


A Criminal Peace. Mapping the Murders of Ex-FARC Combatants

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
Mathew Charles, Başar Baysal
and Juan Diego Forero

OCCO OBSERVATORIO COLOMBIANO
DE CRIMEN ORGANIZADO



Universidad del
Rosario

Facultad de Estudios Internacionales,
Políticos y Urbanos



THE COLOMBIAN OBSERVATORY OF ORGANIZED CRIME (OCCO)

Organized crime (OC) constitutes one of the greatest threats to security in Latin America. It has had a grave impact in terms of violence, corruption and the weakening of institutions, creating an urgent need to understand the penetration of organized crime into the fabric of contemporary societies across the continent.

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EL OBSERVATORIO COLOMBIANO DE CRIMEN ORGANIZADO (OCCO)

El crimen organizado (CO) constituye una de las mayores amenazas a la seguridad en América Latina. Éste ha generado una gran afectación en cuanto a la violencia, la corrupción y el debilitamiento institucional, razón por la cual existe una necesidad urgente de comprender la penetración del CO en el tejido de las sociedades contemporáneas en todo el continente.

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ABSTRACT

More than 200 ex-FARC combatants have been murdered in Colombia since the signing of the peace accords between the government and the former rebels in 2016. The security of ex-fighters is integral to this process. When ex-combatants become targets for murder and other forms of violence, the peace process itself is at risk. There is much debate about who is killing ex-FARC combatants and why, and the motives are many. A lack of transparency about the cases in which convictions have been secured contributes to this uncertainty, but dissident FARC, paramilitary successor groups and the ELN have been identified as posing the biggest threat. This working paper maps the violence against ex-combatants and in so doing highlights some general trends and patterns of ex-FARC murders. We argue that the phenomenon of ex-FARC murders is related to territorial control. We provide evidence that ex-FARC combatants appear to be directly targeted and in places where ex-combatants are concentrated. The number of ex-FARC murders also increases when armed groups are in dispute. It would appear that the murders are also linked to the cultivation of coca and forced displacement. Perhaps most significantly, there are key trends and similarities between the killings of social leaders and ex-FARC combatants.

RESUMEN

Más de 200 excombatientes de las FARC han sido asesinados en Colombia desde la firma de los acuerdos de paz entre el gobierno y los excombatientes en 2016. La seguridad de estos, es parte integral en el proceso. Cuando los excombatientes se convierten en el blanco de los asesinatos y otras formas de violencia, el proceso de paz en sí está en peligro. Hay muchos debates sobre quién y los motivos por los que están matando a excombatientes de las FARC. La falta de transparencia sobre los casos en los que se han obtenido condenas contribuye a esta incertidumbre, pero se ha identificado a las disidencias de las FARC, los grupos sucesores de los paramilitares y el ELN, como la mayor amenaza. El número de asesinatos de ex-FARC también aumenta cuando los grupos armados están en disputa. Parecería que los asesinatos también están relacionados con el cultivo de coca y el desplazamiento forzado. Quizás lo más significativo es que existen tendencias y similitudes clave entre los asesinatos de líderes sociales y excombatientes de las FARC. Este documento de trabajo mapea la violencia contra los excombatientes y, al hacerlo, destaca algunas tendencias y patrones generales de asesinatos de ex-FARC. Argumentamos que el fenómeno de los asesinatos de ex-FARC está relacionado con el control territorial; proporcionamos evidencia de que los excombatientes de las FARC parecen ser un objetivo directo en los lugares donde se concentran.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mathew Charles is a post-doctoral researcher at the Colombian Observatory for Organised Crime at the Universidad del Rosario. He is a former journalist and has lived and worked in Colombia for almost a decade. His mainly ethnographic research focuses on organised criminal dynamics, particularly network structures and the participation of young people in organised crime. He is co-editor of the *Documentos OCCO* working paper series. He obtained his PhD from Cardiff University and holds an MA in European Studies from London Metropolitan University, and a BA in French and German from University College London (UCL).

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KEY WORDS

FARC, DDR, ex-combatant, security, peace process

Introduction

More than 200 ex-FARC combatants have been murdered in Colombia since the signing of the peace accords between the government and the former rebels in 2016. Hundreds more have received death threats, according to former guerrilla commanders. The DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration) process aims to enable ex-combatants to become active, productive and peaceful members of their civilian communities (Ozerdem 2013; Shulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis 2010). The security of ex-fighters is integral to this process. When ex-combatants become targets for murder and other forms of violence, the peace process itself is at risk.

Many human rights organisations claim that conflict in Colombia has not ended, but has simply ‘mutated’ (Fundación PARES 2018a). A wave of massacres in 2020, in which scores of people have been murdered, has raised alarms over a rising tide of violence. There is little doubt that Colombia is beginning a new chapter in its long history of bloodshed. The National Liberation Army (the ELN) continues what has become one of the world’s longest-running insurgencies, and although it wages war against the state where and when it can, violence in rural Colombia is now characterised by a patchwork of local feuds between criminal groups that fight over drug routes, illegal mining and other illicit economies.

Illegal activities such as the production and trafficking of drugs have sustained and intensified the internal armed conflict in Colombia for decades, but these ‘localised confrontations’, which are ‘no longer linked to the struggle for political power’ are for the most part now defined by organised criminal modalities (Espitia Cueca 2019: 7). A disparate collection of armed groups is engaged in a ‘factional-economic conflict’. This is defined by Ramsbotham et al. (2005: 30) as a conflict ‘in which the fighting is... for purposes of economic gain rather than strictly political grievances, or some combination of both’. Armed actors in such a conflict are therefore not attempting to overthrow the state, though they may be seeking to ‘usurp, seize or retain state power merely to further particular interests’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 66).

Against this backdrop, former guerrillas have been killed in revenge attacks (El Heraldo 2018), for refusing to join the dissidents (HRW 2018), and they have been victims of extrajudicial murder at the hands of the security forces (El Espectador 2020).

They have also been killed after public brawls (Extra 2018), because of disputes over drug dealing in the community (Diario del Huila 2019) and for their support of the peace process (El Tiempo 2020). 35-year-old Edgar Rincón Medina was killed in May last year, apparently in retaliation for kidnaps and murders he committed while an active guerrilla (El Heraldito 2018). A mother of another victim in Tumaco told Human Rights Watch in 2018 that her son was killed because he had refused to join the dissidents (HRW 2018), and in April, 2019 ex-combatant Dimar Torres was tortured and murdered by Colombian soldiers (El Espectador 2020).

Ex-combatants say they are being systematically targeted, but there is much debate about who is killing ex-FARC combatants and why. A lack of transparency about the cases in which convictions have been secured contributes to this uncertainty, but the special prosecutor investigating these murders denies they are systematic (El Tiempo 2019). In documents obtained by the authors, the Attorney General's office identifies dissident factions of the FARC; the Clan del Golfo, also known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) or the Urabeños; the ELN; the Popular Liberation Army (the EPL), also referred to as Los Pelusos; and the Caparrapos as posing the greatest threat.

It is, however, important to note that this working paper does not shed direct light on what might be called the perpetrator question. Instead, it maps the violence against ex-combatants and in so doing highlights some general trends and patterns of ex-FARC murders.

This quantitative analysis is the first phase of a wider study funded by a *Capital Semilla* grant, awarded by Universidad del Rosario. These initial findings are therefore intended to determine field sites for an ethnographic study in the second phase next year, and eventually contribute to wider and more concrete understandings about why former guerrilla fighters are being targeted and by whom. It is hoped that this mixed methods approach will develop more effective and refined conclusions about what is most certainly a complex phenomenon.

Subsequent sections of this working paper first explore the context of the demobilisation of the FARC guerrilla. The data and methodology section then outlines six hypotheses to be tested, before the specific findings of the study are explored. The

paper ends with some brief conclusions, and a note on future research directions and the notion of territorial control, which is presented as a central theme of this ongoing research.

Territorial control is indeed at the heart of Colombia's ongoing violence. Territorial control allows armed groups to carve a safe space where they can hide from the state and their rivals. It also allows them to extract resources from the drug trade and other illicit activities. Armed groups seek control of territories that are valuable. The value of the territory is related to its suitability for drug production, processing, transportation, smuggling, and distribution (Calderón et al. 2015; Osorio 2015). Because conflicts over illicit activities cannot be resolved through a formal system of justice, armed groups aspire to keep monopolistic control. Ex-FARC combatants pose a threat to this control as they actively and lawfully seek a peaceful reintegration.

The DDR of the FARC

The peace accords were signed by the FARC guerrilla and the Colombian government in 2016. They were ratified by Congress a year later, despite having been rejected by a slim margin in a national referendum. In 2017, the FARC began to hand over their weapons to the United Nations. The ex-combatants gathered at 26 designated demobilisation sites (ZVTN – Zonas Veredales Transitoria de Normalización). After the disarmament of the guerrilla had been formalised in August 2017, these demobilisation sites were transformed into 24 Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation (ETCR in the Spanish acronym) to be administered by the Agency for Reintegration and Normalisation (the ARN).

According to the ARN, by April 2020, there were 13,510 ex-fighters accredited by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (ARN 2020). Of these 13,510 ex-combatants, 12,767 are in the process of reincorporation and only 2,877 former rebels remain in the ETCRs. 9,217 ex-combatants in the process of reincorporation¹ reside

¹ DDR usually refers to disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. However, in the Colombian context, the authorities differentiate between reintegration and reincorporation, where the former refers to the reintegration of ex-combatants, who have individually chosen to demobilise (in the absence of any peace deal) and the latter refers to the reincorporation of ex-combatants, who as part of a collective peace deal have given up their armed struggle. This study uses both terms interchangeably.

outside of these centres, 78% of the overall total. Many ex-combatants left the ETCRs because of security concerns and other problems with the implementation of reintegration programmes (El Espectador 2020). In late 2017, new de-facto reintegration zones began to emerge. These informal New Areas of Reincorporation (Nuevas Áreas de Reincorporación - NAR) are not officially recognised by the Colombian Government.

Between 2017 and 2019, the number of ex-FARC murders has increased each year. As fears about security have grown, the number of ex-FARC combatants deserting ETCRs in favour of NARs has also risen (El Espectador 2020).

The murder of ex-combatants is sadly not a new phenomenon in Colombia. During the 1980s, an estimated 2-4,000 members of the Patriotic Union (UP) party are estimated to have been murdered (Lee 2012: 31; LeGrand 2003: 176). The UP was created as a political wing of the FARC in 1985 after a ceasefire had been declared a year previously (Crandall 2002: 68; LeGrand 2003: 176; Gonzales Posso 1999: 46). Andrei Gomez-Suarez (2003: 154) defined the murders of UP members, many of whom were ex-combatants, as 'genocide'. He also highlighted the role of drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) such as the Medellín and Cali cartels in the murders.

In 1990, another peace process was launched under the presidency of Cesar Gaviria, which eventually resulted in the 1991 demobilisation of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL). An estimated 2,000 guerrillas gave up their arms (El Pais, 1991), but a dissident faction continued and became known as *Los Pelusos*, remnants of which continue to operate today. Ex-EPL combatants formed the Hope, Peace and Liberty party (Esperanza, Paz y Libertad), maintaining the same EPL acronym, but they soon became victims of targeted violence by the FARC, the ELN and dissident factions of their former comrades. According to a 1997 Human Rights Watch Report, the FARC killed 204 ex-EPL combatants in what was largely a dispute over ideology (HRW, 1997).

There are therefore clearly historic parallels in which the murders of ex-FARC combatants must be considered. Before we discuss the findings of this initial study, we first explain the dataset and our methodological approach.

The data and methodology

The data on murders of ex-FARC combatants was initially obtained from the FARC party. This data was crosschecked and verified with local, regional and national press reports. The first murder was registered on 3rd February, 2017 and our study includes all cases up to and including 31st October, 2020. This data was further cross-checked with the database of CORPOTEPAS, a Bogotá-based foundation that monitors violence against ex-FARC combatants with the objective of producing permanent statistics in order to lobby national authorities and generate awareness. The names of those deemed to be dissidents or in breach of the peace accords were removed from the list, as were any cases in which the victim was a relative of an ex-combatant.

For each murder case the dataset includes: the name of the ex-combatant; the date, department and municipality in which the murder took place; gender; rank; the particular bloc of the FARC to which they belonged; their political status (defined as campaigning for a political party or standing for office); and if they had recently been released from prison.

We categorise armed groups in Colombia into three distinct categories: Dissident factions of the FARC; the ELN and paramilitary successor groups (PSGs) and other drug trafficking organisations (DTOs), which include the Clan del Golfo and the EPL.

The presence of these armed groups was established in each of Colombia's 1120 municipalities, using INDEPAZ reports on paramilitary actors and dissident FARC presence (González Posso 2020a; González Posso 2020b), as well as a study from PARES on the ELN (Fundación PARES 2018b). Although INDEPAZ differentiates between 'dissident' and 'residual' factions of the FARC, where the former refers to those groups which have maintained opposition to the peace process and which did not demobilise in 2017, and the latter to groups which have re-armed since the peace process, we make no distinction for the purposes of this working paper. However, it is important to emphasise the disparate nature of dissident FARC factions within the new landscape of the Colombian conflict. A recent study from Insight Crime (McDermott 2019: 36) described the dissident FARC as 'united only in their history'.

These factions of dissidence have moved away from a vertically integrated organisation, and now resemble a more horizontal network. Each group divides criminal incomes and territory, and makes agreements to work together without necessarily implying any subordination (McDermott 2019: 37).

In addition to the reports mentioned above, we reviewed local, regional and national press, in order to ascertain and crosscheck the presence of armed groups in the 97 municipalities in which the murders of ex-combatants occurred. We then used this data to create a variable on interrelated criminal group existence to examine different combinations of the armed groups in all municipalities of the country.

Measuring the control or influence exercised by these armed group over specific locations is of course extremely challenging. We developed a typology for criminal dynamics, based on a simplified version of Idler's cluster model (2019). She identifies eight distinct types of interaction within three 'clusters' of 'enmity', 'rivalry' and 'friendship'. Within enmity clusters, violent non-state groups do not have any arrangements with each other, while the rivalry cluster accounts for unstable short-term arrangements among groups with unpredictable outbreaks of violence, and the friendship cluster constitutes relatively stable, non-violent, long-term inter-group relations (Idler, 2019: 27).

Our typology simplifies this approach to identify five categories of armed group dynamic: (1) sporadic; (2) dominant; (3) rivalry; (4) co-operation and (5) mosaic. These dynamics were determined for the 97 municipalities in which the murders of ex-FARC combatants have occurred. The dynamics were established according to a specific coding protocol.

Sporadic refers to an ad-hoc presence of an armed group within a particular municipality. That is to say there is both a low 'frequency' and 'visibility' (Durán-Martínez 2018). Frequency refers to the rate at which violent events occur (Durán-Martínez 2018: 39) and visibility refers 'to whether criminals expose or claim responsibility for their attacks' (Durán-Martínez 2018: 36).

Dominant accounts for the semi-permanent or permanent presence of an armed group, unchallenged for its territorial control and share of illicit economies. This is usually characterised by low frequency and high visibility.

Rivalry depicts the presence of two or more groups, competing for control of turf and illicit economies, and usually results in both high frequency and visibility.

Co-operation represents the presence of two or more groups involved in some kind of pact or short-term deal. Violence in these circumstances is unpredictable with perhaps a low frequency and high visibility.

Finally, *mosaic* characterises a municipality in which there is a blend of rivalry and co-operation. This can result in both a high frequency and visibility.

We complement this data on ex-FARC murders and armed group dynamics with further information for each of the 1120 municipalities on the total number of homicides (data obtained from the national police); the total number of social leader murders (obtained from the annual reports by the NGO, *Somos Defensores*), the total number of people forcibly displaced (obtained by freedom of information request from the *Unidad de Víctimas*); and the average number of hectares used for coca cultivation (data obtained from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), covering the 2016-2019 timeframe.

As a final set of variables, we include data on specific features of the 1120 municipalities, including whether or not they are classified as PDET²; if there is a presence of the PNIS³ programme; or if there is a presence of an ETCR or NAR. All of this data was collected from the relevant government department or agency.

We use the dataset to test the following six hypotheses, which are based on our overall assumption that the murders of ex-FARC combatants are predominantly targeted and related to criminal rivalry over territorial control, similar to the murders of social leaders (Prem et al. 2020):

H1: There is no significant relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and general rates of homicide;

² Programa de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (PDET). These 170 municipalities are those that have been most affected by conflict, and which have now become a priority for investment in the post peace-accord era.

³ Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos Ilícitos (PNIS). This is the coca substitution programme established as part of the peace process in which coca farmers are given financial aid and structural support to substitute their coca crops for sustainable and legal alternatives.

H2: Ex-FARC murders are most likely to occur in the places where ex-combatants are concentrated;

H3: There is a positive relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and the existence of rival armed groups;

H4: There is a positive relationship between the hectares of coca cultivation and ex-FARC murders;

H5: There is a positive relationship between forced displacement and the murders of ex-FARC combatants;

H6: There is a positive relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and the killing of social leaders in the country.

To examine the hypotheses outlined above, we created binary variables for the existence of ETCR or NAR within the 1120 municipalities, as well as for the categorisation of PDET and the presence of the PNIS programme. We also created binary variables for the existence of armed groups, namely dissident FARC, the ELN and paramilitary successor groups and other DTOs for the total number of municipalities. Subsequently, we created nominal variables for interrelated criminal group existence to account for the presence of different combinations of multiple armed groups for all 1120 municipalities. We also created nominal variable for armed group dynamics within the 97 municipalities in which ex-FARC murders have occurred.

In addition to these nominal variables, we created scale variables for the average number of hectares of coca cultivation between 2016 and 2019 in all 1120 municipalities, as well as for the total number of homicides in each. We also created scale variables for the total number of people forcibly displaced and the total number of social leaders killed between 2016 and 2019 in each of the 1120 municipalities.

To test the hypotheses outlined above, we then conducted a regression analysis, using a zero-inflated model. Since the distribution of our independent variable (the number of ex-FARC murders) represents a negative binominal rather than a Poisson distribution, we used the zero inflated negative binominal regression (Hilbe 2011; Cameron and Trivedi 2013).

The results of this regression analysis, which constitutes only the initial phase of our study, are presented in the appendices. They are not explored in detail in the main body of this working paper, since our priority for now is to focus on general trends and potential correlations to be able to compare the impact of related variables, and determine a direction for further study in the second phase of our research. Rare events such as the murders of ex-combatants represent a great analytical challenge. The murders of ex-FARC combatants are considered “rare” in quantitative terms because within 1120 Colombian municipalities, there are murders of ex-FARC within just 97 of them. This creates “zero inflation” within the dataset and may ultimately generate small-sample bias. To counter this limitation, we have opted to use the specific zero inflated negative binominal regression to account for overdispersion and excess zeros (Cameron and Trivedi 2013; Hilbe 2014). However, some of our findings still suggest issues with zero inflation and small-scale bias, as explained in the conclusion. This is why the regression analysis is not the focus of our findings.

Mapping the Murders

There have been 238 murders of ex-FARC combatants since the peace deal was signed and the guerrillas demobilised. There has been an annual increase with 35 murders in 2017, 66 in 2018 and 79 in 2019. Up until 31st October 2020, there were 56 murders, which indicates a change in the increasing trend.




Figure 1. The murders of ex-FARC combatants by year

Ex-combatants have been killed in 20 of Colombia’s 32 departments (see Figure 2 below). Three were murdered in Ecuador. The departments with the highest murder rates of ex-FARC guerrilla fighters are Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, Caquetá and Meta, which together account for more than half of the overall total.

This year there has been a considerable increase in Meta and Valle del Cauca with 10 and 6 murders respectively.

The overwhelming majority of those killed are male. This is perhaps surprising, considering that almost 40% of the guerrilla insurgency were female (Verdad Abierta, 2015). The majority of victims are also of a low rank. The data shows that of the 238 victims, only 20 were high ranking. That is to say those who were commanders of specific blocs, fronts or companies.




Figure 2. The number of ex-FARC combatants killed by department




Figure 3. The total number of ex-FARC combatants murdered (by department).

Two of these were killed in 2020, including Jorge Iván Ramos Camacho, who was murdered on 29th August in Santa Rosa in Bolívar. He was the former commander of the 37th Front, which operated mostly in the Montes de Maria region. He was also an active member of the FARC political party and was heavily involved in the coca substitution programme, PNIS (RCN 2020).

The Western Bloc has been most affected with 86 murders followed by the Southern Bloc with a total of 46.




Figure 4. The number of murdered ex-FARC combatants according to the bloc to which they belonged.

75 of the murders took place after the victim was released from prison and 38 of the victims were active in politics, meaning they were candidates for office, involved in political campaigning or local community leaders, promoting the re-integration of ex-combatants. Among them was Juan de Jesús Monroy, a well-known ex-FARC commander who, after demobilising, had been leading farming projects in south-eastern Meta province (El Tiempo 2020).

Subsequent sections of this working paper present and analyse the specific hypotheses outlined above, before the arguments are summarised in the conclusion.

H1: There is no significant relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and general rates of homicide




Figure 5. The number of murdered ex-FARC combatants by municipality.

The municipalities with the highest number of murdered ex-FARC combatants are Tumaco (Nariño) with 15 cases, Ituango (Antioquia) with 11, Puerto Asís (Putumayo) with 10, Cali (Valle del Cauca) with 8 and San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá) with 6. These five local areas account for almost 20% of the total murders. In 47 of the total 97 municipalities, there has been only one murder and in 19 of the municipalities there are only two cases recorded (see Appendix I).

175 murders have occurred in PDET municipalities, those most affected by armed conflict in Colombia and identified as a priority for peace-building investment. This would suggest the majority of murders are occurring in the power vacuum, left behind by the demobilised FARC. The vast majority of these PDET municipalities are those in which the guerrilla exercised influence and control, now the battleground for

other armed groups engaged in rivalry for their share of the turf and the associated illicit economies.

Former guerrilla fighters are not being murdered in municipalities with high levels of general homicide, as shown in the maps below. In Figure 6, the darker shades in the map on the left indicate the total number of homicides between 2016-2019, while the darker shades on the right represent the total number of ex-FARC murdered since the peace accords were signed.




Figure 6. The total number of homicides compared to total number of ex-FARC murders.

If we consider that ex-combatants live in approximately 430 municipalities (Llorente and Méndez 2019: 7) and that murders have only occurred in 97 of them, it shows a concentration of these killings. The fact that these murders also happen in municipalities, which register a significant presence of armed groups also implies the murders of ex-combatants are linked to conflict dynamics in the country (see H3 below).

H2: Ex-FARC murders are most likely to occur in the places where ex-combatants are concentrated.

165 murders have occurred in municipalities with a concentration of ex-FARC combatants. These municipalities have an ETCR and/or a NAR. The United Nations (2020) has issued a warning about security issues at ETCRs in Miranda (Cauca), Puerto Asís (Putumayo) and Mesetas (Meta).

There are 13,510 ex-combatants registered with the ARN. 12,767 are in the process of reintegration. 2,877 of these have decided to stay in an ETCR. Estimates suggest there are also at least 2,000 living in NARs (Llorente and Méndez 2019), and although it is difficult to establish exactly how many ex-combatants are living in these new and informal areas of re-integration, the figures suggest a majority of the former rebels have chosen to desert both formal and informal centres of reintegration. However, the data shows that most of the murders have occurred in municipalities with an ETCR or NAR, demonstrating a concentration of violence against ex-FARC combatants.




Figure 7. Municipalities with ETCRs (left) and total number of ex-FARC murders (right).

The NARs emerged as ex-combatants began to leave the ETCRs for safety concerns, as explained above in the section on The DDR of the FARC. As the NARs have grown in size, so has the number of murders. As a result, there have now been

more murders in municipalities with NAR than with an ETCR. This might suggest a direct targeting of ex-combatants as the violence has apparently followed them.




Figure 8. Murders of ex-FARC in ETCR and NAR.




Figure 9. Murders of ex-FARC in ETCR and NAR 2017-2020.




Figure 10. Municipalities with NAR (left) and the total number of ex-FARC murders (right).

This is further evidence to imply that ex-FARC combatants have become direct targets of violence, as suggested in the previous section, which indicates that ex-FARC murders are not related to general rates of homicide in the country (at municipal level).

H3: There is a positive relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and the existence of rival armed groups.

As explained above, we have categorised the following armed actors: Dissident factions of the FARC; the ELN; paramilitary successor groups and other DTOs. The dataset shows that there is a higher number of ex-combatant murders in those municipalities with a presence of dissident FARC, 192 in total. These include Tumaco (Nariño) with 15; Ituango (Antioquia) with 11; Puerto Asís (Putumayo) with 10; San Vicente del Caguán (Caquetá) with 7; and 6 each in Tibu (Norte De Santander); San José del Guaviare (Guaviare); and Uribe (Meta).

In Figure 11 below, the dark blue municipalities in the map on the left indicate the presence of dissident factions of the FARC, while on the right, the darker shades represent the highest numbers of ex-FARC murders. The same logic is used in Figures 12 and 13, which illustrate the presence of PSG/DTOs and the ELN respectively.




Figure 11. The presence of dissident FARC factions (left) and total murders of ex-FARC (right).




Figure 12. The presence of PSG/DTOs (left) and the murders of ex-FARC combatants (right).

There have been 144 murders in municipalities with a presence of paramilitary successor groups. These include Ituango (Antioquia) with 11 cases; Puerto Asís (Putumayo) with 10; Cali (Valle del Cauca) with 8; and 6 in both Tibu (Norte de Santander) and San José del Guaviare (Guaviare).

There have been 121 murders in municipalities with a presence of the ELN. These include Tumaco (Nariño) with 15; Cali (Valle del Cauca) with 8; Tibu (Norte de Santander) with 6; and 5 in each of El Tara (Norte de Santander); Quibdó (Chocó) and Argelia (Cauca).




Figure 13. The presence of the ELN (left) and the total number of ex-FARC murders (right).

A report from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2017) concluded that ex-FARC combatants are being killed because of their unwillingness to join or create armed factions of the FARC or other criminal groups. Data from the Attorney General's office obtained by the researchers shows that of the 102 total convictions between 1st January 2017 and 13 May 2019, 50 perpetrators belonged to dissident factions of the FARC, 40 to paramilitary successor groups (including 16 to the Clan del Golfo or AGC/Urbano and 11 to the EPL), and 12 to the ELN.

Our study cannot determine motive nor perpetrator so it is not possible to argue that dissident FARC factions are the group most responsible for these killings. In addition, it is also important to note that the presence of some dissident groups may well be a response to high levels of violence against ex-combatants and social leaders. For example, the 2018 report from FIP on FARC dissidence reports that the 18th and 36th Fronts of the guerrilla justify their re-armament in Antioquia as a defence of themselves and their communities (Vanegas et al. 2018). This creates pathways for further study in the second phase of our investigation.

It is perhaps not surprising that according to our data, there are more ex-FARC murders in those municipalities with a presence of multiple armed groups, although

there are also a high number of cases in local areas, where there is only dissident FARC, as Figure 14 below illustrates.




Figure 14. The number of ex-FARC murders according to armed group presence.


Figure 15 below shows that the number of murders of ex-guerrilla fighters are higher in those municipalities, where there is rivalry between armed groups. These particular dynamics are explained in the section on data and methodology above.

In each of the 13 municipalities with five or more murders, the armed group dynamic is categorised as either rivalry or mosaic. For example, in Tumaco, which has the highest number of cases, rival armed groups continue to engage in atrocities similar to those attributed to the FARC during the conflict. Pervasive drug trafficking has helped fuel their growth and levels of serious abuse are again increasing in the municipality (HRW 2018). Dissident FARC factions United Guerrillas of the Pacific and the Oliver Sinisterra Front batter both urban and rural neighbourhoods. They ‘kill and disappear those who dare defy them, rape women and girls, recruit children, and force thousands to flee’ (HRW 2018).

Additionally, the PSG, Clan del Golfo, more known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia in this region, has also engaged in serious abuses in Tumaco,

during a largely foiled attempt to take control of part of the area from the dissidents (HRW, 2018).

In Ituango, which has the second highest number of ex-FARC murders, the dynamic is mosaic. Dissident factions of the FARC (the 18th and 36th Fronts) have reached a temporary agreement with the PSG, Caparrapos, to take on and force out their common criminal rivals, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia. In 2017, the AGC arrived in the municipality declaring they were taking over. There have been several mass displacements and bitter rivalry as a result (Verdad Abierta, 2019).



15. Ex-FARC murders and armed group dynamics⁴

H4: There is a positive relationship between the hectares of coca cultivation and ex-FARC murders.

Nariño with 29 murders of ex-FARC combatants is also the region with the highest average number of hectares of coca cultivation between 2016 and 2019. Tumaco, the regional capital, is the municipality with both the highest number of ex-FARC murders and average coca cultivation. In the four municipalities with an average of more than 5,000 hectares of coca cultivation, there is a total of 35 murders. These include Tumaco with 15 cases; Tibu (Norte de Santander) with 6; Puerto Asís

⁴ The three murders where no dynamic has been registered is because they occurred in Ecuador.

(Putumayo) with 10 and El Tambo (Cauca) with 4. In all of these municipalities, there are multiple armed groups engaged in rivalry, and all include the presence of dissident FARC factions.




Figure 16. Average hectares of coca (2016-2019) and the total number of ex-FARC murders (right).

In Figure 16, the darker shades in the map on the left indicate the average number of hectares of coca cultivation between 2016 and 2019, compared with the total number of ex-FARC combatants killed, illustrated by the map on the left.

95 of the 238 murders of ex-combatants occurred in municipalities in which there has been an implementation of the PNIS coca substitution programme. In Figure 17, the maps follow a similar logic. The darker shades on the right represent the presence of PNIS and, as always, the darker shades on the left, total number of ex-FARC murders.




Figure 17. Municipalities with PNIS (left) and the total number of ex-FARC murders (right).

This data appears to show a positive relationship between coca cultivation, and the number of ex-FARC combatants killed. The presence of the PNIS programme also supports this argument.

H5: There is a positive relationship between forced displacement and the murders of ex-FARC combatants.

Forced displacement is often linked to battles for territorial control. With the exception of Tumaco, the 10 municipalities that register the highest number of cases of displacement record only one or two murders of ex-combatants. In five of these, no murders have been registered at all. These are Hacarí (Norte de Santander); Tarazá (Antioquia); Achi (Bolívar); San Calixto (Norte de Santander); Alto Baudó (Chocó). This would suggest that there is no meaningful relationship between levels of displacement and the murders of ex-FARC combatants.

However, within the 100 municipalities that register the highest levels of displacement from the 976 in total that have been affected by the violent phenomenon, there are also 139 murders of ex-combatants. While it is not possible to establish a positive relationship from these figures, they might provide evidence of a trend, but

this would need to be analysed further. As the maps below indicate, there is no immediate and obvious relationship. In Figure 18, the darker shades of colour on the left represent the highest levels of forced displacement, while on the right, the total number of ex-FARC murders.




Figure 18. The total number of forced displacements and total number of ex-FARC murders.

H6: There is a positive relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and the killing of social leaders in the country.

Almost one in 5 of the ex-FARC murders has occurred in Cauca, a region that has also witnessed the highest number of social leaders killed. At municipal level, Tumaco in Nariño has the highest number of ex-FARC murders and it also registers the largest number of social leaders killed, at 17. 34.6% of social leaders (or 161) and 34% of ex-FARC combatants (80) have been killed in the same 20 municipalities across 11 departments.

Figure 19 shows, the total number of social leaders killed between 2016 and 2019, indicated by the darker shades of colour on the left, and compared with the total number of ex-FARC murders, illustrated by the darker shades on the right. By looking at the map through this comparison, there seems to be a direct relationship.




Figure 19. The total number of social leaders killed (2016-2019) and total number of ex-FARC murders (right).

Social leaders are also killed in municipalities where there is a presence of multiple and rival armed groups. In fact, the relationship between armed group dynamics and ex-FARC murders is similarly reflected in the killings of social leaders.

Of the 465 social leaders murdered between 2016-2019, 293 occurred in are in municipalities where there is a presence of one or more paramilitary successor groups; 240 in municipalities with a presence of dissident FARC; and 211 with a presence the ELN. In municipalities where there is a presence of a single armed group, 20 murders occurred in local areas where the ELN is operational; 50 where there are dissident FARC factions and 89 in places with a presence of paramilitary successor groups and other DTOs. This suggests that there is a significant relationship between the presence of PSGs/DTOs and the murders of social leaders.




Figure 20. The presence of PSG/DTOs (right) and total murders of social leaders (2016-2019).




Figure 21. The presence of dissident FARC (right) and total murders of social leaders (2016-2019).




Figure 22. The presence of the ELN (right) and total murders of social leaders (2016-2019).

Conclusion

In order to summarise the arguments presented above and to understand their implication, it is important to consider each of our hypotheses a final time:

H1: *There is no significant relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and general rates of homicide.* To test this hypothesis, we compared the total of ex-FARC murders with the total number of homicides between 2016 and 2019 at municipal level. We found there to be no significant relationship. If we consider homicide as a general indicator of violence in the country, then the violence against ex-FARC combatants is separate and targeted. The zero-inflated negative binominal regression supports this argument and shows that there is no meaningful correlation between these two variables (see Appendix II).

H2: *Ex-FARC murders are most likely to occur in the places where ex-combatants are concentrated.* This hypothesis was tested by comparing the number of ex-FARC murders in municipalities with and without ETCR and NAR. The results indicate that the murders of ex-FARC combatants are most likely to occur in municipalities with ETCR and NAR. This suggests that ex-FARC murders occur in areas where ex-

combatants are concentrated, again suggesting that violence against the former rebels is targeted. The regression analysis supports these claims (see Appendix III) and shows that the presence of an ETCR is more significant than the presence of NAR, even though more murders occur within these informal spaces. However, the discrepancy in the impact values illustrated by the regression derives from the difference between the total numbers of ETCR (24) and NAR (93) (see Appendix III).

H3: *There is a relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and the existence of rival armed groups.* To test this hypothesis, we compared the number of ex-FARC combatants with the presence of different armed groups, namely dissident FARC, the ELN and paramilitary successor groups and other DTOs. The results show that the murders of ex-combatants are most likely to occur in municipalities with the presence of dissident FARC groups. The results also indicate that there is an important relationship between these murders and the existence and rivalry of multiple armed factions. This study cannot determine motive nor perpetrator, but our findings suggest that the number of ex-FARC murders increase when armed groups are in dispute.

Unlike our initial findings, the regression analysis indicates the existence of paramilitary successor groups is less important to ex-FARC murders. It is important to recall, however, that the special prosecutor reports a number of arrests and convictions among paramilitary successor groups for the murders of ex-FARC (see Appendix IV). This inconsistency is perhaps derived from the fact there are many municipalities in the dataset, which register a presence of these groups, but where there have been no murders of ex-combatants. It is also important to acknowledge that paramilitary successor groups is a broad and catch all term. For future purposes, it will perhaps be necessary to be more precise and compare the presence of the larger groups like the *Clan del Golfo* and the EPL. The regression analysis also indicates that the existence of dissident FARC factions has the most significant impact on the murders of ex-combatants (see Appendix IV).

H4: *There is a positive relationship between the hectares of coca cultivation and ex-FARC murders.* To test hypothesis 4, we compared the municipalities in which there have been ex-FARC murders with municipalities, which have registered the highest

average of coca cultivation between 2016 and 2019. This analysis showed that the two most murderous municipalities also register the highest levels of coca. In fact, there were a high number of murders in all four of the municipalities, which register the largest number of hectares of coca. This may indicate a general trend, which would suggest that there is a significant relationship between the cultivation of coca and ex-FARC murders. The regression analysis supports this assertion (see Appendix V). Furthermore, there is a meaningful relationship between the existence of the PNIS programme and ex-FARC murders, which provides further evidence to support this potential trend (see Appendix VI). However, we acknowledge that further research is required to be certain of a positive relationship.

H5: There is a positive relationship between forced displacement and the murders of ex-FARC combatants. To test this, we analysed the total number of ex-combatants murdered with the total number of people forcibly displaced between 2016 and 2019 at municipal level. The initial analysis showed a potential trend that requires further scrutiny and testing. It would appear that the relationship between ex-FARC murders and forced displacement is complex. The regression analysis, however, does indicate that there is a meaningful and significant relationship between displacement and ex-FARC murders, similar to that of coca cultivation (Appendix VII).

H6: There is a relationship between the murders of ex-FARC combatants and the killing of social leaders in the country. To test our final hypothesis, we compared the total number of ex-FARC murders with the total number of social leaders killed between 2016 and 2019. This showed a significant relationship, confirmed by the regression analysis (see Appendix VIII). To further examine this, we looked at the dynamics of armed groups in the municipalities in which there have been both ex-FARC and social leader murders. The killing of social leaders and ex-combatants follow similar trends according to the armed group dynamics. According to our initial analysis, the presence of PSGs/DTOs seems to constitute a significant factor in the murders of social leaders, but the regression analysis contradicts these results and suggests it is the presence of dissident FARC factions that is of more importance, as it is when ex-FARC murders are considered (see Appendix IX). This contradiction is derived from the high number of municipalities with a PSG/DTO presence, which register no social

leader murders (216 in total), similar to the issues outlined in H3 above. These contradictions perhaps reflect ongoing issues with zero-inflation that were highlighted in the data and methodology section. This is why we urge overall caution with our preliminary results, which we emphasise require further research and testing. This is why we have not overly focussed on the regression analysis. That said, the limitations of the study do not outweigh the significant observations about the general patterns and potential trends involved in the murders of ex-FARC combatants.

By testing our hypotheses, clear avenues for future research have opened up. As we prepare for the second phase of our study, it becomes clear that we need to engage in further and more complex quantitative analysis. It also becomes apparent that the major theme of territorial control, identified in the introduction, remains a key area for investigation.

The issue of territorial control has underpinned our hypotheses explored throughout this working paper. The independent variables we identified above are each related to an element of control. If ex-FARC combatants are being directly targeted in spaces in which they are concentrated and should feel safe, then it might be assumed that the perpetrators of these crimes are seeking to punish those who actively seek the path to peace. Rival armed groups compete for areas in which they can access lucrative illicit markets such as coca cultivation and the production and trafficking of cocaine. Civilians who are deemed to get in the way are forced from their homes. Social leaders, who oppose and resist criminal control and expansion are routinely targeted. It would seem that Ex-FARC combatants have similarly become targets for those who seek to impose their criminal and monopolistic control.

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Appendix I: Number of Murdered ex-FARC Combatants by Municipality

Department	Municipality	Total ex-Farc Murders
NARIÑO	SAN ANDRES DE TUMACO	15
ANTIOQUIA	ITUANGO	11
PUTUMAYO	PUERTO ASIS	10
VALLE DEL CAUCA	CALI	8
CAQUETA	SAN VICENTE DEL CAGUAN	7
NORTE DE SANTANDER	TIBU	6
GUAVIARE	SAN JOSE DEL GUAVIARE	6
META	URIBE	6
NORTE DE SANTANDER	EL TARRA	5
CHOCO	QUIBDO	5
CAUCA	ARGELIA	5
META	LA MACARENA	5
CAUCA	EL TAMBO	4
CAQUETA	SOLANO	4
CAUCA	CALOTO	4
ANTIOQUIA	URRAO	4
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CONVENCION	3
NORTE DE SANTANDER	CUCUTA	3
CAUCA	GUAPI	3
CAUCA	CORINTO	3
ARAUCA	TAME	3
PUTUMAYO	VALLE DEL GUAMUEZ	3
BOGOTA	BOGOTA, D.C.	3
PUTUMAYO	SAN MIGUEL	3
CAUCA	MIRANDA	3
CAUCA	BUENOS AIRES	3
NARIÑO	SANTACRUZ	3
META	PUERTO RICO (META)	3
META	MESETAS	3
CAUCA	PIAMONTE	3
CAQUETA	CURILLO	3
VALLE DEL CAUCA	BUENAVENTURA	2
ANTIOQUIA	MEDELLIN	2

CHOCO	EL LITORAL DEL SAN JUAN	2
NARIÑO	BARBACOAS	2
NARIÑO	MAGÜÍ	2
CAUCA	SUAREZ	2
PUTUMAYO	PUERTO GUZMAN	2
CAQUETA	PUERTO RICO (CAQUETÁ)	2
VALLE DEL CAUCA	JAMUNDI	2
CAQUETA	LA MONTAÑITA	2
CAUCA	PATIA	2
TOLIMA	PLANADAS	2
HUILA	ALGECIRAS	2
CAUCA	SANTANDER DE QUILICHAO	2
HUILA	NEIVA	2
HUILA	PITALITO	2
CAUCA	CALDONO	2
ANTIOQUIA	PEQUE	2
VALLE DEL CAUCA	ALCALA	2
NORTE DE SANTANDER	TEORAMA	1
ANTIOQUIA	CACERES	1
ANTIOQUIA	EL BAGRE	1
CHOCO	RIOSUCIO	1
NARIÑO	EL CHARCO	1
CORDOBA	TIERRALTA	1
CHOCO	CARMEN DEL DARIEN	1
NARIÑO	SANTA BARBARA	1
NORTE DE SANTANDER	SARDINATA	1
BOLIVAR	MONTECRISTO	1
CHOCO	MEDIO ATRATO	1
BOLIVAR	SANTA ROSA	1
CAQUETA	CARTAGENA DEL CHAIRA	1
NARIÑO	RICAU RTE	1
NARIÑO	SAMANIEGO	1
ARAUCA	ARAUQUITA	1
ANTIOQUIA	BELLO	1
VALLE DEL CAUCA	FLORIDA	1
ANTIOQUIA	REMEDIOS	1
TOLIMA	CHAPARRAL	1
ANTIOQUIA	CAREPA	1
NARIÑO	CUMBAL	1

CAQUETA	SAN JOSE DEL FRAGUA	1
VALLE DEL CAUCA	TULUA	1
ATLANTICO	BARRANQUILLA	1
META	VILLAVICENCIO	1
NARIÑO	LEIVA	1
CAUCA	BALBOA	1
ANTIOQUIA	MUTATA	1
TOLIMA	ATACO	1
ANTIOQUIA	DABEIBA	1
PUTUMAYO	MOCOA	1
CAQUETA	EL PAUJIL	1
META	PUERTO CONCORDIA	1
CAUCA	TORIBIO	1
NARIÑO	IPIALES	1
HUILA	CAMPOALEGRE	1
CAQUETA	BELEN DE LOS ANDAQUIES	1
ARAUCA	CRAVO NORTE	1
ANTIOQUIA	CAMPAMENTO	1
CAQUETA	ALBANIA	1
META	SAN JUAN DE ARAMA	1
HUILA	SUAZA	1
SUCRE	COLOSO	1
VALLE DEL CAUCA	EL CAIRO	1
SANTANDER	RIONEGRO	1
CASANARE	NUNCHIA	1

Appendix II: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for Total Number of Homicides and ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-,499	,195	-2,560	,010
ZTotal_Murder	,195	,112	1,749	,080
Log(theta)	-1,255	,243	-5,171	,000

Dependent Variable: ExFARC_Murders

As the significance value (0,08) indicates there is no meaningful relationship between total number homicides and ex-FARC Murders.

Appendix III: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for ETCR and NAR, and Total Number of Ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-,329	,292	-1,130	,258
ETCR	1,389	,315	4,408	,000
NAR	,681	,278	2,448	,014
Log(theta)	,270	,440	,614	,539

Dependent Variable: ExFARC_Murders

As the significance values (ETCR: 0,000, NAR: 0,014) indicate, there is a meaningful relationship between presence of both ETCR and NAR, and ex-FARC Murders. In average, the presence of ETCR is related with a rise of 1.38 ex-FARC murders. The presence of NAR with rise of 0.681 ex-FARC murders.

Appendix IV: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for the Presence of Armed Groups and Total Number of Ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-1,049	,486	-2,156	,031
Paramilitaries	-,059	,280	-,211	,833
Dissident_FARC	1,284	,377	3,406	,001
ELN	,520	,265	1,962	,050
Log(theta)	-,366	,264	-1,386	,166

Dependent Variable: ExFARC_Murders

As the significance values (Paramilitaries: 0,833, Dissident FARC: 0,001, ELN: 0,050) indicate, there is a meaningful relationship between presence of Dissident FARC and ELN, and ex-FARC Murders. However, there is no meaningful relationship between presence of Paramilitaries and ex-FARC Murders. In average, the presence of Dissident FARC is related with a rise of 1,284 ex-FARC murders. The presence of ELN is related with a rise of 0,520 ex-FARC murders.

Appendix V: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for the Coca Cultivation and Total Number of Ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-,256	,148	-1,736	,083
ZCoca_Avarage	,185	,055	3,358	,001
Log(theta)	-,537	,244	-2,201	,028

Dependent Variable: ex-FARC_Murders

As the significance value (0,01) indicates there is as meaningful relationship between coca cultivation and ex-FARC Murders. In average, an increase in one standard deviation in the coca production in related with a 0,185 increase in the ex-FARC murders.

Appendix VI: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for presence of PNIS program and Total Number of Ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-,356	,260	-1,367	,172
PNIS	,998	,346	2,887	,004
Log(theta)	-,739	,303	-2,441	,015

Dependent Variable: ex-FARC_Murders

As the significance value (0,004) indicates, there is a meaningful relationship between presence of PNIS program and ex-FARC Murders. In average, the presence of PNIS Program is related with a rise of 0,998 ex-FARC murders.

Appendix VII: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for Total Number of Forced Displacement and Total Number of Ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-,280	,160	-1,751	,080
ZDisplacement	,181	,076	2,371	,018
Log(theta)	-,801	,218	-3,672	,000

Dependent Variable: ExFARC_Murders

As the significance value (0,018) indicates there is as meaningful relationship between coca cultivation and ex-FARC Murders. In average, an increase in one standard deviation in the displacement related with a 0,181 increase in the ex-FARC murders.

Appendix VIII: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for Total Number of Forced Displacement and Total Number of Ex-FARC Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-,143	,231	-,619	,536
ZSoc_Led_Murders	,229	,059	3,847	,000
Log(theta)	,059	,375	,157	,875

Dependent Variable: ex-FARC_Murders

As the significance value (0,00) indicates there is as meaningful relationship between Social Leader Murders and ex-FARC Murders. In average, an increase in one standard deviation in the Social Leader Murders related with a 0,229 increase in the ex-FARC murders.

Appendix IX: Zero Inflated Negative Binominal Regression for Presence of Armed Groups and Total Number Social Leader Murders

Count Model Coefficients				
	Estimate	Std. Error	z Value	Significance
(Intercept)	-1,187	,233	-5,095	,000
Paramilitaries	,406	,199	2,037	,042
Dissident_FARC	1,126	,217	5,188	,000
ELN	,923	,193	4,783	,000
Log(theta)	-,375	,192	-1,949	,051

Dependent Variable: Soc_Led_Murders

As the significance values (Paramilitaries: 0,042, Dissident FARC: 0,000, ELN: 0,000) indicate, there is a meaningful relationship between presence of Dissident FARC, Paramilitaries and ELN, and ex-FARC Murders. In average, the presence of Dissident FARC is related with a rise of 1,126 ex-FARC murders. The presence of ELN is related

with a rise of 0,923 ex-FARC murders. The presence of Paramilitaries is related with a rise of 0,406 ex-FARC murders.