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THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ AS AN ACADEMIC ACTOR WITH A POLITICAL PURPOSE

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Presented by:

Katharina Pechowski

Katharina.pechowski@urosario.edu.co

No. matriculation: 264279

Supervised by:

Hendrikje Grunow

Dr. Carolina Galindo Hernández

- Profesora Asociada

Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt

Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá

Zentralinstitut für Lateinamerikastudien

Escuela de Ciencias Humanas

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Abstract

Founded in 2017, the Instituto CAPAZ (Instituto Colombo – Alemán para la paz) aims at monitoring and supporting the Colombian peace process. Its constitution of both Colombian and German participating research institutions combined with the German funding and initiative deserve further examination. This thesis thus seeks to first present the institute and second to embed it in its political and theoretical circumstances. Building on interviews with relevant stakeholders, I provide the first conceptualisation of this research institute. Based on the results of the empirical investigation on the Instituto CAPAZ, I identify four theoretical concepts that contextualise the institute. This conceptualisation shows that the Instituto CAPAZ is in first line an involvement of Germany in Colombia, secondly, how the CAPAZ fits into German foreign politics, and thirdly analyses the patterns of academic cooperation between partners in the Instituto CAPAZ. The fourth theoretical concept builds on these findings and concentrates on the intersections between the political and academic sphere within the institute. Overall, I come to the conclusion to characterise the Instituto CAPAZ as an academic actor with a political purpose.

Resumen

Fundado en 2017, el Instituto CAPAZ (Instituto Colombo - Alemán para la paz) tiene como objetivo supervisar y apoyar el proceso de paz colombiano. Su constitución por instituciones de investigación participantes tanto colombianas como alemanas, combinada con la financiación y la iniciativa alemanas, merecen un examen más detallado. Así pues, esta tesis pretende, en primer lugar, presentar el instituto y, en segundo lugar, insertarlo en sus circunstancias políticas y teóricas. A partir de entrevistas con actores relevantes, ofrezco una primera conceptualización de este instituto de investigación. A partir de los resultados de la investigación empírica sobre el Instituto CAPAZ, identifiqué cuatro conceptos teóricos que contextualizan el instituto. Esta conceptualización muestra que el Instituto CAPAZ es en primera línea una implicación de Alemania en Colombia, en segundo lugar, cómo encaja el CAPAZ en la política exterior alemana, y en tercer lugar analiza los patrones de cooperación académica entre los socios del Instituto CAPAZ. El cuarto concepto teórico se basa en estos resultados y se concentra en las intersecciones entre la esfera política y académica dentro del instituto. En conjunto, llego a la conclusión de caracterizar al Instituto CAPAZ como un actor académico con un propósito político.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Instituto CAPAZ, a German – Colombian research institute that is mainly financed by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) out of resources of the German foreign ministry, is a unique and thus very interesting subject of investigation. The binational cooperation that “supports research, teaching, and advisory activities that create new approaches to understanding peace and conflict” (Instituto CAPAZ 2021) has a main focus on the dynamics of the ongoing Colombian peace process, what leads to the question of the role of the German academic and governmental participation within that.

The underlying approach in this thesis is to take a look at the Instituto CAPAZ itself, its history and realisation, mainly based on newspaper articles and interviews with key personnel of CAPAZ and the participating scientific institutions. The first question from here is how this institute fits into existing inter- and transnational Colombian-German relations. Based on the results of the empirical investigation on the Instituto CAPAZ, I identify four theoretical concepts that contextualise the institute. This conceptualisation shows that the Instituto CAPAZ is in first line an involvement of Germany in Colombia, secondly, how the CAPAZ fits into German foreign politics, and thirdly analyses the patterns of academic cooperation between partners in the Instituto CAPAZ. The fourth theoretical concept builds on these findings and concentrates on the intersections between the political and academic sphere within the institute. Overall, I come to the conclusion to characterise the Instituto CAPAZ as an academic actor with a political purpose.

My investigation builds on three pillars: firstly, I realised interviews with relevant researchers and political stakeholders. Secondly, newspaper articles complete the picture of the institute and the surrounding circumstances. Ultimately, I rely on academic publications for conceptualising the prior findings.

So far, there had been no academic publication on the Instituto CAPAZ. This paper aims at filling this gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of the institute. It is therefore an explorative thesis that does not claim to lead to a complete picture of the institute. Instead, I intend to position it within the binational relations between Colombia and Germany as well as within current theoretical discourses on relevant matters. I will thus also suggest further research questions to improve the picture of the institute.

2. METHODOLOGY

As indicated in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to present, analyse and conceptualise the German-Colombian research institute Instituto CAPAZ. To provide a detailed understanding of my methodological approach to this topic, I here first present some general considerations before I enter the explanation of the grounded theory approach that I chose for this investigation. I further concentrate on introducing the interviews realised for this thesis as well as on the way of conceptualising it.

Initially, when I started to think about the Instituto CAPAZ as topic for my thesis, my guiding questions for approaching the institute were:

- 1) What is the interest of the German state in funding the Instituto CAPAZ?
- 2) What is the implication of the German funding on the work of the Instituto CAPAZ?
- 3) How does the Instituto CAPAZ fit into the bilateral relations between Germany and Colombia?

Throughout the investigation, I had to adapt these questions according to the findings of the empirical study. As I outline below, this is a common, and even mandatory, process within grounded theory research.

As the institute is relatively new, founded in 2017, and as there hardly exist similar projects, there also does not exist much material on the CAPAZ. During the first phase of my investigation, I realised that even most of the participant stakeholders weren't aware of the whole picture of the foundation or realisation of the institute. Tom Koenigs, who had the initial idea to create an institute like CAPAZ, wasn't able to tell me a lot about the consolidation of the institute, whereas representatives of the member institutions weren't aware of the circumstances of the initial idea. Therefore, I saw the necessity to dedicate a chapter of this thesis to extensively present the results of my empirical study on the Instituto CAPAZ in order to fill the lack of material describing the institute. The application of theoretical concepts was then based on the findings of this empirical study.

As there doesn't exist academic literature on the Instituto CAPAZ, the first two questions could only be answered based on sources such as press releases, newspaper articles, et cetera and based on interviews. The third question is mainly approached via literature review.

2.1. GROUNDED THEORY

The basic approach in grounded theory is that all conceptualisation emerges from the collected data. I chose this approach to stress the focus on the Instituto CAPAZ. It was my goal to concentrate on the history and the realisation of the institute and conceptualise my findings based on the answers of participant stakeholders.

Followingly, I started with interviews along the lines of the general guiding questions introduced above. Due to my timely resources, I was able to review every interview before starting the next one and thus to keep adapting my guidelines throughout the process of the investigation. The search for theoretical concepts started before the last interviews and the application of those after having reviewed and categorized all of the conducted interviews.

This goes along with the core principles of grounded theory, which was firstly introduced by Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser in 1967. Grounded Theory research should lead to elaborate new theory or a conceptual framework related to the subject of investigation.

The core principle hereby is that all attempts to theorise or conceptualise must be grounded in the collected data. Moreover, and to guarantee the foundation of the research in the data, the collection of this must be open and free.

This implies four aspects for the collection of data. Firstly, the researcher must stay open to new findings, even if they are challenging previous outcomes. Secondly, previously gained knowledge out of literature reviews etc. must be kept in the background when entering the field of data collection. Thirdly, the researcher must be prepared to continuously adapt the research questions according to the collected data. And ultimately, in the process of reviewing data, findings must not be forced into pre-existing categories (Timonen, Foley, and Conlon 2018:1ff.).

Therefore, I kept adopting the questions raised in the previous section. I realised that it was not possible to precisely approach the question regarding the specific interest of the German state in funding the Instituto CAPAZ based on the answers given in the interviews. Instead, the process of interviewing relevant stakeholders and reviewing their answers lead me in the direction of analysing the interesting interferences between the political and academic sphere.

In order to transparently demonstrate my research process along the principles of grounded theory, I decided to first present the results of the empirical study to make the

basis visible. I then start with the conceptualisation based on the findings of the empirical study while keeping to relate to the empirical data gained in the research process.

As I further outline, I thus adapted the manner of conducting interviews and of conceptualizing the findings according to these core principles of grounded theory.

2.2. INTERVIEWS

Interviews with relevant stakeholders involved with the Instituto CAPAZ are the main source for this thesis. It was therefore important to talk to representatives of the German and Colombian scientific consortia, as well as including the perspectives of relevant political actors that were responsible for the foundation of the Instituto CAPAZ or are currently involved in maintaining it.

In total, I realised twelve interviews, among those nine with researchers associated with the Instituto CAPAZ and three with German political stakeholders. When possible, the interviews were realised via the Video Conference Tool Zoom or via telephone. In these cases, the interviews were unstructured, and my aim was to let the participants describe their experiences and their involvement with the project Instituto CAPAZ. In other cases, it was not possible to realise the interview this way, so I sent questions to the respective participant, and they replied via mail or E-Mail.

My aim regarding the interviews was to collect all the individual experiences with and perspectives on the project “Instituto CAPAZ” focusing on the participants’ opinions and involvements with the institute.

Name of interviewed Person	Institution	Date	Interview via	Duration
Dr. Monika Viviana Contreras Saiz	Freie Universität Berlin	14.03.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:27:37
Tom Koenigs	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Germany’s Green Party)	09.05.2022	Telephone	00:53:32

Name of interviewed Person	Institution	Date	Interview via	Duration
Prof. Dr. Stefan Peters	Justus-Liebig Universität Gießen	28.05.2022	Video Conference Tool	01:11:28
Dr. Daniel Alscher	Bundespräsidialamt (Office of the German President)	03.06.2022	Mail	---
Camilo Borrero García (Profesor Titular)	Universidad Nacional de Colombia	29.06.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:29:52
Angelika Rettberg Beil	Universidad de los Andes	22.08.2022	E-Mail	---
Axel Rojas Martínez	Universidad del Cauca	22.08.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:41:36
Edgar Alberto Cortés Moncayo	Universidad Externado de Colombia	25.08.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:26:32
Prof. Dr. Jonas Wolff	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)	02.09.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:48:47
Victoria Lugo	Universidad de Caldas	08.09.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:24:04
Irene Eidemüller	Auswärtiges Amt (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	29.09.2022	E-Mail	---
Carlos Nupia	Instituto CAPAZ	29.09.2022	Video Conference Tool	00:58:12

Figure 1: List of interviews¹

¹ Further stakeholders were requested for an interview, but they did not respond.

Persons interviewed for this thesis:

Political stakeholders:

Tom Koenigs: Koenigs was a member of the German parliament from 2009 to 2017 in the green party “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”. His political interest focused on Human Rights. In April 2015, he became the representative of the Deutscher Bundestag regarding the Colombian peace process. As such, he played a key role in initiating the founding of the Instituto CAPAZ. (Deutscher Bundestag 2017; Deutschlandfunkkultur.de 2019)

Bundespräsidialamt: Frank-Walter Steinmeier was Germany’s minister of foreign affairs from 2013 to 2017 before he became the country's president. As minister, he was responsible for the foundation of the Instituto CAPAZ and appreciated various efforts to support the Colombian peace process. For this thesis, not he himself but one of his employees, Dr. Daniel Alscher, responded to questions via mail in name of the Bundespräsidialamt.

Irene Eidemüller: Eidemüller responded to my request to the Auswärtiges Amt, the German ministry of foreign affairs. The ministry is the main donor of financial means for the Instituto CAPAZ which makes its perspective relevant for this research.

Academic stakeholders – from Colombian Consortium:

Camilo Borrero García: Camilo Borrero is an associate professor at Universidad Nacional de Colombia investigating topics of justice and sociology. Furthermore, he is the Colombian spokesperson of the consortium the Instituto CAPAZ consists of.

Angelika Rettberg Beil: Angelika Rettberg is professor for political science with a focus on peace and conflict studies at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá. As such, she founded the university’s research program on armed conflict and peacebuilding (Netcapaz.org 2022a).

Edgar Cortés Moncayo: Edgar Cortes is lecturer of law at the Universidad Externado de Colombia in Bogotá.

Axel Rojas Martínez: Axel Rojas Martinez is professor of anthropology at the Universidad del Cauca. He focuses his work on topics as territorial conflict, extractivism and conflict, dynamics of multiculturalism in Colombia, and the effect of the Peace Accords in rural territories (Netcapaz.org 2022b).

Victoria Lugo: Victoria Lugo graduated in psychology and focuses on mental health. She teaches at the Universidad de Caldas within the department of human development. Her investigative focus lies on survivors of the Colombian armed conflict and on agency and capacities of populations affected by the conflict. Furthermore, she leads the research initiative CEDAT (Centro de Estudios sobre Conflicto, Violencia y Convivencia social – Centre of Research about Conflict, Violence and Social Coexistence) (Netcapaz.org 2022c).

Academic stakeholders – from German Consortium:

Stefan Peters: Since 2018, Stefan Peters is the academic director of the Instituto CAPAZ. After having achieved his doctoral degree in political science, he is now also professor for peace studies at the Justus-Liebig Universität in Gießen. His broad investigative interests include education, intersectionality and peace accords (Instituto CAPAZ 2022a).

Mónika Viviana Contreras Saiz: Mónica Contreras has a doctoral degree in history and focuses her research on Latin American topics. For the Freie Universität Berlin, she was engaging in the foundation process of the Instituto CAPAZ.

Jonas Wolff: Jonas Wolff is professor for political science at the Goethe University of Frankfurt with a special focus on Latin America. He is the representative of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt for CAPAZ and actively participating since 2015.

From the Instituto CAPAZ:

Carlos Mauricio Nupia: Since 2017, Carlos Nupia is the administrative director of the Instituto CAPAZ. As such he is responsible for administrative tasks. Before joining the Instituto CAPAZ, he was already working in the field of international cooperation and he also holds a doctoral degree in political science (Instituto CAPAZ 2017).

2.3. REMARKS

It has to be acknowledged that all participants knew prior to the respective interviews that their names would be used in this thesis and that followingly, possible readers, including their fellow researchers, would be able to read about the participants' perspectives and opinions on the Instituto CAPAZ.

Especially the existing asymmetries of power inhabited in the project could have influenced the responses of some participants. I also want to stress the issue that I as researcher and author of this thesis am from Germany and from a German participant university, which could have kept participants from revealing possible aspects of criticism towards the German state and participating German universities.

3. POLITICAL CONTEXT IN COLOMBIA – A BRIEF SUMMARY

As mentioned in the introduction, the Instituto CAPAZ has a focus on investigating several aspects of the Colombian peace process. It is therefore necessary to take a close look at the political circumstances surrounding the foundation of the institute.

Already in the 19th century, the conflict between the Liberal and the Conservative Party in Colombia used violent means to realise their political aspirations and in their fight for political power in the country. This bipartisan conflict reached its peak in the period called *La Violencia* (The Violence) from 1946 to 1958. This period is characterised by repressions and led to an increasing political radicalisation, culminating with the assassination of the liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in April 1948. (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:112).

The analyst Paul Oquist estimated that between 1948 and 1966, the bipartisan violence caused 1193.017 deaths (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:115). This violence was committed by armed groups within the political parties, on the one hand to the service of the conservative government, and liberal guerrillas and communist auto defence groups on the other hand (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:112). The 1955 military intervention of the then president Gustavo Rojas Pinilla against those armed liberal and communist groups that didn't follow the prior offer to hand in arms in exchange for amnesty, led their further radicalisation and transformation into revolutionary guerrillas (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:115ff.).

About ten years later, the FARC, the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*² formed themselves. There exist different versions on the causes of the creation of this guerrilla group, whose beginning marks a new phase of the conflict, which then becomes then known as the Colombian civil war. Officially, the FARC were constituted following the attacks of the military against the *Repúblicas Independientes* in 1964 and 1966. Other versions rather concentrate on the assassination of one of the communist groups' leaders, Jacobo Prías Alape by liberal groups as well as on the military beating the liberal

² In 1982, the FARC decided to change its name to FARC-EP, with the suffix standing for "Ejército Popular", - public army (Padinger 2022).

and conservative groups in confrontations (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:117).


The creation of the FARC and of further guerrilla groups with different backgrounds and slightly different goals, the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)* being the second largest after the FARC, led to decade long open and violent confrontations between the guerrillas and the state.

In the 1980s, paramilitary groups arose with the aim to fight back the left guerrillas. Those paramilitary groups had a stronger attachment to the governmental military and supported them in some missions (Chaparro 2017).

The level of violence increased with the emergence of a third party to the conflict. Paramilitary groups are responsible for 58,9% of recorded massacres, the guerrilla groups for 17,3% and the public forces for 7,9%. While the paramilitary groups thus killed more people, the guerrilla groups kidnapped more and damaged more (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:35f.). Overall, it is estimated that the Colombian internal conflict caused at least 220.000 deaths (counted between 1958 and 2012), 27.000 kidnappings (counted between 1970 and 2010) and around 5.000.000 displaced people (counted between 1985 and 2012) (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013:20, 64, 71).

In 2005, the paramilitary groups signed a peace agreement with the then Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez that included the disarmament of the paramilitary combatants as well as the establishment of a system of transitional justice, called Justicia y Paz. The Centro de Memoria Histórica conveyed an extensive survey about several facets of the Colombian violence and also on the perception of the system of transitional justice Justicia y Paz. One of the first deciding findings was that 82% of the general population answered that they either had never heard of it (11%) or only had heard or read about it, but didn't really know what it was about (71%) (Centro de Memoria Histórica 2012:30). Additionally, the survey asked its participants about their trust in the established system.

¿Qué tanto confía usted en el sistema de judicial de Justicia y Paz? RU



Base: Total muestra: 1843 encuestas en Población General; 304 encuestas en Víctimas Organizadas; 138 encuestas en Expertos. La muestra de Población General representa 8.514.987 hogares.

Figure 2: Survey: How much do you trust the judicial system of Justicia y Paz? (Centro de Memoria Histórica 2012:40)

As the figure shows, among the general population, only 25% answered that they had a lot of trust in the system of Justicia y Paz and especially the groups of experts (45%) as well as organized victims (35%) responded that they had only little trust in Justicia y Paz.

Eleven years after Justicia y Paz, in 2016, the Colombian government under then President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón was about to sign the peace agreement with the FARC-EP, the most active and numerous guerrilla group in Colombia. After years of negotiations, the two parties reached an agreement and developed what was about to be known as the accords of La Habana (Amnesty International 2022). It contained the creation of another transitional justice system and a focus on reparation and non-repetition. A peace agreement was formally signed by President Santos and the FARC-EP's leader known as Timochenko in September 2016 in Cartagena under the watch of then UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon.

Depicting the deep social divisions in the country, the peace accords were contested from various sides, leading to a rejection of the treaty in a referendum. The turnout of this referendum was low, with only 37,4% of Colombians eligible to vote participating. Of those, 50,23% voted against, 49,76% in favour of the peace agreement (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2016). The low turnout and the extremely narrow result show that the decision stood on a weak fundament. An analysis of the result reveals that persons living in the rural regions most affected by the armed conflict decisively voted in favour of the agreement, whereas people living in the bigger cities mostly rejected it (Stürzenhofecker 2016). Prior to the referendum, a strong campaign led by former president Álvaro Uribe mobilised Colombians to vote for a rejection. The reasons to reject

that version of the agreement were multi-layered. The opponents' most popular argument was that former members of the guerrilla would receive an insufficient grade of punishment because of planned options for amnesty. Among the further arguments were concerns on the position of members of the armed forces in the transitional justice system, on the punishment of persons involved in drug trafficking and on the use of FARC-EP resources to finance the implementation of the peace accords (Crisis Group 2017).

Nevertheless, an adjusted version of the agreement came into force few weeks later, ratified by the Colombian congress (Crisis Group 2017). The agreement contains a rural reform (chapter 1 of the accords), regulations on the procedure of dealing with former combatants (political participation in chapter 2, cessation of hostilities in chapter 3), and an attempt to end Colombia's drug problem (chapter 4) (Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2017:8f.).

The fifth point of the peace accords from 2016 contained the creation of the so-called *Sistema Integral Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No Repetición* (SIVJRNR). This Integral System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition is composed of (i) the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition (further: Comisión de la Verdad); (ii) the Search Unit for Persons Reported Missing; (iii) the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (further: JEP); and (iv) comprehensive reparation measures for peace building and guarantees of non-repetition (jep.gov.co 2022b).

Furthermore, the sixth chapter of the agreement decided on the establishment of the Commission for Monitoring, Promoting and Verifying the Implementation of the Final Agreement (CMPVI) that is in charge of overseeing the implementation of the peace accords. Apart from each three delegates from the Colombian government and the former FARC-EP, the commission is composed of one delegate from each of the guarantor countries, Cuba and Norway, and of the observer states, Chile and Venezuela (Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2017:212f.).

The Colombian peace process received a lot of approving attention by several international actors, which valued the innovative approach to establish a victim-centred, wholistic peace in Colombia (Nylander, Sandberg, and Tvedt 2018:8; ICTJ 2019).

As will be further outlined in the following chapters, also Germany approves and supports the Colombian peace process. One of the country's major efforts, as becomes visible in chapter 4.1.1. is the Instituto CAPAZ with the aim to monitor and support the course of the peacebuilding process.

It is important to acknowledge that this peace agreement was only between the Colombian government and the largest guerrilla group, the FARC-EP. Other guerrilla groups kept existing, even though their power was drastically cut with the official end of the largest and most influential organisation laying down arms. Followingly, 2016 did not mean an end to all violence in Colombia. According to the JEP, 2021 had been the most violent year since the signing of the peace accords, reporting 329 violent deaths, among those 24 civilians, in context of a so-called reactivation of the conflict (jep.gov.co 2022a). The report also mentions the active presence of illegal groups in twelve Colombian regions.

4. THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ – RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

This chapter aims at presenting the results of the empirical study, which implies presenting the history and the realisation of the Instituto CAPAZ. As mentioned before, there hasn't been academic writing on the Instituto CAPAZ so far and this chapter thus fills the gap of introducing the structures and the work of the institute.

The topic of interest for this thesis is the Instituto CAPAZ, a Colombian - German research institute observing and accompanying the Colombian peace process. As outlined before, the institute was initiated by Tom Koenigs, a former German politician, and is funded by different sections of the German state, among which the German ministry of foreign affairs provides the most financial means, namely up to 500.000€ per year (Eidemüller 2022). The funding is though not directly paid to the institute but is administered by the DAAD.

The Instituto CAPAZ has a dual leadership. Prof. Stefan Peters is the academic director of the institute, whereas Dr. Carlos Nupia serves as managing director. Furthermore, there exists an advisory board, consisting of representatives of the participating universities and research institutes. Apart from that, the institute has its own employees, who work in administrative areas, including public relations and others who also contribute to the research projects.

In order to enhance a deeper understanding of the Instituto CAPAZ, I divided this chapter into three sections. The first one concentrates on the history of the institute and how and by whom it was founded. The second section elaborates the institute's work, meaning an introduction to the research projects, courses, and publications the Instituto CAPAZ realises. The third section starts an analysis of certain aspects of the Instituto CAPAZ that will support the understanding of the conceptual analysis in the sixth chapter later.

The answers given throughout the twelve interviews conducted for this thesis were relatively unanimous regarding the views of interview participants on the institute and no inconsistencies occurred.

4.1. HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ

The history of the Instituto CAPAZ started in 2015 with an official voyage of the then German Minister of Foreign Affairs together with colleagues from the parliament. The focus of the present analysis thus also reaches from 2015 to March 2022, which was when I started interviewing persons involved.

Based on document research and the interviews, I identify four phases in the history of the Instituto CAPAZ until 2022. In the first phase, from February to September 2015, the idea was born to create a binational institute to support the Colombian peace process. In the time from September 2015 to January 2017, the idea was concretised, and the funding proposal was approved by the DAAD. In January 2017, the inauguration act meant the official starting point for the institute. Afterwards, the work of the Instituto CAPAZ began and gained speed with Stefan Peters taking office as academic director in May 2018.

It has to be acknowledged that many of the named dates are based on the memories of participating stakeholders and couldn't be verified by external sources.

4.1.1. PHASE 1: A MINISTER'S VOYAGE AND A PERSONAL INTEREST (FEBRUARY 2015 – SEPTEMBER 2015)

In February 2015, the then German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, went on a journey to various South American countries, including Colombia. Steinmeier was accompanied by several members of the German parliament, among them Tom Koenigs from "Bündnis 90/Die Grünen", back then part of the opposition in parliament, who was named special commissioner for the Colombian peace process by the German government. When interviewing Koenigs, he described his interest in Colombia as based on his personal left-oriented political views as well as on his admiration for the Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez. Out of his special interest and knowledge on the Colombian political situation, Koenigs was allowed to visit a political prisoner and to draw attention on that specific matter. The case of the imprisoned author who was accused of having intense relations with different guerrilla groups also caught the minister's attention.

After the visit, Steinmeier and Koenigs discussed the case, and the minister asked his companion to present five proposals to further support Colombia. These consisted in concentration of humanitarian aid on demining, support of negotiations with the ELN, support for the JEP with German lawyers and the formation of a binational institute to monitor and support the peace process in general. Unfortunately, during our interview, Koenigs was not able to recall the last one of the proposals, which he had developed together with the German diplomat Georg Clemens Dick, who had been working for the German government in Venezuela and Chile (Koenigs 2022).

According to Koenigs, Steinmeier was very open and comprehensive so that he approved not just one but all the mentioned proposals, including creating a peace institute. This was the birth moment for the Instituto CAPAZ. Initially, the idea was to create an institute following the example of existing German peace institutes, as the German Stiftung für Politik und Wissenschaft SWP, the political foundations and another, already existing cooperation with Chile. Already at this early stage, Steinmeier suggested to combine the future institute with the existing knowledge and competence in peace and conflict studies at the Justus-Liebig Universität Gießen.

In September 2015, Koenigs wrote an Email to researchers in Germany working on the Colombian case who, in his view, might be interested in constituting such an institute (Wolff 2022).

4.1.2. PHASE 2: SEARCH FOR THE DIRECTION OF THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ (SEPTEMBER 2015 – JANUARY 2017)

According to Koenigs, it wasn't clear from the beginning that the institute would become an academic one. The idea existed to rather create a political organisation, similar to the German political foundations that are active worldwide. Additionally, with the Maria Sibylla Merian Centres, Germany also already fosters cooperation in the social sciences with India, Mexico, Brazil, Ghana and Tunisia (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung 2022). Furthermore, similar university-based peace research institutes already existed in other countries, for example the US-based KROC Institute for International Peace Studies, connected to the University of Notre Dame in Indiana that also engages in the Colombian peace process (KROC Institute 2023).

Nevertheless, Steinmeier proposed right at the beginning of the consolidation to create a binational academic research institute, because he was aware of the already existent competences in this specific matter at the University of Gießen. For him, this implied that the future academic director would have to be a full professor within the German academic system.

In September 2015, Koenigs himself reached out to potentially interested candidates and institutions in Germany, including among others Thilo Marauhn from the university of Gießen, Marianne Braig and Günther Maihold, both from the Freie Universität Berlin, and Jonas Wolff from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Contreras Saiz 2022; Wolff 2022).

Founding Members		Associate Members	
From Colombia	From Germany	From Colombia	From Germany
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Universidad Nacional • Universidad del Rosario • Universidad de los Andes • Universidad Externado • Pontificia Universidad Javeriana 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justus-Liebig Universität Gießen • Freie Universität Berlin • Albert-Ludwigs Universität Freiburg • Georg-August Universität Göttingen • Peace Research Institute Frankfurt 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Universidad de Antioquia • Universidad de Caldas • Universidad del Cauca • Universidad de Ibagué • Universidad Industrial de Santander • Universidad de Medellín • Universidad del Norte • Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana • Universidad del Atlántico • Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Universität Erfurt • Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt • Goethe Universität Frankfurt • Phillips Universität Marburg • Universität Leipzig

Figure 3: Members of the Instituto CAPAZ (Instituto CAPAZ 2022c, 2022d)

Followingly, in late 2015, there was a meeting of researchers with potential interest in participating at CAPAZ at the University of Göttingen. During this meeting the invited stakeholders discussed several options how to create such an institute as well as possible interested partners in Germany and Colombia (Wolff 2022).

On the Colombian side, the institute built on an existing collaboration researching the Colombian peace process between the five big universities in Bogotá, the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Universidad de los Andes, Universidad del Rosario, Universidad Externado de Colombia and Universidad Javeriana (Borrero García 2022).

Followingly, the consortium that submitted the application to the DAAD in early 2016 consisted of the five named Colombian universities and the Freie Universität Berlin, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, the Georg-August Universität Göttingen, the Albert Ludwigs Universität Freiburg and the Justus-Liebig Universität Gießen, which was decided to be in charge.

With the approval of the application by the DAAD, the consortium progressed with the establishment of the Instituto CAPAZ. As in this moment there didn't exist an institute with staff and an office, it was the board consisting of the representatives of the institutions involved, taking all decisions on how to proceed (Wolff 2022). Carlos Nupia officially joined the institute as administrative director in May 2017 (Instituto CAPAZ 2017). Like this, the Instituto CAPAZ was created and consolidated.

4.1.3. PHASE 3: INAUGURATION ACT (JANUARY 2017)

The Instituto CAPAZ was officially inaugurated on January 13th, 2017, in Bogotá. Steinmeier dedicated his last voyage as German minister of foreign affairs to visit Colombia and to inaugurate the institute. In his speech, he described the Instituto CAPAZ as an additional component of the German foreign cultural and education policies, based on the fact that Germany is mentioned as supporting nation regarding transitional justice and reconciliation in the Colombian peace accords. In his vision, German experiences with efforts to overcome a violent past could be helpful in advising Colombian officials on the matter, even though Steinmeier also highlights that these experiences cannot be copied to other situations and should rather be seen as lessons learned during the last decades.

He also stressed the relevance of the shared basis between Germany and Colombia regarding peacebuilding efforts as well as the German dedication in supporting the Colombian peace process (Auswärtiges Amt 2017).

4.1.4. THE PROCESS TO START WORKING (AFTER JANUARY 2017)

As mentioned before, it was decided in the beginning that the academic director of the Instituto CAPAZ should be an ordinary professor at a German university and as the university of Gießen is in charge of the project, the future director should be a professor at the JLU. Stefan Peters was called as professor at JLU and by this became the academic director at CAPAZ in May 2018. He had recently finished his habilitation and consequently, this was his first position as professor (Peters 2022).

Peters had a concrete vision about how to realise the institute before taking office. He mentioned six aspects he wanted to include in the institute:

- 1) Highlight interdisciplinary research. For Peters, the interdisciplinarity of the institutes and personalities involved in CAPAZ are a great potential that he wanted to take advantage of to maximise the Instituto CAPAZ's impact.
- 2) Incorporate own research focuses and remain broadly positioned: The broad spectrum of research topics is one of the main characteristics of CAPAZ in order to fulfil its designated tasks.
- 3) Close coordination with partners within the consortium.
- 4) Efforts to transfer project outcomes into material for political education programs.
- 5) Creation and roll out of new publication series.
- 6) Expansion of consortium involved in CAPAZ, especially addition of institutes and universities from Colombian regions other than Bogotá. (Peters 2022).

As will be analysed in chapter 4.3., these mentioned aspects were realised to different degrees.

The first, explorative projects realised by CAPAZ were built on cooperations within the consortium. With the increasing institutionalisation of CAPAZ, it became more autonomous and projects lay more and more in the hands of the growing scientific staff of the institute (Contreras Saiz 2022; Wolff 2022).

4.2. THE WORK OF THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ

This section aims to line out the key aspects of the Instituto CAPAZ's work. I was able to identify five relevant categories that help to understand the institute's work. These are research projects, academic schools, courses and events, publications and the so-called Netcapaz.

1) Research projects

Realizing research projects on several issues related to the Colombian peace process is one of the major tasks of the Instituto CAPAZ.

Since 2018, the Instituto CAPAZ has a special agreement with the JEP to support the transitional justice system in Colombia. This cooperation, and another one with the Comisión de la Verdad, ensured a further budget of 1.45 Mio. € provided by the German government. With these additional financial means, the Instituto CAPAZ supports victim groups and scientifically accompanies the process of transitional justice in Colombia (Eidemüller 2022).

2) Academic schools

So far, there have been four summer and winter schools organized and realised by the Instituto CAPAZ, two of them each in Germany and Colombia. In these programs, Master and doctoral students from both countries are invited to the respective hosting university to “present their research work, exchange knowledge and experiences of peacebuilding in Colombia” (Instituto CAPAZ 2022b).

For Victoria Lugo, these academic schools are particularly important because it is also possible for students from the regions to participate in these as the Instituto CAPAZ provides funding for transportation etc. (Lugo 2022).

3) Courses and events

Additionally to the academic schools, the Instituto CAPAZ offers online courses to specific topics as “The Governance of Knowledge for Peace” or “Former Combatants and Transitional Justice: Exploring the Comprehensiveness of the System” (Instituto CAPAZ 2022f).

These courses are directed towards different target groups, depending on the topic and goal of the respective course. Some are for students, others for professionals and others for other social groups, for example for ex-combatants. The courses vary in mode of

operation (on- or offline), hosting university and consequently country of realisation. Interested persons can participate for free (Instituto CAPAZ 2022f).

4) Publications

Publications play an important role at CAPAZ, as transparent and easy accessible communication about the institute's work and findings is one of its core principles.

Policy briefs are written by researchers involved at CAPAZ and seek to contribute to informing about the Colombian peace process and its various facets:

The Policy Briefs include information about researchers' policy proposals and recommendations on topics related to sustainable peacebuilding in Colombia. They provide access to scientific knowledge and knowledge transfer reflecting the research work undertaken to society in general and political actors in particular. (Instituto CAPAZ 2018)

Working papers seek to contribute to scientific debates on relevant topics based on the results of the institute's investigation.

Furthermore, the Instituto CAPAZ has a steady partnership with the Colombian newspaper El Espectador. In the column "Colombia2020", short "Colombia+20", researchers from the Instituto CAPAZ are publishing an analysis regarding peacebuilding in Colombia on a monthly basis (Instituto CAPAZ 2022e).

The annex of this thesis contains a full overview over all courses and publications realised by the Instituto CAPAZ.

5) Netcapaz

As mentioned by Axel Rojas, among others, the major benefit of the Instituto CAPAZ is the platform it offers for all participant researchers to connect (Rojas Martínez 2022). Therefore, the online platform Netcapaz was created. "It is a CAPAZ designed online collaborative platform to strengthen cooperation between German and Colombian researchers working in the field of peace and conflict" (Instituto CAPAZ 2022g). The access to this platform is not limited to researchers from member institutions of CAPAZ, and is also open to researchers from civil society organisations, think tanks, other universities and research centres (Instituto CAPAZ 2022g).

Via this platform, researchers are able to create and publish their scientific profile, to get in contact with other researchers, and to receive information on calls for papers, on relevant publications and so on.

4.3. REALISATION OF THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ

This chapter aims to elaborate various aspects of the Instituto CAPAZ based on the information gained in the interviews. Furthermore, these aspects are the basis for the conceptual analysis following in chapter 6.

4.3.1. MAIN OBJECTIVES OF CAPAZ ACCORDING TO PARTICIPANTS

Unfortunately, I was not allowed to take a look at the final agreement that consolidated the Instituto CAPAZ and thus to analyse the officially negotiated objectives of the institute. Consequently, I asked the interview partners what in their opinion were the main objectives of the Instituto CAPAZ.

All academic stakeholders (see chapter 2.2.) responded to this question and especially Angelika Rettberg and Edgar Cortés provided interesting aspects to frame the institute's main objective. They highlighted the aim of CAPAZ to promote education for peace, to generate knowledge and opportunities for investigation and to include the perspectives from researchers from the regions out of Bogotá (Rettberg Beil 2022; Cortés Moncayo 2022).

Apart from that, the main objective of the Instituto CAPAZ is to accompany the Colombian peace process. Therefore, its task is to generate and distribute knowledge on the various facets of the process (Rettberg Beil 2022). For this, the institute has managed to establish a platform of collaboration between investigators in Colombia, including from outside Bogotá, and in Germany.

4.3.2. WAYS OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN CAPAZ AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Most interview participants valued the aspect of the CAPAZ being a platform for inter-university and transnational scientific collaboration (Borrero García 2022; Rettberg Beil 2022; Rojas Martínez 2022; Cortés Moncayo 2022; Wolff 2022). The component of getting to know researchers from different regions and with different topics of

investigation promotes cooperation beyond CAPAZ, especially also with the Colombian universities of the regions.

4.3.3. VARYING PARTICIPATION OF PARTICIPANT UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

One of the most mentioned aspects in the interviews is the varying participation of the involved universities (Peters 2022; Borrero García 2022). According to Peters, there are different reasons for German and Colombian universities that shape the intensity of participation of the certain institution. In case of the German universities Peters stated that the involvement depends more on specific personalities that engage at CAPAZ. With changes in staff at these universities it is possible that the engagement for CAPAZ decreases, depending on research interests and language knowledge. It is therefore difficult to maintain an institutional coherence, as Peters calls it. The situation at the Colombian universities is different, according to him, as in some cases the responsibility for CAPAZ lies in the hands of administrative staff, rather than scientific personnel. In these cases, it is likely that the certain university engages less in research with CAPAZ and is rather involved in maintaining an overview (Peters 2022).

An important aspect to mention in this place is the financial situation of the different universities. As the Instituto CAPAZ does not directly collect fees from the consortium partners, it is possible for smaller universities with less budget to engage at CAPAZ. This is supporting the initial goal of Peters to include Colombian universities from regions other than Bogotá. The underlying structure of the Instituto CAPAZ implies that scientific staff from the universities do not receive wages from CAPAZ but are only paid by the respective university. This means that universities are indirectly paying for their engagement at CAPAZ and followingly, big universities have more capacities, in staff and budget, to manage engagement at CAPAZ (Peters 2022).

This financial structure fosters a low obligation for permanent and intense engagement of the universities with CAPAZ and implies a stress of personal responsibility.

4.3.4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF GERMAN PARTICIPANTS TO THE WORK OF CAPAZ

One of my principal questions before starting the research on CAPAZ was about what the German research institutes can contribute to investigating and accompanying the Colombian peace process. In my experience, there is a lot of strong and deep research on their own situation at the Colombian universities, so I wondered what the added value of the German academic contribution could look like.

The participants in the interviews mentioned four aspects regarding the contribution of German researchers to the work of the Instituto CAPAZ:

1) External perspective to enhance objectivity

According to Wolff and Lugo, German researchers can provide an external perspective on the Colombian situation (Wolff 2022; Lugo 2022). Especially Victoria Lugo stressed the fact that many researchers from the Colombian universities have personal, strong experiences with and thus opinions on the decades of armed conflict in the country, as well as on the details of the peace accords. In her opinion, the German contribution therefore enhances objectivity within the work of the Instituto CAPAZ (Lugo 2022).

2) Comparative studies vs studies in the field

As mentioned, Colombian researchers are deep in the case and can provide a strong analysis of several aspects of the Colombian situation. Some interview partners outlined that the German researchers are able to concentrate more on comparative components, including again another perspective to the research in general (Borrero García 2022; Wolff 2022).

3) German experiences in treatment of past

In 2013, the then German president, Joachim Gauck, held a speech on memory and reconciliation in Germany at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá. In this speech, he outlined the difficulties Germany faced after the Second World War in 1945 as well as after the end of the DDR in 1990 in terms of reconciliation and transitional justice. He also described the success of these measures in overcoming the country's violent past. From there, he compares the German and the South African experience and starts to describe how other countries involved in violent conflict can build on these lessons. His

next step are recommendations to the Colombian government and civil society on how to design a successful reconciliation process (Gauck 2013).

This self-perception of Germany as competent advisor in questions of treatment of violent pasts is an often-seen aspect within German international relations. As Mónica Contreras stated during the interview, this discourse of “Aufklärungsarbeit”, treatment of past, is rather present in German politics than in the academic sphere (Contreras Saiz 2022).

This is reflected in the response of the Bundespräsidialamt, the office of the German president:

“The German researchers who are involved in CAPAZ are making their contribution - also with the experience of coming to terms with the German past and in the international dialogue about it - especially in the fields of transitional justice, culture of remembrance and conflict transformation. In this way, they can concretely support peace efforts in Colombia through new insights, social debates and diverse educational offers.” (Bundespräsidialamt 2022)

Nevertheless, Wolff, Cortés and Lugo mentioned the German experiences when asking about the contribution of the German research institutes to CAPAZ. Still, none of them further explained how these German experiences can concretely be used in the work of the Instituto CAPAZ.

4) Increased importance of projects because of international funding

Edgar Cortes was the only one to mention the aspect that in his opinion, it gives more importance and reception to a project if it has international funding and involvement. Like this, publications and events of CAPAZ receive broader attention (Cortés Moncayo 2022).

4.3.5. THE RELATION BETWEEN GERMAN AND COLOMBIAN PARTICIPANTS

As mentioned various times before, the Instituto CAPAZ is financed by the German state and was initiated by German politicians. Followingly, the starting conditions of the project CAPAZ implied an asymmetry, as Wolff called it (Wolff 2022). One of the principal,

underlying questions of this thesis is if this asymmetry has an impact on the structures and the work of the institute.

It was already outlined that the different types of participant research institutes have different resources, both financial and personnel, and that this aspect is influencing the intensity of collaboration of certain universities with CAPAZ. Imbalances do exist within the Instituto CAPAZ, especially regarding the access to financial and personnel resources.

In her response to the question about the relationship between German and Colombian universities within the Instituto CAPAZ, Angelika Rettberg commented the difficult balance act of this form of transnational collaboration:

An idea that suddenly in these relations of academic collaboration structures a little colonial are reproduced in a sense of who formulates theory and who formulates research questions. It's the countries from the north and here we are more replicators of already established knowledge. (Rettberg Beil 2022 translated from Spanish).^{3 4}

To what extent these differences in terms of resources have the potential to influence the power of respective institutions and by this to determine who is in control to decide on relevant issues within the cooperation will be elaborated in chapter 6.

4.3.6. THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLITICS

As will be shown, the Instituto CAPAZ implies several aspects of interference with political spheres in both countries that need to be reflected. I first came to notice this component during the interview with Stefan Peters and thus started to talk with the following participants about this topic.

³ Original quote of Rettberg: “Una idea de que pronto se reproducen en estas relaciones de colaboración académica estructuras un poco coloniales en el sentido de que quienes formulan teoría y formulan preguntas de investigación. Son los países del norte y aquí somos más replicadores de conocimiento ya establecido”

⁴ This possibly colonial aspect within the concept of the Instituto CAPAZ was one of my initial questions of interest regarding the institute. As this term wasn't mentioned by any other participant and as it is a difficult term, I didn't use it by myself. For the same reasons, I don't further elaborate its context and meaning in this thesis.

The participants of the interviews mentioned three components:

1) Political initiative and funding

The special aspect within the concept of the Instituto CAPAZ is the fact, that the academic research institute was initiated and is now mainly financed by German political actors. This implies a deeply political moment in the Instituto CAPAZ and the institute's scientific integrity and independence can be questioned.

According to Wolff, the German ministry of Foreign Affairs does see the Instituto CAPAZ as an instrument within the international relations with Colombia (Wolff 2022). Still, all participants who mentioned this aspect of political influence said that while they do recognize the origin of the CAPAZ, the actual influence of the ministry is quite small (Peters 2022; Rettberg Beil 2022; Cortés Moncayo 2022; Wolff 2022). It is also relevant to stress that the financial means do not directly come from the ministry but are distributed by the DAAD, the which is focused on strengthening academic rather than political exchange worldwide.

For Peters, it was also important to point out the freedom of science, as determined article 5 (3) of the German constitution (Bundesrepublik Deutschland), and which guarantees science to be untouched by governmental regulations.

Followingly, the foundation of the Instituto CAPAZ definitely is political, but does not interfere too much with the scientific work of the researchers.

2) Supporting the Colombian peace process

As Peters stated during his interview, when talking about peace in Colombia, there always is a political component (Peters 2022). Other participants expressed similarly that peace is a political matter and so is investigating it from a scientific perspective (Rettberg Beil 2022; Cortés Moncayo 2022). It has also to be stressed that the Instituto CAPAZ does not only investigate a peace process, but by that actively supports the implementation of the peace accords of 2016, even though there would have been other approaches and even though some aspects of the agreement, like the JEP, are deeply contested in the Colombian society (Botero 2020:300ff.).

It was important for Peters to point out the diversity of opinions, also regarding the Colombian peace process, within the institute and followingly that there is no unified opinion of the Instituto CAPAZ (Peters 2022).

Camilo Borrero sees a certain advantage in the position of the Instituto CAPAZ and stressed the fact that CAPAZ was created simultaneously to the peace accords and therefore did not have a political reputation of belonging to the right or the left, as did universities or other institutions, prior to starting to work (Borrero García 2022)

This political component of supporting the implementation of the peace agreement of 2016 is crucial in the founding of the Instituto CAPAZ and influences its work, as will be pointed out in the next step.

3) Research projects and publications with political topics

The Instituto CAPAZ realises projects on several aspects of the Colombian peace process. Followingly, the topic of the actual work of CAPAZ is political because of its content.

This applies also to the institute's publications. Especially the series "Policy Briefs" entails an examination and discussion of topics regarding the peace process and its implementation.

Wolff also stressed that the CAPAZ would rather not fund and realise projects that oppose in any kind the peace process and is rather focused on contributing to the reintegration of ex-combatants and to supporting the JEP and the Comisión de la Verdad (Wolff 2022).

4.4. PROSPECT: HOW CAN THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ GO ON AFTER 2027?

The Instituto CAPAZ receives funding by the DAAD respectively the German ministry of foreign affairs until the year 2027. As Peters pointed out, the institute is not only financed by these financial means, but also builds on money contributed by other institutions, like further German ministries.

As Carlos Nupia points out, it would be possible to keep the Instituto CAPAZ going after 2027, but that it would become a bureaucratic effort to ensure further funding. Apart from that, he stressed that many of the current participants would be interested in pursuing this project (Nupia 2022).

Aside from that, the future of the Instituto CAPAZ depends on the political circumstances in both Germany and Colombia. In Germany, the political support is necessary to ensure

further financial means. But also the political circumstances in Colombia influence the work of the institute. While Juan Manuel Santos was in power, the Colombian government was very approving towards the country's academic sphere and also towards the Instituto CAPAZ as form of international collaboration. This attitude changed with Ivan Duque taking office in 2018 (Borrero García 2022), as he was a critic of the peace process as signed in 2016 and therefore, he didn't support initiatives to contribute to implementing the accords as his predecessor did. Therefore, the possible future of the institute is also influenced by the future political situation in Colombia.

5. OVERVIEW OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND COLOMBIA

As implied in the introduction to this paper, one of the guiding questions is how the Instituto CAPAZ fits into the historical and currently existing relations between Germany and Colombia.

Thus, the first step to contextualise the Instituto CAPAZ is embedding it in past and current relations between Germany and Colombia. These include governmental and civilian relations and can be categorised in political, economic, and scientific relations.

Historically, there were no strong ties between the two countries. German colonial interests were rather focused on the African continent and Colombia was colonised by the Spanish crown.

Still, German presence in what is Colombia today started in the 16th century with representatives of the Welser company, a German merchant family (Birle 2017:299). In 1528, the Spanish kingdom vested the brothers Bartholomäus and Anton Welser the governorship of the province Venezuela (Ferber 2016). Followingly, in the period between 1529 and 1546, representatives of the Welser company aimed at discovering the surrounding areas, including the Guajira, the valley of the Río Magdalena, and the Cordillera Oriental, all of which are located in today's Colombia (Birle 2017:299).

From this first contact on, relations between the two countries emerged.

5.1. POLITICAL

Already in 1892, the Colombian Republic and the German Empire signed a friendship agreement, including for example free movement, access to juridical bodies and free trade between the two states (Roballo Lozano 2012:11).

Bilateral relations between the two countries went well until the rise of the national socialist party in Germany. Even though historians are unsure about the actual nature of relations between Germany and Colombia the 1930s, official relations worsened and broke with the continuance of World War II. Still, in the 1970s, cooperations between both countries re-emerged and improved since then (Roballo Lozano 2012:13f.).

Within these strengthened cooperations, organisations like the “Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – GIZ” (Corporation for International Cooperation) and the German political foundations are of special relevance and will be further elaborated in chapter 5.3. Of special political relevance were those organisations’ contributions to the discourses surrounding the signing of Colombia’s 1991 constitution (Roballo Lozano 2012:16f.)

In 2008, the then German chancellor Angela Merkel was the first (modern) German political representative to visit Colombia. She met with the then Colombian president Álvaro Uribe to talk about support in the fight against violence and drug trade. After that, political relations between Colombia and Germany began to intensify in 2010 (Birle 2017:300f).

After a visit of Juan Manuel Santos in Germany and one of then head of German state, Joachim Gauck, in Colombia, the next big step in international relations between the two countries happened in 2015 with first the already mentioned voyage of Frank-Walter Steinmeier to Colombia and the following nomination of Tom Koenigs as special representative of the foreign ministry to the Colombian peace process.

Germany officially supports the Colombian peace process (Auswärtiges Amt 2016) and is also explicitly named in the final peace agreement:

The German Government shall also be asked to form part of the accompanying countries that will support the issues referred to in Chapter 5, in regard to the subjects of Victims and Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP). (Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2017:229)

Chapter five of the final peace agreement is dedicated to the victims of Colombia’s armed conflict and entails the formation of the country’s “Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparations and non-Recurrence” (Presidencia de la República de Colombia 2017:132f.).

Since then, Germany has invested around 515 Mio. € to directly support the implementation of the peace process (Göring-Eckardt and Hofreiter 2020). Borrero also stressed the positive acknowledgement of the nomination of a special representative for the Colombian peace process (Borrero García 2022).

In 2018, Germany and Colombia decided on an “alliance for peace and sustainable development” (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2022) which implied an increase in financial support, namely another 535 million Euro.

Political relations between the two countries thus intensified within the last twelve years. The main aspect of political collaboration is concentrated on the Colombian peace process, the which Germany strongly supports with both financial means and advice.

5.2. ECONOMIC

Economic relations between Germany and Colombia are quite strong, as Germany is Colombia's fifth-biggest trade partner, the biggest within the European Union.

Trade between the two countries followingly plays an important role in the bilateral relations. Colombia is mainly exporting coal, agricultural products and oil to Germany.

In the 19th century, on June third, 1854, the German hanseatic cities Lübeck, Bremen and Hamburg signed on a trade and friendship agreement with Nueva Granada. This treaty institutionalised the relations between former Colombia and parts of former Germany (Roballo Lozano 2012:10).

In 2013, the Colombia and the EU decided on a free trade agreement lowering custom duties and smoothen the path for further increase in trade (Birle 2017:304).

Tom Koenigs led me to a case of strange economic German - Colombian interaction in the 1980s. The German private secret agent Werner Mauss and his wife Ida were asked by the German company Mannesmann AG to negotiate with the ELN. Mannesmann, one of the biggest German corporations back then, wanted to build a 250km long pipeline in Colombia, crossing ELN controlled territory.

Therefore, the company hired Werner Mauss to negotiate with the guerrilla group, the which was sabotaging the project with explosions and kidnappings. Werner Mauss had a budget at his disposal, provided by the Mannesmann AG and invested this money in building kindergartens and hospitals. To Christmas in 1984, Mauss distributed smaller presents for casual citizens and additional gifts of overall two million dollars were given to local priests and mayors. As most of those were part of the ELN, the Mannesmann AG and the German private agents Mauss financially supported the growth of the ELN (Lamby 1998). According to Tom Koenigs, the guerrilla group appreciates this move until today (Koenigs 2022).

As the story about Werner Mauss and the Mannesmann AG on the one hand and the reports of human rights violations in Colombian coal production on the other hand show, economic interests cannot be easily separated from political ones.

5.3. SCIENTIFIC

Scientific relations between Germany and Colombia started with the brothers Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt in the 19th century. Their model of international science set the starting point for cooperation in science, research and education (Birle 2017:308).

In the 1970s, German political institutions, as the GIZ, the Goethe institute, and the political foundations, started to settle in Colombia. Even though their work is not necessarily scientific in a narrow sense, they established institutional ties in Colombia that supported later efforts of academic cooperation. These institutions also realise research in Colombia and contribute to social and political discourses in the country. As such, publications like “Violent conflict and environmental degradation in Catatumbo” and “Implementation of the peace agreement turned out lethal for social leadership” (FESCOL 2023), and projects as “Dealing with the past to consolidate peace in Colombia” and “Identification, demarcation as protected area and integrated management from coastal zones affected by climate change” (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH 2023) are realised.

Nevertheless, until the late 2000s, academic cooperation between Germany and Colombia mainly built on individual contacts and there hardly existed institutionalised cooperations (Birle 2017:308).

Apart from institutionalised cooperations between certain universities, for example between the Freie Universität Berlin and the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá (Freie Universität Berlin 2023), separately founded research institutions exist building on cooperations between several Colombian and German scientific institutes.

Similar to CAPAZ is CEMARIN, the Center of Excellence in Marine Sciences, which is also financed by the DAAD. CEMARIN’s consortium includes the University of Gießen, five Colombian universities and several independent research institutes. It was founded in 2010 realises investigations on environmental topics in Colombia (DAAD 2022).

According to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, scientific relations between Germany and Colombia are close, marked by more than 260 official academic partnerships (Auswärtiges Amt 2022).

5.4. SYNTHESIS – EMBEDDING THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ IN THIS CONTEXT

As could be shown, Colombia and Germany do not have a long history of close international relations. Even though trade had been a relevant aspect for centuries, the ties between the two countries intensified around the year 2015 with the German political support for the Colombian peace process.

The German political and financial support for the realisation of the Colombian peace process goes beyond the Instituto CAPAZ and Tom Koenig's further proposals. Still, I would consider Steinmeier's visit of Colombia in 2015 a decisive moment in the German-Colombian cooperation.

In my reading, the Instituto CAPAZ probably is the most visible element of this binational cooperation.

6. CONCEPTUALISING THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ

Based on the analysis of the Instituto CAPAZ in its diverse facets and of the context of international relations between Germany and Colombia, in which the institute is embedded, I identify four aspects that deserve further theoretical conceptualisation in order to provide a full picture of the Instituto CAPAZ. As outlined in the second chapter, the selection of these concepts is fully based on the revision of interview material gained for this thesis and is thus obviously dependent on my interpretation of the responses of participant stakeholders.

As the following figure depicts and as the further elaborations will show, the four aspects build on each other and jointly support a deep understanding of the Instituto CAPAZ.




Figure 4: Conceptualising the Instituto CAPAZ

In the first line, the Instituto CAPAZ is a measure of the German ministry of foreign affairs getting involved in the internal affairs of Colombia by aiming at supporting the country's peace process. This aspect will be further elaborated on in chapter 6.1.

Secondly, the responsible stakeholders within the German government probably have an intention to fund the institute which, as I suggest, fits into a broader political program

of German foreign policy. I thus embed the funding of the Instituto CAPAZ in this context in chapter 6.2.

Thirdly, I approach the Instituto CAPAZ along the lines of inter- and transnational collaboration, as the binational relation in the CAPAZ is a crucial item that was often mentioned by participant researchers. In chapter 6.3. I followingly highlight this aspect of the institute.

Ultimately, because of its various facets highlighted in the empirical study, the Instituto CAPAZ is a unique form of transnational academic collaboration that enhances an interference between the academic and the political. Chapter 6.4. consequently focuses on looking at this combination of academic and political spheres.

All the introduced aspects that will be further elaborated in the following sections aim to enhance a broad understanding of how the Instituto CAPAZ fits into relevant discourses and political programs surrounding it. I therefore do not try to depict and explain the used concepts in their full dimensions, but rather to introduce the respective core ideas that support an understanding of the dimensions of the Instituto CAPAZ instead.

6.1. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The Instituto CAPAZ is a concrete measure of the German government to support the Colombian peace process and by this to actively engage for a specific political matter in another country. Even though this is an intervention on a different level than for example military engagement in another country, it remains a non-military action in another country that will be reflected on in this section.

I start the conceptualisation on a quite abstract level, with the principle of the sovereignty of states. This central legislation that no state is to threaten the sovereignty of another state is only legally limited by the responsibility to protect. Apart from these two core rules in international law, states have found a way to pursue their interests in other states without directly hurting their sovereignty even without the given conditions of the responsibility to protect. The term *soft power* was elaborated by Joseph Nye to describe a phenomenon of states convincing others to enforce its interests by attraction instead of force.

While the principle of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect are determined in international treaties, the concept of soft power is an academic reflection of international practice.

I chose to start with the abstract explanations on sovereignty and the responsibility to protect to line out the general lines of international involvement. I do not argue that the Instituto CAPAZ is hurting the sovereignty of Colombia nor that the institute is a case of R2P action. Still, I do argue that the Instituto CAPAZ is a form of international involvement and I thus consider it important to start the conceptualisation with the basic principles of it.

These elaborations do not have a direct connection to the establishment of the Instituto CAPAZ. Nevertheless, I consider it important to reflect on basic debates on international involvement before entering the specific contextualization of the institute. Germany's foreign policy approaches, that will be analysed in the next chapter, fit into the basic line of soft power, which made it relevant to introduce the concept.

6.1.1. SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES

Sovereignty is the basic principle of modern statehood (Hickey 2020:1). The Thirty Years War from 1618 to 1648 sealed the end of the Holy Roman Empire. As the Empire had been the overreaching system containing various smaller estates, a new state order in central Europe was required. The Westphalian peace agreements of 1648, signed in Münster and Osnabrück, ruled the independence of each state, even though the term state was still not comparable to modern nation states (Hickey 2020:1f.) The peace accords stated that the sovereign monarch of each state had the highest power within its borders and that there was no external instance above it:

Sovereign is the one who can prescribe the law to all subjects, decide on war and peace, appoint the officials and magistrates in the country, levy taxes, exempt whom he pleases and pardon those sentenced to death. (Voigt 2016:9translated from German)

With the ideological transformations caused by the French Revolution in the late 18th century, the state sovereignty moved from monarchs to the people. This affirmed the sovereign independence of nation states which have the full right to exercise power within its borders and which are not to be ruled over by external instances.

After the World Wars of the 20th century, the world community saw the need to create and establish a system with a shared set of norms to guarantee that the horrors of the first half of the century would not be repeated. Based on this idea, the United Nations were founded in 1948. Its charter was an attempt to establish supranational legislations valid for all participant states, appended by the International Court of Justice.

Because of the sovereignty of each state, no other state is to get involved in the matters of another state, as all power exercised in one country has to come from its legitimated ruler. Following this principle, article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter states:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. (United Nations:Art. 2(4))

Even though this article rather refers to military intervention, it makes clear the principle of international coexistence: no state is to threaten the territorial and political independence of another state.

The United Nations Charter goes on to define an exception to this principle: If a state is threatening the order of peace, and the Security Council decides so, measures can be undertaken to preserve peace in the international community.

This principle is clear. Still, there had been multiple interventions with and without the permission of the Security Council throughout the past decades. In some of these cases, the justification included that a state decided that a group of (civilian) people in another state needed support or protection and that it was therefore necessary to get involved in the matter. As this is a sensitive and complicated issue, further international regulation was required.

6.1.2. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)

The principle of sovereignty showed that no state should engage in another state's affairs in such a way that it hurts the sovereignty of the respective state. Still, there exists one exception from this rule: the responsibility to protect. In the present section, I introduce R2P in order to enrich the picture of norms regarding international involvement.

At the World Summit in 2005, the participant countries decided that every state had "the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and

crimes against humanity.” (United Nations General Assembly 2009:4). In the cited UN report, the question rises whether a state’s sovereignty, which is considered to be so important in for example the UN Charter, can be “misused as a shield behind which mass violence could be inflicted on populations with impunity?” (United Nations General Assembly 2009:5). It goes on to argue that the sovereignty of a state loses importance if the state does not fulfil its responsibility to protect.

The aim was consequently to establish a system of prevention that would not allow any state to hide behind its sovereignty while committing one or more of the crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity or war crimes. (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 2022).

This responsibility to protect (R2P) was therefore built on three pillars: The first stressing the responsibility of each state to protect its populations, the second elaborating the “commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting these obligations” (United Nations General Assembly 2009:9), and the third encouraging third-party states to take over the R2P if a certain state is not fulfilling it itself (United Nations General Assembly 2009:9–12).

Consequently, R2P takes the international community into responsibility to assist other states in protecting its populations from harm if this state is not able to completely fulfil it itself. It also stresses the importance to still commit to non-military measures to realise this assistance.

According to international treaties and international law, R2P is the only agreed, legitimate reason for a country to get involved in another country’s affairs.

6.1.3. SOFT POWER

Until here, I introduced generally acknowledged norms of international involvement, namely sovereignty of states and R2P. The concept of soft power that I focus on in this chapter, is not a legal but an academic element. I present it as a possibility for international action without necessarily hurting legal norms.

In light of the end of the Cold War, Harvard professor Joseph Nye stated that power concepts in world politics had changed and were about to change even more in the upcoming new century. International power would no longer be restricted to states, but nonstate actors would become more relevant in the new order of world politics. Along

with that, Nye saw that power would no longer only depend on military strength, but that it would become more complex (Nye 1990:153ff.) and e.g. economic resources of large corporations would matter more.

These trends suggest a second, more attractive way of exercising power than traditional means. A state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces such effects.

The second aspect of power – which occurs when one country gets other countries to *want* what it wants – might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of *ordering* others to do what it wants. (Nye 1990:166)

Nye's concept of soft power thus states that it would no longer be necessary for an actor to force other actors to do what it wants, but that it would become more relevant to convince other actors of an ideology, and by this encouraging them to support it. The more legitimate the goals of an actor seem, the sooner other actors will agree to follow them (Nye 1990:167).

Followingly, soft power is the "ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own. This power tends to arise from such resources as cultural and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions of international regimes." (Nye 1990:168).

Nye’s initial elaborations on soft power were further debated by various authors. In his book “Soft Power. The forces of attraction in international relations”, Hendrik Ohnesorge channels the discussions and questions on Nye’s soft power concept and comes clear with some specifications (Ohnesorge 2020:1ff.).




Figure 5: A Taxonomy of Soft Power (Ohnesorge 2020:89)

Following his taxonomy of soft power (Figure 2), Ohnesorge structures soft power in four subunits (Ohnesorge 2020:89). Subunits one and two mark the actions of an Actor A, whereas the subunits three and four concentrate on the receiving Actor B. In short, Actor A has a set of resources, as culture, values and foreign policies, that form the basis for the instruments of public diplomacy and personal diplomacy. Actor B has three options to react to the execution of Actor A’s instruments: attraction, apathy, and repulsion. The outcome of these reactions in the case of attraction is compliance, in case of apathy it is neutrality and in the case of repulsion, the outcome of Actor B’s reception is opposition (Ohnesorge 2020:91f.).

The resources, as outlined by Ohnesorge, include rather broad terms as culture, values and foreign policies.

Nye argued that the “universalism of a country’s culture and its ability to establish a set of favorable rules and institutions that govern areas

of international activity are critical sources of power.” (Ohnesorge 2020:94 citing Nye, J. 1990. *Bound to Lead*. p. 33.)

The core concept is that a country's (Actor A) nature and related actions seem so favourable, that other countries (Actor B) are attracted by this and thus become more willing to adapt their own actions in accordance with the role model, Actor A. As Ohnesorge himself admits that the resource of personalities, that is visible in the figure, is deeply contested (Ohnesorge 2020:112f.), and as it is less relevant for this paper, I decided not to further elaborate it.

Within the introduced taxonomy of soft power, Actor A then has two options to further promote and use its resources. Public diplomacy includes measures as cultural and educational exchanges and international broadcasting, whereas personal diplomacy concentrates on state visits and speeches by important stakeholders. Both forms are seen as purposeful disseminations of the soft power resources indicated before (Ohnesorge 2020:88).

Actor B now has three options to react to Actor A's resources and its transferring: attraction, apathy, or repulsion. When discussing the conditions of success of soft power instruments, especially credibility is mentioned by diverse scholars (Ohnesorge 2020:174).

The three different possibilities of reception lead to an outcome of the whole process. Depending on the success of Actor A's action and thus on the reaction of Actor B, the whole process leads to either compliance, neutrality, or opposition. In case of compliance, Actor A has successfully transferred its soft power resources into the desired outcome. But it is important to point out that the communication of the resources can also lead to the opposite outcome and thus act like a boomerang for Actor A (Ohnesorge 2020:187).

Soft power is thus a means of pursuing certain goals in a less explicit way by concentrating on establishing attractive factors and by this trying to convince others to want what it wants instead of forcing others to do what it wants.

Still, for example Janice Mattern argues that when taking a closer look at how 'convincing others to do what someone wants' works, the actual coercive nature of soft power becomes obvious. As she writes, soft power works through the exercise of representational force, which entails that linguistic means are used to establish a certain narrative of reality. This narrative is then presented to the respective audience that the speaker wants to convince in such a way that only allows submission to the narrative

and any disagreement would inflict social harm. Followingly, Mattern disagrees with the distinction between hard and soft power based on the level of coerciveness and instead states that the actual distinction between the two forms of exercising power is the means of coerciveness: hard power threatens its opponent with physical violence, soft power with social coercion (Mattern 2005:585ff.).

This highly important differentiation makes clear that while the exercise of soft power may appear to be less coercive than military, hard power, it still lies in the actor's hands to scale the coerciveness of his action.

The principle of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect are core legislations in international law and, if brought down to one point, only allow engagement in other states if the preconditions of R2P are fulfilled. Nevertheless, states have found a way to pursue their interests in other states by soft power. This way, the sovereignty of the respective state is not necessarily hurt.

As stated under aspect 6.1., especially the sovereignty of states and R2P have no direct ties to the Instituto CAPAZ. Still, as is soft power, the institute is a form of international involvement apart from any direct military or political action. The use of soft power is a preferred method within German foreign politics, as the next chapter shows.

6.2. PERSPECTIVE ON CAPAZ OF GERMANY AS DONOR

The aim of this section is to conceptualise the perspective of the German government on the Instituto CAPAZ. As the ministry of foreign affairs spends a lot of money on the project, it is likely to assume that there must be an intention or purpose behind this decision. It was not possible to extract a clear idea of what this intention or purpose could look like on basis of the interviews. Instead, this chapter aims at localizing the Instituto CAPAZ within the strategies of German foreign politics.

I thus suggest that there must be a set of political programs that frame the Instituto CAPAZ and that followingly support an understanding of how the institute fits into German foreign policy in general.

Therefore, I follow the argumentation of Hanns Maull and Jonas Wolff and state that Germany can be characterised as firstly, a civilian power that prefers civilian over militant means in international relations and secondly, that the application of this concept has to be cut down a little by the statement that Germany also actively promotes democracy on

an international level which goes beyond the principles of a civilian power (Maull 2000; Wolff 2013).

As Wolff said in the interview, the German ministry of foreign affairs sees, to a certain degree, the Instituto CAPAZ as an instrument of international politics in Colombia (Wolff 2022). This chapter followingly focuses on principles of German foreign politics in order to contextualize the Instituto CAPAZ as a measure within that.

6.2.1. GERMANY AS A CIVILIAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTER?

After the Second World War, West German foreign policy settled into the mould of a 'civilian power', a particular foreign-policy identity which promoted multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration, and tried to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and international norms. (Maull 2000:56)

Around the year 2000, Hanns Maull elaborated the concept of civilian power regarding German foreign politics. He argued that because of Germany's past the nation was rather reluctant in pursuing military engagement and instead concentrated on "pacifism, democracy and respect for human right as core values in Germany's foreign policy concept" (Maull 2000:66).

Even though much in world politics has changed since the publication of Maull's articles defining Germany as a civilian power, the German core debates on how to act on the international level have hardly changed (Wolff 2013:477). Debates on foreign policy in Germany try to find a balance between pacifism and the aim to prevent horrors like genocides in other contexts:

In particular, the problem of how to respond to ethnic conflict and human rights violations in the Balkans, Somalia and Rwanda brought to the fore the tensions between two key lessons of Germany's past – "never again war" and "never again Auschwitz". (Gaskarth and Oppermann 2021:89)

Furthermore, the principle of German foreign policy is to promote democratic and liberal values in other countries. This is "understood as all those measures taken by an external actor that are explicitly 'aimed at establishing, strengthening, or defending democracy in

a given country” (Wolff 2013:2 citing D. Azpuru, S.E. Finkel, A. Pérez-Liñán and M.A. Seligson, ‘Trends in Democracy Assistance’.).

This promotion of democracy can be split into two approaches: a political and a developmental. The first implies a narrow definition of democracy, building on elections and political liberties. The latter rather encompasses a broader understanding including general values as justice, equality etc. According to Wolff, the developmental approach fits more into the concept of a civilian power as it clashes less with the principle of not meddling with another country’s affairs (Wolff 2013:479).

At this point, Wolff stresses that the actual concept of civilian power does not include efforts of democracy promotion as this is not about constraining the use of force. Contrarily, the promotion of democratization “clashes both with the respect for the norm of collective self-determination and sovereignty as well as with the aims to establish mutual trust and maintain international peace by cooperating with all real-existing states in an inclusive international order” (Wolff 2013:478).

Especially the German Foreign Office “prefers indirect measures, above all to avoid confrontation and the charge of interfering in other states’ internal affairs.” (Wolff 2013:481). These indirect measures include diplomatic promotion of for example Human Rights, Climate protection, and crisis prevention and stabilisation, based on perceived core values of German political identity.

Irene Eidemüller from the German ministry of foreign affairs stated that the Instituto CAPAZ was “a beacon of German engagement in the [Colombian] peace process and has established itself as a relevant think tank for [Colombian] politics” (Eidemüller 2022 translated from German). Via the institute, Germany is contributing to reconciliation, strengthening the rule of law, conflict prevention and peacebuilding (Eidemüller 2022)..

Nevertheless, I argue that its foundation cannot be described as an indirect measure that generally promotes liberal values. As mentioned various times before, the institute is a very concrete item of strengthening and supporting a contested political process in Colombia. I thus state that by funding the Instituto CAPAZ, the German state does actively meddle with the internal affairs of another state.

With the establishment and funding of the Instituto CAPAZ, Germany therefore does promote values and concepts according to its previously defined nature, but the manner clearly is more direct than suggested by Maull and Wolff.

Summing up the basic principles outlined until here, I state that while Germany mostly can be characterized as a civilian power that constrains from the use of force in its international relations, this concept is not sufficient to define Germany's foreign politics approach. Rather, it is limited by actions in the mark of democracy promotion as it promotes liberal and democratic values in other countries. Generally, this happens without pursuing a narrow concept of democracy, but by rather making general ideas as equality, justice, and liberty attractive in several contexts. Therefore, the preferred approach to achieve these goals is the application of soft power.

6.2.2. FOREIGN CULTURE AND EDUCATION POLITICS PROGRAM

One instrument of the application of soft power in German foreign politics is the foreign culture and education politics program ("Auswärtige Kultur- und Bildungspolitik"), the third pillar of German foreign politics, next to security and economic politics. Its aim is to enable access to culture and education across political, social and geographic borders and by this to contribute to the prevention of conflicts (Auswärtiges Amt 2021).

The foreign culture and education politics program (AKBP) is a manner to promote Germany abroad and to realise political interests. It is therefore an instrument of soft power and of public diplomacy as outlined in chapter 6.1.3. (Lettau and Kaitinnis 2022:2ff.).

Based on AKBP, several projects and institutes with an international scope in Germany receive funding. Especially the German political foundations, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung represent German engagement in other countries. Also institutions like the Goethe-Institut, which fosters cultural exchange, form part of Germany's international engagement. The funding of the Instituto CAPAZ is another project within this policy program. All the mentioned institutes receive public funding, but other than the Instituto CAPAZ, these institutes engage in various countries worldwide and do not just concentrate on one issue in one country.

At this point, we enter the arena of balancing the contrasting principles presented until here. On the one hand, we have the sovereignty of states which forbids actions from the outside aimed at meddling with one's internal affairs. This goes along with the concept

of civilian power that avoids conflict with other states and stays on the level of general international diplomacy. This can be summarized with the already cited first key lesson of Germany's past "never again war" as introduced by Gaskarth and Oppermann (Gaskarth and Oppermann 2021:89).

On the other hand, we have the principle of R2P, which allows involvement in specific cases and the aim of actively promoting democracy in other countries, e.g., via the application of soft power. Again, I do not state that the Instituto CAPAZ is action alongside the R2P principle. Nevertheless, as R2P actually is the only legitimate reason to get involved in another country's affairs, I consider it important to first understand R2P and the principle of sovereignty before analysing German foreign politics programs aiming at promoting democracy in other countries.

6.3. CHALLENGES AND PARADIGMS IN INTER- AND TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION

At first glance, the Instituto CAPAZ is a form of international cooperation and when taking a closer look, it becomes visible that the institute is a specialized type of it, namely transnational academic cooperation. This present chapter thus aims to focus on one specific form of soft power, partnerships with or between non-governmental institutions, may it be classical NGOs or academic institutes. Development cooperation seems to be an often-occurring phenomenon with many faces and facets. In the following, I therefore first approach the topic of development cooperation in general before I concentrate on the specific case of transnational academic cooperation.

As outlined before, the Instituto CAPAZ is part of Germany's foreign culture and education politics program and thus does not have the label Development Cooperation. Still, I argue that the term development cooperation is used in a very broad sense and does actually entail nearly all forms of cooperation in which a donor (governmental or non-governmental) gives money to another actor with the intention to improve a kind of situation in the surrounding of the recipient.

In this sense, I state that the Instituto CAPAZ can be seen as engagement in development cooperation in a broader sense.

6.3.1. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many perceived a relation between international security and development of poorer countries, which was especially intensified by the terror attacks of September 11 in 2001. With the adoption of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the focus of international development engagement shifted towards the reduction of poverty and the promotion of so-called 'good governance' (Mawdsley, Savage, and Kim 2014:27f.). As the further elaborations demonstrate, this goal was and is not as unproblematic as it seems at first sight.

While analysing approaches of both development and postcolonial studies, Cheryl McEwan states that the MDGs are one example of the 'western' or 'northern'⁵ domination over the rest of the world. Many institutions engaging in inter- or supranational development follow a basic "will to improve" and "have all sought development interventions that are shaped by this will to improve" (McEwan 2019:211f.). This statement fits into her general argumentation that big players in international development are more powerful than actors in the recipient countries. She names two reasons for that: firstly, actors in the donor countries have access to more material resources and second, the basis for power is knowledge (Obamba and Mwema 2009:362; McEwan 2019:208ff.). Because of this power imbalance, the more powerful donor states are able to follow their will to improve without respecting the specific interests of the recipient states.

This power becomes visible in the various kinds of existing development partnerships around the world. As Barnett and Zürcher analyse for the specific case of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict settings, the external actors always act within the existing structures in the recipient state and therefore hardly have the potential to change them. Instead, external peacebuilders risk reinforcing existing, problematic conditions (Barnett and Zürcher 2009:27ff.). I argue that while Barnett and Zürcher analyse peacebuilding efforts that collaborate with national and subnational local elites, the processes are similar in the case of other programs in so-called development cooperation. Furthermore, I argue that international development programs also have the potential to not only

⁵ These terms refer to the popularly used concepts of a) continuing to use the term 'west' as in times of the Cold War describing the conflicting parties and their spheres of influence and b) the distinction between the labels 'Global North' and 'Global South' that I consider problematic and indifferent, based on the argument on the exercise of power by the usage of dichotomies describing cultures also used by McEwan (2019:151ff.).

reproduce structures within the recipient state, but also the relation between the two (or more) states involved. By this, power asymmetries between participating states can be reinforced on a broader level.

This is also what Obamba and Mwema observed in the case of partnerships between 'northern' and African countries:

As has been widely documented in the literature, the distribution of tasks and responsibilities between northern and African partners clearly manifest the hidden reproduction of colonial domination, structural power asymmetries and material inequalities. (Obamba and Mwema 2009:362)

Thus, donors do often have the intention to improve conditions in the respective recipient country but simultaneously risk reinforcing asymmetries and dependencies. It has to be recognised that normally in development cooperation there is a certain asymmetry inherent in the basic structure: the richer donor agency aiming to help a poorer country by providing aid packages, which are created by the donor and that address issues prioritized by the donor. This asymmetric structure entails that the donor can exercise control over all aspects of management and finance (Obamba and Mwema 2009:358f.).

In case of the Instituto CAPAZ, the basic preconditions are similar: Germany has more financial resources than Colombia, the initiative to create the institute came from a will of German politicians to improve the situation in Colombia and the University of Gießen has the responsibility for the financial means provided by the German government.

Nevertheless, all the researchers I interviewed for this thesis mentioned that within the CAPAZ, asymmetries were hardly noticed. Rather, it is the case that while the external conditions all fit into the outlined pattern of a reproduction of existing asymmetries, the relevant persons involved in realising the institute rather established a way of cooperation for mutual benefit.

The Instituto CAPAZ is a special form of cooperation, as it actually is not between states but between universities and research institutions from two countries that is only funded by one of the participant states. The following section thus elaborates the unique aspects of transnational scientific cooperation.

6.3.2. TRANSNATIONAL ACADEMIC COOPERATION

Academic investigation is about producing and disseminating knowledge. Therefore, it is relevant to acknowledge that especially in the social sciences there is no objective truth. Instead, Adler-Nissen and Kropp define four basic principles when analysing knowledge production: 1) the principle of symmetry 2) the principle of situatedness 3) rejection of internal/ external divide and 4) principle of contextualism. Among these four principles, the first two are of special relevance for this thesis.

The principle of symmetry states that all approaches to gain knowledge should be regarded as equal and that there is no one and only right approach. Followingly, Adler-Nissen and Kropp argue that objective facts do not exist, but that facts are rather a belief that can be explained by social conditions (Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015:160).

In addition to that, the principle of situatedness says that “scientific knowledge is often shaped by local conditions in which it is practised and institutionalised” (Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015:163).

I thus conclude that academic investigation does not lead to objective facts but that this produced knowledge has to be seen in the specific local and social preconditions. Especially in case of academic partnerships it is therefore important to analyse these local and social preconditions. Academic investigation builds on existing knowledge and again produces knowledge on this basis.

Most production of knowledge on development takes place in the countries that realise the respective programs. Consequently, researchers from these countries conduct investigation about the recipient countries which become the subject of knowledge. When I asked Angelika Rettberg about the role of German researchers in the Instituto CAPAZ her answer included:

An idea that suddenly in these relations of academic collaboration structures a little colonial are reproduced in a sense of who formulates theory and who formulates research questions. It's the countries from the north and here we are more replicators of already established knowledge. (Rettberg Beil 2022 translated from Spanish)⁶

⁶ Original quote of Angélica Rettberg: “Una idea de que pronto se reproducen en estas relaciones de colaboración académica estructuras un poco coloniales en el sentido de que quienes formulan teoría y formulan preguntas de investigación. Son los países del norte y aquí somos más replicadores de conocimiento ya establecido”

Her statement is similar to what I elaborated before: in many cases of academic collaboration, research questions are built in the 'north' and 'the others' rather become replicators of already established knowledge, even if it is about 'the others'.

In these cases, researchers thus build on knowledge gained in their respective academic institutions in their respective countries and with this basis conduct investigation about other countries. The produced knowledge about the subject country is therefore rather influenced by the preconditions of the researcher than by existing knowledge in the subject country. Followingly, this type of research does not respect the principle of symmetry. Instead, it enhances the connection between knowledge and power that is caused by the discourse which mostly takes place in the 'northern' countries as outlined so far (Schwachula 2021:61).

Anna Schwachula therefore calls for a general transformation in academic development cooperation. She states that because of the outlined differences and inequalities between research partners from the 'global north' and the 'global south', there should be a shift towards the paradigm that change is necessary in all countries, not just 'southern'.

If all nations are perceived as 'developing countries' in certain aspects of social, economic, or ecological sustainable development, previous cooperation patterns which often include North-South knowledge hierarchies, have to be reassessed, and additional types of cooperation for global sustainable development should be examined. (Schwachula 2021:59)

Despite the difficulties that were outlined before, transnational academic partnerships can foster mutual knowledge exchange that may lead to an improvement in academic practice for all participants.

International partnership spanning various organizational and geographical boundaries has emerged as the dominant paradigm for organizing modern scientific research; and for undertaking international development policy [...]. Research partnership can promote knowledge production and sharing; stimulate the pooling of financial and high level human resources across boundaries; and create synergies and competencies among the diverse participants for mutual benefit. (Obamba and Mwema 2009:349).

In case of the Instituto CAPAZ, both facets are present.

Jonas Wolff explained that, as outlined before, because of the structure of CAPAZ and the preconditions of German and Colombian researchers, there exist asymmetries that were attempted to overcome in the process of establishing the Instituto CAPAZ. These

asymmetries evolved from CAPAZ being a German political initiative with German funding operating in Colombia. In realisation of the institute, the Colombian participant researchers are nevertheless more proactive in proposing research topics that should be approached. (Wolff 2022).

Still, all interviewed researchers involved at CAPAZ value the platform of exchange the institute offers. Often mentioned as explanation for the relatively unproblematic structures in the realisation of CAPAZ is the uncomplicated attitude of the director, Stefan Peters, as well as the impression that actually Colombian partners are more active in proposing and realising research projects. Two further aspects I consider relevant at this point is firstly, that publications of the CAPAZ are in Spanish, as well as communication within the institute is. Secondly, research mostly takes place in Colombia and also receives a lot of attention in the country. This becomes visible with the institute's cooperation with the Colombian newspaper *El Espectador* as outlined above. This way, the gained knowledge is made accessible to a broader public.

Consequently, while the Instituto CAPAZ has difficult preconditions regarding the political context, the participant researchers manage to realise its investigations to joint production of knowledge and by this is less reproducing the problematic preconditions.

6.4. INTERFERENCE OF POLITICAL AND ACADEMIC SPHERE

I distinguish this section from the previous ones of this sixth chapter. The previous sections contextualised the Instituto CAPAZ alongside existing theoretical elaborations. This present section instead presents an own conceptual thesis that is derived from the previous statements.

As became visible in the previous chapters, it is of crucial importance to consider the donor of a project and its respective interests it pursues with it.




Figure 6: Interference of political and academic sphere

The Instituto CAPAZ was initiated and is financed by the German state, which placed the institute in its foreign culture and education politics program. With this project, Germany aims to support the ongoing peace process in Colombia by fostering academic cooperation between German and Colombian researchers. I followingly argue that the birth moment of the Instituto CAPAZ is a political one.

Obviously, the research object of the institute – the Colombian peace process – is of political nature, too. I highlight, that CAPAZ is about supporting not any peace movement in Colombia, but about the specific peace agreement of 2016 that is heavily contested within the local society, as outlined in chapter three. I therefore argue that this is a concrete meddling of the German state with the internal affairs of Colombia.

It then again is no direct channel as the Instituto CAPAZ is no governmental organisation and instead, while of course being dependent on financial means, is able to act freely under the umbrella of the constitutional freedom of sciences. Still, it has to be noted that this freedom only applies within the frame of supporting the peace process, which again entails a political moment in the research defined by the political donor.

The constitutionally guaranteed principle of the freedom of science is thus surrounded by the two political instances of the political donor and the political subject of research.

I thus frame the Instituto CAPAZ as a project that started as a political initiative, that nevertheless is a scientific research institute, and again focuses on political subjects in Colombia. Followingly, it is a political measure of the German state that pursues a political goal in Colombia, but that passes a scientific elaboration.

6.5. SYNTHESIS – CONCEPTUALISING THE INSTITUTO CAPAZ

As I stated before, I could identify four relevant approaches to conceptualise the Instituto CAPAZ. In coherence with my methodological approach within this thesis I found these approaches in the results of the empirical study that I conducted.

In the first line, I argue that the Instituto CAPAZ is a form of international involvement of Germany in another country, Colombia. I introduced the principle of sovereignty based on its legal basis in the UN Charter and the principle of R2P as the only legitimate reason to intervene in another country despite its sovereignty. Still, states have found a way to get involved in other countries' affairs by applying soft power and by this to realise own interests by convincing others to follow the own ideas.

These principles are located on a rather abstract level and have no direct connection to the Instituto CAPAZ. Nevertheless, the institute is a cooperation between two countries and followingly it is important to take a look on the general preconditions before entering the specific analysis of the Instituto CAPAZ.

In the next step, I localised the Instituto CAPAZ within German foreign politics, as the institute receives the majority of its funding from the foreign culture and education politics program. Even though Germany is famously characterised as a civilian power that actually does not actively meddle with the internal affairs of another country, it also shows characteristics of a democracy promoting state that fosters a developmental democracy approach in other countries. The Instituto CAPAZ can be seen as one example of this political program.

As already stated, the Instituto CAPAZ is a cooperation between universities and one research institute from both Germany and Colombia and is mainly financed by the German state. My conceptualisation highlighted the difficult dynamics that often characterise inter- and transnational cooperations. When analysing the preconditions of the Instituto CAPAZ, it became visible that there exist inequalities in terms of financial and personnel resources between German and Colombian actors. As the literature showed, asymmetries are likely to be strengthened in many cases of international cooperation. In the special situation of transnational academic cooperation, an additional aspect is the asymmetry often existing in producing and disseminating academic knowledge. From its preconditions, the Instituto CAPAZ fits perfectly into the patterns of

cooperation as outlined in the literature. Still, according to the answers given in the interviews, the Instituto CAPAZ managed to establish a cooperation that fosters an equal way of collaboration.

The fourth approach to conceptualise the Instituto CAPAZ is the result of the previous aspects. The decision to create the Instituto CAPAZ was a political one. Still, the institute is academic and, due to the freedom of science, can act independently. Then again, the predestined goal of the institute is political, namely, to support a contested political process in Colombia. As stated in the previous section, the Instituto CAPAZ consequently is a political initiative that pursues a political that passes an academic instance. At this point, the institute again can be seen as international involvement of Germany in Colombia, as analysed in chapter 6.1.

All the four concepts with their respective sub-points stress different facets of the Instituto CAPAZ and are important to understand the complex context that surrounds the institute. I claim that, as becomes visible in figure 6, the used concepts can be arranged in a circle, meaning that the contemplation of the interference of the political and academic sphere at the Instituto CAPAZ leads to a return of the question of international involvement in the case of CAPAZ.

Consequently, I consider it difficult to define the Instituto CAPAZ over only one of the explored theoretical concepts, as the picture of the institute is a very complex one with many different facets. Nevertheless, to bring the theoretical conceptualisation of the institute down to one point, I state that the Instituto CAPAZ is an academic actor with a political purpose.

7. FURTHER RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As indicated in the introduction, this thesis only is the starting point of analysing and conceptualising the Instituto CAPAZ. Because of its unique composition and its position in current discourses, I state that further research on the institute will be useful to intensify the understanding of all dynamics that exist in and around the Instituto CAPAZ.

I suggest further investigation on the following questions:

- 1) Does the Instituto CAPAZ successfully fulfil its task to support the implementation of the Colombian peace accords? My present research showed that the institute tries to realise this objective by, for example, scientifically accompanying the JEP, by contributing to informing the civil society about various facets of the conflict and the peace process and via other approaches. But this thesis did not aim to evaluate the work of the institute, which would be my first suggestion for further research to be realised. Furthermore, the question remains if the projects realised by the Instituto CAPAZ really have the potential to contribute to the peace process in Colombia.
- 2) The questions raised at the beginning of this thesis partly remain open. Based on the conducted interviews, it was not possible to extract an answer to the question of the interest the German government has to support this specific institute. A first approach to this was made in the chapters 6.1.3. and 6.2., but I consider it relevant to seek further analysis on that matter.
- 3) As chapter 4.3. showed, also in the Instituto CAPAZ dynamics of inequalities in terms of power and resources are present. As chapter 6 demonstrated, the institute nevertheless manages to balance them in a better way than the examples used in the literature. Also, this topic still deserves further attention and future research initiatives should concentrate on these dynamics more intensely and explore, how the post-colonial discourses that Angélica Rettberg named surround the institute.
- 4) Chapter 6.4. pointed out the interferences between the academic and political spheres present at the Instituto CAPAZ. Therefore, it will be interesting to analyse the Instituto CAPAZ in light of changing political circumstances in both Colombia and Germany. This will be a relevant investigation after maybe 2027.

8. CONCLUSION

The present thesis is the first scientific piece concentrating on the Instituto CAPAZ. My goal was therefore to first present the most important aspects of the institute based on interviews with participant researchers. In the second step, I embedded the institute in the historical and current binational relations between Colombia and Germany. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of the Instituto CAPAZ, the third analytical step was to apply theoretical concepts on the case in order to approach the Instituto CAPAZ within relevant discourses.

All of the touched topics deserve further attention and a more intense application on the Instituto CAPAZ, and I thus suggest that future investigation should build on my research in order to address new questions arising from this thesis, as focused on in chapter 7.

“¿El CAPAZ va a deshacer las desigualdades? No. Pero ayuda a transformar la lógica de la cooperación académica.” (Rojas Martínez 2022). With this quote of Axel Rojas, I want to stress my conclusion that the Instituto CAPAZ is a very complex matter of investigation because of its multi-layered contexts that interfere with each other.

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ANNEX

List of publications and courses facilitated by the Instituto CAPAZ (in Spanish)

Documentos de trabajo

- 1-2022: „Entre el desplazamiento forzado y el retorno: el andar embera katío en un continuum de violencias“
Diana Giselle Rivera Murillo
- 5-2021: „Marx, Mao y Marulanda: sobre la historia de las ideas políticas en las FARC“
David Graaff
- 4-2021: „¿Considera que su servicio militar fue voluntario y heroico?“
Andrés M.F. González-Saiz
- 3-2021: „Dinámicas del asilo de personas colombianas en Alemania“
Nora-Christine Braun
- 1-2021: „La Construcción de la Paz Ambiental“
Tobias Ide
- 4-2020: „La justicia restaurativa en la justicia transicional: una reflexión general para el caso colombiano“
Camila de Gambia Tapias
- 3-2020: „Memorias locales y configuración de narraciones conmemorativas. Un caso de estudio en la Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta, Colombia“
Gabriel Ruiz Romero
- 2-2020: „Minería, violencia y riesgo social“
Dorothea Hamilton, Mary Cris Cusi Palomino, Anamaría Ruiz
- 1-2020: „Logros, desafíos y lecciones del proceso de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y el ELN, 2010-2019“
Cécile Mouly, Esperanza Hernández Delgado
- 6-2019. El manejo didáctico de la violencia sexualizada en la guerra. Una mirada a través de las guerras de disolución de Yugoslavia como ejemplo
Oliver Plessow
- 5-2019. Paz territorial: conectando imaginación moral e imaginación geográfica
Luis Peña
- 4-2019. El arte de la memoria – La memoria del arte
Horst Hoheisel

- 3-2019. Recordar, olvidar, hablar, silenciar. El manejo social de pasados conflictivos
Tatjana Louis
- 2-2019. Educación cívica en Alemania: desarrollo y aspectos de la discusión actual
Bernd Overwien
- 1-2019. El derecho al acceso progresivo a la propiedad de la tierra
Diana Carolina Sanabria Ramírez
- 1-2018. Dinámicas territoriales de la violencia y del conflicto armado antes y después del acuerdo de paz con las FARC-EP. Estudio de caso: municipio de Tumaco, Nariño
Luis Gabriel Salas Salazar, Jonas Wolff y Fabián Eduardo Camelo

Policy Briefs

- 2-2022: „Biodiversidad, recursos naturales y construcción de paz en Colombia. Insumos para una gestión sostenible y equitativa“
Rafael Grasa Hernández
- 1-2022: „Más allá de la Cátedra de la Paz: impulsos para la educación política desde la experiencia alemana“
Stefan Peters, Nico Weinmann
- 11-2021: „Perspectiva de género en las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad“
Laura Masson
- 10-2021: „Primera imputación en la JEP: toma de rehenes y otras privaciones graves de libertad cometidas por las FARC-EP“
Kai Ambos
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- 3-2019. Beneficios contemplados en la Ley de Amnistía y algunas dificultades en su aplicación
Kai Ambos y Gustavo Emilio Cote Barco
- 2-2019. Régimen de condicionalidad y acceso a la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz
John Zuluaga y Juliette Vargas
- 1-2019. Panorama de las personas defensoras de derechos humanos y líderes sociales en riesgo en Colombia, 2018 – 2019
Carlos A. Guevara

Escuelas Académicas

- No. 1: Escuela de Verano en Derecho Comparado e Internacional (Agosto 2017, Giessen, Alemania)
- No. 2: Escuela de Invierno: Colombia Paz Territorial (Noviembre / Diciembre 2017, Bogotá, Colombia)
- No. 3: Escuela de Invierno: Memoria, Verdad y Reconciliación (Noviembre 2018, Bogotá, Colombia)
- No. 4: Escuela de Verano: ¿Una paz excluyente? Construcción de paz en contextos desiguales (Septiembre 2019, Berlín, Alemania)

Cursos virtuales

- No. 1: 2020-2021: „Gestión y Gobernanza del Conocimiento para la Construcción de Paz“
- No. 2: 2021-2022: Gestión de proyectos de cooperación e investigación sobre temas de conflicto y paz“

Escuela Territorial:

2019: Experiencias comunitarias para la construcción de paz en el Suroccidente colombiano

Capacitaciones:

- No. 1: Junio 2019 (Bogotá): „Seminario de formación de facilitadores del diálogo: Combatir la violencia con palabras.
- No. 2: Julio 2019 (Berlín): „Taller: Conmemoración y Rememoración. Procesos de construcción de memoria histórica y legitimidad del Estado.
- No. 3: Septiembre 2019 (Bogotá): „Foro-Taller: Educación Política Ciudadana“

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Katharina Pechowski