims at enabling the EU to better respond to natural disasters and pandemics (PESCO – 11, 2021: n.p.). Given that the coronavirus pandemic has the potential to exacerbate the security situation and social tensions in BiH and Somalia, this project is a very useful capability that can be used to reduce the impact of a pandemic on a crisis area. This could prevent the erosion of the SeSi.

8 Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, the central findings will be summarized (8.1) in an orderly manner and the research question underlying this thesis will be answered in detail (8.2). This research question is: "*Can the Effectiveness of the European Union's Military Crisis Management be Increased through Mechanisms of Pooling and Sharing? A single-case and concordance analysis of the European Union's military crisis management in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*".

8.1 Summary of the most important findings

Chapter 2: Two key findings emerge from this chapter. First, the discussion of different concepts of effectiveness and efficiency (2.2) has shown that effectiveness is an extremely complex concept that cannot be operationalized by a single variable alone. Second, the summary of the state of research on the EU's MCM generated so far (2.1.) has shown that the combination of a multiple single-case study as conducted by Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (2009) and a comparative case study as conducted by Katarina Engberg (2014) and Annemarie Peen Rodt (2014) allow for a comprehensive answer to the research question. The key advantage is that both case-specific and generalizable conclusions can be drawn.

Chapter 3: It is clear from this chapter that the EU still is a relatively new ISPA, but one that has considerably developed in quite short time and evolved from a 'pure interventionist normative power' to a hybrid form of 'pure interventionist normative power' and 'liberal power'. From this it can be deduced that the value-based CFSP/CSDP has changed over time into a value-and-interest-based CFSP/CSDP.

Chapter 4: The gist of this chapter is that P&S is by no means a new concept. Bi- and multilateral P&S has been practiced for years. However, due to the effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma, the cooperation currently practiced falls far short of what could be theoretically possible. In theory, extensive P&S can increase the effectiveness of MCM while saving costs. In practice, however, states shy away from giving up the sovereignty rights extensive P&S would require, since they affect one of the core areas of national sovereignty, namely the FSP. As a result, only a fraction of what would be theoretically possible and desirable is practiced. The effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma acts as an invisible barrier to theory. However, the activation of PESCO made possible by Brexit has shown that this barrier may well be shifted over time.

Chapter 5: Based on the findings of the previous chapters, the theoretical framework of the thesis was elaborated, including the definition of key terms of this thesis such as MCM, the operationalization of complex concepts such as 'effectiveness', the adoption of the research methodology

(combination of single case analysis and comparative analysis) and a well-founded case selection – BiH (Althea), Somalia (Atalanta).

Chapters 6.1 and 6.2: Within these two chapters, the EU's MCM in BiH (6.1) and Somalia (6.2) were examined separately based on RS, OI, MF and sustainability. In each case, the analytical focus was on the core military operation Althea (BiH) and Atalanta (Somalia) even though their embedding in a CCMC and the deployment of additional military and civilian sister operations were also taken into account. Tables 3 and 9 provide a clear overview of the factors that positively and negatively influenced the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in each case.

Chapter 6.3: Based on the results of the two single-case analyses detailed in chapters 6.1 and 6.2, a comparative analysis (CA) was conducted on top to identify those factors (independent variables) that influenced the effectiveness of the EU's MCM not only in a specific case (Somalia, BiH) but in general. Table 12 and Chart 3 present the results of this comparison in a clear manner.

Chapter 7: Based on the case-specific factors identified, as well as the results of the CA, I was able to recommend P&S measures and projects that might increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH (7.1), Somalia (7.2) and in general (7.3). The three tables below (13, 14, 15) summarize these findings.

P&S practiced	PESCO projects	Ideas for future P&S projects
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multilateral troop generation - Athena mechanism - LOTs - BPA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ETCCEA - Joint EU Intelligence School - AIFV/AAV/LAV - Military Mobility - ECoWAR - NetLogHubs - EUFOR CROC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activating the EU Battlegroups - Updating the now cumbersome BPA - Extending the existing Athena mechanism - Institutionalization of the LOTs

Table 13: Increasing the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH

P&S practiced	PESCO project	Ideas for future P&S projects
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multilateral troop generation - Athena mechanism - EU NAVCO - MSCHOA - AVPDs - IRTC and MSTC - SHADE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU TMCC - HARMSPRO - Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance - EPC - Eurodrone - EHAAP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revision of the cooperation agreements with Mauritius and Seychelles - Increasing the support to both countries but with focus on the Seychelles - The EU should expand its cooperation with CTF 150

Table 14: Increasing the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in Somalia

Variables for 'Effectiveness'	Ideas for future P&S projects
Increasing the Reaction speed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improving the EU's early warning system by basing the situation assessment of the EUMS on the four identified independent variables (IVs) as well as the intervening variable: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ <i>Primary IVs</i>: affected EU values and economic interests ■ <i>Secondary IVs</i>: profiling opportunities and security doubts (internal/ external) ■ <i>Intervening variable</i>: conflict dynamics (positive/ negative)
Increasing the operational involvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Activating the already existing EU Battlegroups - Speeding the PESCO project "EUFOR CROC" - Extending the existing Athena mechanism
Increasing the mandate fulfillment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of a permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group
Increasing the sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creation of a Permanent Civilian-Military Networking Platform - Institutionalization of the LOTs

Table 15: Increasing the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in general

8.2 Answering the research question

Based on the results presented in the tables 13, 14 and 15, the research question can be answered. On principle, it is possible to increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM through P&S. On one side, the analysis proved that the EU is already actively applying P&S in its current MCM in BiH and Somalia, which have had a positive impact on the EU's reaction speed (RS), operational involvement (OI), mandate fulfillment (MF) and sustainability of the respective operation (cf. tables 13/ 14 and chapters 7.1/ 7.2). On the other side, the individual case analyses in chapters 6.1 and 6.2 revealed that the respective CCMCs still have weaknesses. In order to address them, a number of projects pursued by the EU within the framework of PESCO could be identified, through which the 'effectiveness' might be further increased in each respect. Based on the theoretical considerations of chapters 3 and 4 as well as the results of the single-case analyses, I succeeded in deriving further P&S measures that might further increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM in BiH and Somalia in terms of RS, OI, MF and sustainability (cf. tables 13/ 14 and chapters 7.1/ 7.2). Moreover, from chapter 7.3 and the summarized results in table 15, it can be deduced that the effectiveness of the EU's MCM can be increased not only on a case-by-case basis, but also in general by both adopting existing PESCO projects such as EUFOR CROC, expanding existing P&S mechanisms such as the Athena mechanism, institutionalizing formats that have proven useful such as the LOTs, activating existing rapid reaction forces such as the EU Battlegroups, adapting the early warning mechanism, and creating new coordination platforms such as the 'Permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group' and the 'Permanent Civilian-Military Networking Platform' which all are targeted to improve the different aspects of the EU's MCM in general.

The case-specific and generalizable results of this thesis are both reliable and valid, as they have been developed based on a heterogeneous case selection according to the logic of MDSD. Moreover, the operations chosen for the single-case studies are extensive and protracted and to a certain extent also reflect the EU's development as an ISPA. In addition, the analysis adopted a wholistic approach to the EU's respective MCM in BiH and Somalia, which is why, in addition to the military core operations Althea and Atalanta, their respective embedding in a CCMC as well as the deployment of further civilian and military sister-operations was taken into account. Furthermore, the research design is based on the combination of two different types of analysis - two single-case analyses and a concordance analysis.

Against the backdrop of Brexit, the election of Joe Biden as the new U.S. president and the coronavirus pandemic, it is likely that the dynamic development of the EU's CFSP/ CSDP will continue, for on the one hand external allies (mainly the U.S.) still want the EU to increase its autonomous military capabilities, and on the other one of the most vehement internal opponents to deepening European security integration has left the EU at the turn of 2020/21. In addition, the pandemic, as did the 2008 financial crisis, increases the pressure on the EU and its MS to use their financial and material resources more effectively. As international security threats continue to persist, an expansion of the EU's security engagement is inevitable in order to protect its economic interests and to defend the values on which it is based. P&S can be an effective instrument to this end. Due to the effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma, however, P&S has its limitations (cf. chapter 4). Fortunately, this does not hold for the majority of the P&S mechanisms and projects presented in this thesis, as the EU already pursues most of them within the framework of PESCO. Once these projects are completed, the EU can use the capabilities and capacities developed in this way to increase the effectiveness of its MCM in BiH, Somalia, and as a whole. The analysis and comparison carried out in this thesis, as well as the conclusions derived from it, thus also show that the EU has embarked on the "right" P&S projects.

Alas, the situation is different with the proposals to expand existing P&S mechanisms (e. g. the Athena mechanism) and to institutionalize military formats that have proven useful (e. g. the LOTs), and to set-up new coordination platforms – The 'Permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group' and the 'Permanent Civilian-Military Networking Platform'. Although in theory these projects would increase the effectiveness of the EU's MCM, in practice they could nevertheless fail because of the effectiveness-sovereignty dilemma that must first be overcome for them to work. Moreover, there is the problem that those projects do not even have to directly affect the sovereignty of a MS to activate the dilemma. It is also possible that a state is against a project for another reason and rejects it with reference to its sovereignty. Thus, in the context of the future

P&S projects I propose, there are still a number of uncertainties that must be resolved before they can be implemented or made practical. However, their benefits are undeniable. Against the background that the practical implementation of these theoretically reasonable projects cannot be guaranteed, this thesis offers points for further research. Investigation on how the Athena mechanism could be extended might be one of them. It would require a detailed analysis of the EU's budgetary law and the specific financial rules of the Athena mechanism itself. In addition, a trade-off between philosophical and jurisprudential considerations would be necessary: Is joint funding of military expenditure morally justifiable if it could alleviate humanitarian suffering and defend EU values? This could be examined by researching into the question whether (full/partial) funding of a Battlegroup operation would be morally defensible if this helped to quickly deal with a burgeoning conflict that threatens EU values and causes humanitarian suffering. Further research could address what steps are needed to institutionalize the LOTs, create a "Permanent EU-NATO-UN Contact Group", and launch a "Permanent Civil-Military Networking Platform" within the EU. One question that would need to be addressed in the research is whether these projects would be better pursued within PESCO or by the EDA.

Overall, the central research question of this thesis has been answered completely and comprehensively and a really useful practical and topical reference has been established. In addition, the thesis adds scientific value by confirming the usefulness of the P&S projects currently pursued by the EU in the context of PESCO and, furthermore, by identifying further theoretically useful P&S projects through which the effectiveness of the EU's MCM could be further enhanced. However, the feasibility of these proposals still needs to be verified in the context of further analyses.

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10 Declaration of independent work

I hereby declare that I have authored this thesis independently, that I have not used other than the declared sources/resources, and that I have explicitly marked all material which has been quoted either literally or by content from the used sources. Furthermore, I declare that this work has never before been submitted by me or somebody else at this or any other university. I am aware that noncompliance with this declaration as well as an attempted fraud may result in the Master's Thesis being considered a "fail". Repeated or particularly severe attempts of deception, might ensue the Removal from the Register of Graduate Students.

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11 Appendix: Current PESCO-projects

All descriptions of the PESCO projects given in the table have been taken directly and verbatim from the respective source indicated:

Project number	Area of co-operation	Project name	Abbreviation	Description	Source
1	Training & Facilities	The European Union Training Mission Competence Centre	EU TMCC	<p>The European Union Training Mission Competence Centre (EU TMCC) will improve the availability, interoperability, specific skills and professionalism of personnel employed to staff positions at strategic or operational level for EU training missions across participating Member States. It will support pMS with coordination of commonly organized, harmonized and standardized education for military personnel to become employed to staff positions within EU TMs as well as personnel on strategic levels (MoDs or other high level structures). The EU TMCC will provide pMS with consistent information and data sharing, knowledge management and consultation with regard to past, on-going and future EU TMs and as far as appropriate with regard to personnel educated for and experienced in EU TMs.</p> <p>The EU TMCC should as well contribute to standardized assessment and management of expertise and knowledge related to EU TMs based on own Operational Assessment/Operational Research (OA/OR) and lessons identified/learnt.</p>	(PESCO – 1, 2021: n.p.)
2	Training & Facilities	The European Training Certification Centre for European Armies	ETCCEA	<p>The European Training Certification Centre for European Armies aims to promote the standardisation of procedures among European Armies and enable the staff, up to Division level, to practice the entire spectrum of the command and control (C2) functions at land, joint and interagency levels in a simulated training environment.</p> <p>The Centre will ensure that soldiers and civilian employees will work together in a simulated training environment with scenarios such as “Humanitarian Assistance” and “Support to Stabilization and Capacity Building” and eventually contribute to ensure that corporate experience and</p>	(PESCO – 2, 2021: n.p.)

				knowledge is consolidated, shared and made available to plan and conduct CSDP missions and operations.	
3	Training & Facilities	Helicopter “Hot-and-High” training	H3 training	The project aims to provide EU’s Helicopter Aircrews with specialized flight and tactics training within a “Hot-and-High” environment against new, transnational and multidimensional threats. Moreover, it provides a unique venue for additional training and evaluation of aircrews. It is eligible not only for military crews but also for EU civil aircrews, in order to cover peacetime operations such as [sic!] forest fight firing and police air patrols, in high altitude areas.	(PESCO – 3, 2021: n.p.)
4	Training & Facilities	Joint EU Intelligence School	JEIS	The JEIS, in collaboration with member states, NATO CoEs , [sic!] Intelligence and Security Services, will provide education and training in intelligence disciplines and other specific fields to EU member states intelligence and non military personnel.	(PESCO – 4, 2021: n.p.)
5	Training & Facilities	EU Test and Evaluation Centers	EUTEC	Sweden and France will co-lead the PESCO project on Test & Evaluation (T&E), comprising two work strands: ETEC Vidsel, which is a proposed European Cooperation in advanced T&E for military systems and; T&E centres network, which will promote the EU test and operational evaluation center capabilities, ensuring that they are used in priority for EU supported projects. This project will allow to highlight synergies, to optimize the use of European centers, and overall improve European test capacities and capabilities.	(PESCO – 5, 2021: n.p.)
6	Training & Facilities	Integrated European Joint Training and Simulation Center	EUROSIM	The objective is to establish a tactical training and simulation hub, which through decentralised governance involving multi-national training capacities could integrate tactical training and simulation sites in Europe into a real-time, networked, connected system.	(PESCO – 6, 2021: n.p.)
7	Training & Facilities	EU Cyber Academia and Innovation HUB	EU CAIH	To ensure a secure cyberspace, it is key to develop a technologically skilled workforce, a cyber-savvy ecosystem, and an effective pipeline of future employees. The project of EU CAIH can add value by enhancing the creation of an innovative web of knowledge for cyber defence and cyber security education and training, providing a vital contribution to strengthening national, NATO and EU’s capability to defend against the threats of the	(PESCO – 7, 2021: n.p.)

				digital world. It would also act as a coordination point for future cyber education, training and exercises, explore synergies with industry and academia, and establish an international cooperative approach, at the EU and NATO levels.	
8	Training & Facilities	Special Operations Forces Medical Training Center	SMTC	<p>The main objective is to establish a medical training and excellence centre focused on medical support for special operations. The overall aim would be to enhance medical capabilities supporting the Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions and operations, in terms of training, procedures and interoperability.</p> <p>The intent of the project is to expand the Polish Military Medical Training Centre in Łódź, which has the status of a certified National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians (NAEMT) Training Center, into the Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre (SMTC) to provide medical training capability for SOF personnel, increase coordination of medical support for SOF operations, boost professional cooperation of participating member state in that field, enhance readiness and capability of participating member state regarding personnel and materiel and intensify harmonisation in the subject matter.</p>	(PESCO – 8, 2021: n.p.)
9	Training & Facilities	CBRN Defence Training Range	CBRNDTR	The project is designed to provide CBRND individual and collective training at EU level, both in simulated and live conditions, in order to increase the interoperability between EU Member States, by conducting training activities and tactical exercises as countermeasures to the current and persistent CBRN threats. Its implementation will support the specific needs for military training and evaluation of CBRND personnel assigned to EU BGs or participating in CSDP missions and operations. Additionally, the European CBRND industry will be invited to use the existing facilities, in order to test new CBRND equipment and technologies.	(PESCO – 9, 2021: n.p.)
10	Training & Facilities	European Union Networking of Diving Centers	EUNDC	The main objective is to coordinate and enhance the operation of EU diving centres in order to better support CSDP missions and operations, in particular by ensuring a commonly regulated education and training for divers. EUNDC will provide a full spectrum of authorised training courses for	(PESCO – 10, 2021: n.p.)

				divers and rescue swimmers from member states in accordance with the common standards and procedures (including for inland waters diving).	
11	Land, Formations & Systems	Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package	DM-DRCP	The project objective is to develop a Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package (DM-DRCP) through the establishment of a specialized military assets package deployable at short notice within both EU-led and non-EU led operations, in order to generate a mission tailored Task Force (TF), as a tool to properly face emergencies and exceptional events (public calamities, natural disasters, pandemics, etc.) within EU territory and outside of it.	(PESCO – 11, 2021: n.p.)
12	Land, Formations & Systems	Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle	AIFV/ AAV/ LAV	The project will develop and build a prototype European Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle. The vehicles would be based on a common platform and would support fast deployment manoeuvre, reconnaissance, combat support, logistics support, command and control, and medical support. These new vehicles will also strengthen the EU CSPD ensuring, at the same time, the interoperability among European armies.	(PESCO – 12, 2021: n.p.)
13	Land, Formations & Systems	The Indirect Fire Support Capability	Euro Artillery	The Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery) will develop a mobile precision artillery platform, which would contribute to the EU's combat capability requirement in military operations. This platform is expected to include land battle decisive ammunition, non-lethal ammunition, and a common fire control system for improving coordination and interoperability in multinational operations. This project aims at procuring a new capability / platform of a key mission component for land forces in the short to mid-term.	(PESCO – 13, 2021: n.p.)
14	Land, Formations & Systems	EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core	EUFOR CROC	The EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) will decisively contribute to the creation of a coherent full spectrum force package, which could accelerate the provision of forces. EUFOR CROC will improve the crisis management capabilities of the EU by enhancing the force generation preparedness, willingness and commitment of EU member states to act and engage in operations and missions. It should fill in progressively the gap between the EU Battlegroups and the highest level of ambition within the EU Global Strategy.	(PESCO – 14, 2021: n.p.)

15	Land, Formations & Systems	Integrated Unmanned Ground System	UGS	<p>The objective of the Project is to develop a Unmanned Ground System (UGS) capable of manned-unmanned and unmanned-unmanned teaming with other robotic unmanned platforms and manned vehicles to provide combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) to ground forces. The UGS will have the following capabilities:</p> <p>(1) Modular, multi-mission-capable UGV on which a variety of payloads can be mounted to support various mission functionalities (transport, fire-support, ISR, EW&C, etc.) and integration for required sensors and communication systems.</p> <p>(2) EW resistant networking Command, Control & Communications (C3) solution.</p> <p>(3) Cyber secure autonomous functions solution.</p>	(PESCO – 15, 2021: n.p.)
16	Land, Formations & Systems	EU Beyond Line-of-Sight Land Battlefield Missile Systems	EU BLOS	<p>The project aims at developing an EU new generation medium range BLOS Land Battlefield missile systems family. The output is intended to be integrated on an extensive variety of platforms (ground-to-ground and air-to-ground) and to provide integrated and autonomous target designation capability. The project includes joint training and formation aspects. Dedicated “users’ club” is envisioned develop a common European doctrine on BLOS firing.</p>	(PESCO – 16, 2021: n.p.)
17	Maritime	Maritime (semi) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures	MAS MCM	<p>The Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM) will deliver a world-class mix of (semi-) autonomous underwater, surface and aerial technologies for maritime mine countermeasures. The project will enable Member States to protect maritime vessels, harbours and off shore installations, and to safeguard freedom of navigation on maritime trading routes.</p> <p>The development of autonomous vehicles, using cutting-edge technology and an open architecture, adopting a modular set up, will contribute significantly to the EU’s maritime security by helping to counter the threat of sea mines.</p>	(PESCO – 17, 2021: n.p.)
18	Maritime	Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection	HARMSPRO	<p>The Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO) will deliver a new maritime capability which will provide Member States with the ability to conduct surveillance and protection of specified maritime</p>	(PESCO – 18, 2021: n.p.)

				<p>areas, from harbours up to littoral waters, including sea line of communications and choke points, in order to obtain security and safety of maritime traffic and structures. It will deliver an integrated system of maritime sensors, software and platforms (surface, underwater and aerial vehicles), which fuse and process data, to aid the detection and identification of a range of potential maritime threats.</p> <p>The project will also deliver a command and control function for the deployable system, which could operate in harbours, coastal areas and the littoral environment.</p>	
19	Maritime	Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance	UMS	<p>The main objective of the program is to enhance the Maritime Surveillance, Situational Awareness and potential Response Effectiveness of the EU, by using the existing infrastructure, deploying assets and developing related capabilities in the future. The project on Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance will integrate landbased surveillance systems, maritime and air platforms in order to distribute realtime information to member states, so as to provide timely and effective response in the international waters. It aims to address timely and effectively new and old threats and challenges (such as energy security, environmental challenges, security and defence aspects); thus ensuring accurate Awareness and Rapid Response, so as to contribute to the protection of the EU and its citizens.</p>	(PESCO – 19, 2021: n.p.)
20	Maritime	Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability (DIVEPACK	<p>The project aims at developing an interoperable specialized modular asset for full spectrum defensive underwater intervention operations in expeditionary setting. The DIVEPACK unit will integrate a wide range of diving and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles materiel, operated by qualified personnel, in a comprehensive capability package. Its mission tailorable open architecture “plug-and-play” concept will facilitate the versatility of response in the framework of EU CSDP operations and will provide a quick reaction capability, applicable to a broad range of underwater scenarios, both at sea and in inland bodies of water, short of Special Forces missions.</p>	(PESCO – 20, 2021: n.p.)
21	Maritime	Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System	MUSAS	<p>The Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System (MUSAS) aims to develop and deliver an advanced command, control and communications (C3) service architecture, for anti-submarine warfare, taking advantage of</p>	(PESCO – 21, 2021: n.p.)

				cutting-edge technology and artificial intelligence, in order to counter area denial methods of adversaries. Moreover, it will enhance the protection of underwater high-value infrastructures as well as sea-based energy systems, providing quick response with appropriate levels of force to intrusion or threat to sea lines of communication.	
22	Maritime	European Patrol Corvette	EPC	The objective is to design and develop a prototype for a new class of military ship, named “European Patrol Corvette” (EPC), which allows to host several systems and payloads, in order to accomplish, with a modular and flexible approach, a large number of tasks and missions.	(PESCO – 22, 2021: n.p.)
23	Air & Systems	European Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – MALE RPAS	Eurodrone	The project focuses on common elements in dedicated areas (e.g. operational testing & evaluation, logistics, training, exercises) of a newly developed, operationally relevant, affordable and sovereign European military capability for the next-generation of MALE RPAS, providing, by 2025, enhanced overall value compared to existing systems.	(PESCO – 23, 2021: n.p.)
24	Air & Systems	European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III	TIGER III	The objective of this project is to improve significantly the TIGER global efficiency through a consistent upgrade of its detection, aggression and communication capabilities to develop a modernised, innovative and life-time extended European attack helicopter.	(PESCO – 24, 2021: n.p.)
25	Air & Systems	Counter Unmanned Aerial System	C-UAS	The aim is to develop an advanced and efficient system of systems with C2 dedicated architecture, modular, integrated and interoperable with C2 infrastructure, able to counter the threat posed by mini and micro Unmanned Aerial Systems. The system will be swift to deploy and reach operational status, to ensure protection to our troops in operational theatres, as well as employed for homeland defence, security and dual use tasks. The project will fulfil applicable certification and regulatory requirements, to allow homeland employment.	(PESCO – 25, 2021: n.p.)
26	Air & Systems	Airborne Electronic Attack	AEA	This capability will allow European and NATO air forces to safely operate within EU territories and the projection of the force in other potential areas of operations. The system shall be interoperable with the existing and planned EU member states assets and in cross-domain operations. The project covers the design, development and testing of a multi-jamming	(PESCO – 26, 2021: n.p.)

				capability (including stand-off, stand-in and escort jamming), that will be based in state-of-the-art existing technological cores at European industries level, including in particular Cyber Electro Magnetic Activities (CEMA). The system should follow a modular development approach, able to be integrated inside the aircraft or in a pod configuration, in order to be compatible with different aircrafts, manned and unmanned, of interest of the EU member states. The goal of the system is to enable a platform for Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) missions that could adapt to the latest in electronic warfare requirements, which include (soft) suppression of enemy air defences, escort/modified-escort role, non-traditional electronic attack, self-protected/time-critical strike support, and continuous capability enhancement.	
27	Enabling & Joint	European Medical Command	EMC	<p>The European Medical Command (EMC) will provide the EU with an enduring medical capability to coordinate military medical resources. It will ensure efficient joint EU management of scarce European medical services (planning, management and coordination unit).</p> <p>It will create a common operational medical picture, enhance the procurement of critical medical resources and contribute to harmonising national medical standards, legal (civil) framework conditions and sanitary service principles.</p> <p>The project is expected to make progress on the interoperability and the coherence of health care capabilities in Europe as well as to lay the foundation for effective medical force generation.</p>	(PESCO – 27, 2021: n.p.)
28	Enabling & Joint	Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations	NetLogHubs	<p>This project is aiming for a multinational network based on existing logistic capabilities and infrastructure. The goal is to use a network of existing logistic installations for MN business to prepare equipment for operations, to commonly use depot space for spare parts or ammunition and to harmonize transport and deployment activities. Nations around Europe are going to provide their capabilities to it so that several logistic hubs will be used.</p> <p>Connected with the European Multi Modal Transport Hub, which provides the lines of communication between the multinational hubs, it will grow to an entire network. With respect to possible operations, for the</p>	(PESCO – 28, 2021: n.p.)

				predeployment of materiel, depots and or maintenance facilities of other European countries could be used mutually as well. The network will decrease the reaction time and increase capacities and sustainability for military operations.	
29	Enabling & Joint	Military Mobility	MM	This project supports member states' commitment to simplify and standardize cross-border military transport procedures. It aims to enable the unhindered movement of military personnel and assets within the borders of the EU. This entails avoiding long bureaucratic procedures to move through or over EU member states, be it via rail, road, air or sea. Improving military mobility takes place in a number of expert level working groups within and beyond the EU, as well as from the EU institutions themselves. This project serves as the political-strategic platform where progress and issues stemming from these efforts are discussed. In addition, the project is focused on the sharing of best practices and implementing the deliverables of Council conclusions of 25th June 2018.	(PESCO – 29, 2021: n.p.)
30	Enabling & Joint	Energy Operational Function	EOF	Based on lessons learnt from recent operations, the project “Energy Operational Function” has a double objective: developing together new systems of energy supply for camps deployed in the framework of joint operations and for soldier connected devices and equipment and ensuring that the energy issue is taken into account from the conceiving of combat systems to the implementation of the support in operations, and including in the framework of operational planning.	(PESCO – 30, 2021: n.p.)
31	Enabling & Joint	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Surveillance as a Service	CBRN SaaS	The CBRN Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS) will establish a persistent and distributed manned-unmanned sensor network consisting of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) that will be interoperable with legacy systems to provide a Recognized CBRN Picture to augment existing Common Operational Pictures used for EU missions and operations.	(PESCO – 31, 2021: n.p.)
32	Enabling & Joint	Co-basing		The project aims at improving the sharing of bases and support points operated by project Member States both within Europe and overseas.	(PESCO – 32, 2021: n.p.)

33	Enabling & Joint	Geo-meteorological and Oceanographic Support Coordination Element	GMSCE	<p>The objective of this project is to enhance geospatial, meteorological and oceanographic (GeoMETOC) support for missions and operations by means of an architecture that connects and improves significantly the European GeoMETOC capabilities through</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the coordination and enhancement of the GeoMETOC data acquisition including installation of a Geo-Data Infrastructure EU (GDI-EU) (i.e. common procurement of hard- and software, licensing, where appropriate initiating co-production) the harmonisation, coordination and management of joint training content and training, a common policy for GeoMETOC training support, the establishment of virtual training platforms, the development of GeoMETOC Services based on Advanced Analytics and Big Data and the coordination and guidance of GeoMETOC research for military purposes. 	(PESCO – 33, 2021: n.p.)
34	Enabling & Joint	Timely Warning and Interception with Space-based TheatER surveillance	TWISTER	<p>The spectrum of threats on the European territory is evolving towards more complex and evolving air threats, notably in the missile domain. The project therefore aims at strengthening the ability of Europeans to better detect, track and counter these threats through a combination of enhanced capabilities for space-based early warning and endo atmospheric interceptors. It promotes the European self-standing ability to contribute to NATO Ballistic-Missile Defence (BMD).</p>	(PESCO – 34, 2021: n.p.)
35	Enabling & Joint	Materials and components for technological EU competitiveness	MAC-EU	<p>The objective is to develop the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the area of materials and components technologies, specifically those for which the security of supply and the freedom of use may be restricted. The project will also enhance the competitiveness, the innovation and the efficiency of the EDTIB by supporting collaborative actions and cross border cooperation.</p>	(PESCO – 35, 2021: n.p.)
36	Enabling & Joint	EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities	ECoWAR	<p>The objective is to increase the ability of the armed forces within the EU to face collectively and efficiently the upcoming threats that are more and more diffuse, rapid, and hard to detect and to neutralize. The envisaged</p>	(PESCO – 36: 2021: n.p.)

				outcome of this project will allow the armed forces within the EU to engage together in actions requiring close interactions and interconnections between diverse current and future warfare platform, from sensors to the effectors, in order to foster their efficiency, interoperability, complementarity, responsiveness and their resilience	
37	Enabling & Joint	European Global RPAS Insertion Architecture System	GLORIA	Using an incremental approach, the objective is to develop a robust and persistent Modelling and Simulation (M&S) architecture to analyse, evaluate and define Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) innovative procedures including insertion and integration into the Single European Sky system. It is also to establish a multinational competence centre able to ensure the development of concepts, doctrines and standardisation for Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and counter-UAS use as well as basic and advanced training on selected RPAS.	(PESCO – 37, 2021: n.p.)
38	Cyber & C4ISR	European Secure Software defined Radio	ESSOR	The European Secure Software Defined Radio aims to develop common technologies for European military radios. The adoption of these technologies as a standard will guarantee the interoperability of EU forces in the framework of joint operations, regardless which radio platforms are used, thereby reinforcing the European strategic autonomy. The European Secure Software Defined Radio project will provide a secure military communications system, improving voice and data communication between EU forces on a variety of platforms.	(PESCO – 38, 2021: n.p.)
39	Cyber & C4ISR	Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform	CTIRISP	Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform will develop more active defence measures, potentially moving from firewalls to more active measures. This project aims to help mitigate these risks by focusing on the sharing of cyber threat intelligence through a networked Member State platform, with the aim of strengthening nations' cyber defence capabilities.	(PESCO – 39, 2021: n.p.)
40	Cyber & C4ISR	Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security	CRRT	Cyber Rapid Response Teams (CRRTs) will allow the member states to help each other to ensure a higher level of cyber resilience and collectively respond to cyber incidents. CRRTs could be used to assist other member states, EU Institutions, CSDP operations as well as partners. CRRTs will be equipped with a commonly developed deployable cyber toolkits designed	(PESCO – 40, 2021: n.p.)

				to detect, recognise and mitigate cyber threats. Teams would be able to assist with training, vulnerability assessments and other requested support. Cyber Rapid Response Teams would operate by pooling participating member states experts.	
41	Cyber & C4ISR	Strategic Command and Control System for CSDP Missions and Operations	ESC2	The EMC will support the EU with an enduring medical capability to enable joint and combined operations. The EMC is a coordinating entity to increase the readiness of military medical support as a whole, not only by multinational cooperation but also by civil-military interaction. The MMCC/EMC will host the projects of MMCC and EMC under one administrative and infrastructural framework as an extension of the already inaugurated MMCC	(PESCO – 41, 2021: n.p.)
42	Cyber & C4ISR	European High Atmosphere Airship Platform– Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capability	EHAAP	The project aims at developing cost-efficient and innovative ISR platform (balloon based) that will provide persistence in the area of operations and a high degree of freedom of movement derived from its operating altitude and outstanding Dual Use characteristics.	(PESCO – 42, 2021: n.p.)
43	Cyber & C4ISR	One Deployable Special Operations Forces Tactical Command and Control Command Post for Small Joint Operations	SOCC for SJO	The project aims at developing and operating a SOCC for Small Joint Operations (SJO) with SOF (Special Operations Forces) Tactical C2 (Command and Control) capabilities with Full Operational Capability (FOC) foreseen in 2024. A joint interoperable C2 capability will be available for integration in CSDP, as described in NIP 2018, and NATO.	(PESCO – 43, 2021: n.p.)
44	Cyber & C4ISR	Electronic Warfare Capability and Interoperability Programme for Future Joint Intelligence,	JISR	The primary objective of the project is to produce a comprehensive feasibility study of the existing EU electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and the gaps that need to be filled. The findings of the feasibility study should potentially lead to the adoption of joint EW concept of operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS might include joint training of EW experts and, if agreed upon by the MS, the establishment of a joint EW unit.	(PESCO – 44, 2021: n.p.)

		Surveillance and Reconnaissance			
45	Cyber & C4ISR	Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center	CIDCC	The objective of the project is to develop, establish and operate a multinational Cyber and Information Domain (CID) Coordination Center (CIDCC) as a standing multinational military element, where – in line with the European resolution of 13 June 2018 on cyber defence – the participating member states continuously contribute with national staff but decide sovereignly on case-by-case basis for which threat, incident and operation they contribute with means or information.	(PESCO – 45, 2021: n.p.)
46	Space	EU Radio Navigation Solution	EURAS	The project is to promote development of EU military PNT (positioning, navigation and timing) capabilities and future cooperation taking advantage of Galileo and the public regulated service.	(PESCO – 46, 2021: n.p.)
47	Space	EUropean [sic!] Military Space Surveillance Awareness Network	EU-SSA-N	The main scope of this project is to develop an autonomous, sovereign EU military SSA capability that is interoperable, integrated and harmonized with the EU-SST Framework initiative for the protection of European MS Space assets and services. It will also enable appropriate response to natural and manmade threats.	(PESCO – 47, 2021: n.p.)