



Master Thesis

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Peace Journalism. A media analysis based on the Colombian Peace Process.

Periodismo de Paz. Un análisis de los medios de comunicación sobre el proceso de Paz en Colombia.

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To Timo and my parents.

I cannot put into words how grateful I am for your support.

Abstract

In 2016, the Colombian government under President Juan Manuel Santos reached a peace agreement with the country's largest guerrilla group, the *FARC-EP*. A big part of the negotiations, which lasted about four years (2012-2016), was the creation of a Transitional Justice mechanism to investigate and judge members of the *FARC-EP* as well as members of the Public Forces and third parties who participated in the armed conflict. The name of this jurisdiction is *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP)*. Since its entry into force in 2017, there has been much public discourse about this institution, including the debate in the Colombian media.

The Colombian online and print media in particular can have an impact on the population and frame and shape certain discourses through their reporting. This, in turn, means that certain types of reporting can have an impact on the perception of certain issues – such as specific institutions – and can fuel and mitigate a conflict. This is why the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung created the concept of Peace Journalism, which journalists can use to contribute positively to the development of any conflict or war. Therefore, it will be determined in this thesis to what extent four of the most significant Colombian online newspapers manage to incorporate the concept of Peace Journalism into their reporting and thus contribute to peace in the country. Moreover, the aim of the research presented here is to answer how these newspapers represent and frame the *JEP* throughout the year of 2019. To answer these questions the qualitative oriented content analysis according to Philipp Mayring is used. 47 articles of the four newspapers *El Colombiano*, *El Espectador*, *El País Cali* and *El Tiempo* are analyzed in four different periods of the year 2019 with regard to the frames that were used in the specific media coverage. In addition, in a second step of the analysis, the characteristics of Peace Journalism established by Galtung were used as deductively formed categories within the investigation.

Overall, it can be said that the newspapers with the more politically liberal background portray *JEP* more strongly as a peace-bringing institution that is impartial and follows the law. The rather conservative online media outlets utilize frames with negative connotations more often than their competitors, but they increasingly cite third parties, such as the ruling party *Centro Democrático*. Furthermore, with regard to the characteristics of Peace Journalism, it can be seen that the more liberal newspapers manage to incorporate this criteria more than the conservative ones, although it must be noted that they also only partially meet Galtung's requirements.

Resumen

En 2016, el gobierno Colombiano del presidente Juan Manuel Santos alcanzó un acuerdo de paz con el mayor grupo guerrillero del país, las *FARC-EP*. Una parte importante de las negociaciones, que duraron cuatro años (2012-2016), fue la creación de un mecanismo de Justicia Transicional para investigar y juzgar a los miembros de las *FARC-EP*, así como a los miembros de la Fuerza Pública y a terceros que participaron en el conflicto armado. El nombre de esta jurisdicción es *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP)*. Desde su entrada en vigor en 2017, ha habido mucho discurso público sobre esta institución, incluyendo el debate en los medios de comunicación colombianos.

Los medios de comunicación en línea e impresos colombianos, en particular, pueden tener un impacto en la población, enmarcar y dar forma a ciertos discursos a través de su información. Esto, a su vez, significa que ciertos tipos de reportajes pueden tener un impacto en la percepción de ciertos temas – como instituciones específicas – y pueden alimentar y mitigar un conflicto. Por ello, el sociólogo noruego Johan Galtung creó el concepto de Periodismo de Paz, con el que los periodistas pueden contribuir positivamente al desarrollo de cualquier conflicto o guerra. Por lo tanto, en esta tesis se determinará en qué medida cuatro de los periódicos en línea colombianos más significativos logran incorporar el concepto de Periodismo de Paz en sus informaciones y así contribuir a la paz en el país. Además, el objetivo de la investigación que aquí se presenta es responder cómo estos periódicos representan y enmarcan la *JEP* a lo largo del año 2019. Para responder a estas preguntas se utiliza el análisis de contenido de orientación cualitativa según Philipp Mayring. Se analizan 47 artículos de los cuatro periódicos *El Colombiano*, *El Espectador*, *El País Cali* y *El Tiempo* en cuatro periodos diferentes del año 2019 con respecto a los encuadres que se utilizaron en el cubrimiento mediático específico. Además, en un segundo paso del análisis, se utilizaron las características del Periodismo de Paz establecidas por Galtung como categorías formadas deductivamente dentro de la investigación. En general, puede decirse que los periódicos con un trasfondo político más liberal retratan con más fuerza al PJ como una institución pacificadora, imparcial y que cumple la ley. Los medios online, más bien conservadores, utilizan marcos con connotaciones negativas con más frecuencia que sus competidores, pero citan cada vez más a terceros, como el partido gobernante Centro Democrático. Por otra parte, en cuanto a las características del Periodismo de Paz, se observa que los periódicos más liberales consiguen incorporar este criterio más que los conservadores, aunque hay que señalar que también cumplen parcialmente los requisitos de Galtung.

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1. Introduction

On May 1st, 2020, the Colombian weekly newspaper *Revista Semana* published an article called “Las carpetas secretas”¹ (cf. Semana 2020). *Revista Semana* reports that Colombian military officials conducted computer surveillance of more than 130 different individuals between February and December 2019. Among these people were politicians, trade unionists, but the vast majority were journalists, both from Colombia and from other countries, i.e., from the United States of America (cf. *ibid.*). In the process, they performed secret software searches, collecting massive amounts of personal data, such as telephone numbers, private and work addresses, information about family members or where these people voted (cf. Semana 2020). What is clear is that these investigations of mainly journalists’ personal data represent a significant interference with the country’s freedom of the press. Especially with the events in Colombia in 2019, such as the rearming of some guerrilla fighters of the group *FARC-EP*, this event joins the continuous flow of the internal Colombian conflict that has kept the country in suspense since the late 1940s (cf. Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia 2018 : 1).

Colombian journalists reported particularly frequently on one topic during this 2019 military surveillance period: The *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP)*, a transitional justice organ that was one of the components of the peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the country’s biggest guerrilla group, *FARC-EP*, in the year 2016 and is intended to judge crimes committed during the armed conflict (cf. Final agreement 2016: 153). In doing so, the *JEP* should serve to speak justice, find out the truth about what happened and ensure reparations for the victims of the conflict and their right to non-repetition (cf. *ibid.*). The *JEP*, as well as the reporting of the Colombian press in 2019, can influence, change and shape the development of the armed conflict (cf. Bilke 2007: 139). This might also have been the reason for the illicit surveillance performed by the military.

In order to find out how newspapers, or media coverage in general, should contribute to the development of a conflict, the sociologist Johan Galtung established a theoretic frame called Peace Journalism. He found out which characteristics news reports need to follow in order to not aggravate and how to positively attribute to a conflict as a journalist. The media coverage of topics related to the *JEP*, which *could* shape the conflict in certain ways, will be studied in this master thesis. The purpose of this work is to find out what the coverage of four of the most significant newspapers in Colombia looked like in four different periods of the year 2019. For

¹Own translation: “The secret files”.

this purpose, 47 online articles from the newspapers *El Colombiano*, *El Espectador*, *El País Cali*² and *El Tiempo* will be examined from different perspectives of investigation. To this end, this paper first clarifies understandings of peace and how ongoing conflicts are dealt with politically for the purpose to establish peace in a particular region. Therefore, the terms Peace Building, Peace Keeping and Peace Process will be discussed in order to distinguish them from each other and to see what advantages and disadvantages these types of peacemaking have in practice. For this aim, investigations of Jabri (2013) and Selby (2008) will be taken into consideration. Furthermore, principles of journalism will be explained, which should help to understand what kind of tools journalists use in their coverage. Here, for example, the basic agenda setting approach will be drawn, the main authors on this theoretical standard work are still McCombs and Shaw (1972), however, more recent developments that other authors studied lately, such as the development of agenda setting in online media, will be incorporated (cf. Vonbun et al 2016). Moreover, the idea of frame-creation and frame-use by Jörg Matthes (2014) will be presented and the significance of these frames for Peace Journalism is explained. Afterwards, Johan Galtung's (1998b) explanations of Peace Journalism will be unfolded in more detail and expanded with theories by Wilhelm Kempf (2004) – who has a rather psychologic point of view – in order to provide a comprehensive framework for linking the theories of peace and conflict studies with journalism.

In addition to this, a closer look will be taken at the historic developments of the Colombian armed conflict, the formation of the guerrilla group *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC)*, more recent progresses that led to the peace agreement between these guerrillas and the Colombian state, such as the creation of the *JEP*. Before beginning the qualitative content analysis begins, the stories of the four newspapers' origins will be studied. With this theoretical background knowledge of Peace Journalism and the Colombian Conflict, 47 articles from four Colombian newspapers will be analyzed in the evaluation section. The qualitative content analysis will therefore be based on the theoretical framework by Philipp Mayring (2015), who established quality criteria for this type of analysis, which will also be presented in the corresponding chapter. In the second, analytical part of the work, it will be examined to what extent the newspapers implement the principles of Peace Journalism in their articles and whether they manage to establish this type of journalism

² In the following: *El País*

stringently over all four periods of 2019 that were chosen for the following analysis. Furthermore, the question arises whether different images of the *JEP* are drawn in the different newspapers during those time periods and whether these images change over time.

2. The Theoretical Basis

2.1 The Main Understanding of Peace

In order to understand the concept of Peace Journalism it is necessary to disaggregate the different notions within the main concept. Firstly, a closer look will be taken at the primary part of the concept “peace”. In the next chapters the notion of peace will be explained in more detail so the analysis at the end of this thesis can follow a stringent and well-defined concept.

First of all, it can be perceived that there is more than one way to define peace itself. Different authors claim their peace concept to be the most encompassing one. This is also why different approaches and discussions in the scientific sphere talk at cross purposes because different definitions of peace are taken into account and the main aim of peace cannot be reached because of diverse perceptions. Therefore, this thesis will concentrate on one specific concept of peace which was defined by the Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung with the extension by the Austrian psychologist Wilhelm Kempf. Galtung’s definition which will be seen further on was already established in 1969 (cf. 167). Consequently, there must have been more recent developments in the peace research field which also need to be considered. However, the basic structure remains valid and for the most part it is still highly topical and universally applicable. By the fact that Galtung himself also invented and shaped Peace Journalism, he sensibly laid the foundation with his definition of peace for this work (cf. Galtung 1998a: 5). Nevertheless, the additions of Wilhem Kempf’s additions that are in turn based on the work of Galtung, consider an influence of recent conflicts and therefore a more modern view on peace (cf. Kempf 2019: 2). Combining those will create a solid foundation of understanding peace in this research. In the following chapters an overview about peace research will be given in more detail. Firstly, the concepts of Galtung and Kempf will be shown and elucidated. case.

2.1.1 An Understanding of Peace by Johan Galtung

Already in 1969, the Norwegian mathematician, sociologist and political scientist Johan Galtung was convinced that the notion of peace in everyday language was misused and inaccurate (cf. Galtung 1969: 167). He points out that:

“[t]he use of more precise terms drawn from the vocabulary of one conflict group, and excluded from the vocabulary of the opponent group, may in itself cause dissent and lead to manifest conflict precisely because the term is so clearly understood” (Galtung 1969: 167).

Therefore, he wanted to establish a more precise definition of the notion so different conflict groups could have the same fundamental understanding of peace (cf. *ibid.*). To begin with, Galtung distinguishes between two different approaches of peace: the so called negative and positive peace (cf. Galtung 1964: 2ff.).

Negative peace, according to Galtung is the absence of direct violence and war (cf. Galtung 1964: 3). The definition of this kind of peace could be the replacement for the notion of peace in everyday language. He specifies as well that this negative peace is the most unlikely case to happen in everyday life (cf. *ibid.*). It would presuppose that there was a consistent “[h]armony and bliss in psychological, social and political sense” within a society which is not likely to happen and therefore highly utopian (Galtung 1964: 3). Galtung also mentions that this case would not occur without a disarmament, not only of civilians but also of the state and its organs, which is also improbable (cf. *ibid.*).

On the other hand, Galtung mentions positive peace that can be seen not only as the absence of any kind of violence, but as a more comprehensive set of conditions for peace. That means to participate in a stable peace that is not only the absence of violence but the contribution of human beings to a more peaceful society (cf. Galtung 1964: 2). With this contribution he means

“to change [humans’] ideas about other groups, improved contact through exchange, improved understanding through studies, peace research itself, semantic analyses, improved communication – especially news communication – changes in the economic order of society, and so on to functional cooperation between groups or nations through technical and cultural cooperation or trade policies, to institutional fusion with superordinate bureaucracies, police forces, courts and governments till the world state is reached.” (Galtung 1964: 3)

Galtung calls upon his fellow peace researchers and demands that peace research should

“concern itself with reduction of violence and promotion of integration regardless of the basis of group-organization. Thus, race conflict or other group conflicts are relevant to peace not only because they may lead to international conflict or teach us something about it, but in their own right.” (Galtung 1964: 2)

According to this argumentation, negative and positive peace are two different dimensions which are observed apart from each other (cf. *ibid.*). The question that poses itself at this point is why Galtung tended to use the highly normative terms *positive* and *negative* peace in order to describe his concepts. The answer to this question is, according to the sociologist himself, it is due to the fact that “the absence of personal violence does not lead to a positively defined condition, whereas the absence of structural violence is what we have referred to as social justice, which is a positively defined condition” (Galtung 1969: 183). Galtung’s idea is not only to end violence but also establish social structures in order to prevent violence (cf. Singh Grewal 2003: 4). Therefore, a closer look at all parts of a society must be taken in all levels of human interaction (cf. *ibid.*). Singh Grewal interprets Galtung’s statements in the way that:

“[I]nter-gender violence is no less important than inter-state violence and positive peace promotion has to address issues of violence at all levels. This requires an understanding of the civilisations, development, peace and conflict studied eclectically.” (2003: 4f.)

Galtung emphasizes in his argumentation not to prevent conflict but violence (cf. Galtung 1969: 191). Conflict in his point of view can be either a win-win or a win-lose situation, but it is always an “incompatibility of goals” (*ibid.*). Unlike violence which “is present when people are so influenced that their actual somatic and psychic realization is less than their potential realization.” (Kempf 2019: 2).

2.1.2 The Extension of the Peace Notion by Wilhelm Kempf

In order to include more recent developments in peace research, the extension of the term of peace, elaborated by the Austrian psychologist Wilhelm Kempf, should be taken into account. Kempf himself uses Galtung’s execution of peace as a basic assumption and expands these ideas by adding more present terms and criticising some parts of Galtung’s peace understanding (cf. Kempf 2019: 1). The outcome is an outright peace term to work with in the ongoing thesis. In contrast to Galtung, Kempf uses a more constructive way of conflict resolution (cf. Kempf 2019: 1). The author mentions that he does not want to do a judgemental classification of peace – such as Galtung’s positive and negative peace – but a rather neutral division (cf. *ibid.*).

Nevertheless, Kempf is of the opinion that a distinction between conflict and violence needs to be done in order to define peace properly (cf. *ibid.*). Therefore, he gives his own definition of these two terms. He sees conflict as a “mutual obstruction or hindrance of actions or goals of two or more conflict parties” whereas violence is a “violation of people’s physical or mental integrity” (Kempf 2019: 2). Going further than Galtung, Kempf not only includes human beings into his concept of violence, but also the integrity of objects and economic violence as a disturbance of peace while saying that “[d]amaging or destroying the economic capacity of a person, group or society” falls into the category of violence (Kempf 2019: 2). Therefore, peace is not only the absence of violence against a human being itself, but also against its mental and economic wellbeing.

2.1.3 A Definition of Peace

In conclusion, it can be said that peace is not only the pure absence of violence as it is seen as such in an everyday understanding (cf. Galtung 1969: 191; cf. Kempf 1978: 81). Galtung’s idea is not only to end violence but also establish social structures in order to prevent violence (cf. Galtung 1969: 191). Therefore, a closer look at all parts of a society must be taken in all levels of humanization (cf. Singh Grewal 2003: 4). In this sense, Galtung already made three assumptions to grasp the concept in more detail:

- The notion “peace” needs to be seen as a term for goals within a society which need to be accepted by most of the members
- There needs to be a possibility to fulfil these goals, they must not be utopian
- The presumption that negative peace is the pure absence of violence keeps being binding (cf. Galtung 1969: 167).

Nevertheless, violence does not equal conflict. Conflict itself is an important tool that helps maintaining peace in a society.

In this sense, peace does not only take place at the state or formal level, but affects all strata of the population, and not only on a direct or indirect level of physical and mental integrity of people, but also on objects and the avoidance of so-called economic violence (cf. Kempf 2019: 2). Furthermore, it can be assumed that in this thesis, the peace notion is therefore not only seen as the negative peace Galtung describes. It will be acknowledged that peace in the now following chapters is an absence of the direct and structural violence already mentioned, but also the establishment of a specific form of conflict management provided by Kempf (2019: 2):

“The strategy to understand own positions as means to achieve underlying interests, and to keep them disposable until common (or at least reconcilable) interests are found, starting from which one seeks compatible courses of action that enable conflict parties to support their justifiable interests.”

2.2 Peace Creation and Maintenance during and after a Violent Conflict

The theoretical basis that was laid in the previous chapters now allows to continue further and apply the theoretical framework on a more applicable field. The question that poses itself now is the following: How is it possible to establish, maintain or keep peace after a real, social and violent conflict? For this reason, two different, fundamental peace concepts were chosen to be presented in the next points. Therefore, the approaches of Peace Building and Peace Process will be clarified.

2.2.1 Peace Building

One measure in order to establish peace is the so-called Peace Building. According to Selby (2008) Peace Building only begins after a conflict has ended (cf. Selby 2008: 14). According to the United Nations, “Post-conflict peace-building was defined as action to identify and support structures which strengthened and solidified peace to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations 1993: 36). Peace Building after a conflict is therefore highly critical. Mostly, the Peace Building measures, after a conflict has ended, are imposed by international organizations and liberal westerners from NGOs that tend to establish their own version of peace (cf. Jabri 2013: 12). It can be criticized that these missions are founded on a neo-colonial civilizing mission and that they are mainly “an attempt to transplant liberal democratic structures into post-conflict societies” (Selby 2008: 12).

Furthermore, the main aim is to establish arrangements for a social and economic renewal in post-conflict societies (cf. *ibid.*). The missions therefore might seem post-conflictual but tend to have post-colonial structures which restrict the possibilities of a post-conflict society to implement their own ideas for its future (cf. Jabri 2013: 3). The problem that occurs in these situations is not the “significant distinction [...] between ‘internationals’ and ‘locals’, but rather, between practices that view their target as populations to be governed and practices that recognize these populations and their conflicts as distinctly political” (Jabri 2013: 6).

In order to grasp what Peace Building really stands for, Vivienne Jabri provides two basic imperatives of the norm of Peace Building. She points out that the first principle is the “liberalism” principle which says that “[t]he project of peace building is hence one of institution-building, one that is geared toward the transformation of the state itself” (Jabri 2013: 8). This means the governmentalizing imperative can be seen as the international normative consensus and its occurrence is perceived as desirable (cf. *ibid.*). The second principle is based on the ideas of Boutros Boutros-Ghali who pointed out that the aim of Peace Building actions is to ensure the prevention of future atrocities (cf. Jabri 2013: 10). Moreover, the intervention in the name of human rights places human rights above sovereign rights, so the conflict is therefore “not interpreted in terms of political contestation, but primarily as a matter of the failure of government” (*ibid.*). The idea is to reach a sustainable peace through the re-shaping of societies and their institutions, such as the government, which is seen as a guarantee for peace (cf. *ibid.*).

These Peace Building missions frequently took place in Central America in the 1990s as a response to post-cold war conflicts (cf. Pearce 1999: 51). So-called *Complex political emergency (CPE)* research projects developed the concept of Peace Building further and identified its three critical elements (cf. *ibid.*). Mostly, the crises are multi-dimensional, and a profound human suffering exists after the conflict has ended, their “[r]oots are in part political, [and] complicated by other disasters” and “[o]ne dimension of emergency is that the state has failed or collapsed” (Pearce 1999: 51). In Central America though, most of the states did not collapse but Peace Building in these areas has been predisposed by the failure to find a path to economic growth (cf. *ibid.*: 65). Most of these interventions came from the “international community, particularly the USA, [when they] played an interventionist role in defeating the efforts of poor and middle-class radicals to reform and modernize the state through revolutionary armed struggle” (Pearce 1999: 66). It can be recognized that the liberalization in these areas were the main aim of the missions and more important than Peace Building itself (cf. *ibid.*).

2.2.2 Peace Process

Another way to restore peace are the so-called Peace Processes. In contrast to Peace Building, Peace Processing already begins during an ongoing conflict and does not end after a cease-fire but also tries to establish peace after a conflict has ended (cf. Selby 2008: 12). Peace Processes

can take place in intra-state and inter-state conflicts and have mostly – but not necessarily – neutral international mediators (cf. *ibid.*). In order to start a Peace Process, it is immanent that the negotiating parties have built enough trust and confidence so the willingness to trust and to make a compromise supports the peace establishment (cf. *ibid.*). Selby furthermore points out that Peace Processes have certain side effects that influence the implementation of measures taken by the negotiators:

“These developments are accompanied by economic and social reconstruction programmes funded by international peacebuilders or state authorities, which, in combination with the resolution of outstanding political differences, hopefully usher in a final peace settlement and a happy conclusion to the peace process” (Selby 2008: 13).

According to him Peace Processes are a rather new phenomenon in the sphere of peace establishment, because it was “first used only in the mid-1970s, when American diplomats coined it as a label for the tentative thaw in relations between Israel, Syria and Egypt” (Selby 2008: 13). Moreover, Peace Processes often have vulnerabilities “because of a fundamental mismatch between the nature of the conflict and the conflict management strategies deployed” (Mac Ginty 2006: 76f.). The most important characteristic of a Peace Process is though, that “inter-elite political accommodations [exist] whose aim is often not so much ‘peace’ as the reconfiguration of domestic hegemony and/or international legitimacy” (Selby 2008: 13). The goal is therefore not the peace itself, but the negotiations are based on a personal and economical advantage which disadvantages the less fortunate in a society (cf. *ibid.*).

Concluding, one could say that Peace Processes are mostly led by local elites and are therefore more likely to fail (cf. *ibid.*). It needs to be acknowledged that Peace Processes are “informed by a sharply realist power politics”, which means that profits and losses are weighed rationally (Selby 2008: 13; cf. Wendt 1992: 400). Peace Processes are mostly seen from a political and economic point of view but are lacking to create a social sphere (cf. Selby 2008: 13). In the context of this work, it is the most applicable version of peace establishment to journalism in a post-conflict situation, because the media plays an important role in Peace Processes (cf. Hattotuwa 2002). Hattotuwa mentions that:

“The media can also serve as destructive agents in a peace process, and can choose to negatively report on the risks and dangers associated with compromise, raise the legitimacy of those opposed to concessions, and reinforce negative stereotypes of the enemy” (Hattotuwa 2002).

What media can really do in this case, according to Hattotuwa, is to define the political atmosphere (cf. *ibid.*). Furthermore, journalists need to influence the stakeholders' strategy and behaviour to the conflict and then influence the nature of debate on a Peace Process (cf. Hattotuwa 2002). She points out that "media can buttress or weaken public legitimacy of the stakeholders involved in the peace process" (*ibid.*). This is why it must be acknowledged that journalism can have an influence on Peace Processes. In the now following chapters the importance of journalism and reporting during the transition from violence to peace will be explained in more detail.

2.3 Terminology in Journalism Studies

The main aim all journalists ought to strive for is the accurate and neutral representation of reality and to provide the most accurate image of the world possible (cf. Schulz 1989: 140). Therefore, it is questionable how the term Peace Journalism fits to this demand for a neutral manner of reporting because it sounds like it would influence the audience in a certain way (cf. Bilke 2003). In the following points, the notion Peace Journalism will be explained more precisely and concepts of audience influencing will be further elaborated.

2.3.1 Peace Journalism

Numerous studies show that the media coverage on crises and wars is not nearly as objective and neutral as it is ought to be (cf. Bilke 2003). Distinctions are made between good and bad, sides are taken, and the narrating structures do not have anything to do with the roots or the realities of a conflict (cf. *ibid.*). This is why it was clear to some academics that there needs to be a new form of conflict and peace reporting in order to break up narrative patterns and to support a neutral and all-encompassing coverage about war, crisis and peace (cf. Bilke 2003). Journalism in its whole, develops the ability to carry out a profound conflict analysis. In this way, the media could support non-partisan mediators in the peace service and also act as mediators (cf. *ibid.*).

The ensuing question that poses itself now: What exactly is Peace Journalism and how can it be defined properly? Lynch's answer to the question is the following:

"Peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – about what to report, and how to report it – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and to value non-violent responses to conflict" (Lynch n.n.: 1).

Peace Journalism is therefore not an investigation department but a journalistic self-perception. Furthermore, Kempf points out that Peace Journalism is not only a field of journalism studies but mostly of psychology (cf. Kempf 2004: 439). He also says that based on the results of social psychology, propaganda and enemy image research as well as models of conflict management and the constructive transformation of conflicts, it is investigated which influencing factors cause an escalation-oriented bias of conventional war reporting and how this can be transformed into a de-escalation or peace-oriented conflict reporting (cf. *ibid.*). Building up upon Kempf's findings it can be said that depending on the form of informational coverage, journalists can aggravate or deescalate a conflict in certain ways. This is why it is immanent that journalists must be sensitized to specific conflicts they are working on.

The well-known Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung therefore wrote several essays about the importance of a Peace Journalism (cf. Bilke 2003). According to his argumentation, a journalist has a specific background, with personal experiences which make him or her inform in a specific way. This is why they always influence a conflict and impose a certain way of seeing it (cf. Bilke 2007: 137f). In order to comply with the maxims of objective reporting, it is therefore important for journalists what kind of expressions they use and about what kind of event they are reporting (cf. Loquai 2007: 61). Moreover, they should think about their style of coverage, how they introduce and present certain people and what kind of proposals they make in order to present solutions (cf. *ibid.*).

Galtung presented his idea of Peace Journalism based on his conflict theories. He criticizes existing journalistic structures in relation to the media coverage and how journalists could improve this situation. Furthermore, Galtung also makes a distinction between Peace Journalism and War Journalism (cf. Galtung 1998b: 4). He says that there needs to be a differentiation between transformation and the actual conflict or between the meta-conflict and the question who wins (cf. *ibid.*). He provides two patterns of media coverage about conflicts. The first one, which Galtung calls "low road" is also classic War Journalism (cf. Galtung 1998b: 4). It can be determined that a reduction to two parties occurs (cf. *ibid.*). During a still ongoing violence, patterns of military command characterize the reporting. The questions answered in articles and reports are mostly "Who surrenders?", "How many casualties were there?", etc. (cf. *ibid.*). After or during peace negotiations, low road coverage provides verbal battles about the topics "who gives in?" and "who deviates the least in the end?" (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5).

The second pattern which can be seen as the literate Peace Journalism is the so-called “high-road” coverage (cf. *ibid.*). In the center of the reporting is the transformation of the conflict and there is always an opportunity for violence but also an opportunity for progress and change in the coverage (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5). According to Galtung, there are several questions good peace journalists need to ask themselves in order to implement the high-road media reporting and therefore Peace Journalism:

- What is the subject of the conflict? Who are the parties to the conflict, what are their real goals? How many parties are invisible in the background?
- What are the structural and cultural roots of the conflict, also from a historical perspective?
- What ideas are presented for solutions other than one party imposing its ideas on others? In particular creative or new ideas? Can these ideas be powerful enough to prevent violence?
- When it comes to the use of violence: what about such invisible consequences as trauma and hatred and the desire for retribution and fame?
- Who tries to prevent violence? What visions of a conflict outcome do these people have, what are their methods and how can they be supported?
- Who initiates reconstruction, reconciliation and conflict resolution and who ultimately benefits from the activities of others? (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5f.)

Galtung demands a more open discourse, in which journalists need to report about positive and negative aspects, about resolutions and violence and that they should try to change the discourse in a society (cf. Galtung 1998b: 6). Moreover, he accuses the war journalists for not paying attention to Peace Journalism and thus intensifying conflicts (cf. Bilke 2007: 139). Furthermore, Galtung adds the idea that Peace Journalism needs to be seen like a real Peace Process which is always evolving and transforming (cf. *ibid.*). The tools for constructing a path towards peace are the same as in a real Peace Process: conflict analysis, veracity, empathy and the will to establish compromises (cf. Bilke 2003).

Galtung proposes two types of conflict resolution based on his idea of Peace Journalism. The first is the so-called “journalism of attachment” (Galtung 1998b: 8). It ought to be the voice of the victims, to call the international community to act and to make a classification in good and bad but still have a connection with both sides (cf. Galtung 1998b: 8f.). The second which is also called Peace Journalism seeks to influence a conflict in order to prevent violence and to

transform it constructively (cf. Galtung 1998b: 9). Concluding, the term Peace Journalism should investigate certain conflict backgrounds and provide solutions in order to reach peace. Moreover, a voice is given to the voiceless, which means the victims. Additionally, the journalist finds himself in a mediator position and be aware of the fact that his reporting should be de-escalating (cf. Galtung 1998b: 10).

Why should journalists go the harder path and implement Peace Journalism even when War Journalism seems to be the easier and, in some cases, the more accurate way of reporting? It is based on idea that the action of conflict parties is not determined by the objective conflict situation, for example the actual incompatibility of their rights, intentions and actions, but by their subjective conflict perception (cf. Blumer 1973: 82). People are not acting because of the objective nature of things in their environment, but because of the meaning that they have for them (cf. *ibid.*). Psychologically speaking, Peace Journalism seeks to influence subjective points of view rather than explain objective concepts (cf. Kempf 2004: 442). According to Kempf reporting is about the construction of social realities and about the question what role journalism and the media play in this process (cf. Kempf 2004: 442). These questions and how media coverage influences the audience will be clarified in the following points.

2.3.2 Journalism's Possible Influences on Recipients

It has been empirically proven that journalistic publications have the power to influence the recipients in many different ways. As Bonfadelli and Friemel emphasize, however, there is only a weak correlation between the use of mass media and the actual knowledge transfer that mass media strives for (cf. 2017: 239). A difference of the degree of information transfer and the actual medium can be recognized: print media is more suitable for this kind of learning process than television or radio channels. In the following chapters it will be pointed out why this is happening. Even though the internet – or in this case online articles – is also counted as electronic media, it behaves analogously to print media (cf. *ibid.*). Lenz and Zillien also mention different social factors, such as psychological, social and cultural barriers, that could be important to gain knowledge while using mass media (cf. 2005: 238). These specific factors should not be a determining point in this thesis, since the focus will be on the online mass media and how journalists can overthink and develop their article structures and production. It just needs to be acknowledged that the social standing of the recipient also changes the way of his

reception of certain articles. In order to understand and clarify possible patterns of the influence on the recipient, the following chapter now deals with the effects of mass media.

2.3.3 Agenda Setting

In the modern, connected world social discourses about certain topics exist that affect certain social or cultural groups. The question is, who decides which topics are worth debating about and which aspects and opinions about these topics are stressed in media coverage? In order to answer this question, McCombs and Shaw assumed that mass media coverage could influence the society and established the basic Agenda Setting approach which will be explained in the following part.

2.3.3.1 The basic Agenda Setting Approach

In order to prove their assumptions, McCombs and Shaw took a deeper look at mass media reporting and its connection with voters' opinions about the political US-election campaign in 1968 (cf. McCombs/Shaw 1972: 181). After their research they could confirm their former hypothesis:

“In short, the data suggest a very strong relationship between the emphasis placed on different campaign issues by the media (reflecting to a considerable degree the emphasis by candidates) and the judgments of voters as to the salience and importance of various campaign topics.”(McCombs/Shaw 1972: 181)

After that, the Agenda Setting Theory was often extended to other political campaigns and McCombs and Shaw could recognize more and more coherencies about mass media coverage and the topics of conversation:

“[T]he political world is reproduced imperfectly by individual news media. Yet the evidence in this study that voters tend to share the media's composite definition of what is important strongly suggests an agenda-setting function of the mass media” (McCombs/Shaw 1972: 184).

Although McCombs and Shaw only focused on political campaigns, the idea can be spread and applied to other non-political topics “[t]he salience [that is given] to certain topics will shape public perception of the most important issues in one society.” (Ninkovic Slavnic 2016: 50). The Agenda Setting theory states that topics that are published in the mass media are automatically topics that are discussed in society (cf. *ibid.*). In any case, it can be assumed that mass media coverage influences the assessment of the importance of topics (cf.

Jäckel/Fröhlich/Röder 2012: 67). Jäckel also points out that not only the thematization but also structuration of topics is part of the Agenda Setting process (cf. *ibid.*). This is also why DeFleur and Lowery formulated certain steps that are characteristic for Agenda Setting processes:

“First, the media provoked among its audiences an awareness of the issues. Second, it provided a body of information to the members of that audience. Third, this information provided the basis for attitude formation or change on the part of those who acquired it. And fourth, the attitudes shaped behavior among those involved in the sequence” (DeFleur/Lowery 1995: 275).

Over time, different Agenda Setting approaches emerged, so that the basic Agenda Setting was extended to the concept of attribute Agenda Setting (cf. McCombs/Shaw 1972: 184; cf. Ninkovic Slavnic 2016: 48). This notion “explores how these issues are framed, described and explained. [...] It evolved with the aim to explore and explain interconnected processes which shape people’s perception, knowledge and attitudes about public affairs.” (Ninkovic Slavnic 2016: 48f.). The more research was done, the more results of various studies emerged so the following points can be assumed:

- Leading media determine the public agenda (cf. McCombs 2008: 2).
- Leading media have cognitive effects on the recipient (cf. Davie/Maher 2010: 360).
- Other media adopt the agenda of leading media as well, so that the agenda setting process has a “top-down” character even within the media system (cf. McCombs/Guo 2005: 253).
- Online blogs and debates in online forums can influence the agenda of the leading media (cf. Jang 2010: 39).
- Political campaigns and individual politicians can influence how an agenda is shaped as part of an agenda building (cf. Dunn, 2005: 637).
- Public relations by own parties lead to this phenomenon, which is also called priming (Meier 2018: 119).

With all these assumptions in mind it must be noted that Agenda Setting itself is divided into three different agendas that influence the actual agenda setting of media makers (cf. Dearing/Rogers 1996: 5). The first agenda is called the Media Agenda which defines the number and scope of a certain topic in the news, how often and to what extend is it mentioned in the media reporting (cf. *ibid.*). The second one is called Public Agenda and defines which topics the society considers to be important (cf. *ibid.*) This Public Agenda also implies an interdependency between the audience and the media itself, which means that both parties

influence one another (cf. Dearing/Rogers 1996: 5). The third agenda is the so-called Policy Agenda which includes the political agenda, so to say parliament debates or budget distributions, etc. (cf. *ibid.*). Although large, national, quality newspaper's sales seem to be declining, they still have a central role in the agenda setting process (cf. Abdi-Herrle 2018: 35; cf. McCombs/Guo 2005: 253). Studies have found that print offers determine the topic and exercise the already mentioned top-down character on television channels and radio stations (cf. *ibid.*). Some well-known and established international mass media channels – such as the *New York Times* – also influence a global agenda and imply their ideas on national media in foreign countries (cf. Danielian/Reese 1982: 41f.).

2.3.3.2 Agenda-Setting and its Development in Online Media

The research done by McCombs and Shaw already took place in the late 60s when online media did not have any influence on the audience. Now the question arises how the Agenda Setting has developed with regard to the internet and online media news in general. An investigation done by Vonbun et al. (2016) examined this specific question in more detail. They found out that “[m]any newspapers use their online outlets to publish articles online before they appear in the printed newspaper. In general, then, it can be assumed that online news coverage will precede traditional media (newspapers and broadcasts).” (Vonbun et al. 2016: 1056). Due to the rise of online media Vonbun et al. presumed that “it seems plausible that the relationship between print and online has now been reversed and online news has become more influential in terms of intermedia agenda-setting.” (Vonbun et al. 2016: 1067).

It is therefore no longer just print media, but mainly online editions of print magazines that provide the agenda setting, not only for society, but also have an influence on other media types and shape their agenda setting. Due to these facts, the empirical chapters of this thesis will focus on online editions of newspapers which have the highest influence on the public agenda.

2.3.4 Framing

If a particular topic has landed on the agenda of the online edition of the newspaper, there is another factor that influences the perception of the article. This specific factor is called framing. The framing process will now be explained using a specific example, which is the tonality in daily discussions about the *Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)*. The way people perceive the *ELN* is already very controversial within the Colombian population: For some they are communists, for other freedom fighters, for other right-wing people, for others terrorists.

Matthes points out that these opinions are highly influenced by the journalistic media coverage (cf. Matthes 2014: 9). But what has the *ELN* to do with framing and what connection can be built there? This question will be explained in the following chapter.

2.3.4.1 Key Terms in Framing Research

Matthes defines the so-called frames in a way that they are interpretation forms that stress certain information and positions while fading out others (cf. Matthes 2014: 10). Meier widens this term and points out that frames are mostly cognitive structures that are embedded in everyone's conscience (cf. Meier 2018: 209). Accordingly, the framing approach deals with the origin, change and the effects of frames on the level of communicators, media content and recipients (cf. Matthes 2014: 10). Frames, therefore, structure a topic and regulate information processes (cf. Meier 2018: 209).

Besides the definition Matthes offers four key assumptions about the framing process. The first assumption is called the "presumption of ambivalence" (Matthes 2014: 20). This principle stresses that there is a coexistence of several, conflicting aspects provided by different communicators, for example from different newspapers, that stress different parts of a specific topic (cf. *ibid.*). In the case of the Colombian conflict and the position towards the *ELN*, different newspapers would stress different aspects of the group within their media coverage about them. This could be for example either the groups' religious background or their leftist ideology. Matthes justifies the ambivalence towards a topic with the different interests of newspapers (cf. Matthes 2014: 20). The second assumption is the "principle of selection" (cf. *ibid.*). It means that communicators can stress different aspects and leave out others, therefore some aspects get more attention than others (cf. *ibid.* 20f.) The "principle of selection" therefore describes the function of frames in picking out certain aspects from this ambivalent world. Journalists structure social events in a way that is not fully implied by the events themselves (cf. *ibid.*). Matthes' third principle is called the "principle of consistency" which describes that frames provide a coherent horizon of meaning for all actors (cf. Matthes 2014: 21). Frame elements – so to say the definition of the problem plus a cause analysis, instructions and provided solutions – are connected in order to establish a consistency in the argumentation. An actor advocates for a point of view during a discourse and sticks to its frame (cf. Matthes 2014: 21). The last assumption Matthes provides to explain framing is the "principle of competition" (cf. *ibid.*). It means that the frames of several actors are in a contest for sovereignty of

interpretation. Actors do not only advocate their own view but have to deal with others' opinions and frames in order to react to them adequately. The goal is to prevail the own frame, which means society is taking on the discourse of one party (cf. Matthes 2014: 22). For the recipient himself, the principle of competition is an internal process which is made up individually (cf. *ibid.*).

Moreover, framing is not a completely conscious action. Surely, journalists can freely choose the frames they want to use, but sometimes unconscious frames are set by journalist without them even realizing (cf. Kuklinski/Sigelman 1992: 819). Therefore "images of reality [...] in a predictable and patterned way" are emerging (McQuail 1994: 331). Mass media in that sense establishes frames for their recipients in their informational coverage, so they can discuss and interpret certain events. At the same time there are pre-existing frames coming from the journalistic coverage because journalists – like all human beings – have personal backgrounds which they make them interpret and inform in a specific way (cf. Scheufele 1999: 107). This is why the theories of news selection are connected to psychological and sociological theories (cf. Meier 2018: 209). Even though, the influence of the journalist's personal background and the interpretation of the recipient is given, nobody can tell to which extend they are influencing the public (cf. *ibid.*).

2.3.4.2 Conduct of Journalistic Framing Processes

After the term framing has been explained, it should now be clarified how framing works and how it occurs that journalists in particular make use of frames. For this reason, only journalistic framing will be of interest. Of course, the patterns also apply to other communicators, but it will be limited to journalists as they are conducive to this thesis.

The definition of a journalistic frame is close to the framing analogue. It can be said that the design of a journalistic outcome is influenced by frames. These frames are based on the ideas and the knowledge of a journalist (cf. Tuchman 1978: 184). As already mentioned, journalists have certain patterns in mind that make them determine which aspects of a topic are important, and which are not. It is important to acknowledge that this distinction is not always dependent on the personal opinion of the author but also linked to editorial guidelines (cf. *ibid.*). Journalists do not only assume topics of other communicators but also insert their own ideas, points of view and arguments (cf. *ibid.*). It can therefore be said that they select and construct frames,

and frame building simplifies the work of a journalist (cf. Tuchman 1978: 186). Journalists cannot accept all circumstances for every article and discuss contingencies, but instead they target certain schemes (cf. *ibid.*). In order to understand how frames are built, Scheufele's (1999) Framing Process Model is used to explain how frames are made up and how they are set.

Firstly, Scheufele describes the building of frames. He points out that "the key question is what kinds of organizational or structural factors of the media system, or which individual characteristics of journalists, can impact the framing of news content" (Scheufele D. 1999: 115). He also explains that the

"first source of influence is journalist-centered influences. Journalists actively construct frames to structure and make sense of incoming information. The formation of frames is moderated by variables such as ideology, attitudes, and professional norms [...] and is eventually reflected in the way journalists frame news coverage"(Scheufele D. 1999: 115).

The selection of frames also depends on the political guidelines the paper/channel/station has and how tied the journalist is to them (cf. *ibid.*). Moreover, journalists are exposed to external influences, such as opinions of politicians or interest groups (cf. *ibid.*).

Scheufele's second point is the so-called "Frame Setting" which can be seen as a rather similar terminology to Agenda Setting. The only difference here is that there is no salience of issues, but salience of issue attributes so that Frame Setting can be perceived as a second level Agenda Setting (cf. Scheufele 1999: 116). He continues in his third point of his argumentation that journalists are the audience of their own work or of the work of other journalists as well (cf. *ibid.*: 117). Therefore, "[i]t can be expected that journalists, like their audiences, are cognitive misers. Consequently, they are equally susceptible to the very frames that they use to describe events and issues." (Scheufele D. 1999: 117). Framing also has an influence on journalists, since they are exposed to framing as private persons outside of their work. Although an effect on an individual level exists, the question why and how this connection is established is not considered in this work, since psychological factors will not play a role. The important conclusion for this thesis is that it can be assumed that frames *can* indeed have an influence and therefore there is a possibility to influence an audience through media coverage (cf. *ibid.*).

2.3.5 Interim Conclusion on the Effects of the Media

Concluding the possible media effects on the recipient, it can be noted that both – Agenda Setting and Framing – can have an influence how recipients consume mass media. The content, the choice and the emphasis within the topic and the way of reporting can influence its entire discussion within a society. Moreover, a particularly high degree of knowledge transfer and wealth of influence is ascribed to print media and online media in particular. As pointed out in the previous chapters, especially Peace Journalism requires an increased attention on the placement of an article, the title and a neutral speech formation in the article in order not to aggravate a conflict or a situation. Everything that is published, in its own specific way, can have an influence on the audience. If Peace Journalism is to be established, special attention must be paid to the Agenda Setting and the Framing in the respective medium, as well as to linguistic subtleties and the tonality. Journalists need to become aware of their responsibility and their ability to shape and change a conflict. In the Colombian conflict in particular, which has determined political events in the country since the 1950s, journalists are even more likely to fulfill this special task. The conflict's history, roots and the most recent developments will be explained in the now following chapters.

2.4 The Colombian Conflict

The term “The Colombian Conflict” might not be the most accurate notion for the historical events that led to the current situation in the country. However, this term shall be used in order to describe historical developments in the country that paved the way to the actual situation in the republic. The reason why “The Colombian Conflict” is not the correct term, lies within the multidimensional character of the conflicts that were and are still going on in Colombia. Different groups of interest join mostly violent confrontations not only because of diverse motives, but also through contrasting genesis' and divergent geographical locations. Therefore, the emergences and development of one of the most involved actors in the conflict – the *FARC* – shall be stated.

2.4.1 Beginning and Roots

Arguably one of the most important periods for the development of the Colombian internal conflict, is the *La Violencia* period from 1946 to 1964. A time when the powerful parties within the two-party-system, the *Partido Conservador* and the *Partido Liberal* worked strongly against each other on the political field and the population was violently antagonized to a high

degree (cf. Livingstone/Pearce 2004: 42). Two circumstances that further fueled the conflict during this period were, first, the presidential election of the conservative politician Mariano Ospina Pérez in 1946 and, second, the assassination of the liberal Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948 (cf. Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia 2018: 1). After the election of Ospina Pérez, the liberal party experienced a split that had already been announced in the early 1940s. It was cloven between the official liberal candidate Gabriel Turbay Avinader and Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. The latter was an independent candidate of the Liberal Union and advocate of a more socialist political system (cf. Ararat Ospina 2013: 471). After the conservative candidate won the presidential election, many conservative landowners took this as an opportunity to take land from liberal farmers. They felt empowered to do this because they thought this expropriation of liberal land, would happen anyway with their new president (cf. Livingstone/Pearce 2004: 42). These assaults plunged the country into a valley of even more violence (cf. *ibid.*). In 1947, some 14,000 people died in these conflicts about land and political convictions (cf. Pécaut 2016: 12). This division in society and the lack of willingness to reach out to the other side culminated on April 9th, 1948, when the liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán was assassinated on open street in Bogotá (cf. Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia 2018: 5). This was followed by the so-called *Bogotazo*, the capital descended into chaos and violence, houses and streets were destroyed, and people were killed in street battles, which also triggered a new massive wave of violence in the rest of the country (cf. Arias Escobar 2018; cf. Bello Montes 2008: 76).

Then, in the 1950s, so-called *Repúblicas Independientes (RI)* were founded as a reaction to what was happening in Colombia (cf. Gonzáles Arias 1991: 72). They were later on perceived as mechanisms of political-military resistance to the violent persecution unleashed by the conservative government and they mainly consisted of liberals and communists (cf. Gonzáles Arias, 1991: 72). Their goal was to achieve an agrarian reform and become independent from the conservative government of President Rojas Pinilla (cf. *ibid.*). These *RI* are considered the predecessors of guerrilla groups, such as the *FARC*, which formed about a decade later in 1964 (cf. Secretariado Nacional de las FARC-EP 2020; cf. El País 2014). In the 70s then, in nearly all Latin America, the conflicts with the guerrilla groups ended, or were ended with the support of the United States of America with their fight against communism all over the continent (cf. Pizarro Leongómez 1996: 89). The consequence was the rise of different dictatorships in for example Brazil and Chile. Opposing to the rest of the continent this was not the case in Colombia, since the two main parties agreed on the *Frente Nacional*. An agreement that permitted the *Partido Liberal* and the *Partido Conservador* to share their power permanently.

This *Frente Nacional* did not threaten the people with as many restrictions as the dictatorships in the other countries and is therefore considered as “semi-closed” in a political sense (cf. *ibid.*). Even though the guerrilla groups suffered losses in the 70s, they mainly survived, and a new generation of guerrillas emerged, as for example *Movimiento 19 de Abril* known as *M-19* (cf. Pizarro Leongómez 1996: 89).

2.4.2 The *FARC-EP*

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the so-called *RI* spread all over the country. One member of the Communist Party, Manuel Marulanda, who led a small group of those *RI*'s settled down in Marquetalia, Tolima “with the goal of creating a society in which the needs and concerns of the rural population would be addressed” (Mapping Militant Organizations 2019: 2). In 1964, however, military forces invaded those *RI*'s with more than 16.000 soldiers and tried to capture the insurgents. Still, some of them, such as Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas, achieved to escape and settle down in Cauca where they founded the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)* by the end of the year 1964 (cf. Molano 2000: 26).

In the following years, under the government of the *Frente Nacional*, the president Pastrana “adopted a rural development model that aimed to eliminate all obstacles to free investment in the countryside.” (*ibid.*) That led to the fact that surged an even higher “concentration of land ownership, the undermining of small-scale peasant producers and the rise of peasant proletarianization. [...] [T]housands of desperate peasants were propelled into both organized and spontaneous invasions of rural properties.” (Molano 2000: 26). This model provoked more riots, starting from the poorer peasants, which in the end led to an immense growth of the *FARC* between 1970 and 1982 (cf. *ibid.*). But not only peasants joined the lines of the insurgent groups, also young, educated people such as students or workers from the urban areas aligned with the *FARC* (cf. *ibid.*). Nevertheless, the peasants who were enlisted in the *FARC* always felt like displaced in their own country and suffered many years of poverty until they learned about the coca cultivation which allowed them to earn much more money through its taxation than they used to (cf. Molano 2000: 27). At the starting point of the agronomy of coca in the regions the guerrilla leaders were strictly against this kind of cultivation but:

“the guerrilla leadership soon realized that banning coca would mean losing peasant support to the authorities. This realization marked the birth of the infamous *gramaje*, a

cocatrade tax that is nothing less than guerrilla-imposed extortion of drug traffickers and prosperous coca farmers” (Molano 2000: 27).

This kind of farming was also established by *FARC* guerrillas and has served as an engine of the Colombian conflict since then, due to the high demand on coca especially in western countries and because of the stable and high price the groups could ask for (cf. *ibid.*).

From 1982 onwards, various governments repeatedly started attempts to negotiate peace with the *FARC*. Even though some agreements on certain topics could be found during all the peace conversations, the opposing parties had never come to a final agreement. Starting with the government of president Belesario Betancour (1982-1986), in the *Acuerdo de la Uribe* the parties firstly compromised on a bilateral cease fire, the suspension of kidnappings, which were used frequently by armed groups at that time, and the opening of the political space for the guerrillas in order to form political parties (cf. CIDOB 2014). Although Betancour himself approved the measures, he missed out on the political support of the parliament, so the negotiations were called off in 1987 (cf. *ibid.*). The successor Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) whose negotiations with other guerrilla groups ended successfully, also contacted the *FARC* in order to restart the negotiations, but these discussions ended after a short period. The reason was the systematic politically motivated assassinations conducted by drug traffickers, paramilitaries and security forces of members of the *Unión Patriótica (UP)*, a political party which was founded by demobilized guerrillas in 1985 (cf. CIDOB 2014).

The next president who tried to negotiate a peace agreement with the *FARC* was Andrés Pastrana who held the office from 1994 until 2002. It was in the year 1998 when Pastrana started a new attempt to bring all parties to the table in order to discuss a peace contract. Pastrana united with Manuel Marulanda Vélez, better known as *Tirofijo*, and discussed a potential agreement which should include a demilitarization of more than 42.000 km². Due to the fact that the murdering and kidnapping continued during the negotiations and other acts of violence took place as well, the negotiations were finally called off (cf. CIDOB 2014).

The predecessor of President Juan Manuel Santos, who achieved the agreement with the *FARC* guerrillas, Álvaro Uribe Vélez promoted a rather violent discourse against the guerrillas (cf. *ibid.*) He openly discussed the persecution of the *FARC* and in contrast to his predecessors he did not recognize them as an equal negotiating partner but degraded them to terrorists (cf. Olmo 2016). Moreover, he started the initiative “Seguridad Democrática”³ with which he tried to

³ Own translation: “Democratic Security”

recapture territories occupied by guerrilla groups, causing an unprecedented wave of violence (cf. ICG 2013: i). Until this day, however, he is accused of having ties to paramilitary groups which are mostly known for the persecution of left-wing guerrillas (cf. El Tiempo 2020).

The last negotiations held between the *FARC-EP* and the government of Juan Manuel Santos were the first to end in a settlement and a peace agreement between both parties. In the now following chapter these peace negotiations will be explained in more detail, why they were more successful than the previous ones, how they developed, what they agreed on and what happened after the treaty was signed.

2.4.3 Peace Negotiations between the Government of Juan Manuel Santos and the *FARC*

Since Juan Manuel Santos held the position of the defense minister in the government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez from 2006 until 2009 and was voted president in 2010, many Colombians were quite sure that he would extend the “democratic security policy” of his predecessor and continue with the persecution of the *FARC* (cf. BBC News 2012). He started a new negotiation attempt, which was last broken off in 1998 by president Pastrana (cf. *ibid.*). Even if Uribe’s strategy was apparently successful in the sense of regaining territory,

“Colombia’s vast territory, thick forests, inaccessible mountains and porous frontiers had always provided the rebel group with plenty of safe havens. In addition, the *FARC*—*EP* had demonstrated a great deal of resilience during five decades of armed conflict” (Nasi 2018: 36).

Therefore, and for the increasing poverty in the rural areas where the *FARC* mostly ruled, Santos was sure “that the all-out strategy entailed significant costs in terms of the legitimacy of the state.” (*ibid.*). The guerrillas also showed a greater willingness for peace negotiations since they recognized that

“[a]fter enduring successive severe military blows and realizing that the war was no longer profitable enough (nor leading to any meaningful political ends), the rebel group and its leadership must have considered it prudent to seek a way out of the conflict through politics” (Nasi 2018: 36).

In order to not jeopardize the contact in the first place, secret pre-negotiations had been held in 2011 with the main leaders of the *FARC* near the Colombian-Venezuelan border (cf. *FARC-EP International* 2012). All previous conversations with the *FARC* failed at some point and Santos’ negotiators wanted to take some weak spots from the past into account so the negotiations would have a more positive outcome. In the aforementioned pre-negotiations, the people

involved in the process agreed on five fixpoints before even starting the conversations (cf. Nasi 2018: 37ff.):

- The dialogues are held in a foreign country
- The “limit[ation] [of] public participation and media involvement”
- The absence of a truce
- The rule that “nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed”
- A strict number of points to be negotiated (cf. Nasi 2018: 37f.)

With the agreement on negotiations in Havana, Cuba, the *FARC* as well as the government of Santos got diplomatic support from outside Colombia. The talks took place under the auspices of Norway and were accompanied by delegates from Chile and Venezuela. Furthermore, the negotiations were supported by the Vatican (cf. Prange 2015). Moreover, the topics, that the opposing parties agreed on, included the long required agrarian reform, political participation of the *FARC*, the dealing with narcotrafficking in the country, how to set an end to the conflict itself, the execution of the consensus and the question about how to deal with the victims of the conflict and the transitional justice. The aim of the last point was to simplify the case law for members of the *FARC*, public forces and other parties involved in the armed conflict (cf. Nasi 2018: 39).

After nearly four years of negotiations, the agreement was first presented to the Colombian people, in order to hold a national referendum about the acceptance of the results that were achieved in Cuba. On October 2nd of 2016, the Colombian citizens voted “yes” or “no” on the present agreement between the government and the *FARC* (cf. Hernández-Mora 2016). Not least because of the strong mobilization of Álvaro Uribe to vote for “No” and the quite low turnout of approximately 37% of all registered voters, the plebiscite narrowly failed (50.2%) (cf. Fagan 2016; cf. García Sánchez 2016; cf. Lafuente 2016). This is also why “[i]n order to preserve the legitimacy of the peace process, President Santos was forced to renegotiate the peace accords with the *FARC-EP*, introducing many of the concerns of those who were opposed to the agreements” (Nasi 2018: 40). Shortly after the rejection of the present agreement, both parties met to renegotiate the outcomes. Therefore, they inserted various smaller details without really changing or doubting the agreement in general (cf. *ibid.*). It was on the 24th of November 2016 when the Colombian government and the *FARC* finally signed the peace agreement, which was submitted to the Colombian congress directly, without performing a second public plebiscite (cf. BBC News 2016).

As it was specified in this chapter, one important point of this peace contract was the inclusion of a transitional justice organ, in order to facilitate the jurisprudence processes for groups and individuals that were part as perpetrators in the armed conflict (cf. JEP 2018a). In the now following points, the understanding of the term “transitional justice” (TJ), its necessity for the establishment of a stable peace and the implementation in Colombia will be elucidated.

2.4.4 Transitional Justice within the Colombian Peace Agreement – the *JEP* and its Critics

Transitional Justice (TJ), that was firstly known as an expression for the shift from authoritarian to democratic states, firstly emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in order to face human rights abuses in Latin America and Eastern Europe (cf. ICTJ 2009: 1). The approach of TJ is much more wholistic than only a shift to another form of government. According to the International Center for Transitional Justice, it:

“seeks recognition for victims and promotion of possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves after a period of pervasive human rights abuse. In some cases, these transformations happen suddenly; in others, they may take place over many decades.” (ICTJ 2009: 1).

Moreover, it must be acknowledged that if crimes that were committed during a conflict would be judged and investigated by the ordinary jurisdiction of a country, it would firstly not be sufficient because of the number of victims and perpetrators that could not be dealt within the ordinary procedures and secondly are more likely to fail “especially in cases where those courts are weak and corrupt” (ibid.). Therefore, the TJ organs can not only be seen as a new established jurisdiction but also as a completion to the already existing judiciary of a state (cf. ibid.).

For this reason, the negotiating parties, such as the government of Santos and the *FARC* agreed on a special jurisdiction (*Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz – JEP*) in order to have a fairer and more independent way of judging crimes committed during the conflict (cf. Final agreement 2016: 153). The *JEP* should be the guarantee

“to realise the victims’ right to justice, offer truth to the Colombian society, protect victims’ rights, contribute to achieving a stable and lasting peace, and take decisions that offer full legal certainty to those who participated directly or indirectly in the internal armed conflict with regard to acts committed in the context of and during said conflict and which represent

serious breaches of international humanitarian law and serious violations of human rights”(Final agreement 2016: 153).

This is why the *JEP* consists of three justice rooms. The first one to name is the “amnesties and pardons room” which shall process amnesties and pardons after the judicial process and decide about the grant and the denial of amnesty and accompany processes of release (cf. Gutiérrez 2018). The second one is called “Legal situation definition room” and is responsible for the cases that do not fall into the task area of the third room, the so-called “responsibility recognition room”, which deals with cases in which the defendant acknowledges his crimes (cf. *ibid.*). In addition, the “responsibility recognition room” receives reports from the ordinary justice and decide if certain cases fall into the competences of the *JEP* (cf. Gutiérrez 2018). The *JEP*, which was originally founded in 2017, only obtains a maximum validity, which will expire 20 years after the establishment which would be in the year 2037 (cf. *JEP* 2018a). Furthermore, it emphasizes that only crimes that were committed before the 1st of December 2016 will be taken into account (cf. *ibid.*). In March 2018, nearly one and a half year after the signing of the final agreement, the *JEP* started to work properly. As the first official act, the Executive Secretary published a report that included the estimated cases that the *JEP* would have to deal with (cf. Gutiérrez 2018). It is expected that the *JEP* has to judge more than 6,400 people of the guerrilla and the public forces and hear more than 11,800 victims (cf. *ibid.*).

Even if the signing of the Final Agreement took place in 2016, five years later the controversies about this TJ organ are still existent and the profound political and social discussions are not likely to be resolved anytime soon (cf. Gómez 2020). Gómez points out that mainly two opposing viewpoints collide in this discussion: on one hand there is the part that supports the Final Agreement, and which accepts the implementation of the *JEP* because it believes in the holistic nature of a negotiated peace; on the other hand, people are against negotiated politics and see the Final Agreement and the *JEP* more as a resolution from which only the *FARC* can benefit (cf. Gómez: 2020). It can be determined that mainly Álvaro Uribe Vélez and his political party *Centro Democrático* fuel the negative discourse about the *JEP*, also the officiating President Iván Duque addressed the *JEP* as a “monumento a la impunidad”⁴ (Agudelo Mancera 2018).

⁴ Own translation: „monument of impunity“

Keeping in mind that the *Centro Democrático* frames a rather negative discourse about the *JEP*, the next chapters will inform about the most important Colombian print and online media, its origins, developments and its political backgrounds such as its ties with Colombian politicians.

2.5 The Colombian Media Landscape

In order to understand why specific online newspaper were chosen for this investigation, the functioning of the Colombian media landscape must be explained in more detail. Though nowadays, the majority of the media consumption in Colombia falls on electronic media such as television, radio, the internet and recently messengers such as WhatsApp, print media have an important place in the history of the country (cf. Arroyave Cabrera 2020). Most of the Colombian newspapers emerged in the 19th and in the beginnings of the 20th century and it can be recognized that a newspaper that was either unbiased or not linked to a Colombian president has never existed (cf. Arroyave Cabrera 2020; cf. Herrán 1991: 57). They were involved not only as shareholders, but also as owners, directors and even responsible for editorial guidance (cf. Herrán 1991: 57). The issue with these ties between politics and newspapers will be specified again in more detail in the sub-chapters for each newspaper that will be used for the investigation in chapter 3.

Even if the daily media consumption in Colombia is four hours on average and mainly television and radio are consumed (consumption levels: 91% television, 79% radio), print media has managed to create new ways of disseminating information even with declining sales figures (cf. Herrán 1991: 57). It can be acknowledged that with the emergence of the internet “it is common to observe today that the main newspapers, television and radio are consumed online” (Arroyave Cabrera 2020).

Even though the media consumption in the country is very important to its inhabitants, Arroyave Cabrera (2020) points out that journalists and the media have always been targets of armed groups of all parties, be it guerrilla groups, paramilitaries or the regular military. In the ranking of Reporters Without Borders, Colombia is in 130th place out of 180 and the situation is still classified as “difficult” (cf. Reporter without Borders 2020). This position is also due to the fact that:

“In 2019, the Foundation [for Press Freedom] documented 515 attacks against the press in Colombia, of which 137 were threats, 4 were kidnappings and 2 were homicides.[...] In the regions of Colombia, where journalists have been intimidated or have witnessed

violence against their colleagues, self-censorship becomes an alternative for survival. [...] Between 1977 and 2019 there have been 159 murders of journalists in Colombia, [...]” (Arroyave Cabrera 2020).

With all the intimidation journalists are facing, these threats are severe obstacles to Peace Journalism. Another determining component is the influence of political elites on the content and frames of newspapers. This point is to be investigated in the following subsections.

2.5.1 The Origins and Developments of *El Colombiano*

The first newspaper to be presented is *El Colombiano*, which can look back on more than 100 years of history. It was founded by Francisco de Paula Pérez Tamayo, a student of the faculty of law of the *Universidad de Antioquia*, a well-known public university in Medellín. On February 6th, 1912 he incorporated the newspaper with two releases every week. In addition to his work for his newspaper, Paula Pérez Tamayo started his political career, initially as secretary member from 1914 to 1918 and from 1926 to 1929. From this point on, he was first finance minister in the government of President Enrique Olaya Herrera, who like de Paula Pérez Tamayo belonged to the *Partido Conservador* (cf. Palacio Palacio 2020: 31ff).

Due to the fact that de Paula Pérez Tamayo was occupied with his tasks in Bogotá, he sold the newspaper to the families of Julio C. Hernández and Fernando Gómez Martínez in 1930 (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015a). The Hernández family dealt with the administration and negotiation part; therefore, the Gómez family oversaw the editorial and journalistic components. The newspaper’s editorial guidelines stood for a conservative coverage and covered mostly topics of national and regional politics. It is therefore not surprising that some members of both owner families were linked to the Colombian *Partido Conservador* (cf. *ibid.*). One of them was Jorge Hernández Restrepo, another member of the *Partido Conservador*, who was councilor of Medellín and senator of the republic, but also worked for *El Colombiano* in the editorial section (cf. Colprensa 2014). Furthermore, when he became senator of the republic, he was installed by Mariano Ospina Pérez who was not only the President of the Republic but also the uncle of Hernández Restrepo (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015a). Another rather famous member of the Gómez family is Juan Gómez Martínez, the son of the owner of *El Colombiano* Fernando Gómez Martínez, who alternated his political career with his work in the publishing group of the newspaper. It must be pointed out that he can politically be connected to other

politicians such as Fabio Valencia Cossio of the *Partido Conservador* and the former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez of the *Centro Democrático* (cf. *ibid.*).

From 1992 on, Ana Mercedes Gómez took over the position of director of the newspaper. In 2002, she transformed the editorial guidelines and drew more attention to human rights topics and investigative journalism (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015a). Within the publications, positions of the President Uribe were represented in the newspaper. This is why according to Monitoreo de Medios (2015a) the independence of the medium suffered from the lack of analytical steps and neutral reporting. In 2012, tensions between the two families emerged since the Gómez family wanted to stand by the positions of Uribe and against the new President Santos. The Hernández family distanced themselves from these statements (cf. *ibid.*). Because of the cleavage Ana Mercedes Gómez resigned from her occupations at *El Colombiano*, her brother Juan Gómez Martínez and afterwards Martha Ortiz Gómez took over this function. In 2014, Ana Mercedes Gómez was elected to be Senator of the Republic for the party *Centro Democrático*.

The example of *El Colombiano* shows how deeply Colombian politics and this specific newspaper are interconnected. It can therefore be suspected that independent journalistic work is hardly imaginable. The aim of the next chapter is to determine to what extent this presumption of dependent journalism applies to the newspaper *El País*.

2.5.2 The Origins and Developments of *El País Cali*

When the newspaper *El País* was found on April 23rd, 1950 in Cali, Valle de Cauca, the main aim of Álvaro Lloreda and his brother Alfredo was to report in more detail about the southwestern region of Colombia (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015b). Moreover, they were also interested in national media coverage. The Lloreda family to which *El País* belonged ever since, is an important influential family from Valle de Cauca and has continuously been active for the *Partido Conservador* of Colombia (cf. *ibid.*). The founder, Álvaro Lloreda for example, was not only the newspaper's founder and director for 25 years, but also a politician for the *Partido Conservador*. Last but not least, he was active as mayor of Cali, congressman and Colombian diplomat. His son Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo was also responsible for the newspaper, but he also embarked on a political career: his main tasks were governor for the Valle de Cauca, Senator, Minister of Education, ambassador in the US, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister under President Pastrana (cf. Gauhar 1983: 770; cf. *El Tiempo* 2000).

At this point it can be stated that the participation of politicians in newspapers, at least for the time being, is a common phenomenon in Colombia on the conservative side. The next chapter will now determine whether this is also the case for newspapers that are considered to be more liberal, analyzing the roots and history of *El Tiempo* and *El Espectador*.

2.5.3 The Origins and Developments of *El Tiempo*

Another Colombian newspaper which has its origins in the beginning of the 20th century is *El Tiempo*. With its foundation in 1911, the lawyer, journalist and intellectual Alfonso Villegas Restrepo laid the foundation for today's most widely read newspaper in Colombia. Only two years later in 1913, Villegas Restrepo sold the newspaper to his brother-in-law Eduardo Santos Montejó who belonged to one of the most influential families of the country. Since the takeover, they not only had influence on economic decisions in the country, but also gained power in questions of politics and public opinion through their newspaper.

Moreover, Santos Montejó joined the *Partido Liberal* in 1917. He was since then not only the owner of the newspaper, but he held other political offices for his party: he became minister of foreign relations (1930), governor of Santander (1931), head of the Colombian delegation in the League of Nations (1931-1933) and senator (1935-37) (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015c). During his membership in the *Partido Liberal* he tended more to the right wing of the party which lead to his election as president of Colombia in 1938 (cf. *ibid.*).

From 1913 on, *El Tiempo* remained in possession of the Santos family until 2007, when the *Grupo Planeta*, a Spanish publishing group, bought 55% of the shares of the *Casa Editorial El Tiempo CEET S.A.* (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015c). They held these shares until 2012 when the *Organización Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo* (OLCSA) bought the 55% from the *Grupo Planeta* (cf. *El Economista* 2012). Since OLCSA already owned a little more than 33% of the shares, they now hold 88% of *El Tiempo*. Still, nearly 12% are still in the hands of the Santos family. OLCSA implemented changes such as appointing designated famous entrepreneurs of the Colombia economy and industry, that had never worked in the field of journalism before, to members of the *Junta Directiva*, so the board of directors (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015c). In 2015, they presented a new general manager for the newspaper: Juan Guillermo Amaya Salcedo, who was the former vice president of *Grupo Aval Acciones Valores* – a financial group of Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo, the owner and namesake of the OLCSA. The reason for his

implementation were based on the fact that he strived for a forward-looking strategy for *El Tiempo* which included the establishment of digital media and television for the newspaper and to take into account the changing consuming habits in Colombia (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015c).

It can be recognized that *El Tiempo* is the most read daily newspaper in Colombia and currently belongs to the richest man in Colombia, Luis Carlos Sarmiento Angulo. Because of the historical ownership of the Santos family, the newspaper is said to have a liberal tendency, but the economic interests of the current owners might also have an influence on the editorial guidelines of *El Tiempo* (cf. *ibid.*).

2.5.4 The Origins and Developments of *El Espectador*/Colombia2020

In order to complete the history of the newspapers to be examined, the oldest one in Colombia, *El Espectador*, will now be presented. It was founded on March 22nd, 1887 in Medellín by Fidel Cano Gutiérrez and according to the newspaper itself, it should serve as a political, literary and industrial daily journal. Moreover, in its first edition it was stated that *El Espectador* should be in charge of proclaiming Liberalism as a doctrine and to support the *Partido Liberal* (cf. Cardona Alzate 2019). In 1915 the journal moved its editorial rooms to the capital Bogotá. In the following decades, *El Espectador* stuck to its editorial guidelines of liberalism until 1955. During the military government, led by Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-57), the newspaper closed down because it received economic sanctions. The reason for the punishment was the critical coverage of the military regime (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015d). The newspaper was able to resume operations a year after Rojas Pinilla's term of office ended. In the 1980s, *El Espectador* increasingly expanded the investigation section of the newspaper in order to pay particular attention to the functioning of drug traffickers and corruption (cf. *ibid.*). This expansion put the journalists in danger. It culminated in 1986 when the grandson of Fidel Cano, Guillermo Cano Isaza, who also worked as a journalist of *El Espectador* and was a leading reporter for the topics drug trafficking and corruption, was killed when he left the newspaper building on December 17th (cf. Fundación Gabo 2021). Eleven years later, in 1997, the *Grupo Santo Domingo* took over the newspaper, later *Valorem SA* bought the shares in the same year and still owns them today. The Cano family only owns 1% of the total shares (cf. Monitoreo de Medios 2015d).

Over time, several influential Colombian personalities have held the position of director of *El Espectador*. One of them was Carlos Lleras de la Fuente, a politician for the *Partido Liberal* and further on for the *Movimiento de Salvación Nacional* – a rightist conservative party. Moreover, Lleras de la Fuente is the son of the former Colombian president Carlos Lleras Restrepo (cf. *ibid.*). The second well-known director is Rodrigo Pardo García-Peña, who was not only director of *El Espectador*, but also Presidential Councilor on International Affairs for Virgilio Barco (1986-1990), vice minister of foreign affairs under César Gaviria (1990-1994), Chancellor under Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) and ambassador in Venezuela and France (cf. *Monitoreo de Medios* 2015d). The last important person to name is Ricardo Santamaria who was presidential advisor for peace in the 1990s and ambassador in Cuba and also director of *El Espectador* (cf. *ibid.*). Since 2004 the office of director is held by Fidel Cano Correa, the great-grandson of the founder Fidel Cano Gutiérrez (cf. *Monitoreo de Medios* 2015d).

Shortly before the signing of the Final Agreement between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the *FARC*, *El Espectador* published an article which explained that there will not be peace immediately. Therefore, they announced the formation of a campaign to raise awareness, participation and information in cooperation with the European Union (EU) with the name *Colombia2020*. Their aim of the campaign is to change the narratives the war has implemented in the last decades. Furthermore, they wanted to name topics that could be interesting for the readership and the transition to peace. They point out that the tonality needs to be modified and healing but must not forget the past. The goal is to prepare the stage for local and regional communities to have their say and to represent their ideas of peace (cf. *Colombia2020* 2016).

3. Empiricism

3.1 The Qualitative Oriented Content Analysis According to Mayring

Now that the theoretical foundations have been laid, the following empirical analysis will show how four of the most important Colombian online newspapers report on issues related to the *JEP*. Thus, this thesis is intended to be a contribution to peace processing and to examine whether online media could have a rather positive or negative influence on the population, in terms of the internal conflict. The idea at the beginning of the investigation was to conduct a qualitative content analysis of certain online articles in newspapers. However, in years of research, various scientists have found that a delimited dualism between qualitative and

quantitative research is not appropriate (cf. Mayring 2015: 17). Therefore, the method of a rather qualitative-oriented content analysis will be used for the research. This kind of procedure will be described in this chapter.

The researcher Philipp Mayring, a German psychologist and sociologist, is considered to be a founder of qualitative content analysis, the concept of which he refined over time and has thus developed into the qualitative-oriented content analysis. In order to not only present a simple definition, but he also examined six points that should contribute to a more precise understanding of the term:

1. The material must be embedded in the communication context, which means that communication is always the center of attention. The subjects of the content analysis are therefore “symbols (verbal, musical, pictural, plastic, gestural) which make up the communication itself” (Berelson 1952: 13).
2. The object of the content analysis is always fixed. This means that the element to be analyzed must always be recorded in text, pictures, etc. or be available in a protocol, so that it can be accessed at any time. This work is based on the articles of the four Colombian daily newspapers already presented.
3. Evident for content analysis is a systematic approach as well, which prohibits a purely free interpretation. A certain procedure should therefore be determined in advance and always adhered to.
4. The analysis is rule-driven and aims at intersubjective traceability. This means that the work should be equally comprehensible for an expert in communication science as for an outsider.
5. In addition, the content analysis must be based on a theoretical construct and tie in with the experience of other scientists. This also means that the interpretation of the results should be carried out against the respective theoretical background.
6. The qualitative content analysis should also allow statements to be made about analyzing the material and drawing conclusions about certain aspects of communication (cf. Mayring 2015: 12f.).

The reason why this research cannot be called purely qualitative is based on a finding by Mayring (2015: 21). He states that qualitative-oriented research is also partly quantitative. In this sense, the characteristic “qualitative” explains that a purely linguistic classification of concepts is carried out. Quantitative sorting adds a metric level, which means that numerical

components are added to the categories (cf. Mayring 2015: 17f.). Therefore, in the qualitative-oriented content analysis, the first step is to divide the content into qualitative categories and then to show the frequency of the individual categories in a classical quantitative way. In the end a qualitative, theory-based interpretation is performed.

In order to implement this qualitative content analysis, Mayring (2015: 62) provides a general process model, which is definite but leaves room for interpretation depending on the type of analysis performed. He names eight steps, which are the following:

1. Determination of the material
2. Analysis of the development situation
3. Formal characteristics of the material
4. Definition of the analysis direction
5. Theoretical differentiation of the question(s)
6. Definition of analytical units
7. Compilation of the results and interpretation of the research question
8. Application of the content analytical quality criteria (cf. Mayring 2015: 62).

The first step, which Mayring calls “Determination of the material”, means that one first has to determine which material is to be sighted. How many items should be taken into account in an analysis? The goal is to select a representative quantity that is also feasible in terms of time. In addition, only the material that is also related to the research questions should be analyzed (cf. Jenkner 2007). In the case of this work, a total of about 47 articles was chosen. For each unit of time (which will be discussed at a later point) around four articles from each newspaper should be analyzed. Each publication must report on the Colombian conflict and be related to the *JEP*. The final step is to guarantee that sufficient material is available to ensure optimal analysis.

In his second step Mayring speaks of the “Analysis of the development situation”. By this, he means how the collection of the material arose and who collected it. Furthermore, the motives and objectives of the material search are to be explained (cf. *ibid*). In the case of this thesis, a data journalism group from the Journalism Department of the *Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá* – under the direction of Carlos Andrés Charry Joya – collected tweets from various Colombian media throughout the year 2019 and recorded them in tabular form. They collected tweets that revolved around the Colombian conflict. They wrote down when the tweet was exactly

published, the content of the tweet with reference to articles and videos from the newspaper/radio/TV station, the retweets and likes. From these tables, the four selected newspapers were filtered and the tweets with the most retweets, i.e., the articles that reached the most people, were selected. In some cases, the problem arose that the followers of the newspapers were not very active or that the newspapers often did not tweet on topics concerning the *JEP*. In this case, articles on the subject of *JEP* were nevertheless selected, even if they did not receive much traffic. Furthermore, four analysis periods of the year 2019 were selected, based on the evaluations of Google Trends. It was shown that in the periods from March 24th to March 30th, from April 28th to May 4th, from September 29th to October 5th and from November 10th to November 16th the biggest traffic in the web search for “*Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz*” took place (cf. Google Trends).

The third point “Formal characteristics of the material” describes the already mentioned prerequisites that the material must fulfill in order to be included in the analysis. Similarly, the material must be precisely documented and recorded. Moreover, properties of the material must be named and determined in order to follow the systematic of the content analysis (cf. Jenkner 2007). The biggest challenge to be mentioned here was probably the decision whether to analyze the articles in their original language or translate them into English first and then examine them. After researching how to proceed best in this matter, it was decided to follow an article published by the Forum: Qualitative Social Research (FQS) (2019) for guidance. Although the research content is different, interviews of this research were conducted in different languages and translated into German (cf. Camp/Kull/ Petersen 2019). Thus, also in this work, all articles should first be translated into English, in order to not to have to switch between two languages during the execution of the findings. Also, the possibility of a professional translation could not be used due to financial reasons. The author is aware that through this own translation, culture-specific connotations may be lost.

Moreover, when it comes to the formal characteristics of the articles, in this case they must be uniform in order to be able to perform an exact analysis. The material of the present work fulfills the following criteria:

- the articles must have the *JEP* in the title,
- the original Spanish article must have been at least 1200 characters long
- the article must have been published within the four periods to be analyzed

- the article must have received as many retweets or likes as possible on Twitter

Before the actual analysis takes place, it must be determined which aspects are to be examined in more detail. This should be done in the fourth step called “Definition of the analysis direction” (cf. Mayring 2015: 62). At this point of this master’s thesis, it should be noted that certain frames are to be defined, with which the *JEP* is reported on and their analysis. Furthermore, it should be determined whether certain aspects of Peace Journalism are taken up according to Galtung, i.e., the provision of solutions, which actors were given a voice, the explanation structural and historic roots, coming to terms with trauma, etc. (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5f.). In this context, it is not intended to deal with the effect on the recipient, as Jenkner (2007) explains. With the knowledge that journalism can have an influence on the recipient, it can be assumed that readers are influenced; however, the degree cannot be analyzed here due to the narrowing of the topic.

The next step “Theoretical differentiation of the question(s)” has already been dealt with in this thesis in the previous points. In order to do justice to the systematics, a theoretical basis is to be created here, to give the later results an interpretation framework. The theoretical foundations of framing, peace understanding, and Peace Journalism can help to better classify the outcomes of the analysis.

The next step according to Mayring is the “Definition of analytical units”. This involves creating a category system that makes it easier to structure and analyze the material. The category system applied here, and its creation will be concretized in point 3.2. The last two steps to follow are the “Compilation of the results and interpretation of the research question” and the “Application of the content analytical quality criteria”. These steps will be executed during the examination and evaluation of the chosen material.

3.2 The Category System

In order to comply with Mayring’s demands to determine the frames and at the same time to work out the necessary parameters of Peace Journalism, the categories were formed both deductively and inductively. The deductive approach provides the categories already before the analysis of the material. Inductive categories mean, in contrast, that new categories are formed during or after the analysis, therefore these categories count for the result finding (cf. Borchert et al. 2004: 10ff.). It can be stated that a constant back-testing of the categories to the theory is going to take place. Since the criteria of Peace Journalism have already been established by

Galtung (1998b), the approach in this part of the analysis was mainly deductive. This contrasted with the frames, which only became apparent during a closer examination of the material. For this purpose, newly discovered frames were repeatedly noted as codes in the program *MAXQDA*.

Superordinate, two top categories (TC) can be identified, according to which the analysis will be divided – “Frames” and “Peace Journalism”. Both topics will be dealt with separately, even though identified frames will be (re)found in the analysis of the structures of Peace Journalism. Here, frames are understood as the patterns that are clearly noticeable in the articles, structuring them and giving them an interpretative framework. For the analysis of this paper, therefore, all 47 selected articles from the newspapers *El Colombiano*, *El Espectador*, *El País* and *El Tiempo* were reviewed and examined for these interpretive patterns that describe the *JEP* or its work. A total of 20 frames were identified, but only eight of them were introduced more than five times in different articles. In the following, the frames that occurred most repeatedly will be analyzed in terms of their essence, what they say, in which contexts they occur, which online newspaper particularly uses them, and in which time periods in which context these frames are invoked. The most frequently appearing frames that can be attributed to the *JEP* after the analysis of all four periods of all the online newspapers are the following: “Peace Processor” (23 times), “Truth Seeker” (13 times), “Rule Follower” (11 times), “Rule Rejecter” (10 times), “Rule Enforcer” (nine times), “Controversial issue” (seven times), “Victim of the parliament/ government/ president” (six times) and “Partial institution” (six times). The definition of all frames that were found, including examples, can be found in the appendix under the item “Category System”.

The second TC is called Peace Journalism and aims to capture the extent to which online newspapers have incorporated these features into their reporting. At this point, it must be emphasized that it must not be assumed that the editors or the authors of the articles are aware of the concept of Peace Journalism and consciously adopt or reject it. Rather, the aim is to present whether the online newspapers naturally adopt these patterns in their reporting. The deductively established codes, based on the findings of Galtung (1998b), that were explained in chapter 2.3.1 are as follows: “Trauma of the Victims”, “Solutions”, “Structural/ Cultural/ Historic Roots”, “Subject of the Conflict” and “Voice given to”. It can be recognized that the questions established by Galtung were reduced to their essence in order to simplify the classification of categories in *MAXQDA*. Moreover, the category “Voice given to” describes

how many actors in the conflict have their say in the respective article and are thus included in the reporting. This is intended to answer the question of “Who are the parties to the conflict?” and whether different opinions and points of view are represented in the article. Therefore, subcategories representing the different actors can be found below. Under some of these actors – four to be exact – there are sub-subcategories that contain frames. This means that certain actors who have their say in the reports have been attributed either the frames “Initiator of Reconstruction” or “Violence Preventer”. These frames represent two important questions in Peace Journalism, “Who initiates reconstruction, reconciliation and conflict resolution and who ultimately benefits from the activities of others?” and “Who tries to prevent violence?” (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5f). These frames have been examined not only for the *JEP*, but also for other actors involved in the conflict, such as the *Centro Democrático* party and President Iván Duque.

3.3 A Frame Analysis based on the Colombian Peace Process

In the following evaluation of the results of the qualitative content analysis, the frames that are to serve the representation of the *JEP* are analyzed first. After that, the reporting patterns of Peace Journalism will be presented and then it will be determined whether the four online newspapers also implement them.

3.3.1 The *JEP* as “Peace Processor”

The most used frame of all 47 articles is the one that portrays the *JEP* as a so-called “Peace Processor”. Among them, all the text passages categorizing the *JEP* as the entity that wants to advance the peace treaty, complies with it, and establishes peace in Colombia, were assembled. This category is of particular importance, as it repeatedly shows that *JEP* is forward-looking. That it is not a perfect entity without any flaws, but rather perceived as an institution that has peace as its goal but is still on its way to accomplish it and trying to be impartial. These steps of the process and the frame associated with it are noted, for example, in El_Esp12: 11. Here, the statements of Oscar Parra, president of the Recognition Chamber of the *JEP* are reproduced, which *El Espectador* summarizes in the article as follows: “He also said that they will cross-check the reports they have received on this issue to find the most appropriate investigation strategy, for example, from what period to investigate the forced disappearance.” (El_Esp12: 11). Even though only a member of the *JEP* was paraphrased here, it is assumed here that the use of the particular quote alone can be attributed to a reporting pattern and therefore can also be a frame.

In the first period, that is, from March 24th to March 30th, 2019, all online newspapers use the frame of the “Peace Processor” at least twice. It is interesting to observe that the majority (five of the nine articles of all four newspapers in the first period) present the *JEP* as a “Peace Processor” whereas the other main actor of the article is Colombian ex-president Álvaro Uribe or his party *Centro Democrático*, as is the case, for example, in El_Tie1: “The president of the JEP points out that from that justice he has observed with ‘respect, tranquility and prudence the reform proposals’ to this model of transitional justice, which have been promoted by sectors led by Uribe.” (El_Tie1: 11). However, this perception emerges primarily in the more liberal newspapers *El Tiempo* and *El Espectador*. It should not go unmentioned, that *El Colombiano* and *El País* also use this frame to describe the *JEP*. However, this frame is more likely to be taken up and expressed in quotes from other people, such as in El_Col1: 6: “According to the UN Secretary General, the JEP ‘is the principal guarantor of the rights of victims to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition’ and also constitutes a legal guarantee ‘for those who in good faith have laid down their arms’”, or in El_País1: 9: “‘Peace requires calm spirits, a democratic, serene, sincere and conciliatory language, the language that Colombia needs to finally turn the long page of war and be immersed in the task of rebuilding ourselves as a society,’ the judge concludes.”

Compared to the first period, in the second one – from April 28th to May 4th, 2019 – the interpretive framework of the “Peace Processor” is not even used. The reason for this seems to be that the main topic reported on in this period is not the *JEP* itself, but a discussion about the entity in parliament is in focus. This means the competencies of the *JEP* are being discussed and not mainly whether and how it contributes to peace.

In the third period – from September 29th to October 5th, 2019 – similar patterns and structures as in the first period can be observed. The liberal newspapers in particular repeatedly use the frame of the “Peace Processor”, whereas *El Colombiano* and *El País* do not. *El Tiempo* focuses a total of five times on portraying the *JEP* as an institution that wants to advance the Peace Process impartially, as it says in El_Tie10: “And the JEP responded that same day, not with the expulsions, but with a public declaration by the president of the jurisdiction, Patricia Linares, who explained that the incidents of non-compliance of the rearmed ex-guerrillas were being set in motion and that the rearmament was ‘a fact of the greatest gravity’ and a cause for exclusion from the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition.” (El_Tie10: 6), such

as in El_Tie11: “In the reading of the decision, made by the magistrate Ivan Gonzalez, of the Chamber of Truth Recognition, in which case 01 refers to the kidnappings committed by the Farc in the conflict, and to which the ex-Farc were linked, including the already expelled 'Jesus Santrich' and 'El Paisa', he explained that the three men had no excuse for having abandoned the peace process.” (El_Tie11: 10). Just as in period one, the *JEP* is opposed by a second major player known to criticize and doubt the *JEP*. In contrast to the first period, it is now neither Álvaro Uribe, nor the *Centro Democrático*, but the members of the *FARC* who have already entered the *JEP* and are therefore part of the Peace Process (cf. El_Tie11: 10). It can be seen in this quote, that the *JEP* went through a verifying process in order to ascertain if the *FARC* members Iván Marquez, Henry Castellanos Garzón and José Manuel Sabogal complied with the requirements of the peace agreement. They came to the conclusion to expel them in order to proceed the Peace Process.

The last analyzed period – between November 10th and November 16th, 2019 – follows a similar pattern to the previous ones. Only *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* included this frame repeatedly in their coverage. Particularly here, it emerges, according to the two newspapers, how much emphasis the *JEP* puts on an impartial Peace Process: “They will give the judges of the Recognition Chamber the book Cartography of Forced Disappearance in Colombia, a project of the HREV that was born to divulge the gaps in information about this crime and the debt that the State has to establish the real dimension of the disappeared left by the war.” (El_Esp12: 6). *El Tiempo* also uses this frame several times to highlight the adherence to requirements and the importance of the investigative process: “In any case, says González, in the presence of minors, the principles of proportionality and precaution must prevail in the operations” (El_Tie12: 20). Especially in El_Esp12 it can be recognized that the *JEP* is presented as an institution that contributes massively to the Peace Process, is trustworthy and particularly important for the development of the conflict in Colombia. According to the frame used, the *JEP* is about to expand the classic definition of the Peace Process. Although it states that these procedures are mainly carried out by elites (in this case the *JEP*) and often lacks the social level (cf. Selby 2008: 13). The *JEP*, with its hearings, always brings the voice to civilians and actors, trying to work through the conflict, which *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* state through the use of the frame in the last period: “The JEP has already held public hearings for the cases of Antioquia, and on November 20 and 21, the one related to San Onofre will be held in Cartagena.” (El_Esp12: 10).

Summarizing the frame of the “Peace Processor”, it is mainly used by the liberal newspapers in periods one, three and four. The two more conservative online offerings almost do not use this frame at all. If they do so, it is nearly exclusively in the first period and when the counter-actor of the article is Álvaro Uribe or the right-wing conservative party *Centro Democrático*. This does not mean, however, that the newspapers do not report positively on the *JEP*, only that other frames are used more often than this one. Furthermore, the study examined whether articles from *El Espectador* published by the *Colombia2020* project portrayed the *JEP* more often as a “Peace Processor” than its liberal competitor *El Tiempo* or as the actual *El Espectador* page, but this was not the case.

3.3.2 The *JEP* as a “Truth Seeker”

The second category to be analyzed, which emerged during the analysis, is the “Truth Seeker” frame. It is understood to include all article sections that describe how the *JEP* is searching for the truth or is investigating and researching in order to carry out its work as a judicial institution. It is not portrayed as already knowing the veracity, but rather how it takes the steps to find out the truth. If the individual categorized sections are considered, they are often requests for research material or hearings, but also when the *JEP* checks whether someone who has joined the process of jurisdiction complied with the requirement of the institution. The words “investigate/investigation”, “open a case/justice” or “verify” are increasingly used to describe the search for truth (cf. *El_Esp2*; cf. *El_Tie2*; cf. *El_Esp10*).

El Espectador is the only newspaper that not only utilizes this frame itself, but also adds quotes from politicians to reinforce it, as for example from a creator of the electoral campaign of the *Partido Liberal* in *El_Esp3*: “‘All will be on the same premise, and that is that those who want to end and shatter the peace agreements are those who propose to end the *JEP* so that the truth will never be known. [...]’ concluded the political strategist who participated in the design of the campaign.” (9). This contrasts with the approach of *El País* in the first period, which uses the frame to present that the *JEP* is in search of the truth: as it requests reports from different institutions to investigate further (cf. *El_País2*: 11). In the same period, the newspaper *El Tiempo* tries to highlight the importance of the hearings. According to their reporting, the *JEP* not only hears witnesses, but also opens cases to advance the Peace Process: “Testimonies like these, of violence committed against gays, lesbians and transsexuals during the armed conflict, were compiled by Colombia Diversa and Caribe Afirmativo, organizations that promote LGBTI rights, in Tumaco and Urabá and constitute two reports that were delivered this Friday to the

Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in the framework of the territorial cases 002 (Tumaco, Barbacoas and Ricaurte, in Nariño) and 004 (Urabá) that opened this justice.” (El_Tie2: 5). The reason why this section is not rated as a “Peace Processor” frame is because the main focus is sending the report and witnesses and not the actions that were taken by the *JEP*.

The *JEP* is almost never described by the frame of the “Truth Seeker” in the second period, as it already happened with the “Peace Processor” frame. Only *El Espectador*, in an article from *Colombia2020*, uses this reporting pattern. The counter-actor is not a specific group, but many politicians who are under investigation for links to paramilitary groups. *El Espectador* frames all of these politicians as “perpetrators”, and that the *JEP* is the one entity that seeks the truth: “A long list of politicians investigated for links to paramilitarism is in the hands of the Legal Situation Definition Chamber of the Special Peace Jurisdiction (JEP). The names were made public by the JEP, which is considering whether or not to accept their submission to the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition, which was created after the Peace Accord.” (El_Esp7: 4).

In the third period, the frame of “Truth Seeker” is likewise used by *El Colombiano*, which juxtaposes the *JEP* with *FARC* members at the time in this article. The latter are portrayed rather negatively, whereas the *JEP* is confronted with the pattern of the Truth Seeker, and thus fairly positive. In addition, the categorized section shows that *JEP* does not make decisions based on emotions, but first examines factual situations in order to be able to make a decision afterwards: “What the magistrates of this Chamber have analyzed is whether the guerrilla chiefs of the former Farc committed any type of fault in the face of the obligations that the Constitution and the law impose on those who want to access the benefits and guarantees of the transitional process being followed in the JEP.” (El_Col9: 4). Even in the coverage of the rather liberal newspapers, the *JEP* always faces former *FARC* guerrillas when it is portrayed as a “Truth Seeker”. The respective *FARC* members, whether dissidents or party members, are ascribed a negative and peace-denying role, which the *JEP* tries to resolve and find out the truth as it is displayed in this section: “However, in order to comply with due process and make the decision to exclude the dissident from the JEP, the court requested the Ministry of Defense on September 16 to submit the evidentiary material related to the crimes that 'Mayimbú' would be committing.” (El_Tie9: 9).

In the fourth period, *El Tiempo* is the only newspaper that uses the “Truth Seeker” frame. It is particularly present in this article, as it is repeated several times in El_Tie12. It can be concluded that *El Tiempo* finds it particularly important to convey to its readers that the *JEP* is a very important institution in advancing the search for truth. In El_Tie12: 6 and El_Tie12: 10, it is even highlighted that the *JEP* is also interested in the *FARC*'s approach to the conflict and that perhaps the truth about it could prevent bad happenings in the future: “The *JEP* has already called 37 former combatants, including former guerrilla chiefs, to give their versions for enlisting children in their ranks, and the first thing they will have to clarify is what their recruitment policy was.” (El_Tie12: 6).

It can be said that the demarcation from the “Peace Processer” and also from the “Rule Follower” frame was difficult in some phases. For some sections, discussions could take place whether these could not also be assigned to other categories. Nevertheless, to conclude the “Truth Seeker” frame, again, liberal newspapers use this positively connoted frame more often than their conservative competitors. *Colombia2020*'s publications adopt this frame more frequently than *El Espectador*'s regular news pages. In addition, an increased use of this pattern emerges at *El Tiempo*. In both periods three and four, *JEP* is basically presented as a “Truth Seeker” when the opposing actors are *FARC* members or dissidents. These are therefore framed negatively, and the *JEP* is displayed as the entity that really seeks the truth – even when talking to former *FARC* guerrillas.

3.3.3 The *JEP*, the Laws, Rules and Norms

The *JEP* is often portrayed because of the way it deals with laws, rules and norms. In doing so, three frames emerged during the categorization and analysis process that evaluate the *JEP* based on their handling of laws or rules. The jurisdiction is therefore depicted as either a “Rule Follower”, a “Rule Rejecter”, or a “Rule Enforcer”. If the “Rule Follower” pattern is used, the *JEP* is presented as an entity to strictly follow the laws and protocols, or when it has made a decision after a closer examination. Some signal words that could be filtered out for this as well, were for example “legal reason”, “decision was taken after ...”, or “verify/verification”. These signal words of the article often provided a hint for this specific frame, but the article components were also seen in the overall context and classified accordingly. When the “Rule Rejecter” frame emerges, the *JEP* is being accused of not following the law or established rules. The final category of the *JEP* that is taken in the context of rules and laws is the “Rule

Enforcer”. This frame is used when the *JEP* has applied the laws, even if it has been criticized for doing so. Throughout the analysis it could be identified that “Rule Follower” and the “Rule Enforcer” is connoted rather positively, whereas as “Rule Rejecter”, the *JEP* obtains a more negative connotation.

In the first period of analysis, only three articles in all four newspapers use the aforementioned frames. In particular, *El Espectador* and *El País* use the “Rule Follower” frame, *El Colombiano* applies the “Rule Rejecter” frame several times in one article. It can be observed that in this period the frame of the “Rule Follower” is used solely when a person speaks about the *JEP* or when a person's statement about the Jurisdiction is paraphrased, as for example in the case of *El País*1: “Linares emphasizes in her writing that the tribunal she presides over was created to overcome the war that has afflicted the country and that it will not guarantee impunity. In that sense, she clarifies that they have observed with ‘respect, tranquility, and prudence’ the proposals of adjustments that have been made to the model adopted by the State.” (*El País*1: 6). *El Colombiano* alone makes its own fact-based statements about the *JEP*, thus portraying it as a “Rule Rejecter”, as in *El Col*3: 5: “However, the statistics tell a different story: the *JEP* has so far received 57 requests to apply the guarantee of non-extradition, of which it has rejected 40 and only seven (which have been studied), including that of Seuxis Paucias Hernández Solarte, known as ‘Jesús Santrich’.” (*El Col*3: 5). However, they also paraphrase statements made by various individuals or entities that indirectly refer to the *JEP* as a “Rule Rejecter”: “In the opinion of the Procurator General's Office, the lack of the second instance clearly threatens fundamental rights to due process, making it necessary to resort to tutelage in order to obtain protection in the face of the exhaustion of the ordinary means of protecting constitutional guarantees.”(*El Col*3: 31).

In the second period, only *El Colombiano* uses the classification of *JEP* based on its relationship with rules and laws. Again, the newspaper only uses the frame of the “Rule Rejecter”, but several times. Here as well, statements – this time from demobilized *FARC* guerrillas – are introduced. Because the *JEP* does not have its say in the article and cannot defend itself, the frame of the “Rule Rejecter” becomes more and more apparent, as in this case: “In the letter, ‘el Paisa’ and Iván Márquez, who also signed the communiqué dated Monday, indicated that the current *JEP* is not the same as the one agreed upon in Havana, and expressed that this transitional justice should be more measured in its decisions and apply the principle of favorability, as it was in the Agreement signed between the government and the guerrilla.” (*El Col*5: 5).

Compared to the second period, all newspapers now use frames in connection with the “rules”. However, none uses the “Rule Rejecter” interpretation pattern. Even *El Colombiano*, which in the previous periods exclusively used the frame of the “Rule Rejecter”, now uses a more neutral language, that of the “Rule Enforcer”: “For this reason, the Chamber for the Recognition of Truth and Responsibility expelled them from the Jurisdiction and dictated the loss of all transitional, legal and economic benefits.” (El_Col8: 4). As already seen in 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, *El Espectador* portrays the *JEP* exclusively positively as a “Peace Processor” and “Truth Seeker” in the third period and follows the positive reporting pattern in this section as well. The *JEP* is portrayed as a “Rule Follower” and “Rule Enforcer”, while the *FARC* has a negative connotation in these two articles (cf. El_Esp9: 5 & 10; cf. El_Esp10: 5). The only frames that *El País* uses in the third period belong to the category of laws and norms. They not only cite the *JEP* itself, but also frame the events – the expulsion of three former *FARC* fighters – themselves. In doing so, they portray the *JEP* as both “Rule Enforcer” and “Rule Follower” (cf. El_País9: 3; cf. El_País10: 6). *El Tiempo* also uses one of the three frames in each article of the third period. In doing so, they follow the other newspapers and only provide frames that attribute positive characteristics to the *JEP*, i.e., mainly those of the “Rule Follower” and once of the “Rule Enforcer”. Especially El_Tie10 sounds like a defense speech of the *JEP*: “However, the expulsions would not be as fast as some sectors of opinion wanted, since it was necessary to fill in the procedural steps in line with the guarantees of due process to which all citizens are entitled.” (El_Tie10: 8).

Unlike in the previous periods, *El Colombiano* now also uses the “Rule Follower” frame in the fourth period, and the negative statements about the *JEP* are taken from other sources. For example, when the *FARC* talks about the *JEP*, the Jurisdiction becomes the “Rule Rejecter”: “‘Sandino has fulfilled in an integral, satisfactory and permanent way the norms and procedures that the JEP guides, so, in spite of not having any restrictive measure of freedom, she informed the jurisdiction of her intention to participate in the event to which she had been invited by FESCOL, bringing all the pertinent documentation,’ said from the Party.” (El_Col10: 5). *El Espectador*, on the other hand, remains faithful to its way of reporting and reimplements the image of the *JEP* as “Rule Enforcer”, making it clear that it will “bring those responsible to justice”, who are accountable for forced disappearance in the Catatumbo region (El_Esp12: 8). In addition, *El País* changes its reporting and portrays the *JEP* in the fourth period as a “Rule Rejecter” and, by citing actors such as the National Political Council or the *FARC* party, suggests that the *JEP* overestimates its competencies and thus does not follow the rules: “The

National Political Council of that community wonders this Sunday morning if with the decision the JEP exceeds the scope of its powers since, they say, the senator does not have restrictive measures to leave the country.” (El_País12: 5).

While the liberal newspapers again portray the *JEP* in a fundamentally positive way, i.e., as a “Rule Follower” and “Rule Enforcer”, a change over time can be seen in the other two online offerings. In principle, *El Colombiano* begins to present the *JEP* as a “Rule Rejecter” in the first two periods, and in doing so, it offers a great deal of criticism of the institution. In the last two periods, the tone regarding the laws, rules, and norms definitely becomes more positive. *El País*, on the other hand, varies its framing in this framework greatly from period to period and also from topic to topic.

3.3.4 Controversies about the *JEP*

There is some controversy about the *JEP*, as noted in previous chapters – for example as whether it is a “Rule Rejecter” or a “Rule Follower”. Therefore, in some of the 47 articles, the frame of the so-called “Controversial Issue” is used. This frame includes all statements in which it is stated that the *JEP* is indeed an institution that can be discussed controversially as it is stated in i.e., El_Col4: “The JEP has been the most controversial issue among the congressmen, a debate that is transferred to their social networks.” (El_Col4: 10). Clear signal words for this category were “controversy”, “different positions” or “discussion”. Mainly, this pattern has been used when at least two actors have their say in the articles, which is logical, but the parties included in the articles do not express that the *JEP* is a controversial institution. The authors of *El Colombiano*, *El País* and *El Tiempo* perform this task. Only the writers of *El Espectador* do not use this frame for their reporting. Moreover, it can be noted that this frame is basically only visible in the first two periods analyzed. After that, it is no longer used.

In the first period, the frame is used three times in three different newspapers. Most of the time, it is about the dispute between different parties or between the *JEP* and its biggest critic, Álvaro Uribe and the *Centro Democrático* (cf. El_País4; cf. El_Tie1). While *El Colombiano* presents the *JEP* in El_Col4 as a “Controversial Issue”, El_País4 and El_Tie1 present it in connection with the frame of the “Peace Processer”. This means that it is shown that the *JEP* can and should be discussed, but that it is an important unit for advancing peace in Colombia. Likewise, it is presented that this issue has been discussed before and then the actors commented on it again, as it can be seen in El_Tie1: “In the midst of the controversy unleashed by the billboards of the Centro Democrático against the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), the president of this

justice system, Patricia Linares, sent a letter to the former president and natural leader of that community, Álvaro Uribe.” (El_Tie1: 4).

In the second period from April to May 2019, only *El País* and *El Tiempo* are using the “Controversial Issue” frame. Here again, it can be said that it is used when different parties have discussions about the *JEP*. Then, once again, it is emphasized by the online newspapers that the *JEP* is being debated on. The main topic of this period are the objections of President Duque and the corresponding vote in the Senate: “On Tuesday, the controversy arose because during the voting, 47 votes were reached for dropping the objections, and 34 votes for their approval.” (El_País6: 13). The reporting shows how divided the parliament itself is towards the *JEP* and that even the vote is almost unfeasible due to various opinions on the topic: “The defenders of the peace agreement were barely one vote short of denying President Iván Duque's objections to the statutory law on the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in the Senate, by an absolute majority, on a first attempt.” (El_Tie8: 4).

In summary, this frame was mainly used when the topic of the article were the discussion and vote on the objections to the *JEP* Statutory Law in the Senate. A law which “fija parámetros claros para la atención de las víctimas y la materialización de sus derechos. Así mismo, se garantizan plenamente los derechos de las víctimas a lo largo de todos los procesos en la JEP”⁵ (JEP 2018b). During the discussions, the more liberal, left-wing parties were against the objections, whereas the more conservative, right-wing parties in the majority were more in favor of the demurs. The newspapers maintain neutrality in the sometimes heated debate by presenting the *JEP* as a “Controversial Issue”.

3.3.5 The *JEP* – a Victim of the Government, Parliament or the President?

The next frame to be analyzed is called “Victim of the parliament/ government/ president”. All text segments in which the Parliament, the Government or the President denigrates the *JEP* or betrays it through resolutions or statements were assigned to this category. However, this includes not only certain laws and actions by politicians, but also statements intended to polarize against the *JEP*. This frame is again only found in the first two periods, but in each of the four newspapers (cf. El_Col7: 14; cf. El_Esp2: 4; cf. El_País8: 3; cf. El_Tie7: 10). It can be noted that the articles in which the *JEP* is presented as “Victim of the parliament/

⁵Own translation: “establishes clear parameters for the attention of victims and the materialization of their rights. Likewise, the rights of the victims are fully guaranteed throughout all the processes in the JEP.”

government/ president” take place in five out of six cases when the subject of the publication is the objections on the Statutory Law of the *JEP*.

In the first period, the frame is only used by the liberal newspapers. *El Espectador* paraphrases the statement of Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the United Nations: “Although the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, noted the progress made by the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz in several cases of human rights violations and international human rights in the context of the conflict, the organization was concerned about the levels of political polarization that have been reached around the work of transitional justice.” (El_Esp2: 4). It is shown that intergovernmental groups are also concerned about the growing division of opinion on the JEP and that this could be an obstacle to peace. This division is also reflected in the article El_Tie3, which again focuses on the objections to the Statutory Law. Here *El Tiempo* writes: “The decision taken by Cambio Radical on Thursday not to support the presidential objections to justice for peace became the most certain - and perhaps deadly - blow that the objections presented by President Iván Duque to some aspects of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) have suffered in Congress.” (El_Tie3: 9). The term “to suffer” is used here to show how much the *JEP* struggled with the discussions and its related standing among the population.

These very discussions are also reinforced again in the second period, and the frame of “Victim of the parliament/ government/ president” is taken up even more frequently by three out of four newspapers (cf. El_Col7: 14; cf. El_País8: 3; cf. El_Tie7: 10). These articles continue to show the extent to which the vote on the law was delayed and debated, and it resonates that the *JEP* suffers from these disputes. These debates in Congress are pointed out by *El Colombiano*, but the frame itself is only found in a quote from Roy Barreras, *Partido de la U*: ““The objections that hurt the JEP have been denied. I read the case law and it was very clear that for the absolute majority it is half of the members, not half plus one. We have 108 members minus 14 with the impediments and that gives 94, and the absolute majority is half, and half is 47, that in simple mathematics, even for Senator Ernesto Macias,’ said Barreras.” (El_Col7: 14). Here the talk is of “hurt”, which portrays the *JEP* as a victim. In addition, the extent of the split is made clear by the narrow difference in votes. The same quote is also used in an expanded form in the *El Tiempo* article (cf. El_Tie7: 10).

With one exception, the frame “Victim of the parliament/ government/ president” is only used in connection with the *JEP* Statutory Law. The number of frames used is divided between quotes from politicians and the online newspapers' own statements. By using words such as

hurt or suffer, it is made clear that the *JEP* is a victim of the respective institutions and therefore cannot pursue its task as a court for peace. *El Espectador* also uses this category only once in its coverage of the statements of the United Nations. If it then comes to the articles about the law, unlike their competitors, the authors of the *Espectador* no longer refer to the frame. In the last two periods, the frame is no longer taken into account because the controversy of the topics is not as strong as in period two.

3.3.6 The Partial Jurisdiction?

The last frame to be analyzed is the one in which the *JEP* is displayed as a “Partial Institution”. It is the last frame that could be detected at least five times in the articles. Still, only three of the four newspapers use it, and only two of them more than one time. Under the “Partial Institution” interpretation pattern fall all segments that accuse the *JEP* of partisanship. It should be noted that all segments that belong to the frame are statements third parties which do not belong to the newspaper, either politicians or organizations, such as in El_Esp3: “Senator Paola Holguín, from the Centro Democrático, installed two billboards this weekend in which she implies that to defend the JEP is to be on the side of the victimizers.” (El_Esp3: 5).

In the first period, only *El Espectador* uses the frame in connection with the billboards of the *Partido Liberal's* electoral campaign. As quoted above, a senator from the *Centro Democrático* party responds by portraying the *JEP* as partial entity and on the side of the victimizers (cf. El_Esp3: 5). Then, in April and May, the pattern is also picked up by *El Colombiano* and *El Tiempo*. The article in *El Colombiano* refers to a letter from the ex-*FARC* member “El Paisa” to the *JEP*. In it, two of the former *FARC* fighters express that the *JEP* should also hold politicians accountable and not just *FARC* members: “‘It has always been expected that they would cite, with the same vehemence as they do with the counterpart, those involved in the State who victimized millions with their political and social decisions,’ indicated Márquez and ‘el Paisa’. Furthermore, they expressed that the JEP should call Senator Álvaro Uribe Vélez and those involved in various crimes such as Operation Orión, in Comuna 13.” (El_Col5: 6-7). Contrasting this with *El Tiempo's* article, which discusses the *JEP's* Statutory Law it mainly presents the view of President Duque and the *Cambio Radical* party, which have a rather negative image of the *JEP*, as the following quote makes clear: “On the subject, the president said that it is not possible that there be mockery of the country ‘by avoiding justice and not showing up and trying to use false arguments’” (El_Tie6: 13).

In the last period, *El Colombiano* and *El Tiempo* also include the frame in their coverage. Here again, different actors see the *JEP* as a one-sided institution, which the respective newspapers then include in their publications. In El_Tie12, it is a victims' organization that accuses the *JEP* of partisan behavior: "The Rosa Blanca victims' corporation, which brings together victims of these crimes, has been a harsh critic of the JEP, to the point that members such as journalist Herbin Hoyos have promoted the collection of signatures to carry out a referendum to overturn that jurisdiction." (El_Tie12: 22). In El_Col10, on the other hand, it is the National Political Council that comments on the *JEP* in this sense: "The National Political Council of that community wonders this Sunday morning if with the decision the JEP exceeds the scope of its powers since, they say, the senator does not have restrictive measures to leave the country. In fact, they recall that 'Congresswoman Sandino has repeatedly left the country in compliance with an agenda related to her work as a senator of the Republic (...) accepting invitations from countries that work for the defense of human rights'." (El_Col10: 6).

In this category, it is interesting to observe that the criticism of the *JEP* and the accusation of one-sidedness cannot be located only from one political direction. The reality is that the criticism comes from all sides, be it the *FARC*, the *Centro Democrático* party, or a victims' organization, many actors have their points of criticism of the *JEP* and feel that they are treated in a backward manner. This negative portrayal of the *JEP* could lead to further incitement or advancement of the conflict.

3.4 A Peace Journalism Analysis

In order to know if this incitement or advancement of the conflict could take place due to the reporting of the newspapers, it shall now be clarified if they include, may it be consciously or unconsciously, structures of Peace Journalism by Galtung into their publications. For this analysis, the questions that Galtung elaborated and that were presented in chapter 2.3.1 were summarized in a shortened form and used as deductive categories. In the following paragraphs, the seven categories will be examined in more detail and subjected to analysis. For this purpose, two frames that have not yet been presented in 3.3, "Violence Preventer" and "Initiator of Reconstruction", will also be used, since according to Galtung they belong to two of the questions about Peace Journalism (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5f.).

3.4.1 The Subject of the Conflict

The first question Galtung asks is about the subject of the conflict. Out of this question, a category called “Subject of the Conflict” was formed. This category includes the parts of the articles presenting the “why” of the conflict and what this conflict item has to do with the overall conflict, as can be seen i.e., in El_Esp13: “Another government official who has continuous contact with former combatants from the two Territorial Training and Reincorporation Centers (ETCR) in Caquetá said that there are drug trafficking groups -including dissidents-, businessmen, and ‘cattle ranchers’ who do not ‘like or want’ former guerrilla members to settle in the area. He also pointed out that the assassination of ex-guerrilla fighter Alexander Parra on October 24th within the ETCR of Mariana Páez in Mesetas (Meta) further increases the fears of ex-guerrilla fighters.” (El_Esp13: 7). Here, just as in the frame analysis, the following sections take a closer look at each time period, how newspapers include the subject of conflict, and how this inclusion changes over time.

In the first period, at the end of March 2019, only *El Colombiano* and *El Tiempo* include what is then the subject of the conflict, offering the reader a deeper understanding about the Colombian conflict. *El Colombiano* uses this type of explanation only once (cf. El_Col2: 4); *El Tiempo*, on the other hand, explains the subject of the conflict in almost every article of the first period, such as in El_Tie2: “The investigation found that 17 of those cases were of sexual violence, although in the region, explained Cindy Hawkins, one of the investigators, the persecution towards the LGBT population was also framed in other types of behaviors such as threats and forced displacement, homicides and femicides, and forced labor.” (El_Tie2: 26). The article revolves around the inclusion of the *JEP* procedures due to violence based on people’s sexual orientation. This quote clearly shows why the *JEP* is investigating and what types of violence have been inflicted on members of the LGBTQ+ community. Likewise, the object of the conflict in El_Tie3 can be determined. This is the objections against the Statutory Law of the *JEP*. The title of the article also immediately poses the crucial question that will be clarified during the reporting: “Did Cambio Radical deal a mortal blow to the objections to the JEP?” (El_Tie3: 2). Here it is explained why the Congressmen and women are so upset and what the whole discussion is about: “In the middle of the congressmen's meeting, held at the Club de Ejecutivos, in the center of Bogota, the legislators were asked who agreed not to support the objections to the JEP. Most raised their hands and a few did not. The die was cast.” (El_Tie3: 6). Even though no subject of the overall conflict – such as the division of the land

or the types of violence – is presented here, it is of the sub-conflict over the *JEP* and therefore counts as a “Subject of the Conflict” as well as the quote from *El_Tie2*: 26. Especially in the first period, it is clear that *El Tiempo*, unlike all other newspapers, repeatedly presents the subject of the conflict in order to inform the reader extensively.

In the second period, the picture of the first period is repeated. However, it must be emphasized that now *El Espectador* also begins to present the subject of the conflict as it can be seen in the following: “A long list of politicians investigated for links to paramilitarism is in the hands of the Legal Situation Definition Chamber of the Special Peace Jurisdiction (JEP).” (*El_Esp7*: 4). Here, the subject are clearly the links of various Colombian politicians to paramilitarism, which is presented in this quote and therefore informs the lector of the importance of this dispute. *El Colombiano* also takes in the subject of the conflict with the *FARC*, writing: “The arrest warrant against ‘el Paisa’ was ordered last Friday by the Recognition and Truth Room of the JEP, ‘due to the multiple failures of the former guerrilla chief to comply with the peace process and the JEP, a court to which he did not send reports and did not appear to tell the truth to the victims’” (*El_Col5*: 8). Increasingly, however, the subject is again represented in *El Tiempo* (cf. *El_Tie6*: 7; cf. *El_Tie7*: 5). It is intriguing to observe that the newspaper, which is mainly owned by the Santos family, again and again tries to explain the context in the first two time periods and to make all readers aware of the essential component of the conflict and thus further contribute to peace in the country.

It noteworthy that in the third period *El País* tries to introduce the category several times, as in *El_País9*: “The decision of the JEP was taken after analyzing the video where these three subjects appear in the company of ‘Jesús Santrich’ who announced his rearmament under the argument that the State has been failing to comply with what was agreed in Havana” (*El_País10*: 6). The subject matter here is the rearmament of the *FARC* guerrillas, which happened already in the past, but nevertheless it has to do with the overall development of the conflict and is important for its evolution. However, it must be mentioned that even in this period *El Tiempo* manages to explain clearly the object of the conflict best: “By means of an order signed on September 27, the Recognition Chamber of the JEP gave five working days, that is, until next Friday, to send him the information it has on the conduct of ‘Mayimbú’, a dissident of the Farc accused of participating in the murder of five people in Suárez, Cauca, among them the candidate for mayor Karina García” (*El_Tie9*: 5).

In October 2019, it is only *El Espectador*, in normal news and *Colombia2020*, that captures and explains the subject. Here, an evolution can be observed throughout the year, from the former

non-mentioning at the beginning of the year, to few mentions in April and May, until November, in which the newspaper is the only one to record the clarifications:

“The forced disappearance committed by armed actors during the conflict had three purposes: ‘to punish and educate those with different political positions, to generate terror in order to gain territorial control, and to hide crimes such as homicides and sexual violence, since it is a crime that erases any evidence. This is explained in the report *Hasta encontrarlos*, by the National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH). Such purposes make it one of the most atrocious crimes of the war, because it translates into a state of constant uncertainty for families.’” (El_Esp12: 4).

Summing up the periods and the newspapers, it can be said that *El Tiempo* has named the subject of the conflict several times in almost every period to bring the quintessence of the conflict closer to the readers. *El Colombiano* and *El País* explained this background knowledge only sporadically; no development can be observed here. This contrasts with *El Espectador*, which barely explained the subject matter at the beginning of 2019, but steadily and extensively included it in its coverage throughout the year.

3.4.2 Diversity of Opinions and Voices as a Characteristic of Peace Journalism

As it was mentioned in 2.3.1, the actors that are represented in the articles need to be heard. This is why Galtung asks the question about the parties to the conflict and what their real goals are (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5). This query was summarized for this thesis in a sense that the parties, to whom a voice was given, are analyzed in order to realize if the newspapers are able to display different opinions or if one point of view dominates. If this is the case, the question would be what opinions are being presented. Therefore, once again, all four newspapers were examined in all four timeframes. Only direct quotes and summaries of quotations are taken into consideration (i.e., cf. El_Esp11: 10). Furthermore, rather than analyzing each category – in this case, the individual actors – as in the previous chapters, the purpose is to provide an overview of which sides have their say and whether multiple opinions are heard.

In the first period, it can be said for *El Colombiano* that, for the most part, actors or institutions that see or present the *JEP* as something negative have their say. When the *JEP* is shown positively, the statements often come only from the *JEP* itself (cf. El_Col3: 6). Furthermore, it can be stated that only in El_Col3 a great diversity of opinion is shown, and many different actors are given the floor, including the victims of the conflict: “Cifuentes argued to the JEP that he was a farmer, miner and fisherman in an area of historical FARC interference. ‘We have

been forced many times to provide food, financial and logistical assistance to the different illegal and legal armed groups in the area, including the FARC’, he said, adding that because of this relationship he was accused and requested to be extradited by the US for the crime of drug trafficking, with which ‘he is being doubly victimized’. (El_Col3: 11). *El Espectador* reports even more one-sidedly in the first timeframe, only one or two parties to the conflict get to speak at a time, and no alternation between different opinions takes place, but rather, for example, only right-wing parties are given a say (cf. El_Esp4: 5ff.). The coverage of the first period in *El País* is also rather partial. In the first two articles, either only the *JEP* or only the Constitutional Court has its say (cf. El_País1: 4, 5, 6, 7, 9; cf. El_País2: 5). In El_País3, although the opinions of the *JEP* and those of the Constitutional Court alternate, both have only a brief say (cf. El_País3: 4, 6). At the end of the period, the newspaper allows actors from different political camps to speak, such as the *Partido Conservador*, the *Partido Alianza Social Independiente* or *Polo Democrático*, but they then represent the same opinion on the topic of the article; diversity is not shown (cf. El_País4: 5, 7, 11, 12). *El Tiempo* also lines up with its competitors and only includes one-sided opinions. However, it must be noted that unlike *El País* and *El Espectador*, at least once the victims get to speak: “One of the victims, a trans person, asked the JEP to prioritize the LGBT population, ‘we are a very easy target, we are very vulnerable and they never take us into account in any case. It's as if we don't have rights (...) trans people are hit harder because they have us as a kind of mockery and sexual object’.” (El_Tie2: 22).

Also, in the second period, *El Colombiano* probably represents the greatest diversity of opinion of all four newspapers. *El Espectador* again only allows a maximum of two different opinions and actors, such as the *Centro Democrático* and then, in contrast, the *De la U* party (cf. El_Esp8: 3, 6, 7). *El País* usually uses only one opinion page, so it lets the *Centro Democrático*, and Álvaro Uribe speak in one article, and then only the *Polo Democrático*, the *De la U* party and the *Partido Liberal* in the next (cf. El_País6: 10, 14; cf. El_País8: 10, 12, 13). Of course, it must be noted that *El País* does not just publish in a completely one-sided way, since it lets the various sides have their say in different articles and does not just write in favor of any political wing. However, it must be noted that there is a lack of diversity of opinion in the single articles. In *El Tiempo*, there is only one article in the second period that lets two sides, two right-wing and three more left-wing parties in Congress speak (cf. El_Tie8). Unfortunately, the main sufferer of the situation – the *JEP* – does not even get a chance to defend itself, in order to comment on the statement of, for example, Paloma Valencia of the *Centro Democrático*:

“Several senators spoke on behalf of the defenders of the objections, among them Paloma Valencia, who affirmed that the head of state, in presenting the objections to the JEP, was not ‘attacking’ the peace agreement reached between the previous government and the FARC.” (El_Tie8: 22). *El Colombiano* always allows at least and usually more than two actors to have their say in the articles of the second period. Moreover, among the actors is at least one statement from a person who speaks for the victims. Moreover, *El Colombiano* also includes expert opinions: “‘President Duque is facing a crisis in which there is a lack of government and this would be the final blow to show society and Congress that his institutionality is weak. The ability of the Executive to take the reins of power would be in question,’ said Arias.” (El_Col6: 14).

In the third period, the diversity of voices turns: *El Colombiano* only gives the word to the JEP (cf. El_Col9: 5). The other newspapers continue to follow their pattern of only allowing a maximum of two parties/actors to speak, although at least *El Tiempo* tries to vary in between the articles and then present different opinions and include several actors, such as the Ministry of Defense or dissidents of the FARC (cf. El_Tie9: 10; cf. El_Tie11: 7). *El País* and *El Espectador* therefore allow only one side and little criticism. This is particularly surprising for *El Espectador*. Especially when considering, in the third period, all articles originate from *Colombia2020*, which is supposed to be a strong advocate for different opinions.

This coverage is changing in the last period in *El Espectador* and therefore also in *Colombia2020*, allowing several different opinions in their reporting. In addition, people are also allowed to express themselves on behalf of the victims: “‘We find with great sadness that he is lying to us, that he is lying to other victims, to his institution, to the JEP and to the Colombian State,’ said a relative of the victims, in whose opinion Torres Escalante’s position is giving them a residual role in his request for forgiveness, ‘in our eyes it is arrogant, since he is only pursuing benefits for his personal cause, without leaving aside the fact that by merely joining the JEP he is granted benefits’” (El_Esp11: 11). In contrast, *El Tiempo* and *El País* have the respective situations described only from the point of view of one party, in *El País* it is the FARC party, in *El Tiempo* the JEP (cf. El_País12: 4, 6; cf. El_Tie12: 5, 8, 15, 17, 23, 24).

In summary, *El Colombiano* in particular has incorporated many opinions to add diversity to its reporting. It should also be noted that *El Espectador’s* reporting was very one-sided, especially at the beginning, but this changed considerably over time. *El País* and *El Tiempo* lagged behind their competitors in this category and therefore still have some work to do in terms of diversity of voices in their publications.

3.4.3 Explanations of the Roots of the Colombian Conflict

Another category that, according to Galtung, belongs to high road reporting is the question of the structural, cultural or historical roots of a conflict (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5). If these are sufficiently explained and included in articles to bring the reader to a certain level of knowledge about the conflict, this is seen as an indication of a conflict-sensitive type of journalism (cf. *ibid.*). Therefore, this chapter shall work out which of the four newspapers reported in a conflict-sensitive manner and if they did so over the entire year or only in one time period.

At the beginning of 2019, from March 24th to 30th, three of the four newspapers lacked the inclusion of the conflict's roots. *El Tiempo* alone took this tool to hand and included it in three of the four articles. The newspaper did not only focus on historical backgrounds, as in *El_Tie4*: 12, but also on cultural and structural problems that have made the conflict what it is today: "In addition, in this territory all the victims are Afro-Colombians with a high level of territorial roots who, after leaving their territory due to threats, arrived in other places where they are also discriminated against because of their skin color, for being poor or displaced, the report states." (*El_Tie2*: 20).

In the second period, this category of roots is used at least once by *El Colombiano*, as the newspaper once again explains why *FARC* members Iván Marquez and "El Paisa" complain about the *JEP*, specifically because "[...] the current *JEP* is not the same as the one agreed upon in Havana, and expressed that this transitional justice should be more measured in its decisions and apply the principle of favorability, as it was in the Agreement signed between the government and the guerrilla." (*El_Col5*: 5). Even though *El Tiempo* used the category eight times in the first timeframe, it does not use it in the second to clarify the roots of the conflict. The same can be said for *El Espectador* and *El País*, which also do not include the desired category.

From September 29th to October 5th of 2019, it can be noticed in *El Espectador* and accordingly in *Colombia2020*, which produced all the articles for the third period of *El Espectador*, that the roots of the conflict are taken up significantly and make up a large part of the coverage. For this, the authors take whole paragraphs to describe backgrounds in more detail, such as the example of *El_Esp9*: The article informs about the expulsion of Iván Márquez, "Romaña" and "Aldinever Morantes" from the *JEP*. To let the reader know how the ejection occurred, the author of *Colombia2020* writes the following: "Marquez, who was the second most important man of the disappeared *FARC* guerrillas, signed the Peace Agreement with the state in August

2016 in Havana, then left his weapons in Colombia at the Miravalle (Caquetá) Reincorporation Space, where he spent several months campaigning politically to reach the Congress of the Republic. Later, following the capture of former guerrilla chief Jesús Santrich, accused of conspiring to send cocaine to the United States after the signing of the peace agreement, he took refuge in that region of northern Caquetá from where he never again left, arguing that he too would be captured and extradited.” (El_Esp9: 6). *El Tiempo* also includes the category in at least one article and, like *El Espectador*, reports on the expulsion of the three *FARC* guerrillas and its background (cf. El_Tie11: 7-8). The last period actually follows the previous one: neither *El Colombiano* nor *El País* address the roots of the conflict in the articles, whereas *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* include and explain the roots in every publication of the last period studied. For this purpose, not only the overall context of the conflict is seen (cf. El_Tie12: 4), but individual personal backgrounds of people involved in the conflict are also explained: “The soldier is being investigated for his alleged participation in two killings of civilians who were not part of the armed conflict and were presented as ‘combat casualties’ by the Army on March 16, 2007 in Aguazul, Casanare, the area where the Torres Escalante Brigade was operating. The victims were Daniel and Roque Julio Torres, father and son, who were presented as Eln guerrillas.” (El_Esp11: 14).

Concluding the category, it can be acknowledged that *El Tiempo* is the only newspaper that has regularly included historical background, as well as structural and cultural roots of the conflict in its coverage since the beginning of the year. This contrasts with the more conservative online publications of *El País* and *El Colombiano*, which make little to no comment on the background in this sense and thus do not educate the reader in this regard. Of course, it can also be assumed that the two newspapers presuppose certain knowledge on the part of their readers. The biggest change in this category is made by *El Espectador* with *Colombia2020*. At the beginning of the year, no roots of the conflict were explained; as time progressed, reporting on it became more frequent. *Colombia2020* in particular used this way of reporting on the conflict in every article of the third and fourth timeframes.

3.4.4 Newspapers as Solution Providers and Trauma Workers

Two other questions Galtung poses about establishing Peace Journalism are how to deal with trauma and how to propose solutions in individual articles:

- What ideas are presented for solutions other than one party imposing its ideas on others? In particular creative or new ideas? Can these ideas be powerful enough to prevent violence?
- When it comes to the use of violence: what about such invisible consequences as trauma and hatred and the desire for retribution and fame? (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5f.)

These two sets of questions were paraphrased for this research into the categories “Solutions” and “Trauma”. The aim was to find out whether one or each of the newspaper provide solutions on certain topics or if the issue of trauma after the use of violence is being broached. Even though the victims get to express their concerns or feelings in some of the article, the specific topic of trauma work is not being discussed in any of the articles. In the day-to-day business of online newspapers, the time pressure is so overwhelming sometimes that there is often no time left for embedding trauma processing. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that *Colombia2020* could have the time and space to include the purpose it was created for, to establish some kind of Peace Journalism, since it has the claim to be

“[u]na campaña pedagógica y periodística para el posconflicto que pretende servir de escenario de discusión para la construcción de país desde las regiones. Para cambiar las narrativas impuestas durante décadas de conflicto armado y pensar cómo queremos ver a la sociedad colombiana después de la guerra.”⁶ (Colombia2020 2016).

The same applies to the proposals that the newspapers present for resolving individual sub-conflicts of the conflict. *El Espectador* alone, or rather *Colombia2020*, asks questions in a single article that can contribute to the critical consideration of the topic when organizations asked the *JEP* to open a case of forced disappearance. It is the only time in all 47 articles a newspaper asks question to find a solution: “How would the JEP address the dimension of this crime in its ten years of life so that impunity does not continue to be the rule? How would they articulate with the Search Unit for Persons reported missing, which is extrajudicial, so that families can recover their loved ones and there is justice?” (El_Esp12: 13).

Concluding these two pieces of Peace Journalism, all online newspapers failed to comply with this category. Even though it would be understandable for ordinary daily newspapers not to include those topics, it is rather unintelligible how *Colombia2020* could not internalize the initialization of solutions, neither the refurbishment of trauma within the articles, since it ought to be their main aim.

⁶ Own translation: “a pedagogical and journalistic campaign for the post-conflict that aims to serve as a discussion scenario for the construction of a country from the regions. To change the narratives imposed during decades of armed conflict and think about how we want to see Colombian society after the war.” (Colombia2020 2016).

3.4.5 The *JEP* as a Violence Preventer and Initiator of Reconstruction

In order to respond to the last two questions Galtung poses to define Peace Journalism, two frames will be analyzed in more detail: “Violence Preventer” and “Initiator of Reconstruction” (cf. Galtung 1998b: 6). All paragraphs were categorized as “Violence Preventer”, in which the actor that is mentioned is to speak out against violence and to avoid it.

As it was presented for the categories “Solutions” and “Trauma” the newspapers hardly include the frame of the “Violence Preventer” into their reporting. *El Colombiano* uses the frame only for the *JEP*. Nevertheless, they do not apply it repeatedly. In this case of the *JEP* it is not the author of the article which frames it as a “Violence Preventer”, but the *JEP* president Linares herself: “In the missive, Linares urged the congressman and his followers not to resort to strategies of discredit, ‘disinformation and continuous aggression’ against this transitional justice, and at the same time, to have moderation, serenity and prudence, especially at this time when the country is polarized not only before the role of the *JEP*, but also before the implementation of the Peace Accord signed with the FARC.” (El_Col2: 4). *El Tiempo* uses the frame “Violence Preventer” as well. Not for the *JEP*, but to present President Duque in the case of the objections of the Statutory Law of the *JEP*. He is displayed as someone who is interested in condemning a former *FARC* member, in order to establish justice: “Similarly, Duque reiterated that since Friday night he gave instructions to the authorities to pursue and capture Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, 'el Paisa', a former member of the Farc, about whom the arrest warrants were reactivated.” (El_Tie6: 12).

The other and last category is the frame “Initiator of Reconstruction”, which shall respond to the question: Who initiates reconstruction, reconciliation and conflict resolution and who ultimately benefits from the activities of others? (cf. Galtung 1998b: 6). In the case of the 47 examined articles can be said that only two actors of the conflict are presented as an “Initiator of Reconstruction” which are the *JEP* and the Colombian president Iván Duque. In both cases it is mostly the conservative paper *El País* that includes this frame (cf. El_País2: 10, 15; cf. El_País10: 5; El_País3: 4). It is notable that in this newspaper the *JEP* is the entity of initiating reconstruction in the first time period: “Transitional justice, upon realizing the refusal of the entities, issued a letter in which it expressed in a 35-page document that this list was fundamental so that the victims of the conflict would not feel that this patrimony, which is the fruit of the conflict, is fictitious, and that it would serve the postulates of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition.” (El_País2: 15). Whereas it is Iván Duque in the third period: “He also recalled that he and President Iván Duque have been meeting with former combatants

both in the former Territorial Spaces of Training and Reincorporation (ETCR) and outside them to ratify this commitment.” (El_País10: 5).

Concluding the two last categories it must be stressed that none of the newspapers include the responses to Galtung’s questions about the prevention of violence and the initiators of reconstruction. Merely *El País* achieves to include the “Initiator of Reconstruction” frame in some of their articles but fails to incorporate this frame stringently into their reporting.

4. Conclusion

During the evaluation, some observations could be made regarding the presentation of the *JEP* and the use of the quality criteria of Peace Journalism, according to Galtung (cf. 1998b). It needs to be acknowledged that during the examination of the 47 articles the picture of the *JEP* painted by the four Colombian newspapers is rather positive, even though sometimes, some of the articles criticize the *JEP* or display it in a certain, more negative way. The frame that was mostly used in an overall view was the frame of the “Peace Processer”, which was primarily introduced by *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* in the first, second and third period, whereas *El Colombiano* and *El País* hardly used this frame to describe the Jurisdiction entity. When they include it, the counterparty is the actual opponent, Álvaro Uribe and the right-wing conservative party *Centro Democrático*. When it comes to the second frame that was elaborated, the “Truth Seeker” was again over all utilized by liberal newspapers, mostly in publications of *Colombia2020* in comparison to the ordinary *El Espectador* news page and *El Tiempo*. Moreover, in *El Tiempo*, the *JEP* is presented as a “Truth Seeker” when the other actors presented in the article, are former *FARC* members or dissidents, which are framed rather negatively in comparison to the jurisdiction. The same picture can be seen in the frames dealing with rules and laws. On one hand *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* present the *JEP* as a “Rule Follower” and a “Rule Enforcer”. On the other hand, *El Colombiano* sees the *JEP* as a “Rule Rejecter” in the first two chosen time periods and criticizes the institution for its handlings with rules. But: in time frame three and four, the description of the *JEP* becomes much more positive, concerning how it deals with rules (cf. El_Col8: 4). In these categories *El País* is varying its display of the *JEP* from article to article and no pattern emerged in the reporting.

Furthermore, it can be determined that sometimes the *JEP* is being presented as a “Victim of the parliament/ government/ president” in combination with the topic of the Statutory Law of the *JEP*. It comes into play in all newspapers. The particularity here is that *El Espectador* utilizes this frame only once which is astonishing, because firstly, the newspaper is historically

known for criticizing governments and presidents for their approach to peace in Colombia and, secondly, because with *Colombia2020* they even created a campaign to uncover such grievances. Moreover, the frame is not used anymore in the last two time periods. The reason for that could be the lack of controversy of the topics. This controversy of the *JEP* was being represented with the frame “Controversial Issue” which was mainly used by the newspapers while reporting on the Statutory Law of the *JEP*, but also in the second period while reporting about the senate and different opinions. The last category to be summarized, the “Partial Institution” frame, was used by all four newspapers but mainly as comments or quotes from different actors. They all criticize the *JEP* for being partial in certain decisions. These actors come from all over the political spectrum, so their accusations might not be true in this sense, but the newspapers do not provide context. This lack of context and the resulting accusations towards the *JEP* might aggravate the conflict as Kempf displays it in his expansion of Galtung’s the Peace Journalism theory (cf. Kempf 2004: 439).

In an overall conclusion about the frames used by the different newspapers it can be pointed out that the newspapers with the politically liberal background are more likely to frame the *JEP* as a peace bringing, impartial and rule following institution. When negatively connoted frames such as the “Rule Rejecter” or “Partial institution” are used in *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*, they come mostly from third parties, for example, from the *Centro Democrático* or the victims' organization “Rosa Blanca” (cf. El_Esp3:5; cf. El_Tie12: 22). It can be equally noted that the newspapers with a more conservative historical background use the negatively connoted frames more often. However, it should not go unmentioned here that they merely quote or paraphrase actors in the process. The negative aspects of *JEP* are more strongly reflected in *El Colombiano* and *El País*, as well as positive frames: The two sides in both newspapers balance each other out.

Answering the questions of Galtung, a clear picture can be drawn about the ability of the four newspapers to include the characteristics of Peace Journalism (cf. Galtung 1998b: 5f.). The categories that are used multiple times in the articles of the four online newspapers are the following: “Subject of the Conflict”, “Voice given to” and “Structural/ cultural/ historical roots”. Regarding the first of the three, it can be said that *El Tiempo*, in particular, manages to highlight the objects of the conflict and bring them closer to the readers. *El País*, on the other hand, introduces the category, but does not manage to constantly present the subject. *El Colombiano* lags even further behind the competition, introducing this unit of analysis only once. The newspaper is therefore failing to highlight this sub-task of Peace Journalism. The

greatest development, however, can be seen in *El Espectador*. Even if at first the subjects of the conflict did not appear in the coverage, over time it was included more frequently and in greater detail, thus becoming an essential part of the coverage.

When the various opinions and sentiments in the different newspapers and time periods are examined for diversity, *El Colombiano* probably brings in the most variety. The authors of this newspaper include many voices per article, which are also rich in contrast and thus also allow the actual conflicts to be represented in the articles (cf. El_Col3). *El País* frequently lets actors have their say as well, but they are not contrasted within the articles. However, in El_País6, for example, the *Centro Democrático* and *Álvaro Uribe* are heard, while in the same period – then in El_País8 – only more liberal actors have their say, such as the *Partido Liberal* or *Polo Democrático*. In contrast to that are the liberal newspapers: They report in a strongly one-sided way in terms of the people who have their say in the articles, and there is not much exchange between actors. *El Espectador* has the same problem, but again – as in the previous category – it improves somewhat on the passage of time and allows different voices to have their say in one article (cf. El_Esp10). When it comes to explaining the structural, cultural and historical roots, both *El País* and *El Colombiano*, fail to include these descriptors in their reporting, thus giving all readers of their articles the chance to be at a certain level of knowledge. Omitting this category completely probably makes it more difficult for many readers to understand complex content because they do not know the back story to it. Once again, the only newspaper that stringently includes this category is *El Tiempo*, which explains the background in three of the four time periods and in just under half of its articles, such as in El_Tie1: “The billboards known this weekend related those who support the JEP, a transitional justice scheme derived from the peace agreement with the Farc, with the perpetrators of the armed conflict that the country lived for 50 years.” (ibid.: 6). Despite the fact that *El Espectador* does not explain the background in the first two timeframes, they are then included in every single article in the last two timeframes, thus strengthening the reporting (cf. El_Esp9: 6; cf. El_Esp13: 11).

A rather regrettable observation could be made regarding the topics “Solutions” and “Trauma of the Victims”: none of the newspapers included these guidelines for Peace Journalism, which were specified by Galtung (cf. 1998b: 5). Even though some articles in each newspaper included the victims’ voices (cf. El_Esp11: 10), their trauma was never covered in depth. There were also no proposals for solutions to specific problems; only *Colombia2020* raised unique

questions that could contribute to finding solutions (cf. El_Esp12: 13). Moreover, the use of the two frames “Violence Preventer” and “Initiator of Reconstruction” were merely not existing, only *El País* included the “Initiator of Reconstruction” frame twice to describe the *JEP*.

If the evaluation is analyzed further, it can be noted that in general *El Colombiano*, *El País*, *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo* report positively about the *JEP*. The newspapers all frequently portray the jurisdiction as a “Peace Processer” or “Rule Follower” and occasionally add other frames, such as “Rule Rejecter” or “Partial Institution”, but it should be noted that these inserts are almost exclusively the opinions of other actors that are being reproduced (i.e., cf. El_País12: 7). These frames are used throughout the year in all newspapers. However, no pattern can be recognized in the yearly change for the use of the frames. They do not vary over the periods but between the articles, which is logical, since the topics and the point of view of the *JEP* on certain subjects change just as the opinions of the newspapers do. The categories for Peace Journalism fulfillment created by Galtung are only partially included in the four newspapers' coverage in the four time periods. Especially in the categories “Subject of the Conflict” and “Structural/ Cultural/ Historic Roots”, *El Tiempo* alone manages to stringently include this information in its reporting, whereas *El Colombiano* and *El País* hardly do so at all. A development over time in these categories can only be seen in *El Espectador*, which creates more space for this in the third and fourth periods than in the first two. This contrasts with the inclusion of the voices of the actors: *El País* and *El Colombiano* also present the conflicts in the articles, juxtaposing actors to form a greater diversity of opinion. In this case, the more liberal competition shows very one-sided reporting. The remaining requirements for comprehensive Peace Journalism are almost completely disregarded here; comprehensive reporting on the topics “Trauma of the victims”, “Who is trying to prevent violence?” and “Who is initiating reconstruction?” should be given greater focus by the four newspapers. Likewise, it can only be beneficial if newspapers also suggest and shows ways of resolving the conflict in order to mitigate it and not incite it further. Even though it is impossible to say at this point whether the newspapers had a part in it: due to the coronavirus pandemic and other developments in the country, the number of violent acts rose sharply again the year following the time frame which was considered in this analysis (cf. Noticias ONU 2020). At present, it does not look as if the Latin American country will come to rest anytime soon. However, it is to be hoped that Colombian journalism will help lead to the long-awaited peace in the future.

5. Literature

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7. Category System

Category	Definition	Example
Top category (TC) Frames		
Category (C) JEP	When the JEP is mentioned, it is marked with this category so that it can be seen to be part of the coverage.	JEP, Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (El_Col4: 3) ^[P]_{SEP}] Patricia Linares, president of the JEP (El_Esp1: 3) backbone of the Peace Agreement ^[P]_{SEP}] (El_Esp4: 3 ^[P]_{SEP}])
Subcategory (SC) Controversial issue	This includes all statements confirming that there are controversial opinions about the JEP.	The JEP has been the most controversial issue among the congressmen, a debate that is transferred to their social networks. (El_Col4: 10)
SC Fair and impartial institution	This includes all statements in which the JEP made decisions that were fair and impartial in the eye of the author or the person cited.	At least as far as the JEP is concerned, the chapter on the rearmament of 'Marquez' and company will be resolved and closed this Friday, as there is no other legal recourse against the expulsions. The expulsions of Olivio Merchán, alias El Loco Iván, and of Élmer Caviedes, other rearming men whose expulsion process was announced on 17 September, would remain pending, if they are not also announced. ^[P]_{SEP}] (El_Tie10: 15)
SC Brave decision maker	This includes all statements in which the JEP has decided courageously and against all criticism.	However, it is expected that in the next few hours the JEP's ruling will be known in order to determine the legal reasons that led to the decision. ^[P]_{SEP}] (El_País12: 8) ^[P]_{SEP}]
SC Legitimized institution	This includes all statements in which the JEP is presented as legitimate and legal.	In this sense, they will not accompany with their vote in the Capitol the six points that the president argued to object to some aspects of what has been called the backbone of the Peace Accord. (El_Esp4: 4)
SC Threat for victims and defendants	This includes all statements in which the JEP, by its very existence, is portrayed as a danger to victims and witnesses, because their statements make them the target of violent groups.	The same fate has befallen the uniformed members of the Public Force who have gone before the transitional justice system to confess to crimes in the cases of extrajudicial executions, known as "false positives. After their declarations before the judges of the Recognition Chamber, their families and even their lawyers have been persecuted and threatened with death.“ (El_Esp13: 9)

SC Alerter	This includes all statements in which the JEP is the entity that points out future grievances and threats.	According to a warning from the JEP itself, article 308 of the National Development Plan project (today 148 in the presentation) is highly inconvenient, because, by giving administrative autonomy to the entity that investigates the crimes, it would violate the Final Agreement of Paz and legislative act 01 of 2017, already declared enforceable by the Constitutional Court. (El_Esp6: 5)
SC Peace processor	This includes all statements in which the JEP is portrayed as the entity that wants to advance the peace treaty, comply with it, and establish peace.	These testimonies, gathered during more than 7 months of investigation, will serve as input for the JEP to investigate and subsequently judge the serious crimes committed in these territories, in this case, for prejudice against people with diverse sexual orientations, identities, and gender expressions. (El_Tie2: 6)
SC Rule Follower	This includes all statements in which the JEP strictly observes the law and follows its rules.	The decision of the JEP was taken after analyzing the video where these three subjects appear in the company of 'Jesús Santrich' who announced his rearmament under the argument that the State has been failing to comply with what was agreed in Havana. It was also taken into account that they did not appear before this tribunal, despite multiple summonses to testify in case 001, which analyzes all the kidnappings committed by this guerrilla group during the conflict. (El_País10: 6)
SC Truth Seeker	This includes all statements in which the JEP is presented as the authority to ascertain the truth.	The JEP has already called 37 former combatants, including former guerrilla chiefs, to give their versions for enlisting children in their ranks, and the first thing they will have to clarify is what their recruitment policy was. (El_Tie12: 6)
SC Rule Enforcer	This includes all statements in which the JEP enforced the rules despite criticism.	What the magistrates of this Chamber have analyzed is whether the guerrilla chiefs of the former Farc committed any type of fault in the face of the obligations that the Constitution and the law impose on those who want to access the benefits and guarantees of the transitional process that is followed in the JEP. (El_País9: 3) ^{[F]_{JEP}}
SC Victim of policies	This includes all statements in which	According to parliamentarians who defend the Peace Agreement, the liberal

	policies have been implemented that make the JEP's work more difficult or impossible.	representative Édgar “el Pote” Gómez is promoting an article that seeks to take resources away from the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) to hand them over to the questioned investigation and prosecution unit of the same court. (El_Esp6: 4) ^{[P]_{SEP}}
SC Victim of the parliament/ government/ president	This includes all statements in which the Parliament, the Government or the President denigrates the JEP or betrays it through resolutions or statements.	Although the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, noted the progress made by the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz in several cases of human rights violations and international human rights in the context of the conflict, the organization was concerned about the levels of political polarization that have been reached around the work of transitional justice. (El_Esp2: 4)
SC Partial institution	This includes all statements accusing the <i>JEP</i> of partisanship.	Senator Paola Holguín, from the Centro Democrático, installed two billboards this weekend in which she implies that to defend the JEP is to be on the side of the victimizers. (El_Esp3: 5)
SC Peace preventer	This includes all statements accusing the JEP of standing in the way of peace.	Two weeks ago another controversy had arisen between the Ministry of Defense and the JEP, also because of this case, since the Minister, Guillermo Botero, stated that they had not captured 'Mayimbú' because the JEP had not excluded him and that gave him a kind of immunity. (El_Tie9: 11) ^{[P]_{SEP}}
SC Rule Rejecter	This includes all statements accusing the JEP of not following the law or established rules.	But the Court also made it clear that the JEP must be respectful of the rules of the requesting countries, so it must accept that the United States does not provide more evidentiary material than that which it provided in the indictment, as happened on March 1, when the Office of International Affairs of the U.S. Department of Justice responded: "we must decline the request, because what is requested (9 recordings between July 10, 2017 and February 13, 2018) is contrary to our treaty practice and asks for unnecessary evidence for the extradition request". (El_Col3: 26)
SC Truth ignorer	This includes all statements accusing the JEP of closing its eyes	However, after looking for his name in the lists of guerrillas accredited by the OACP and not finding it; after consulting

	to the truth and not taking it into consideration when making decisions.	the databases of the Attorney General's Office and not finding any accusation that links him to the insurgency; and not being able to identify him as a relative of any ex-guerrilla fighter, the JEP decided to abstain from invoking the knowledge, "because the necessary assumptions to activate the competition were not found". (El_Col3: 12) ^[P]_{JEP}]
SC Distributer of false information	This includes all statements in which the JEP is accused of making false statements.	Nonetheless, this journal had access to 17 files on which the Review Section based its decisions to revoke or not to acknowledge. (El_Col3: 7)
SC Violence Preventer	This includes all statements in which the JEP is to speak out against violence and to avoid it. This category is also a category of Peace Journalism and is therefore taken into consideration both, in the frames and in the Peace Journalism analysis.	In the missive, Linares urged the congressman and his followers not to resort to strategies of discredit, "disinformation and continuous aggression" against this transitional justice, and at the same time, to have moderation, serenity and prudence, especially at this time when the country is polarized not only before the role of the JEP, but also before the implementation of the Peace Accord signed with the FARC. (El_Col2: 4)
SC Initiator of Reconstruction	The JEP is presented here as an institution committed to reconstruction and recompensation. Again, as with the "Violence preventer" category, it is used in both parts of the analysis.	He added that the Jurisdiction "will continue to advance in its task of applying restorative justice with strict adherence to the law and the Constitution". (El_País3: 4) ^[P]_{JEP}]
TC Peace Journalism		
C Voice given to:		
SC Constitutional Court	A member of the Constitutional Court is quoted.	Court Judge José Fernando Reyes further explained that "the Court understands that the JEP must evaluate the date of the facts, there is no doubt, but the JEP cannot say if the person requested in the extradition is the author or the accomplice of the crime or if he is guilty or not". (El_Col3: 27)
SC Office of International Affairs	A member of the Office of International Affairs	But the Court also made it clear that the JEP must be respectful of the rules of the requesting countries, so it must accept

US Department of Justice	US Department of Justice is quoted.	that the United States does not provide more evidentiary material than that which it provided in the indictment, as happened on March 1, when the Office of International Affairs of the U.S. Department of Justice responded: "we must decline the request, because what is requested (9 recordings between July 10, 2017 and February 13, 2018) is contrary to our treaty practice and asks for unnecessary evidence for the extradition request". (El Col3: 26)
SC Ministry of Defense	A member of the Ministry of Defense is quoted.	The request of the Ministry of Defense to the JEP, to give it more time, was filed on September 24th, when it asked for "an extension of additional working days to obtain the information from the various Defense Sector agencies competent to make the required report". (El Tie9: 10)
SC The Committee of Prisoners for the Truth of Colombia	A member of the Committee of Prisoners for the Truth of Colombia is quoted.	"We want to make known to you, to every country, and to the whole world, the truth related to events of so many years of national conflict that still persists and of which we have been a part, either as actors or as direct witnesses," they state in the letter. (El Tie4: 5)
SC Military	A member of the Colombian Military is quoted.	"I regret not having been able to prevent those deaths or detect them in time," reiterated Torres Escalante, who emphasized that his failure to accept responsibility is based on his rejection of the statements made by two of his subordinates before the Prosecutor's Office and the JEP. "I will never be able to admit responsibility because I would be lying. I never agreed with a subordinate to pass off homicides as deaths in combat". (El Esp11: 6)
SC Government	A member of the government is quoted.	"For 8 months I had said that in the case of the three, the conditions had been met for them to be removed from Transitional Justice definitively. We hope that this is the beginning of a dynamic where we can distinguish between those who were never in the process and the vast majority of those who are in the process," added the counselor.

		(El País10: 4)
SC Partido FARC	A member of the <i>FARC</i> party is quoted.	"Sandino has fulfilled in an integral, satisfactory and permanent way the norms and procedures that the JEP guides, so, in spite of not having any restrictive measure of freedom, she informed the jurisdiction of her intention to participate in the event to which she had been invited by FESCOL, bringing all the pertinent documentation," said from the Party. (El Col10: 5)
SC Partido Conservador	A member of the <i>Partido conservador</i> is quoted.	This Thursday, in fact, the support of the Conservative Party, which, in spite of being in government, has not yet reached consensus on the objections, was "we shall see". (El Esp4: 7) ^[P] _[SEP]
SC Partido Polo Democrático	A member of the <i>Polo Democrático</i> is quoted.	He added that the six presidential objections are due to judgments of unconstitutionality, although the Government raises judgments of inconvenience, therefore, "Congress does not have the competence to study them unless it is solely and exclusively considering them to insist on the sanctioning of the bill". (El País4: 12)
SC Partido Verde	A member of the <i>Partido Verde</i> is quoted.	Senator Antonio Sanguino said during the session that "this is the first time that the government bench obstructs the legislative agenda". (El Col6: 11)
SC Partido Centro Democrático	A member of the <i>Centro Democrático</i> is quoted.	For Senate President Ernesto Macias, the votes for overturning the objections were not enough to reach the required "absolute majority" in that chamber, which has 106 congressmen. (El País6: 14) ^[P] _[SEP]
Sub-Sub-Category (SSC) Initiator of Reconstruction	This category includes the passages in which the party <i>Centro Democrático</i> is presented as a person committed to reconstruction and recompensation.	"I think that in the JEP they should respect opinions that believe that this is not the path to peace or to the vindication of the victims. I will continue in Congress, with arguments, as you have known it, seeking reforms," the former president wrote on his Twitter account. (El Esp1: 6)
SC Partido Liberal	A member of the <i>Partido Liberal</i> is quoted.	"Who is a member of @SenateGovCo ? who has taken office. Ivan Marquez and Aida Merlano (cannot be replaced), elected but not possessed. Conclusion:

		There are not 108 members but 106. -14 disabled=92. The majority is 47. My thesis : the objections were rejected yesterday," Rivera wrote on his Twitter. (El País8: 10)
SC Partido Cambio Radical	A member of <i>Cambio Radical</i> is quoted.	"The objections are not applicable because they are included in the legislative acts and in the laws that have already been revised in their constitutionality," affirmed Varón, who thus made it clear that Cambio Radical accepted this thesis in the legal debate on the viability of processing them in Congress. (El Tie3: 8)
SC Partido Alianza Social Independiente	A member of the <i>Alianza Social Independiente</i> is quoted.	In turn, Senator Jonathan Tamayo, known as 'Manguito', explained that "we will call on the various parties, their presidents to listen to them and gather their comments". (El País4: 7) ^[P] _[SEP]
SC Partido De la U	A member of the <i>Partido De la U</i> is quoted.	At the same time, Roy Barreras, from La U Party, assured that the objections to the Statutory Law sank anyway because the presentation of the officialism only adds up to 34 votes, so that it will be the Constitutional Court the one that in the end would decide the future of the Statutory Law. (El País5: 8)
SC Partido Social	A member of the <i>Partido Social</i> is quoted.	"This power struggle has made the country lose 50 days and what it has done is sow uncertainty," said Senator Lozano, who added that this uncertainty touches the victims, the State itself, the demobilized members of Farc who hope to have a legal floor to continue their reintegration, and the JEP that is waiting for its bases to fully operate. (El Col7: 8) ^[P] _[SEP]
SC Experts	An expert or scientist is quoted.	Juan Manuel Charry, constitutionalist of the Universidad del Rosario, warned that, according to the Constitution, the main responsibility of the actors of the armed conflict is with the transitional justice, since it has as its foundation the satisfaction of the rights of the victims. (El Col3: 39)
SC Álvaro Uribe	The ex-president and senator Álvaro Uribe is quoted.	Through his Twitter account, Senator Álvaro Uribe responded to the president of the JEP that he "should respect

		opinions "that believe that this is not the path to peace or to the vindication of the victims. (El Col2: 11)
SC Iván Duque	The president Iván Duque is quoted.	In this sense, President Duque affirmed this Saturday that although the current government does not seek to "attack peace," what it does want is "that there be no more impunity," nor that "the peace processes be used so that the mafiosos seek to avoid extradition and justice in other states". (El Tie6: 9)
SSC Violence Preventer	This includes all statements in which president Iván Duque is to speak out against violence and to avoid it.	Similarly, Duque reiterated that since Friday night he gave instructions to the authorities to pursue and capture Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, 'el Paisa', a former member of the Farc, about whom the arrest warrants were reactivated. (El Tie6: 12)
SSC Initiator of Reconstruction	This category includes the passages in which President Iván Duque is presented as a person committed to reconstruction and recompensation.	He also recalled that he and President Iván Duque have been meeting with former combatants both in the former Territorial Spaces of Training and Reincorporation (ETCR) and outside them to ratify this commitment. (El País10: 5)
SC UN	A member of the United Nations is quoted.	"The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz is the main guarantor of the rights of victims to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition, and is also the expression of the legal guarantees granted to those who, in good faith, have laid down their arms with the verification of the United Nations," the report said. (El Esp2: 5)
SSC Violence Preventer	This includes all statements in which the United Nations are to speak out against violence and to avoid it.	In the report on the Mission in Colombia that he will present to the Security Council on April 10, UN Secretary General António Guterres reiterated the call for the Statutory Law of the JEP "to be enacted as soon as possible". (El Col1: 3) ^{ P } { SEP }
SC JEP	A member of the JEP is quoted.	Linares "requests" him "and through him to the members of the Centro Democrático", "the strict fulfillment of the dispositions of article 22 of the Constitution that establishes that peace is a right and a duty of all Colombians, an ethical and juridical duty that links us without distinction". (El Tie1: 5)

SC FARC dissidents	A member of the <i>FARC</i> dissidents is quoted.	The events took place in the village of La Ativa, in that municipality, where Romaña organized a meeting with the community and informed them that he had returned to the area "and that he planned to take back the land that belonged to him". (El_Tie11: 7)
SC Victims		
SSC Someone speaking for victims	Someone is expressing the opinions for the victims.	The Dean of Law of Los Andes said that locating this crime in the international arena "represents a historic opportunity to recognize that armed actors systematically violated LGBT people because of their sexual orientation and gender identity, which has never been made visible in a transitional justice court". (El_Tie2: 10)
SSC Voices of Victims	A victim is quoted.	In a letter to this newspaper, the victims told the judges of the JEP that they do not intend to come forward to see how Torres Escalante wants to appear as a victim of the judicial system, politics and his subordinates. (El_Esp11: 10) ^P _{SEP}
C Solutions	Under this category fall the parts of the articles that ask questions and provide solutions for strengthening peace and resolving the conflict.	How would the JEP address the dimension of this crime in its ten years of life so that impunity does not continue to be the rule? How would they articulate with the Search Unit for Persons reported missing, which is extrajudicial, so that families can recover their loved ones and there is justice? (El_Esp12: 13)
C Structural/ Cultural/ Historic Roots	This category includes the parts of the articles that present the structural, cultural and historical background of the conflict. This includes all statements in which the JEP is accused of making false statements.	A pattern and systemic nature of violence against people with diverse gender identities was also evident in this region, i.e., the violence was motivated specifically by being LGBT people and to send the message to the community that this was not allowed and had to be "corrected". (El_Tie2: 27)
C Subject of the Conflict	This category includes the parts of the articles that present the "why" of the conflict and what	The arrest warrant against "el Paisa" was ordered last Friday by the Recognition and Truth Room of the JEP," due to the multiple failures of the former guerrilla

	<p>this conflict item has to do with the overall conflict.</p>	<p>chief to comply with the peace process and the JEP, a court to which he did not send reports and did not appear to tell the truth to the victims.(El_Col5: 8)</p>
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8. Selected and translated Articles

8.1. 24th of March 2019 – 30th of March 2019

8.1.1 *El Colombiano*

	1	El_Col1:
	2	UN reiterates call for enactment of JEP law
..UN ..JEP	3	In the report on the Mission in Colombia that he will present to the Security Council on April 10, UN Secretary General António Guterres reiterated the call for the Statutory Law of the JEP "to be enacted as soon as possible".
..UN	4	Although the organization had already made several pronouncements on the matter, the document that was revealed this Thursday insists that both the Executive and the Legislative and "all entities" must "take measures quickly" to have the law enacted.
	5	Read also: Radical Change to vote down objections to JEP Statute
..UN ..Peace Proce	6	According to the UN Secretary General, the JEP "is the principal guarantor of the rights of victims to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition" and also constitutes a legal guarantee "for those who in good faith have laid down their arms".
..UN	7	In this vein, Guterres notes that the JEP "is the central pillar of the peace agreement" and that it must ensure that this jurisdiction "has all the political and practical tools necessary for its effective functioning" with independence and autonomy".
	8	The UN Security Council will meet in 13 days, at UN headquarters in New York.
	1	El_Col2:
	2	President of the JEP asked Senator Uribe Vélez for respect
..JEP ..JEP ..Peace Proce	3	This Tuesday, through a letter, the president of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, Patricia Linares, asked the former president and now Senator Alvaro Uribe, and in that way the Centro Democrático, to respect "as judges of the Republic and as citizens (sic), committed to peace".
..Violence F ..Subject of ..JEP	4	In the missive, Linares urged the congressman and his followers not to resort to strategies of discredit, "disinformation and continuous aggression" against this transitional justice, and at the same time, to have moderation, serenity and prudence, especially at this time when the country is polarized not only before the role of the JEP, but also before the implementation of the Peace Accord signed with the FARC.
	5	In his message, Linares tells former President Uribe that all debates are welcome, always from a position of respect.
	6	The letter comes two weeks after a debate on the JEP was opened due to the objections of President Ivan Duque to the Statutory Law of this jurisdiction and the appearance in Antioquia of several contradictory fences to this special justice sponsored by the Centro Democrático.
..Peace Proce ..JEP	7	In his letter, Linares begins by recalling the words of Pope Francisco during his visit to Colombia, in the sense of "fleeing from all temptation of revenge" in the search for peace.
	8	In addition, the judge affirmed that the JEP is attending "with respect and tranquility" to the proposals of reform to this system of justice, created as a result of the Peace Agreement with the FARC.
	9	Precisely this week, in Congress, the discussion on the 6 points of the Statutory Law objected by President Duque will begin.
	10	The deadline for the legislature to decide whether to approve the objections is June 20.
..Peace Prever ..Álvaro Uribe	11	Through his Twitter account, Senator Álvaro Uribe responded to the president of the JEP that he "should respect opinions "that believe that this is not the path to peace or to the vindication of the victims."

	1	El_Col3:
	2	The JEP is not an easy way to avoid extradition
	3	Only 17% of requests for guarantees of non-extradition have been analyzed. None of them is yet final.
..JEP	4	Since the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) has a guarantee of non-extradition for its appearances, there is the idea that it is a logging operation when it comes to extraditing criminals to other countries when they have committed crimes outside national territory.
..Rule rejecter	5	However, the statistics tell a different story: the JEP has so far received 57 requests to apply the guarantee of non-extradition, of which it has rejected 40 and only seven (which have been studied), including that of Seuxis Paucias Hernández Solarte, known as "Jesús Santrich".
..JEP	6	EL COLOMBIANO consulted with the JEP for a list of those who have requested this benefit, and the Review Section of the Peace Tribunal responded: "the request related to the list of names and surnames of persons who to date have requested a guarantee of non-extradition is of a reserved nature and, consequently, cannot be provided".
..Distributer of Fal	7	Nonetheless, this journal had access to 17 files on which the Review Section based its decisions to revoke or not to acknowledge.
	8	In them, it states that the rejection of the cases is due to the "lack of the personal character factor," that is, that the individuals do not meet at least one of the requirements for processing the request: having been a member of the FARC recognized by the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP), having been accused in a criminal proceeding of being a member of the FARC, and having been a member of the JEP or a relative up to the second degree of consanguinity (parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren and siblings) or first degree of affinity (husband, father-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law) of a member of the FARC or someone accused of being one.
	9	The main cases
	10	Manuel Kinderlen Cifuentes Guerrero was told by the JEP on January 11 of this year that it would not process his request.
..Voices of Victims	11	Cifuentes argued to the JEP that he was a farmer, miner and fisherman in an area of historical FARC interference. "We have been forced many times to provide food, financial and logistical assistance to the different illegal and legal armed groups in the area, including the FARC," he said, adding that because of this relationship he was accused and requested to be extradited by the US for the crime of drug trafficking, with which "he is being doubly victimized".
..Truth Ignorer	12	However, after looking for his name in the lists of guerrillas accredited by the OACP and not finding it; after consulting the databases of the Attorney General's Office and not finding any accusation that links him to the insurgency; and not being able to identify him as a relative of any ex-guerrilla fighter, the JEP decided to abstain from invoking the knowledge, "because the necessary assumptions to activate the competition were not found".
	13	As Cifuentes there are other 39 cases; the one of Irguis José Fontalvo Peláez stands out, requested in extradition by the United States for drug trafficking and at the same time requested by the traditional Wayuú authority who asked for him "to be tried in our territory according to our normative system".
..Truth Ignorer	14	Some files arrived at the JEP with accreditations from former guerrilla commanders who

affirmed, under oath, that the requested man was part of the FARC.

- 15 This is the case of Rubén Durán Moreno, alias "Gato", who had a case open in the ordinary justice system for conspiracy, forced displacement and rebellion, in the midst of territorial disputes between the Rastrojos and the Urabeños on the San Juan coast (Chocó). He was requested by the Eastern District Court of New York for six federal narcotics charges.
- 16 The court's file says that Durán was part of the organization led by Román Narváez, alias "Ramón," which trafficked drugs from Cauca.
- 17 Police intelligence had precise information about his great ability to build speedboats with double-bottomed coves to transport cocaine from the coasts of Valle del Cauca and Chocó to Panama, from where the shipments were transported to the United States. But nothing linked him to the Farc; on the contrary, his relationship is with the drug trafficking routes of the Comba brothers, the most feared assassins of the North Valley Cartel.
- 18 Luis Eduardo Prada, ex-commander of the 30th Front of the Farc, accredited Durán, assuring that for more than seven years he was a collaborator of the insurgency, especially in financial tasks and that "he participated in military operations where important blows were given to the Army". Three other former commanders testified to his collaboration with the guerrillas. However, the OACP excluded him in Resolution 029 of September 22, 2017, along with 24 other "narcos" from the list of those accredited, because they were considered "colados" (sneaks).
- 19 "We cannot call a person who has a process in place for the crime of conspiracy to commit a crime for the purpose of rebellion," said Freyder Prada, defense attorney. His extradition took place in June 2018.
- 20 Most of the requests came with the favorable concept for extradition from the Supreme Court of Justice and some with presidential approval, which facilitated the process towards the northern country.
- 21 Under study
- 22 The JEP has made known seven cases: that of Luis Eduardo Carvajal Pérez, alias "Rambo", former commander of the Daniel Aldana Mobile Column, which operated in Nariño; and those of his colleagues José Geidin Castro Chillambo, alias "doctor", and Diego Alberto González Castillo.
- 23 There is also the case of Pedro Luis Zuleta Noscué, alias "the invalid," who became the chief of finance of the sixth front of the FARC; that of Polivio Milton Rosero Mena, who demobilized in the rural area of La Variante, in Tumaco (Nariño); and Seuxis Paucis Hernández Solarte, alias "Jesús Santrich," a former member of the FARC Secretariat. There is an additional case whose identity EL COLOMBIANO was unable to establish.
- 24 When the JEP determines that the person required by the foreign justice system meets the legal requirements for access to the guarantee of non-extradition, it must verify the date on which the crime was allegedly committed. If it was before December 1, 2016, the date on which the agreement between the Government and the FARC was signed, he cannot be extradited, according to Legislative Act 01 of 2016.
- 25 For this purpose, the JEP can access and practice all types of evidence, as established by the Constitutional Court last week when it revised some articles of the law of procedure of the jurisdiction. That is why, for example, it has requested the evidence of the crime

		Santrich is accused of from the United States.
<div> <div> <div>..Rule rejecter</div> <div>..Office of Inter</div> </div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div> </div>	<div>26</div>	But the Court also made it clear that the JEP must be respectful of the rules of the requesting countries, so it must accept that the United States does not provide more evidentiary material than that which it provided in the indictment, as happened on March 1, when the Office of International Affairs of the U.S. Department of Justice responded: "we must decline the request, because what is requested (9 recordings between July 10, 2017 and February 13, 2018) is contrary to our treaty practice and asks for unnecessary evidence for the extradition request".
<div> <div> <div>..Rule rejecter</div> <div>..Constitutiona</div> </div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div> </div>	<div>27</div>	Court Judge José Fernando Reyes further explained that "the Court understands that the JEP must evaluate the date of the facts, there is no doubt, but the JEP cannot say if the person requested in the extradition is the author or the accomplice of the crime or if he is guilty or not".
	<div>28</div> <div>29</div>	<div>Second instance</div> <div>All decisions made by the Review Section in these proceedings will have a double instance, as determined by the Court for Peace earlier this month; that is, the defense, the Public Prosecutor's Office or the victims will be able to file an appeal that will have the Appeal Section review the decision.</div>
<div> <div>..Someone speaki</div> </div>	<div>30</div>	This, according to Attorney General Fernando Carrillo, who protected the law, is a victory: "not as a dilatory mechanism but as a guarantee for the victims".
<div> <div>..Rule rejecter</div> </div>	<div>31</div>	In the opinion of the Procurator General's Office, the lack of the second instance clearly threatens fundamental rights to due process, making it necessary to resort to tutelage in order to obtain protection in the face of the exhaustion of the ordinary means of protecting constitutional guarantees.
	<div>32</div> <div>33</div>	<div>Victims at the Center</div> <div>If the crime for which another country is requesting the extradition of a former guerrilla was committed after the signing of the Agreement, the extradition procedure is the same as that applied in any case, since transitional justice loses its jurisdiction: the Supreme Court of Justice evaluates the request and issues a concept, the last word being in the hands of the President of the Republic, who alone has the power to send a national to a foreign court.</div>
	<div>34</div>	The Constitutional Court recommended that the Supreme Court should weigh the satisfaction of the victims of the armed conflict against international extradition treaties.
<div> <div> <div>..Positive Towar</div> <div>..Experts</div> </div> <div> <div></div> <div></div> </div> </div>	<div>35</div>	The constitutionalist Bernardita Perez, from the University of Antioquia, considered that "the government is concerned about not complying with the international treaties in which we have obliged ourselves to hand over Colombians without evaluating the evidence, what we have to say to President Ivan Duque is that we are in a transitional justice to end the violence in the country, that is a superior value to extraditing a criminal".
	<div>36</div>	He recalls that when the paramilitaries were extradited to the United States, after having taken advantage of the Justice and Peace Law during the government of Alvaro Uribe, the truth went with them.
	<div>37</div>	In October 2017, a report by EL COLOMBIANO revealed how Salvatore Mancuso, former commander of the Catatumbo Bloc of the extinct Auc, could not be brought before Colombian justice, since he was isolated in a prison. Since 2008 and up to that moment, the ex-paramilitary had only clarified 10,000 of the 70,000 crimes of which he was accused, a matter still claimed by his victims.

..Partido FARC	38	Likewise, former guerrilla commander Iván Márquez, former chief negotiator for the FARC, is concerned that the extradition will be a mechanism of retaliation. In a communiqué published last Thursday in the Bolivarian Press Agency, in which he criticized the objections of Iván Duque to the JEP, he expressed: "the President wants that guerrilla commanders may be extradited without evidence in order to satisfy his thirst for revenge. This is what Uribe did with Simón Trinidad whom he extradited to the United States, without being requested by that power, by means of a judicial montage. Simón ended up sentenced to 60 years in prison for a crime invented at the last minute, which was not even part of the initial setup".
	39	Juan Manuel Charry, constitutionalist of the Universidad del Rosario, warned that, according to the Constitution, the main responsibility of the actors of the armed conflict is with the transitional justice, since it has as its foundation the satisfaction of the rights of the victims.
..Experts	40	This is how legal support is provided so that those who actually participated in the conflict remain in Colombia, telling the truth and making reparations to the victims, and how the doors are closed to the colados, who see this justice system as a tool to circumvent foreign authorities.
..Initiator of Re ..Iván Duque	41	However, the last word remains with President Iván Duque, whose policy has been to honor international treaties as a mechanism "to avoid impunity".

	1	El_Col4:
	2	Challenges and impediments hold up the vote on objections to the JEP
..JEP	3	The night begins and the Senate has not yet begun to debate, much less vote, President Iván Duque's objections to the statutory law of the JEP, Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz.
	4	To the long list of impediments of the parliamentarians, were added the objections against four of the main senators who have led the discussion of the objections, Álvaro Uribe, Roy Barreras, Ivan Cepeda and Ernesto Macias, president of the Senate of the Republic.
	5	Macias, of the Centro Democrático, who has been singled out by the opposition for "delaying" the votes so that the government can gain time to attract votes in his favor, stopped the discussion when he filed a challenge against Cepeda, who he said could not vote because he has repeatedly spoken about the objections in the media and social networks, as well as that his wife, Pilar Rueda, works with the JEP.
	6	Cepeda withdrew from the session, but warned that this is a new form of delay that the government bench wants to make, to prevent Duque's objections to the JEP from sinking once and for all.
	7	Later, Roy Barreras anticipated that he was challenging the former president and Senator Alvaro Uribe, because in October 2016 he was a negotiator for the No group in the plebiscite, which achieved changes in the final agreements of the JEP.
	8	Barreras was challenged by the Centro Democrático group, because they told him that he had been the plenipotentiary negotiator for then-President Juan Manuel Santos in the final stage of the negotiations with the FARC in Cuba.
	9	The recusals should be addressed by the Senate ethics committee, which should meet and this would be preventing the vote from being taken after 5 hours of plenary session.
..Controversial Iss	10	The JEP has been the most controversial issue among the congressmen, a debate that is transferred to their social networks.

8.1.2 *El Espectador*

	1	El_Esp1:
	2	"I will continue in Congress, seeking reforms": Uribe responds to the president of the JEP
..JEP	3	Patricia Linares, president of the JEP, asked the former president to comply with Article 22 of the Constitution, which states that peace is a right and a duty.
..JEP	4	The former president and senator Álvaro Uribe Vélez responded this Tuesday morning to the letter sent by Judge Patricia Linares, president of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), in which she asked the former president to comply with Article 22 of the Constitution, "which establishes that peace is a right and a duty of all Colombians, an ethical and legal duty that binds us without distinction".
	5	In addition, Linares asked Uribe to resort to the "unavoidable commitment of not resorting to strategies of discredit, disinformation and continuous aggression".
..Truth Igno	6	"I think that in the JEP they should respect opinions that believe that this is not the path to peace or to the vindication of the victims. I will continue in Congress, with arguments, as you have known it, seeking reforms," the former president wrote on his Twitter account.
..Álvaro Uril		
..Initiator of Reconstr	7	The cross of words between Linares and Uribe comes at a crucial moment in the Legislative for the objections that President Iván Duque Marquez made to six articles of the statutory law of the JEP. This week, the House and Senate's accidental committees will meet to report to the respective plenaries, which must vote on whether to accept or deny the objections.
..Peace Preventer	8	This weekend, it was also learned about a couple of billboards that were installed in the country by Senator Paola Holguin's movement from the Centro Democrático, in which she equates the JEP with the victimizers, while pointing out that those who oppose this transitional justice system are in favor of the victims.
	9	The fences got a response from the Liberal Party, which announced the installation of 200 fences throughout the country, but saying the opposite of what the fence of Uribismo indicates.

	1	El_Esp2:
	2	Polarization overshadows the impressive work of the JEP: UN
	3	In a report by UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres, the UN warns that the division in Colombian society due to the political debates around the JEP has been exacerbated. It calls for the statutory law to be enacted "as soon as possible".
..Peace Procees ..Victim of the	4	Although the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, noted the progress made by the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz in several cases of human rights violations and international human rights in the context of the conflict, the organization was concerned about the levels of political polarization that have been reached around the work of transitional justice. Although it noted the identification of some former members of the FARC and the call for their testimony in cases such as illegal detentions and events that occurred in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, the document begins by warning about the growth of political divisions in the country.
..Peace Procees ..UN	5	"The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz is the main guarantor of the rights of victims to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition, and is also the expression of the legal guarantees granted to those who, in good faith, have laid down their arms with the verification of the United Nations," the report said.
..Truth Seeker	6	The report highlights the opening of the cases referred to illegal detentions, the extermination of the Unión Patriótica and four other cases that are being investigated by the JEP. For example, 31 former high-ranking ex-guerrilla commanders have been summoned to testify about illegal detentions, while in the case of victimizations in the departments of Antioquia and Chocó, 174 ex-combatants were identified and called to testify. In the case of acts perpetrated in Cauca and Valle del Cauca, 151 people have been identified. The UN estimates that the cases being investigated by transitional justice will involve events that left some 820,000 victims. In the 15 months that this jurisdiction has been in operation, 9,691 former members of the FARC, 1,958 members of the military forces, 39 people from other public institutions, and 12 individuals have appeared.
..Peace Processes ..Rule Follower	7	The Secretary General also noted the capture of the prosecutor of the JEP Carlos Bermeo. He pointed out that although at first the Prosecutor's Office affirmed that Bermeo was seeking to influence the extradition of former guerrilla chief Jesús Santrich, that entity "later retracted". He also recalled that the Attorney General's Office did not find any evidence to demonstrate this intention to influence the case. He also pointed out that 57 requests have been presented to the transitional justice system requesting that the guarantee of non-extradition be applied, of which 40 have been studied and denied.
	8	The UN recalled that for the peace process to be successful, guarantees must be given to those who have laid down their arms. "For those who are in the process of returning, the confidence that can be generated by the progressive efforts being made to offer them socio-economic opportunities is diminished if, on the other hand, there is growing legal insecurity due to the uncertainties affecting the transitional justice system," Guterres said in the report.
	9	The concerns of the multi-lateral body also relate to the substitution of illicit crops. The document highlights the compliance of the families who committed to pull up the bushes. "94% of the families that received the initial financial benefits of the Program (Integral National Program of Substitution of Illicit Use Crops) have eradicated their crops," it emphasizes. He also reveals figures about reseeded when the eradication is done voluntarily, in seven municipalities analyzed by the UN the reseeded rates were 0.6%.
	10	Like the previous report, the UN asks "what will happen to the other 30,000 families that have requested access to the Program but have not yet officially registered". It also showed that although some families are about to receive the last payments established by
		the Pnis, only a third of them have received technical assistance for the projects they started after the eradication.
	11	Guterres also recalled the January 17 attack on the General Santander Police Cadet School in Bogotá, which left 23 dead and more than 70 wounded. He recalled the broad rejection that this action by the Eln generated and the consequences that it had as the reactivation of the arrest warrants against commanders of this group and the suspension of the negotiation table with the State. "With the cessation of the dialogues, violence has increased in some regions, which has affected the civilian population, infrastructure and the environment," he stressed.

	1	El_Esp3:
	2	Liberal Party responds to Uribeism with fences of support for the JEP
..JEP {	3	The community launched a campaign to educate about the importance of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace. With the slogan "to end the JEP is to end the Peace Agreement" 200 fences will be installed in 20 capital cities and 80 municipalities, those hit by the conflict.
	4	The electoral campaign is getting stronger every day, and this weekend could become the one that marked the formal beginning of the struggle for regional power. The proof is that different political billboards have begun to appear in Antioquia; and since it is still not legal to campaign for candidates, the center of the propaganda is the topic of the moment: the Special Peace Jurisdiction, whose future is at stake these days in the Congress of the Republic.
..Partial Institution {	5	Senator Paola Holguín, from the Centro Democrático, installed two billboards this weekend in which she implies that to defend the JEP is to be on the side of the victimizers. The Liberal Party responded with a campaign in support of the Peace Accord, and the transitional justice system as the heart of the agreement. The slogan of 200 billboards, which have already begun to be placed, is: "to end the JEP is to end the Peace Accord".
..Peace Processes {	6	For this reason, the first of these fences, located in Remedios (Antioquia), was designed in response to those installed by the Uribeista senator in Caldas and the road between Medellín and Bolombolo. With a similar aesthetic, liberal propaganda asks the same question: You, whose side are you on? And it affirms that to be on the side of the victims is to defend the JEP, a system built to guarantee truth, justice and reparation for the victims.
	7	In this regard, the sole leader of the Liberal Party, former president César Gaviria, was emphatic that liberalism will be played to the hilt in defense of the Peace Accord and the JEP. "If the JEP falls, the Accords fall. What are they afraid of the JEP and the truth," said former President Gaviria on several occasions.
..Partido Liberal {	8	Thus, for the Liberal Party the fences of the Centro Democrático became the perfect reason to advance its campaign to support the Peace Accords. "For days we have been working on the strategy to place 200 billboards throughout the country. We started with this one in Remedios, but very soon the rest will come out, which will be located in 20 capital cities and 80 municipalities of the most affected by the armed conflict, where they value what has been the silence of the guns," explained one of the creators of the campaign.
..Truth Seeker {	9	The campaign, in addition to billboards, will include television and radio commercials, social networks and press. "All will be on the same premise, and that is that those who want to end and shatter the peace agreements are those who propose to end the JEP so that the truth will never be known. Because, as former President Gaviria says, to go around asking that the accords be ignored does irreparable damage to the peace of Colombia," concluded the political strategist who participated in the design of the campaign.

<div> <div>..JEP</div> <div>..Legitimized ir</div> </div>	1	El Esp4:
	2	Without Oxygen Objections to JEP?: Cambio Radical will not support them
	3	Unanimously, the community of Germán Vargas Lleras decided to reject the arguments presented by President Iván Duque around the backbone of the Peace Agreement and will not give him their votes in the Congress of the Republic. Thus the accounts, the government's arguments could arrive lifelessly at the Capitol.
<div> <div>..Legitimized instif</div> </div>	4	The Cambio Radical group in Congress decided this Thursday, through a ballot box and unanimously, not to support President Iván Duque in the objections he presented to the country against the Statutory Law of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz. In this sense, they will not accompany with their vote in the Capitol the six points that the president argued to object to some aspects of what has been called the backbone of the Peace Accord.
	5	"We believe that the objections are set out in several of the rules that were approved in the fast track. If there is only one control by the Constitutional Court, it is already absolved from the legal point of view," said Senator Germán Varón, spokesman for the party. He clarified, however, that Cambio Radical did not stop to determine whether or not Congress was competent to study such objections and if, in fact, they would be incurring in some crime or disciplinary offense by voting them.
<div> <div>..Partido Camt</div> <div>..Victim of the</div> </div>	6	"We abstained from the substantive arguments and I reiterate that the strongest argument is that if the Court has already made the examination on the constitutionality of the laws issued by fast track, we could hardly think of revoking those pronouncements," added Varón. He added that, in any case, the prosecutor - to whom the bench listened before making the decision - is not defeated despite the fact that he has become one of the main defenders of the presidential objections.
	7	As it is, the head of state has a hard time in Congress because, although the ruling Centro Democrático is the majority party in the Senate, it does not have the required majority to overturn the objections. In addition to the votes of Uribism (19), only the Christian parties (6) are added. This Thursday, in fact, the support of the Conservative Party, which, in spite of being in government, has not yet reached consensus on the objections, was "we shall see". In any case, they would add up to 13 votes.
<div> <div>..Partido Conserv</div> </div>	8	Meanwhile, in addition to the 16 votes of Cambio Radical against the objections, those of the U (14) and the Liberal Party (14), which have already announced that they will defend the JEP, plus the opposition senators (21). However, the impediments that affect the number of votes required to constitute the majority have yet to be removed.

8.1.3 El País Cali

	1	El País1:
	2	JEP asks Uribe to avoid "disinformation" campaigns against him
..JEP	3	The president of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, Patricia Linares, sent this Tuesday a public letter to Senator Álvaro Uribe Vélez, asking him to avoid campaigns of "discredit" and "disinformation" against that tribunal.
..JEP	4	"I would like to address you to request strict compliance with the provisions of Article 22 of the Political Constitution, which establishes that peace is a right and a duty for all," said Linares.
..JEP	5	And she adds: "a duty that translates into moderation, prudence, serenity and the unavoidable commitment not to resort to strategies of discredit, disinformation and aggression continues against those of us who have the difficult task of administering transitional justice".
..Rule Follower ..JEP	6	Linares emphasizes in her writing that the tribunal she presides over was created to overcome the war that has afflicted the country and that it will not guarantee impunity. In that sense, she clarifies that they have observed with "respect, tranquility, and prudence" the proposals of adjustments that have been made to the model adopted by the State.
..JEP	7	"We recognize as necessary the political debate that finds in Congress its natural scenario, demanding, of course, the respect we deserve as judges of the Republic and as citizens committed to peace", reads one of the paragraphs of the letter in which it also warns that "we will never resort to warlike, offensive or degrading language".
	8	Although there is no explicit mention of a name, the message is directed to congressmen and representatives of the community led by Uribe Vélez who have been posting batteries from their social networks and in statements to the media about the actions of the JEP.
..Peace Proce ..JEP	9	"Peace requires calm spirits, a democratic, serene, sincere and conciliatory language, the language that Colombia needs to finally turn the long page of war and be immersed in the task of rebuilding ourselves as a society," the judge concludes.

	1	El País2:
	2	Prosecutor's Office beats JEP in bidding for undeclared FARC assets
	3	With a unanimous vote, the Constitutional Court determined this Thursday that the Attorney General's Office will be the one to assume the possession of the assets of the FARC that were not inventoried in the framework of the final signature of the peace agreement.
..JEP	4	On this subject, the Attorney General's Office had maintained a confrontation of positions with the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, a court that considered that it had jurisdiction over these assets.
..Rule rejecter	5	According to Magistrate Luis Guillermo Guerrero, the speaker on the subject, "the JEP has defined competencies with the investigations and does not have competence in the area of material reparation for the victims".
..Constitutiona	6	Thus, what Order 155 of 2019 says is that "the Prosecutor's Office is competent to adopt the precautionary measures on the assets subject to extinction of ownership due to their relationship with the FARC".
	7	In other decisions, the High Court determined to leave without effect the proceedings carried out by the JEP related to the request for the imposition of precautionary measures on the assets subject to extinction of ownership due to their relationship with the group outside the law.
	8	Likewise, it warned the Prosecutor's Office that the assets whose dominion has been extinguished due to their relationship with the extinct group, are destined to the reparation of the victims of the armed conflict, and therefore it must ensure that the respective measures are adopted.
	9	The assets of the Farc, which today oscillate in an amount close to 2.3 trillion pesos, have no other purpose than to repair the victims. That group had to hand over the list by August 15 of last year and the assets that were declared after that date were under what is ordered by law and this is extinction of dominion.
..Initiator of Recor	10	The bidding of the FARC's assets began last July when the Investigation and Prosecution Unit of the JEP (UIA) asked several government entities for a list of the properties. In October, the First Instance Section for Cases of Absence, Recognition and Truth of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) suspended the provision of information because the necessary and relevant information to identify the Farc's inventory for reparations to the victims had not been collected.
..Truth Seeker	11	At that time, the transitional justice court asked the Prosecutor's Office, the Society for Special Assets (SAE), the Ministry of the Interior, and the Superintendency of Notaries and Records, among other entities, to provide reports on the assets of the group now demobilized.
	12	Despite the request for material, the first refusal was registered by the accusing entity, in its opinion, because assets in its possession must be part of a process of extinction of dominion. "The Prosecutor's Office must bear in mind the impossibility of complying with them, since the information related to domain extinction processes is reserved", said the accusing entity at the time.
	13	Another refusal was received from the Superintendence of Notaries and Registry, because "such information is an integral part of the files of the Attorney General's Office".

	14	Due to the Ministry of the Interior, the court assured that the Ministry did not give any answer to the request, and therefore it was determined to suspend the delivery of the information.
..Initiator of Record	15	Transitional justice, upon realizing the refusal of the entities, issued a letter in which it expressed in a 35-page document that this list was fundamental so that the victims of the conflict would not feel that this patrimony, which is the fruit of the conflict, is fictitious, and that it would serve the postulates of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition.
	16	Upon learning of the JEP's letter, Prosecutor Néstor Humberto Martínez sent a letter to the Constitutional Court so that it could define its competence. And this Thursday, the corporation gave him the backing, after it was known on Wednesday that the vote in the Plenary Hall was six in favor and three against.
	17	Now, the procedure from the Prosecutor's Office will be to abide by the regulations issued by President Iván Duque with the National Development Plan, in article 144, which establishes the strengthening of the reparation fund for victims of violence.
	18	"The liquid resources derived from the extinct goods that have not been handed over by the FARC-EP in the terms of Article 2 of Decree Law 903 of 2017, will be destined to the Reparation Fund for the Victims of Violence referred to in Law 1448 of 2011, with the exception of the rural properties referred to in the second paragraph of Article 91 of Law 1708 of 2014," says the regulations.
	19	Thus, the Attorney General's Office will be the one to determine the assets that are linked to processes of extinction of ownership that do not correspond to the inventory referred to in Decree Law 903 of 2017.
	20	Although, so far the accusing entity has not pronounced itself by the backing given by the Court, official sources confirmed that they are studying the way to proceed. It should be recalled that at this time, the Prosecutor's Office has a massive inventory of assets, from rags to gold bars. However, in the opinion of the prosecutor there is still a lack of assets to declare.

	1	El País3:
	2	JEP celebrates the Constitutional Court's determination for the use of FARC assets
..JEP	3	The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), highlighted the decision taken this Thursday by the Constitutional Court, which warned the Attorney General's Office that the assets of the extinct Farc should be used "exclusively" to repair the victims of the armed conflict.
..Initiator of Record	4	He added that the Jurisdiction "will continue to advance in its task of applying restorative justice with strict adherence to the law and the Constitution".
..JEP	5	The determination of the High Court was registered this Thursday after a conflict of competence for the possession of the goods originated in 2018.
..Constitutional Court	6	For the Court, "the JEP has defined competences with the investigations and has no competence in material reparation for the victims". Thus, what the Order 155 of 2019 says is that "the Prosecutor's Office is competent to adopt precautionary measures on the assets subject to extinction of ownership due to their relationship with the FARC".
	7	In other decisions, the High Court determined to leave without effect the proceedings carried out by the JEP related to the request for the imposition of precautionary measures on the assets subject to extinction of ownership due to their relationship with the group outside the law.
	8	Likewise, it warned the Prosecutor's Office that the assets whose dominion has been extinguished due to their relationship with the extinct group, are destined to the reparation of the victims of the armed conflict, and therefore it must ensure that the respective measures are adopted.
	9	The assets of the Farc, which today oscillate in an amount close to 2.3 trillion pesos, have no other purpose than to repair the victims. That group had to hand over the list by August 15 of last year and the assets that were declared after that date were under what is ordered by law and this is extinction of dominion.

	1	El País4:
	2	On April 9, the Senate will decide whether to consider objections to Justice of the Peace
..JEP	3	The political discussion about the presidential objections to the JEP's Statutory Law began to be clear about when it could be defined in the Congress of the Republic.
	4	This Tuesday, after a meeting of the special commission that was integrated in the Senate to deliver a report on President Duque's claims, it was decided that they will take two weeks to hear different voices on the matter and thus formulate a proposal to the plenary.
..Partido Conserv	5	Conservative Senator David Barguil, indicated that "in the commission it was decided to give us 15 days to try to approach and listen to the different sectors, to look for a great agreement that will serve the country, that will serve the peace process, that will serve the victims. In this time frame we are going to try to make that effort".
	6	Barguil even hopes that a concrete proposal for reforms to the JEP can be gathered among the different sectors and make up for the mistakes made since its approval in Congress.
..Partido Alianza S	7	In turn, Senator Jonathan Tamayo, known as 'Manguito', explained that "we will call on the various parties, their presidents to listen to them and gather their comments".
	8	The senators who will study the objections are Paloma Valencia (Centro Democrático), José David Name (De la U), Antonio Zabaraín (Cambio Radical), Julián Bedoya (Partido Liberal), David Barguil (Partido Conservador), John Milton Rodríguez (Colombia Justa Libre), Jonatan Tamayo (Decents), Iván Marulanda (Alianza Verde) and Jesús Alberto Castilla (Polo Democrático). It is estimated that most of them will be inclined to recommend a vote in favor.
	9	In the House of Representatives it is expected that this Wednesday the special committee that was integrated would be defining the moment when the plenary would make the decision, which is not discarded that it will also be for the second week of April.
..Controversial Iss	10	Alberto Castilla, Senator from the Polo Democrático, who is part of the accidental commission that will study the objections to the JEP's Statutory Law, explained that in the first session on Tuesday, different positions were exchanged on the matter.
..Peace Proces	11	In the party we have supported the process that put an end to the armed conflict between the government and the FARC guerrillas, we believe that the JEP will bring truth, seek justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition. "We welcome what the Constitutional Court says, that once Congress has addressed the study of the objections, the last word will be given to the Court, which has put forward its views in several judgments".
..Partido Polo I		
..Partido Polo Der	12	He added that the six presidential objections are due to judgments of unconstitutionality, although the Government raises judgments of inconvenience, therefore, "Congress does not have the competence to study them unless it is solely and exclusively considering them to insist on the sanctioning of the bill".

8.1.4 El Tiempo

	1	El_Tie1:
..JEP	2	Peace implies a commitment not to fall into disrepute: JEP to Uribe
	3	<i>Linares, president of that justice, sent a letter to the senator amidst controversy over fences in the CD.</i>
..Controversial Iss	4	In the midst of the controversy unleashed by the billboards of the Centro Democrático against the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), the president of this justice system, Patricia Linares, sent a letter to the former president and natural leader of that community, Álvaro Uribe.
..JEP	5	Linares "requests" him "and through him to the members of the Centro Democrático", "the strict fulfillment of the dispositions of article 22 of the Constitution that establishes that peace is a right and a duty of all Colombians, an ethical and juridical duty that links us without distinction".
..Subject of the Ci	6	The billboards known this weekend related those who support the JEP, a transitional justice scheme derived from the peace agreement with the Farc, with the perpetrators of the armed conflict that the country lived for 50 years.
..Structural/Cultur	7	The JEP is the specialized justice system for investigating and judging the most atrocious crimes committed during the conflict, not only by the ex-guerrilla, but also by other actors in the conflict.
	8	Centro Democrático Senator Paola Holguín has posted images of the fences on her Twitter account.
	9	In her letter, Linares tells Uribe that this duty spoken of in the Constitution is more intensified when it comes to servants of the State, such as senators.
..JEP	10	"It translates into moderation, prudence, serenity, and the unavoidable commitment not to resort to strategies of discredit, disinformation, and continuous aggression, against those of us who have the difficult task of administering transitional justice, directed at judges of the Republic who exercise our functions with the autonomy and independence that the Constitution provides," Linares affirms.
..Peace Process	11	The president of the JEP points out that from that justice he has observed with "respect, tranquility and prudence the reform proposals" to this model of transitional justice, which have been promoted by sectors led by Uribe.
..JEP	12	But at the same time, they demand the "respect we deserve as judges of the Republic and as citizens committed to peace.
..JEP	13	Linares adds: "We are a Peace Tribunal, created to help overcome the war that has plagued Colombia for half a century, guaranteeing no impunity and a vocation for reconciliation.
..JEP	14	"Peace requires calm spirits, of a democratic, serene, sincere and conciliatory language, the language that Colombia needs to finally turn the long page of war and be immersed in the immense task of rebuilding ourselves as a society", the judge affirms.
	15	In addition to the controversial billboards, on social networks, supporters of the Centro Democrático and its representatives have published their criticisms of the JEP.
..Álvaro Uribe	16	For his part, Senator Alvaro Uribe responded to Linares: "I think that in the JEP they should respect opinions that believe that this is not the path to peace or to the vindication of the victims. I will continue in Congress, with arguments, as you have known it, seeking reforms".

	1	El_Tie2:
..JEP	2	Persecution on the basis of sexual orientation, a crime that comes to JEP
	3	<i>For the first time, a court has received reports of this crime against humanity against LGBTI people.</i>
	4	"I am raping you to make you a man. "I am raping you so that you feel what a woman should feel. "You want to be a woman, then feel what women feel.
..Truth Seeker	5	Testimonies like these, of violence committed against gays, lesbians and transsexuals during the armed conflict, were compiled by Colombia Diversa and Caribe Afirmativo, organizations that promote LGBTI rights, in Tumaco and Urabá and constitute two reports that were delivered this Friday to the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in the framework of the territorial cases 002 (Tumaco, Barbacoas and Ricaurte, in Nariño) and 004 (Urabá) that opened this justice.
..Peace Processer	6	These testimonies, gathered during more than 7 months of investigation, will serve as input for the JEP to investigate and subsequently judge the serious crimes committed in these territories, in this case, for prejudice against people with diverse sexual orientations, identities, and gender expressions.
	7	Persecution, explains Catalina Botero, dean of the University of Los Andes Law School, is a very serious form of violence and is a crime against humanity. Different criminal tribunals around the world, starting with the Nuremberg Tribunal that tried the persecution of Jews in World War II, have heard cases of persecution on ethnic, religious, cultural or political grounds; however, this is the first time that reports have been made to a tribunal on international crimes for the persecution of the LGBTI population.
..Someone speaki	8	"It represents a historic opportunity to have it recognized that armed actors systematically violated LGBT people because of their sexual orientation and gender identity".
	9	Colombian researcher Diversa Daniela Díaz Villamil, who participated in the report on Tumaco, commented that these investigations manage to legally situate at the international level a supremely strong conduct that has a high impact on the victims, who were prohibited from exercising their rights as LGBT persons in these territories.
..Someone speaki	10	The Dean of Law of Los Andes said that locating this crime in the international arena "represents a historic opportunity to recognize that armed actors systematically violated LGBT people because of their sexual orientation and gender identity, which has never been made visible in a transitional justice court".
..Someone speaki	11	Botero added that talking about persecution is important because it allows us to understand that these acts of violence were not committed in an isolated or incidental manner, "but were used by the armed actors to reinforce their control over the territory".
..Someone speaki	12	These reports, she said, "show that LGBT people were raped, displaced, tortured, beaten, humiliated and threatened because they are LGBT".
	13	Tumaco
..Structural/Cultur	14	In the city of Nariño, the research was carried out by Colombia Diversa, which documented 12 cases of survivors of LGBT violence from 1985 to 2016.
..Subject of the Cr	15	Of the 12 cases, 8 were committed by the ex-guerrilla of the Farc, and these are the cases that will be presented to the JEP, which is the natural judge of that ex-guerrilla after the peace process, and 4 by criminal groups such as 'Aguilas Negras', 'Los Rastrojos', and the Eln guerrilla. The latter will be handed over to the Truth Commission, which is in charge of investigating what happened during the armed conflict.

..Subject of the Cr	16	In six of the eight cases committed by the FARC, the victims were sexually assaulted, while in the other two cases they were threatened or otherwise violated. In total, the violence and threats led 7 of the 8 victims who survived FARC violence to leave their territory by being forcibly displaced.
	17	Although statistically these cases may not be comparable to the millions of people persecuted, for example, during World War II, Daniela Díaz highlights that having 12 cases of survivors, added to a large number of homicides, "in a municipality as small as Tumaco, it is a phenomenon of immense magnitude.
	18	In a municipality as small as Tumaco, this is a phenomenon of immense magnitude.
	19	The research showed that three FARC structures violated LGBT people in Tumaco: the 29th front, which arrived in 1985 (the date of the first case documented by Colombia Diversa), and the Daniel Aldana and Mariscal Sucre columns.
..Structural/Cultur	20	In addition, in this territory all the victims are Afro-Colombians with a high level of territorial roots who, after leaving their territory due to threats, arrived in other places where they are also discriminated against because of their skin color, for being poor or displaced, the report states.
	21	The report also concludes that there was a high degree of premeditation in the crimes, which rules out the hypothesis that they were isolated or incidental cases, and in most cases the victims were taken from their usual environment to rural areas where they were sexually assaulted. After the events, the victimizers were told not to report what happened, said investigator Díaz.
..Voices of Victims	22	One of the victims, a trans person, asked the JEP to prioritize the LGBT population, "we are a very easy target, we are very vulnerable and they never take us into account in any case. It's as if we don't have rights (...) trans people are hit harder because they have us as a kind of mockery and sexual object".
	23	Trans people are more beaten up because they have us as a kind of mockery and sexual object.
..Structural/Cultur	24	Urabá
	25	On the other hand, the report on the events in the Urabá region was prepared by the organization Caribe Afirmativo, which compiled 19 cases of violence against LGTB people between 1986 and 2013.
..Subject of the Cr	26	The investigation found that 17 of those cases were of sexual violence, although in the region, explained Cindy Hawkins, one of the investigators, the persecution towards the LGBT population was also framed in other types of behaviors such as threats and forced displacement, homicides and femicides, and forced labor.
..Structural/Cultur	27	A pattern and systemic nature of violence against people with diverse gender identities was also evident in this region, i.e., the violence was motivated specifically by being LGBT people and to send the message to the community that this was not allowed and had to be "corrected".
	28	The Farc was the main armed actor that perpetrated the attacks, although there are also records of paramilitary victims.
	29	Hawkins added that in Urabá it was found that among the impacts generated by this violence towards LGBT people were forced displacement but also forced pregnancies, physical, emotional and economic damage, and infections of sexually transmitted viruses
		such as HIV.

	1	El_Tie3:
	2	Did Cambio Radical deal a mortal blow to the objections to the JEP?
	3	<i>This Thursday, the party's leadership decided not to support the presidential objections.</i>
..JEP }	4	Cambio Radical's decision on Thursday not to support the presidential objections to justice for peace became the most certain - and perhaps deadly - blow to the objections presented by President Iván Duque to some aspects of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in Congress.
	5	In Thursday's meeting, the party decided that it will not support the objections Duque sent to Congress to make adjustments to the justice with which the ex-combatants are being processed, and that it will vote against them.
..Subject of the Cr }	6	In the middle of the congressmen's meeting, held at the Club de Ejecutivos, in the center of Bogota, the legislators were asked who agreed not to support the objections to the JEP. Most raised their hands and a few did not. The die was cast.
..Partido Cambio I }	7	Before this majority, Senator Germán Varón went before the media and stated that the decision of the bench had been against the presidential objections. "The strong argument was to consider that if the Constitutional Court had already made an examination on the constitutionality of several of the laws issued under the 'fast track' procedure, and likewise of the legislative acts, we could hardly think that they are going to revoke those pronouncements," explained Varón.
..Partido Cambio I }	8	"The objections are not applicable because they are included in the legislative acts and in the laws that have already been revised in their constitutionality," affirmed Varón, who thus made it clear that Cambio Radical accepted this thesis in the legal debate on the viability of processing them in Congress.
..Victim of the par }	9	The decision taken by Cambio Radical on Thursday not to support the presidential objections to justice for peace became the most certain - and perhaps deadly - blow that the objections presented by President Iván Duque to some aspects of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) have suffered in Congress.
	10	The decision-making votes
	11	From the moment the presidential objections to the JEP's statutory law became known and the political parties began to take a stand, several observers began to do accounts on the future of the JEP.
	12	According to congressional regulations, presidential objections must have an absolute majority in order to be accepted or rejected. This means 55 yes or no votes in the Senate and 87 in the House of Representatives.
	13	On the Senate side, they would be voted on by the 19 senators of the Centro Democrático, Duque's party, which has been critical of several points of the peace agreement; at least 10 conservative senators and 6 from the Christian movements. There would be 35 votes.
	14	If we take into account the positions of some senators from the U, it is possible that about five votes will be added from that group's bench, in which the majority is against the objections to justice for peace. The vote for yes, therefore, would be 40.
	15	On the other hand, those who are against would be 18 opposition senators -the votes of the 4 from the Farc party are not counted because they would surely be accepted-; 14 liberals; some 10 from 'la U', and now 16 from Cambio Radical. This adds up to 58 supports, with which the presidential objections would be denied in the Senate.

- 16 And in the House the figures are as follows: 32 from the Centro Democrático, 21 from the Conservative Party, and 3 from the Christian movements. That is 56 votes, a far cry from the 87 required to give a yes to the presidential disagreements with the JEP.
- 17 On the other side would be almost all the remaining 110 representatives to the House from the Liberal Party, 'la U', Cambio Radical, Alianza Verde, Polo, Opción Ciudadana, Coalición Lista de la Decencia, Mais, Coalición Alternativa Santandereana AS and Renaciente, the new party of the Afros. Once again, the votes of the five congressmen of the Farc party are excluded from the vote.
- 18 Thus, the decision of Cambio Radical this Thursday leaves in more trouble, than they already had, the presidential objections and, if these accounts end up being given, President Duque with the obligation to sign the statutory law of justice for peace so that it goes into effect.
- 19 Vargas won over the Chars
20 Former Vice President Germán Vargas won the round of the Char House yesterday in the race for the presidency of the House. The Cambio Radical party elected by a large majority Representative Carlos Cuenca, to be the party's candidate to occupy this dignity, which, according to the agreements between the parties, corresponds to Cambio Radical as of July 20.

	1	El_Tie4:
	2	More than 200 inmates of La Picota ask to be heard at the JEP
	3	<i>They say they will tell the truth about the assassination of Alvaro Gomez Hurtado and the explosion of the Avianca plane.</i>
..JEP	4	The Committee of Prisoners for the Truth of Colombia and 200 inmates of the La Picota prison in Bogotá sent a letter - dated March 21, 2019 - to the members of the Integral System of Justice, Truth, Reparation and Non-Repetition, of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP.
..The Committee c	5	In the letter, they reiterated their willingness to appear before the court of justice to tell the truth about various events in the internal conflict in which they were involved. "We want to make known to you, to every country, and to the whole world, the truth related to events of so many years of national conflict that still persists and of which we have been a part, either as actors or as direct witnesses," they state in the letter.
	6	The inmates reiterate their willingness to make the rights of the victims and their families to "truth, reparation and non-repetition" prevail.
..Structural/Cultur	7	The acts of violence that they would enter to narrate were registered in the middle of what they qualify as an internal conflict between the years 1984 and 2016, and links paramilitary, self-defense, guerrilla (Farc-Eln) and criminal gangs and the role of drug trafficking in the conflict.
..Peace Processes	8	The signatories point out that the request is made on the basis of the legal rules established and of the competence of the JEP, which in one of its contributions indicates that it is "necessary to provide full truth, reparations for the victims and to guarantee non-repetition. To provide full truth means to report, when the elements for it are available, in an exhaustive and detailed manner, the conducts committed and the circumstances of their commission, as well as the necessary and sufficient information to attribute responsibility, in order to guarantee the satisfaction of the victims' rights to reparation and non-repetition".
	9	They point out that for this purpose it is necessary for the JEP to call them to appear before the Truth Commission and thus make known the facts they claim to be relating.
..Structural/Cultur	10	Relevant facts:
	11	In the letter, the inmates state that they will make the truth known in cases such as the murder of Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, an assassination for which they say they will provide the names of the perpetrators and their accomplices.
..Structural/Cultur	12	Important facts such as the attack on the Avianca plane; the development of Operación Orión (murders, disappearances, displacement, torture). And relations with the military forces, among other chapters of national life.
..The Committee c	13	In 24 points they also offer to talk about: "Homicides, forced disappearance, assassinations, terrorism, massacres, common graves, false positives, kidnappings between guerrillas and self-defense groups, social cleansing, drug trafficking relations with the Armed Forces. MM. and Police, drug trafficking relations with local, departmental, and national politicians, drug trafficking relations with businessmen, industrialists, and landowners, paramilitary, self-defense, and criminal gang relations with FFMM and Police, paramilitary, self-defense, and criminal gang relations with businessmen, industrialists and landowners, paramilitary, self-defense, and criminal gang relations with local, departmental, and national politicians, guerrilla relations with local

..The Committee c		politicians, guerrilla relations with paramilitaries and self-defense and drug trafficking, guerrilla relations with the FF. MM. and the police for criminal conduct such as kidnappings, among others".
..The Committee c	14	As well as "truths that the prisoners abroad and beneficiaries of Justice and Peace want to contribute, false victims and false demobilizations of the AUC, corruption, business, contracting for kidnappings, extortion and homicides, buying weapons from personnel of the Armed Forces and the Police, and homicides in peasant marches and the sale of information from the authorities to criminal organizations".
..The Committee c	15	They point out that they have carried out a "rigorous preliminary sweep of the phenomena of the armed conflict and violence in Colombia", in which they were the protagonists, which will allow them to "help with the identification of real actors in the conflict who are still unknown".
..The Committee c	16	"Who want to contribute to the truth and who aspire not to take to the grave important secrets for the truth of the conflict, of the victims and of the country".
..The Committee c	17	Voices from Abroad
..The Committee c	18	In the letter, the members of the Committee of Prisoners for the Truth of Colombia affirm that they have received "communications from people in hiding and from prisoners abroad, condemned to long prison terms (some with life sentences), who want to contribute to the truth and who aspire not to take to the grave important secrets for the truth of the conflict, of the victims and of the country.
	19	Finally, they requested a meeting with Father Francisco de Roux S.J., who is the President of the Truth Commission, to explain the plan of action and to make themselves heard by the high court.

8.2 28th of April 2019 – 4th of May 2019

8.2.1 *El Colombiano*

	1	El_Col5:
	2	"El Paisa" reappears with a letter to the JEP
..JEP	3	In a missive signed by Hernán Dario Velásquez Saldarriaga, better known as "el Paisa", former guerrilla chief of the mobile column Teófilo Forero of the extinct Farc, criticized the Special Justice for Peace, JEP, for its decision last Friday to order the national police to arrest him.
..Rule rejecter	4	According to "Óscar Montero", as "el Paisa" is also known, the decision causes great damage to itself, "because it does not consult the legal insecurity and the absolute lack of physical security to appear".
..Rule rejecter	5	In the letter, "el Paisa" and Iván Márquez, who also signed the communiqué dated Monday, indicated that the current JEP is not the same as the one agreed upon in Havana, and expressed that this transitional justice should be more measured in its decisions and apply the principle of favorability, as it was in the Agreement signed between the government and the guerrilla.
..Structural/Cu		
..Partido FARC	6	"It has always been expected that they would cite, with the same vehemence as they do with the counterpart, those involved in the State who victimized millions with their political and social decisions," indicated Márquez and "el Paisa".
..Partial institu'		
..Partial institution	7	Furthermore, they expressed that the JEP should call Senator Álvaro Uribe Vélez and those involved in various crimes such as Operation Orión, in Comuna 13.
..Subject of the	8	The arrest warrant against "el Paisa" was ordered last Friday by the Recognition and Truth Room of the JEP, "due to the multiple failures of the former guerrilla chief to comply with the peace process and the JEP, a court to which he did not send reports and did not appear to tell the truth to the victims.
..Someone spk		
	9	At the same time, spokespersons for the Farc party asked international organizations such as the UN, and the guarantor countries, to mediate in the decision of the JEP to lift the parole of "el Paisa".
	10	We ask the Second Mission of the United Nations and the countries that guarantee the agreement to consider the possibility of taking steps so that 'el Paisa' can attend before the jurisdiction, for which reason we demand from the National Government and the General Attorney's Office the political and legal guarantees so that this end is fulfilled," indicated the political party through a communiqué.

	1	El_Col6:
	2	Dilate to give oxygen to JEP objections
	3	Very early on, the Senate Presidency announced that the debate of the presidential objections to the JEP's statutory law would not begin at 11:00 a.m., as was foreseen in the legislative agenda, but would be postponed until 1:00 p.m. The debate began at about 2:00 p.m. with the vote on the impediments, and at about 4:00 p.m., when 16 of them had already been approved, Senate President Ernesto Macias, of the Centro Democrático, surprised with his challenge against Senator Ivan Cepeda, of the Pole.
	4	Two arguments supported the congressman's position: Cepeda's wife, Pilar Rueda Jimenez, is a contractor for the Investigation and Accusation Unit of the JEP, and a long series of trills by the politician speaking out against the objections.
	5	This procedure unleashed a number of comings and goings in the Plenary, in which Senators Álvaro Uribe, Fernando Araújo, Ciro Ramírez and Ernesto Macías (of the Democratic Center), Laureano Acuña (of the Conservative Party) and Roy Barreras (of the U Party) also ended up being challenged for the personal or family interests they may have in relation to the debate of the objections of the JEP.
	6	These are precisely the parliamentarians who have led the discussion of the statutory law and President Iván Duque's objections to it. In order to solve the problem, which was not solved during the Plenary, the seven cases were passed to the Ethics Commission of the Congress, which will have to decide who can and cannot participate in the discussion.
	7	Do you want to delay the process?
	8	Several senators pointed out that all this discussion about the reopening of impediments and challenges was nothing more than a delaying maneuver for the government to twist the majorities, as pointed out, for example, by Roy Barreras.
..Experts	9	In this regard, Carlos Andrés Arias, professor of political communication and public opinion at the Universidad Externado de Colombia, indicated that "the government is looking to open a jar of jam with enough oxygen to allow it to twist some of the votes to pass at least two of the objections". The expert added that this process of "jamming" these potential voters is very complex, because it requires parliamentarians to be certain that they are going to deliver on their promises. As it is, time is money. The former president and senator, Álvaro Uribe, said that "the Centro Democrático insists on the need for an agreement from the majorities of the Senate", and criticized that "if the objection is not approved, extradition will practically be prohibited". Uribe's intention is that the Senate at least approve the objections "that have to do, besides the extradition, with the risk that outsiders (third parties) are involved in this process," said Uribe. This requires that those who have already committed their votes to the leaders of their parties in Cambio Radical and the Liberal Party change their position. Macias has pointed out that this is not a matter of delay but rather an open debate. Andrés Felipe Bernal, a researcher at the Political School of the Sergio Arboleda University, does not believe that the government will achieve a majority for this effort, because the cards are already out and, as happened in the House, the objections would sink. However, Bernal stressed that the delay is legitimate in all collegiate bodies around the world and is part of the democratic discussion, in this case, the Senate.
..Álvaro Uribe		
	10	What is at stake
..Partido Verde	11	Senator Antonio Sanguino said during the session that "this is the first time that the government bench obstructs the legislative agenda".
	12	He refers to the fact that the National Development Plan and other reforms, including the ICT policy and law, are being held up until the legislature makes decisions regarding the objections of the JEP, which thanks to the Statute of the Opposition have priority.
	13	For Arias, the legitimacy and governance of the Executive is at stake, far beyond the JEP, which at this point is already at the bottom of the Government's agenda.
..Experts	14	"President Duque is facing a crisis in which there is a lack of government and this would be the final blow to show society and Congress that his institutionality is weak. The ability of the Executive to take the reins of power would be in question," said Arias. Bernal agreed, considering that the objections to the statutory law of justice of the peace are only six articles that are not even the points of honor of the JEP, but they are the dignity of an administration that is increasingly discredited.
	15	Today the government bench will have a new opportunity to convince the congressmen to vote in favor of the objections and close the cycle of discussion on the JEP.

	1	El_Col7:
	2	Senate to Repeat JEP Objection Vote Today
..JEP	3	The accounts that the opposition parties were seeking to sink President Iván Duque's objections to the JEP's statutory law, did not go beyond a day's work and, after yesterday's vote of 47 votes against the presidential proposal and only 34 in favor, this fundamental procedure for Transitional Justice once again came to a standstill.
	4	With more than six hours of deliberation, and as if it were a contest in which arguments have to be defended even with one's life, each of the party representatives came forward and explained why the objections should and should not be voted on.
	5	With the speeches, the debate turned, once again, into a spiral of accusations and defense that prolonged the decision and led to public opinion starting to exert pressure through social networks with an up #VotenLaJepYa.
	6	In the length of the debate, and with a favorability that seemed to vanish, the opposition parties began to do the math with a simple vote, that is, with half of the votes (48 votes), the objections would sink, this because of the fact that of the 108 senators, five from Farc would be prevented from voting, plus eight accepted impediments, the plenary would be left with 95 congressmen able to decide.
	7	With the accounts like this, the senator of the Green Alliance party, Angelica Lozano, showed a photograph in which she added up the votes like this: in favor would be the Liberal Party with 13; De la U, 5; Cambio Radical, 13; Alianza Verde, 8; Polo Democrático, 5; Colombia Humana, 4; and against would be Centro Democrático with 17 votes; Conservatives, 10; Colombia Justa Libres, 3; Mira, 3; ASI, one vote and De la U, 6.
..Partido Social	8	"This power struggle has made the country lose 50 days and what it has done is sow uncertainty," said Senator Lozano, who added that this uncertainty touches the victims, the State itself, the demobilized members of Farc who hope to have a legal floor to continue their reintegration, and the JEP that is waiting for its bases to fully operate.
..Solution Provide	9	Next, Senator and former President Álvaro Uribe Vélez insisted on the proposal to vote on an objection-by-objection basis, emphasizing the issue of extradition, which seeks to ensure that it is not prohibited even for those who tell the truth about what happened in the armed conflict, and secondly, that the High Commissioner for Peace has the power to accept or deny ex-guerrillas who take advantage of the transitional justice system.
	10	However, the lack of a vote to add the 48, which apparently was that of the U Party Senator Maritza Martinez, who withdrew, meant that only 47 were obtained, and according to the Senate's board of directors, these were not enough to make a decision denying the objections. Thus the confusion over whether or not the objections were rejected was fueled, and as a result, the room was left almost empty and without a quorum to vote again as requested by Ernesto Macias, President of the Senate.
	11	One more chapter
	12	While the corporation's board of directors called for a new discussion of a third chapter of the objections to the JEP today at 10:00 a.m., arguing that there was no qualified majority, since 48 votes were not obtained, the opposition parties insist that Duque's proposal was shelved and with a negative presentation.
	13	The opposition parties insist that Duque's proposal was shelved and presented a negative statement. This was made known by the U party's congressman, Roy Barreras, who was one of the senators who withdrew from the premises after the vote against it.
..Victim of the ..Partido De la	14	"The objections that hurt the JEP have been denied. I read the case law and it was very clear that for the absolute majority it is half of the members, not half plus one. We have 108 members minus 14 with the impediments and that gives 94, and the absolute majority is half, and half is 47, that in simple mathematics, even for Senator Ernesto Macias," said Barreras.
	15	Contrary to Barreras, the Minister of the Interior, Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez, considers that

		there is not a last word said and expressed that today the diligence will continue.
..Partido Cambio I	16	"The idea is to repeat the vote. The government continues to insist that the parties consider these presidential objections. There is really a great risk for the country in the issue of ending extradition and strengthening drug trafficking, and the people who are responsible for this crime, that is why it is not convenient for the country," said the minister.
	17	One of the corporations that regretted what happened was the Representative to the House, Juanita Goebertus, who described as pathetic what happened yesterday on the Senate floor when she said that months were lost.
..Partido Verde	18	"It will have to be voted on again tomorrow (today). If there is a discrepancy between the Senate and the House, the paragraphs or articles will be filed and the matter will be left in the hands of the Constitutional Court. Colombia loses," Goebertus said.
	19	In we will see the PND
	20	With what happened yesterday, the National Development Plan, PND, is in check, which could not be discussed because the majority of the plenary was not present. Now President Iván Duque and his ministers are undertaking a race against time, because the PND must have all of its paperwork before May 7, otherwise it will sink and depend exclusively on the presidential pen.

8.2.2 El Espectador

	1	El_Esp5:
	2	Where were they? The votes that were missing to deny the objections to the JEP
..JEP {	3	During the vote on the filing of presidential objections to the JEP's statutory law, only one vote was needed to sink them, according to the board of directors. Who are the senators who left the premises and were able to end the proceedings of the objections in Congress?
	4	In their accounts, the "propaz" bench knew it needed only 48 votes to sink the presidential objections to the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) statute. They were confident that more than 48 senators would give their yes to the archiving speech, since both the liberals, Cambio Radical, the U and the opposition, after the president presented the objections, publicly announced that they would not accompany the government on this issue.
	5	However, at the time of the vote on the presentation of the file, doubts took over the premises and those who were sure of being victorious on Tuesday. The reason? Six U parliamentarians and one from Cambio Radical left the plenary at the decisive moment, when there was only one vote left to settle the discussion of the objections in Congress.
	6	Ana María Castañeda, from Cambio Radical, who is also the president of the Women's Commission; Maritza Martínez, Berner Zambrano, José Alfredo Gnecco, Eduardo Pulgar, José David Name and Miguel Amín, from the U, were the senators who were not present when the vote was opened, not complying with the decision of their parties to say yes to the presentation of the file.
	7	Although the reasons why they were not present at that time are not known, it is known, for example, that Name agreed with the objections and was part of the accidental commission that studied the objections, nevertheless, he resigned after his party agreed not to accompany the government, stating that he would abide by the decision.

	1	El_Esp6:
	2	They denounce "mico" to remove the budget from the JEP in the PND
..JEP {	3	An article promoted by the liberal representative Édgar “el Pote” Gómez seeks to deliver the budget of the peace court to the investigation and prosecution unit of the JEP.
..Victim of Policies {	4	A dark movement is noticed in the corridors of the House of Representatives. According to parliamentarians who defend the Peace Agreement, the liberal representative Édgar “el Pote” Gómez is promoting an article that seeks to take resources away from the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) to hand them over to the questioned investigation and prosecution unit of the same court.
..Alerter {	5	According to a warning from the JEP itself, article 308 of the National Development Plan project (today 148 in the presentation) is highly inconvenient, because, by giving administrative autonomy to the entity that investigates the crimes, it would violate the Final Agreement of Paz and legislative act 01 of 2017, already declared enforceable by the Constitutional Court.
..JEP {	6	"Article 148 grants administrative, patrimonial and technical autonomy to the UIA, when said autonomy by constitutional provision resides in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace as a justice component of the SIVJRN, and is materialized through the management carried out by the Executive Secretariat, body that exercises the legal representation and the administration and management of the resources of the justice component in a comprehensive manner under the guidance of the government instances established for this purpose. The law of the National Development Plan cannot include constitutional reforms or provisions against the Political Charter," says the JEP.
	7	This article would break the harmony between the different gears of the system, opening the door for the political bureaucracy to take over the investigation unit, today strongly questioned by the case of Prosecutor Bermeo and some appointments of politicians in the entity that follow to track the Attorney General of the Nation.

..JEP
 ..Subject of the
 ..Truth Seeker

- 1 **El_Esp7:**
- 2 **These are the people under investigation for paramilitarism who want to submit to the JEP**
- 3 One former minister, 10 former congressmen, 5 former governors, 11 former mayors, 7 former councilors and 3 former staff members are part of the list being evaluated by the Legal Situation Definition Room.
- 4 A long list of politicians investigated for links to paramilitarism is in the hands of the Legal Situation Definition Chamber of the Special Peace Jurisdiction (JEP). The names were made public by the JEP, which is considering whether or not to accept their submission to the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition, which was created after the Peace Accord.
- 5 One former minister, 10 former congressmen, 5 former governors, 11 former mayors, 7 former councillors and 3 former staff members are part of the group of third party civilians who are asking to be tried by the transitional justice system.
- 6 Among the list is Sabas Pretelt de la Vega, former Minister of Justice in the presidency of Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison for the Yidispolitics scandal. The Supreme Court of Justice found him guilty of the crime of concussion in 2015 after he managed to prove that Sabas Pretelt illegally influenced the processing of the bill through which then President Alvaro Uribe Velez was intended to be reelected.
- 7 Among the group of former congressmen is Besaile Fayad, a former parliamentarian from Córdoba, who was arrested in August 2017 when it was discovered that he paid \$2 billion to trick his file into parapolitics. It was the genesis of the so-called toga cartel, where three former presidents of the Supreme Court of Justice were splashed, among others: Francisco Ricaurte, José Leonidas Bustos and Camilo Tarquino; the then chief prosecutor of the Anti-Corruption Unit, Gustavo Moreno, and his partner in crime, Leonardo Pinilla (both extradited and convicted in the United States), and former magistrate Gustavo Malo Fernández.
- 8 Likewise, Salvador Arana Sus, ex-governor of Sucre and who was sentenced to 40 years in prison for the disappearance and subsequent murder of the mayor of El Roble, Eudaldo 'Tito' Díaz Salgado, also asked the JEP for a clue.
- 9 Another ex-congressman who requested to be tried by the JEP is Zulema Del Carmen Jattin Corrales, who is being prosecuted for acts that date back to 2001 and that would have extended to 2007 and are related to alleged support she received from self-defense groups operating in the department of Córdoba.
- 10 Another name that had not been mentioned until now for the JEP was that of Efrén Antonio Hernández Díaz, sentenced to 72 months in prison for signing pacts with former paramilitary chief Héctor Buitrago, known as 'Martín Llano'.
- 11 The cases of Álvaro Ashton, who was investigated for aggravated conspiracy and bribery for alleged relations in favor of the Northern Bloc of the Self-Defense Forces, and Habib Merheg Marún, who was investigated for the crime of aggravated conspiracy in relation to alleged ties with members of the Central Bolívar Bloc, under the direction of Carlos Mario Jiménez Naranjo, or "Macaco," are also being studied. Finally, there are Pedro Mary Muvdi Aranguena, Álvaro García Romero, Jesús León Puella Chamie, and Héctor Julio Alfonso López.

- 12 In the case of the ex-governors, Juan Francisco Gómez Cerchar, known as Kiko Gómez, stands out. He was sentenced to 55 years in prison for his responsibility in the murder of the ex-mayor of the municipality of Barrancas, Yandra Brito; her husband, Henry Ustariz; and the escort Wilfrido Fonseca Peñaranda. Also present are Edilberto Castro Rincón, ex-director of Meta; William Hernán Pérez Espinel, of Casanare; Juan José Chaux Mosquera, of Cauca; Julio Enrique Acosta Bernal, of Arauca.
- 13 The JEP also mentioned former mayors Franklin Germán Chaparro Carrillo, from Villavicencio; Wilson Antonio Chaverra González, from the municipality of Vigía del Fuerte (Antioquia); Luis Rafael Páez Zambrano, from the municipality of Cerro de San Antonio (Magdalena); Jorge Luis Alfonso López, from the municipality of Magangué (Magdalena); José Mauricio Jiménez Pérez, from the municipality of Aguazul (Casanare); Ramiro Suárez Corzo, from Cúcuta; Manuel Francisco Ríos Revuelta, from the municipality of Coveñas (Córdoba); César Augusto Mayo García, from the municipality of Mutatá (Antioquia); Julio César Ardila Torres, from Barrancabermeja, and Benjamín Bulla Dueñas, from the municipality of San Luis de Gaceno (Boyacá).
- 14 In the section of the ex-council members are Eladio Antonio Muentes Avila, Carlos Alberto Olivera García, Abel Antonio Toscano Benítez, Etemilson Vásquez Camargo, Claudia Cecilia Buitrago Ortiz, Ovelio Andrés Cárdenas Álvarez and Javier Zárate Ariza.
- 15 And finally, in the ex-personnel department, there are Jaime Alberto Mora Pérez, Rubén Darío Ruiz Berrío and Ervin Hernán Ortega Herrera.

	1	El_Esp8:
	2	Objections to the JEP were also not voted on in the Senate on Wednesday
..Partido Centro D	3	The president of the corporation, Ernesto Macias, said that because of an "involuntary mistake" he did not announce Tuesday night the discussion of the presidential objections to the rule of the statutory law, a fundamental requirement to proceed to debate any project in the plenary.
..JEP	4	After several hours of recess, and in the midst of a heated atmosphere in the National Capitol, the Senate of the Republic postponed, once again, the discussion of the presidential objections to the statutory law of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz. As argued by the president of the corporation, Senator Ernesto Macias (Centro Democrático), due to an "involuntary error" he forgot to include in the agenda for today, Wednesday, the continuation of the debate, a fundamental requirement so that it is not vitiated by procedural matters.
	5	In the long pause adopted by the plenary to bring together the sectors that reject the objections to the JEP with those who support it, it was sought to establish whether, in fact, the vote on Tuesday night left such objections sunk or if, on the contrary, the low quorum did not allow the Senate to adopt a decision. According to legal interpretations, there are those who believe that the seat of Aida Merlano, of the Conservative Party, should have been deducted from the Senate.
..Partido De la U	6	"It is not possible that the Presidency of the Senate of the Republic determines that the absolute majority of the members of the Senate is forty-eight (48), since the total number of members must be one hundred and seven and not one hundred and eight senators, when discounting the seat of Aida Merlano, To this number is also discounted the fourteen approved impediments, giving a total number of ninety-three Senators, constituting the absolute majority in this case a total of forty-seven (47) Senators, that is one less based on the President's interpretation", were the accounts of U Senator Roy Barreras.
..Partido De la U	7	Senator Barreras, at the end of the session, recalled that nothing can be approved in the Senate until it makes a final decision on the objections. Therefore, he explained, the future of the National Development Plan is on hold since it has a legal deadline - May 7 - for it to be endorsed by the Legislative. "Yesterday we won and the objections were denied. President Macias ignored that victory as he ignored the victory of the House," insisted the congressman. He added that "I appealed that decision very early and it has not been processed. Until that happens, the PND or any other law cannot vote.
	8	Thus, Senator Macias called for a new session for this Thursday, in which the appeal filed by Barreras will have to be decided so that it can be defined, really, how the legislative majority in the Senate was composed, taking into account the impediments endorsed and the empty seat that, says the U senator, should be discounted to the blue community because of Merlano's absence. "That appeal has to be voted on," he insisted. If it is not endorsed, the paper that calls for the collapse of the objections to the statutory law will have to be voted on again.
	9	Prior to the recess, two of the senators who were singled out for absenteeism from the vote, which many considered to be the missing support to sink the objections, explained the reasons why they left the chamber. "I have never had any doubt on the subject of peace and I still do not have it, but they are not going to prevent me from speaking, establishing my positions and leaving my records when I consider it indispensable. (...) So, if I cannot express my opinion, it means that my vote is not indispensable either. I hope that the report is approved with yesterday's vote," said Senator Maritza Martinez of the U.
	10	For his part, his colleague José David Name, also took the floor arguing that: "My position and that of the other four (José Alfredo Gnecco, Miguel Amin, Eduardo Pulgar and Berner

Zambrano) is that we cannot vote on an article that opens the door to non-extradition of drug traffickers in this country (...) Nobody can force me to vote on some objections en bloc, while I have that reasonable doubt. If you want to have Senator Name's vote, which you needed yesterday, I will gladly do so. Let me vote on the article where I have a doubt," he said.

11 Ernesto Macías, president of the Senate, ratified that for the Board of Directors yesterday's result must be repeated because of the lack of a vote to complete half plus one of the quorum. For them the seats authorized to vote, subtracting the impediments, were 94, that is, the majority to sink the objections were 48.

12 While for the "propaz" party, the 47 votes obtained yesterday are more than enough to file the objections, since in their accounts they subtracted the seats, according to them irreplaceable, of Iván Márquez, of the FARC, and of Aída Merlano, currently detained for a process before the justice system for corruption. In other words, 92 parliamentarians were empowered to vote.

13 For this reason, during today's session, Roy Barreras, of the U and a strong defender of the Havana Agreement, announced that they appealed the decision of the Presidency of the corporation, considering that "the absolute majority is 47". He also argued that: "Yesterday the draft objections were not announced for today. By not doing so, the only way to save the National Development Plan, to start voting on it, is to consider that once this appeal is made, the discussion on the discussions is already over".

14 "Pursuant to Article 44 of the Fifth Law of 1992, the undersigned Senators presented an appeal of the decision of the President of the Senate of the Republic regarding the application and interpretation of the majority rule in the vote of the report of presidential objections to the JEP's statutory bill, this because an erroneous calculation is being made of the members of the corporation that made up the quorum and corresponding absolute majority for this issue," reads the appeal document.

15 Another of the doubts that were left on record, especially by the Greens, is whether Senator Antanas Mockus, whose election was annulled by the Council of State due to inabilities, was notified of this decision by the Board of Directors, attaching the order that he could no longer participate in the debates at the Capitol. For the bench of the former mayor of Bogotá, his presence would have given an end to this discussion that has been postponed for three days.

16 Because of the tug-of-war between the "propaz" and government benches, Macías decreed a half-hour recess to define the number that corresponds to the majority. However, this break has been extended by one hour.

8.2.3 El País Cali

	1	El_País5:
	2	Second Postponement of Voting on JEP Objections
..JEP	3	The parliamentary benches that seek to sink the presidential objections to the Statutory Law of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP, left on Tuesday night the premises of the Senate of the Republic because they lacked a seat to make the initiative sink.
..Partido Centro D	4	With this, once Ernesto Macias, president of the Corporation, verified the quorum after 10 p.m., it was determined that "there was no quorum to vote," since of the 97 senators who registered at the beginning of the plenary session, only 39 remained in the precinct at the time of the count.
	5	What motivated the withdrawal of the congressmen was the lack of a vote to sink the objections to the Statutory Law into a block, since the seats to define that way, and not article by article, remained 47 to 34. A minimum of 48 votes was needed for a decision, according to the Senate secretary.
	6	The vote that was left to sink the objections, apparently, was that of the senator of the Partido de La U, Maritza Martínez, or Ana María Castañeda, of Cambio Radical, who withdrew from the session at the time of the vote.
..Partido Centro D	7	Senator Gabriel Velasco of the Centro Democrático, through Twitter, said: "they call themselves Democrats, but they don't accept a vote in which they lose. It was so in the plebiscite, and it is so today, when they withdraw from the precinct and destroy the quorum. They do not respect the will of the people."
..Partido De la U	8	At the same time, Roy Barreras, from La U Party, assured that the objections to the Statutory Law sank anyway because the presentation of the officialism only adds up to 34 votes, so that it will be the Constitutional Court the one that in the end would decide the future of the Statutory Law.
..Controversial Iss	9	What is certain is that the discussion will be resumed this Wednesday, a holiday, starting at 10 a.m., when the plenary session will be called again.
	1	El_País6:
	2	Voting on JEP bill objections in the Senate postponed to Thursday
..JEP	3	The vote in the Senate on the objections made by the Presidency to the Statutory Law of Special Justice for Peace (JEP) was postponed again to this Thursday at 9:00 am.
	4	The postponement decision was announced by Senate President Ernesto Macias after a long day of discussions without agreement on Wednesday.
	5	This is the second time that the vote has been postponed this week, which was initially scheduled for Tuesday.
	6	Before the postponement, Wednesday's session had been in a 'recess', during which an attempt was made to reach an agreement among the leaders of the parties.
	7	The discussion revolved around whether the vote taken on Tuesday, which was interrupted because many congressmen decided to leave in the middle of the vote, was finally valid, or not.
	8	Also, agreement was sought on whether to vote on the objections together or 'one by one'.
	9	Senator Álvaro Uribe, one of those who had asked to approve the objections, spoke to the media in the middle of the recess.
..Álvaro Uribe	10	"We propose an agreement to reach a second vote. That agreement would consist of the approval and partial denial of the objections," the Senator said in a video published by Rubi Chagui, a congressman from the Centro Democrático.
	11	During the 'recess', a curious fact marked the day: the arrival of Senator Antanas Mockus, who the Council of State decided to remove the seat. It seems that the ruling of that court has not been made effective, so the congressman of the Alianza Verde could be entitled to vote.
	12	Disagreement by vote
..Controversial Iss	13	On Tuesday, the controversy arose because during the voting, 47 votes were reached for dropping the objections, and 34 votes for their approval.
..Partido Centro D	14	For Senate President Ernesto Macias, the votes for overturning the objections were not enough to reach the required "absolute majority" in that chamber, which has 106 congressmen. That is, 54 votes (half plus one) were needed.
	15	The missing vote to get the objections through was due to the absence of senators from Partido de la U who had announced their vote to overturn the objections, but came out right at the moment of voting, as were Maritza Martínez, Berner Zambrano, Jorge Pulgar and José David Name.

	1	El_País7:
	2	The Senators who disappeared in the middle of the vote to sink objections to the JEP
..JEP	3	Only one vote was missing in the Senate on Tuesday night to sink the eight objections to the Special Peace Justice made by President Iván Duque.
	4	The vote ended 47 against the objections and 34 in favor of approving them. That is, there was only one vote left to reach 48, half plus one of the 108 members of the corporation minus 14 parliamentarians who had to declare themselves unable to vote.
	5	And despite the fact that the bloc that defended the peace agreement thought it had that number of votes, at the time of the vote two senators disappeared from Congress without a reason.
	6	They were Ana María Castañeda, from Cambio Radical, and Maritza Martínez, from the 'U', both parties had agreed to vote en bloc to reject Duque's objections to the JEP's statutory law.
..Partido Verde	7	Regarding the former, Angélica Lozano, from the Partido Verde, said that she was in the General Secretariat of Congress and refused to participate in the vote.
	8	Regarding Martínez, some parliamentarians explained that he left the premises minutes before the voting began and has not yet made a statement on this fact.
	1	El_País8:
	2	Were objections to the JEP rejected? Debate over accounts in the Senate
..JEP	3	Although the vote against the presidential objections to the JEP's Statutory Law was 13 votes higher than those supporting it, it was one vote short of the absolute majority of votes required. This has left the future of the law in limbo for the time being.
..Victim of the par	4	According to the Secretary of the Senate, the proposal that rejected the presidential objections had to be voted on by at least 48 senators, equivalent to half plus one of the 108 members of the corporation minus 14 parliamentarians who had to declare themselves disabled.
	5	That is, 108 minus 14 equals 94. Half of 94 is 47, plus 1, 48.
	6	The Secretary of the Senate is supported by Article 134(3) of the Constitution, which states: "For the purposes of forming a quorum, the number of members of the Corporation shall be the total number of members, except for those seats that cannot be replaced. The same rule shall apply in the event of impediments or accepted challenges".
	7	For several members of the opposition, these accounts do not balance, especially for three seats that, according to them, should not be added together.
	8	As former Minister of the Interior Guillermo Rivera has shown in his Twitter account, among the 108 members of the Senate are Ivan Marquez and Aida Merlano, who were elected but have not taken office.
	9	According to Rivera, only those who have taken office can be members of the Senate. Thus, the members of the Senate would be 106 and not 108, so, discounting the 14 who are impeded, there would be 92 valid votes. Half of 92 is 46, so the majority would be 47.
..Partido Liberal	10	"Who is a member of @SenateGovCo ? who has taken office. Ivan Marquez and Aida Merlano(cannot be replaced), elected but not possessed. Conclusion: There are not 108 members but 106. -14 disabled=92. The majority is 47. My thesis : the objections were rejected yesterday," Rivera wrote on his Twitter.
	11	The seat of Antanas Mockus is also controversial. The former presidential candidate has already been notified by the Council of State of the annulment of his election, but his replacement has not yet been appointed, so they were unable to vote for each other.
..Partido Polo Der	12	This is what Senator Gustavo Petro wrote on his Twitter account: "In my opinion, the annulment of the election of Mockus by the Council of State makes the 47 votes obtained to reject the objections presented by Duque the qualified majority that is needed.
..Partido De la U	13	And according to Senator Roy Barreras, even if these three seats are taken into account, in any case the objections were rejected because, according to him, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has made it clear that the absolute majority is half of the members and not half plus one.
	14	Despite the protests of the opposition, the decision of the President of the Senate was to repeat the vote because the absolute majority was not reached. If the proposal that rejects the objections still does not reach 48 votes, the controversy will most likely end up in the Constitutional Court, which will have to determine whether or not the decision was approved following the correct procedure.

8.2.4 El Tiempo

	1	El_Tie5:
	2	Senator Maritza Martinez explains why she did not vote objections to the JEP
	3	<i>The U party congresswoman says she will not be intimidated by the criticism.</i>
..JEP	4	The senator of the 'la U' party, Maritza Martinez Aristizabal, explained this Wednesday the reasons why she did not vote the objections to the statutory law of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz. This situation has her in the eye of the hurricane, after her vote was needed to sink the presidential objections in that corporation.
	5	Martinez is part of the 'de la U' group, which had decided to vote en bloc against President Iván Duque's objections. Even so, minutes before the voting began, the congresswoman left the premises and later one of her collaborators collected her belongings.
..Partido De la U	6	In the middle of Wednesday's session, the senator expressed that "doubts persisted in front of the effects of article 153 of the statutory law", which talks about extradition. "The extradition of any person who is offering truth within the framework of the JEP cannot be understood as a mechanism through which criminals evade their responsibilities before the justice of third states," said the legislator.
..Partido De la U	7	She also said that during the sessions on Monday and Tuesday, where the objections were discussed, she was not allowed to speak in the plenary, since she also finds it inconvenient to "allow alternative penalties" for crimes "such as sexual abuse against children, a crime that in my opinion has no relation to the internal armed conflict. "I endured all kinds of pressure and insults for presenting and defending this article. Even within my party I was accused of wanting to sink the peace with this initiative," she detailed.
..Partido De la U	8	Martinez indicated that although he respects "the directive" of his party "he would not vote for the presidential objections under these conditions.
	9	Finally, the Senator assured that the "aggressions of some colleagues and their followers in the social networks" do not frighten her.
..Partido De la U	10	"For those who qualify my vote as indispensable, I hope they understand that it is also my right to express my opinions as a Senator and that in no way will I give it up," the congresswoman said.

	1	El_Tie6:
	2	A law of the JEP 'did not enter a monkey, but King Kong': Duque
	3	<i>The President referred to the objection that speaks of extradition in the special justice of peace.</i>
..JEP ..Controversial	4	A few hours before the Senate votes on the presidential objections to the statutory law of the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), President Iván Duque made a final call to the congressmen to reflect on the issue of extradition in the model of prosecution for ex-combatants.
	5	From Pereira (Risaralda), at the beginning of the workshop Building a Country, the president referred to the "debate" that has taken place around the norm and invited the senators to "reflect".
..Iván Duque	6	"We have to be frank: this law was introduced not by a monkey but by King Kong, because there was an article through which the supposed third parties who are going to tell the supposed truth permanently avoid extradition", Duque affirmed.
..Subject of the C	7	The Head of State's reference has to do with the article that allows those who take refuge in the JEP and bring truth to the system, even if they have not participated directly in the armed conflict, would not be extradited in case they have requirements for this mechanism to be applied to them.
..Partido Cambio	8	The Attorney General, Néstor Humberto Martínez, has also expressed his opposition to this provision and has said that with it "they want to end extradition through the back door.
..Iván Duque	9	In this sense, President Duque affirmed this Saturday that although the current government does not seek to "attack peace," what it does want is "that there be no more impunity," nor that "the peace processes be used so that the mafiosos seek to avoid extradition and justice in other states".
..Iván Duque	10	"I also hope that this debate will be patriotic, without criteria in which politics is above objectivity and the interest of the Colombian people," he said, referring to next Monday's session of the Senate in which the presidential objections to the JEP are expected to be dropped.
..Violence Prevent	11	Capture of 'el paisa'
	12	Similarly, Duque reiterated that since Friday night he gave instructions to the authorities to pursue and capture Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, 'el Paisa', a former member of the Farc, about whom the arrest warrants were reactivated.
..Iván Duque	13	On the subject, the president said that it is not possible that there be mockery of the country "by avoiding justice and not showing up and trying to use false arguments".
..Partial institut	14	"I am pleased that the country is united in demanding this capture and we are going to work to fulfill this mandate of the Colombian people," he said.
..Iván Duque		

	1	El_Tie7:
	2	Macias asked to validate the vote on the JEP's objections in the Senate
	3	<i>Opposition sectors say that the 47 votes are enough to reject them.</i>
..JEP	4	The sectors opposed to the National Government and defenders of the integrity of the agreement reached with the Farc rose early on Wednesday to demand the vote that was given in the Senate against the presidential objections to the statutory law of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and to ask that it be validated.
..Partido Polo I	5	Through a statement, known through the team of the senator for the Polo Ivan Cepeda, opposition sectors asked the president of Congress, Ernesto Macias, to validate that vote and send the initiative to presidential sanction. "But the 14 impediments must be subtracted from this universe, thus leaving only 92 senators apt to vote. Therefore, 47 votes is the absolute majority," the opponents argue. The new legal controversy comes after Tuesday night's vote in the Senate on a report that asks for the denial of the objections, which reached 47 votes in favor. The interpretation of the Senate Board of Directors was that, discounting impediments, the necessary votes were 48, so, according to that thesis, the minimum required vote would not have been reached and should have been repeated in the session cited for this Wednesday.
..Subject of the	6	However, opponents argue that the seats of Aída Merlano and Iván Márquez, who have not been elected because they are in the midst of legal proceedings in the high courts, should also be discounted.
	7	From this, the number of 106 senators claiming these seats arises.
	8	The same interpretation was given by Senator Roy Barreras, defender of the integrity of the peace accord, on Tuesday night.
	9	For the congressman, former negotiator of the previous government in Havana, "the Board of Directors, in its desperation to sabotage the result, intends to ignore its defeat in the Senate.
..Victim of the par	10	"The objections that hurt the JEP have been denied. I read the jurisprudence and it is very clear that for the absolute majority it is half of the members, not half plus one. 108 members, in the worst case, we think it is 106, because Mr. Ivan Marquez and Mrs. Merlano never took office, but even if they were 108, minus 14 disabled, it is 94, elementary mathematics, even for President Macias. And 94 is half of 47. That's what the law and jurisprudence says. The absolute majority is half," said Barreras.
	11	The corporation is scheduled for Wednesday at noon to repeat Tuesday night's vote on the objections to the JEP, but another intense legal debate on the issue is already planned.

	1	El_Tie8:
	2	One vote short of the opposition denying objections to the JEP
..JEP	3	<i>The debate on President Duque's objections to the JEP will continue this Wednesday.</i>
..Controversial Iss	4	The defenders of the peace agreement were barely one vote short of denying President Iván Duque's objections to the statutory law on the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in the Senate, by an absolute majority, on a first attempt.
	5	Forty-eight votes were needed to approve the report that asked for the denial of the objections, presented by Senators Iván Marulanda (from the 'Greens') and Jesus Alberto Castilla (from the Polo), and only 47 votes were obtained, which left the project with the possibility of being submitted to a second round.
	6	Although Uribeism asked for the second vote to be held immediately, as required by the regulations, this could not be done for two reasons: first, because of the legal confusion that was generated, as both sides claimed victory, and second, because the quorum was soon disrupted.
	7	When the time came to look for culprits, the eyes were directed towards two senators: Ana María Castañeda, of Cambio Radical, and Maritza Martínez, of 'la U'.
..Partido Cambio R	8	Regarding Castañeda, Senator Angélica Lozano affirmed on Twitter that at the moment of the vote she was "missing" and that she was "in the general secretariat with her husband Mario Alcocer, candidate for mayor of Sincelejo.
..Partido De la U	9	And Martinez affirmed, a few minutes before the vote, that "as a member of the 'la U' party of course" she was abiding by "the guidelines" of her party, which had decided, on the bench, that she would reject the objections to the JEP.
	10	However, his name did not appear on the electronic board, but his bag was on his chair, from where he was picked up by one of his collaborators minutes after that first vote was taken.
	11	The debate
	12	The fundamental debate was preceded by a new package of impediments that, in the opinion of some, was used by the two competing blocks to weaken each other, subtracting votes that were definitive.
	13	Álvaro Uribe himself asked the plenary to remove the impediments, in order to vote, from two of his own, Senators Honorio Miguel Enriquez and Alejandro Corrales.
	14	On the other side of the discussion and of the room, Gustavo Petro asked the opposition to approve the impediments of the pro-Uribe congressmen. In the end, Uribe was defeated. A vote-by-vote struggle was evident in each of the two blocks in which this discussion was divided.
	15	At about 5:00 p.m., the debate began with the presentation of the two reports on the presidential objections: the first, which asked for the rejection of these objections; and the second, which proposed voting on them one by one and supporting them.
	16	The plenary, fragmented into two blocks, kept up the pulse and the expectation of the fate of the debate until the last minute. On the one hand, Cambio Radical, the Liberal Party, 'la U' and the leftist movements declared in opposition to the government showed themselves determined to deny the official position.
	17	And on the other, the Democratic Center, the Conservative Party and the Christian movements were fighting to save them.
	18	For the opposition bloc, the one that presented the report that asks for the collapse of the objections, Senators Alberto Castilla (Polo) and Iván Marulanda ('greens') spoke.
..Partido Polo	19	Castilla reiterated that these objections "are not of inconvenience" but of "unconstitutionality" and that in this sense President Iván Duque "should not have
..Legitimized ir		

..Partido Polo I			presented them" taking into consideration that this statutory bill of the JEP "had already been revised by the Constitutional Court".
..Legitimized Ir		20	Marulanda, in turn, began his speech by asking for an applause to the memory of the ex-minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, murdered 35 years ago by drug trafficking.
..Partido Verde		21	The congressman referred to the objection that has to do with the extradition of third parties that come to the JEP and said that "the anti-drug policy of Colombia is a failure", since "it has led us to turn this nation into a cemetery of compatriots".
..Partido Centro D		22	Several senators spoke on behalf of the defenders of the objections, among them Paloma Valencia, who affirmed that the head of state, in presenting the objections to the JEP, was not "attacking" the peace agreement reached between the previous government and the FARC.
..Partido Cambio I		23	The government intervened through the Minister of the Interior, Nancy Patricia Gutiérrez, who stated that "nobody should be left with the 'Inri' of having allowed these doubts about drug trafficking and the benefits for the drug traffickers to be included in the Colombian legislation".
		24	The result of Tuesday's vote left the government's allies more reassured. They undoubtedly obtained a partial victory and will now intensify their efforts to save the government's position.
		25	'They did not succeed in shattering the peace'
..Partido De la U		26	Senator Roy Barreras, at the end of the session, assured that the objections were indeed denied. "Read the case law, it is very clear that for the absolute majority it is half of the members, not half plus one.
		27	Barreras, one of the main defenders of peace, added that the report that asked for accepting the objections is also denied and that the objections are sunk with the results obtained in the House and Senate.

8.3 29th of September 2019 – 5th of October 2019

8.3.1 *El Colombiano*

	1	El_Col8:
	2	JEP expelled "Iván Márquez", "Romaña" and "Zarco Aldinever"
..JEP	3	The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz found that rearmed former guerrillas Iván Luciano Marín Márquez, aka Iván Márquez; José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, aka Czarco Aldinever; and Henry Castellanos Garzón, aka Romaña, seriously failed to comply with the JEP's conditionality regime by failing to comply with truth, justice, reparation, and guarantees of non-repetition, which include contributing to their own and collective reincorporation.
..Rules enforce		
..Rules enforcer	4	For this reason, the Chamber for the Recognition of Truth and Responsibility expelled them from the Jurisdiction and dictated the loss of all transitional, legal and economic benefits.
..Rules enforcer	5	In the decision of the Chamber's judges, it was clear that the Prosecutor's Office must reactivate the arrest warrants that were suspended when the three former guerrilla commanders submitted to the JEP and that the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization must take away all economic benefits from those who took refuge in the laying down of arms.
	6	This determination comes after the Attorney General's Office provided evidence of the video in which "Iván Márquez" and company appear, announcing their return to arms.

	1	El_Col9:
	2	This Friday Ivan Marquez and Romaña will leave the JEP
..JEP	3	This Friday afternoon the decision of the incident of noncompliance of the Chamber of Recognition of Truth and Responsibility and Determination of the Facts and Behaviors of the JEP will be known in front of the case of Ivan Luciano Marquez Marin Arango, "Ivan Marquez"; Jose Manuel Sierra Sabogal, "Zarco Aldinever", and Henry Castellanos Garzon, "Romaña".
..Truth Seeker	4	What the magistrates of this Chamber have analyzed is whether the guerrilla chiefs of the former Farc committed any type of fault in the face of the obligations that the Constitution and the law impose on those who want to access the benefits and guarantees of the transitional process being followed in the JEP.
..JEP	5	At the time, the court specified that in this particular case they would study whether there had been "a laying down of arms, no recidivism in the commission of crimes, full truthfulness, comprehensive reparation of the victims and reconciliation of Colombian society, and appearance before the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition".
	6	Days after the appearance of the video of the rearmament of the mentioned subversives, in which at the head of Iván Márquez they informed of the birth of the second Marquetalia, the JEP informed that it would unify its files, since the three were united by the same procedural cause.
	7	It is predicted that Romaña, Márquez and el Zarco will suffer the same fate as Santrich and Wálter Mendoza, and be expelled from the court. A decision practically sung since the beginning of this scandal, since the magistrates had pointed out that all deserters appearing around Marquez and company were out of the Jurisdiction.

8.3.2 El Espectador

	1	El_Esp9:
	2	Iván Márquez, "Romaña" and "Aldinever Morantes", expelled from the JEP
..JEP	3	The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) decided this Friday to take away the benefits of transitional justice from former chief peace negotiator Ivan Marquez and former guerrilla commanders Henry Castellanos (Romaña) and Jose Manuel Sierra Sabogal (Zarco Aldinever), who appeared with Marquez in a video announcing their rearmament.
	4	A month ago, Luciano Marín Arango, known as Iván Márquez, announced to the world, through a video that circulated on the Internet, that he was taking up arms again together with another group of former commanders of the old FARC guerrilla. The reason, he said at that time, he felt betrayed by the Colombian State in the face of what was agreed in Havana in mid 2016. Today, the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) took the decision to expel him and two other former commanders, Henry Castellanos (Romaña) and José Manuel Sierra Sabogal (Zarco Aldinever), who appear in the video in which Márquez delivered the news.
..Rule Follower	5	The Board of Directors' Room for the Recognition of Truth and Responsibility and the Determination of Facts and Behavior determined that the ex-guerrillas did not comply with the conditionality regime, which establishes that those who submit to this jurisdiction must lay down their arms and commit to not taking them up again. The statement recorded in the video turns all those who participate in it, as the Appeals Section of the Peace Court has already declared, into armed deserters who are manifestly part of the peace process," said Judge Ivan Gonzalez during the hearing this Friday at the JEP.
..JEP	6	Marquez, who was the second most important man of the disappeared FARC guerrillas, signed the Peace Agreement with the state in August 2016 in Havana, then left his weapons in Colombia at the Miravalle (Caquetá) Reincorporation Space, where he spent several months campaigning politically to reach the Congress of the Republic. Later, following the capture of former guerrilla chief Jesús Santrich, accused of conspiring to send cocaine to the United States after the signing of the peace agreement, he took refuge in that region of northern Caquetá from where he never again left, arguing that he too would be captured and extradited.
..Structural/Cultur	7	He later disappeared along with Hernán Darío Velásquez (El Paisa), another former guerrilla chief who is in the video and who was already expelled from the transitional justice system to be sought by the authorities and brought to ordinary justice. The same will happen to José Manuel Sierra Sabogal and Henry Castellanos, both former military chiefs of the former Eastern Bloc of the FARC.
..Structural/Cultur	8	Among the benefits revoked by the JEP for these ex-guerrilla chiefs are the amnesties or pardons granted, probation, suspension of arrest warrants, and administrative and economic benefits related to the process of reincorporation into civilian life.
	9	Judge González placed special emphasis on the conduct of Henry Castellanos (Romaña), who since May 2018 has allegedly committed the crime of massive displacement against campesinos in the rural zone of the municipality of Uribe (Meta). According to the magistrate, "Romaña" gathered the peasants of the village of La Ativa, in order to inform them that he had returned to the area for his lands, which he had returned to the peasants in past years as a result of the dispossession he carried out before the peace process.
	10	The defense of the ex-guerrilla chiefs abstained from appealing the decision, although it called on the magistracy to also sanction agents and state entities that have not complied with the Peace Accord, said one of the lawyers. For its part, the Public Ministry agreed with the Chamber's decision and announced that it will follow up on the transfer of the case to the ordinary justice system so that it complies with the law, such as issuing new arrest warrants against the former guerrilla chiefs.
..Rules enforcer	11	Finally, the High Counselor for Stabilization, Emilio Archila, spoke minutes after the
..Experts		announcement of the JEP and said that this is a good message for the peace process. "We hope that this is the beginning of a dynamic in which we can distinguish between those who were never in the process and the vast majority who are only. To them, we will continue to guarantee our accompaniment and support. We have been meeting with those who are in the spaces of reincorporation and with those who are outside of them, to advance in this matter," he said.
Peace Process		
..Experts		
..Peace Process		

	1	El_Esp10:
	2	Ministry of Defense asked for an extension to the JEP to hand over evidence against "Mayimbú"
..JEP	3	Although Minister Guillermo Botero stated that he has not been able to capture the former Farc guerrilla because he has not been expelled from this justice system, so far his portfolio has not provided the evidentiary material that the magistrates need to exclude Leyder Johany Noscué. Leyder Johany Noscué, known in the war as Mayimbú, became the new point of conflict between the government and the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP), after Guillermo Botero, Minister of Defense, assured that the authorities had not been able to capture the ex-combatant, who would have reoffended, because the jurisdiction had not expelled him.
	4	The JEP immediately affirmed that it could apprehend him and asked the ministry for evidence for a possible expulsion. However, according to a court order known to this newspaper, Botero's wallet has so far not provided a single piece of evidence.
..Structural/Cu ..Governme ..JEP ..Rule Follo	5	The story began last September 6, when the Ministry of Defense asked the JEP, through an official letter, to "take measures that respond to the competencies established in law" in the Mayimbú case, taking into account that, according to information from a security council, the ex-combatant had participated in the atrocious crime in which Karina García Sierra, candidate for mayor of the municipality of Suárez, Cauca, died, along with five other people. Later, on September 18, Minister Botero expressed via Twitter that it was necessary to expel Mayimbú from this justice system so that the authorities could capture him: "We ask the JEP, through a written communication, to expel alias Mayimbú so that the Public Force can act. This criminal cannot have any kind of benefit from justice, he must pay for each of the crimes he is charged with". In response to these declarations, Patricia Linares, president of the JEP, denied the minister and reminded him that, according to the constitutional norms, the competence of the JEP "is exclusively over crimes committed before December 1, 2016 that are related to the internal armed conflict. In this sense, Linares made it clear that "the Public Force has no limitation to pursue and capture those who have re-armed and are committing crimes" after that date. And he reminded him that this is his duty and obligation".
..Truth Seeker	6	Until that moment, the tension seemed to have dissipated. A few days earlier, the JEP opened an incident of non-compliance in Mayimbú, an investigative process to examine the behavior of those who are taking advantage of this justice and to verify whether or not they are in breach of what was agreed in the Final Agreement. If it is proven that Mayimbú committed this crime and returned to arms, it will lose all benefits and will be expelled from this jurisdiction. But to prove that the ex-guerrilla fighter is committing another crime, the JEP needs evidence. The magistrates, through order 023 of September 16, requested evidentiary material from the Ministry of Defense, the Attorney General's Office, and the indigenous community to which the accused belongs. The deadline was 19-24 September. All sent information except the Ministry of Defense, which, despite insisting on the need to expel the former combatant, requested an extension of time to respond.
..Government	7	"I respectfully request that you grant this Ministry an extension of additional working days to obtain the information from the various Defense Sector agencies competent to make the required report. Of course, if it is possible to respond earlier, that is how we will proceed," says the letter sent to the JEP on September 24.
..Government	8	Although the JEP granted the extension through a new order, it left the stipulation that "it does not cease to cause surprise to the Office, since it was the Minister of Defensa himself who sent a letter informing the Jurisdiction of the possible participation of Mr. Noscue Bototo in the events described. Furthermore, he expressed his concern that "the intelligence information available to the Ministry of Defense does not reflect in real time the situation as evidenced in its communication of September 6 of this year". A couple of weeks ago, Minister Botero catalogued him as "the most wanted in the southwest of the
..Government		country". In fact, at an extraordinary security council in Popayan, he went from offering \$30 million to a \$1 billion reward to capture him.
..Structural/Cultur	9	Mayimbú accepted the peace agreement and joined the JEP in March 2017. The ex-guerrilla fighter had committed himself to the JEP to provide truth, reparation for victims and non-repetition. However, the army has said that the former commander is not only rearming, but also commanding the 105-man Jaime Martínez column in northern Cauca.

8.3.3 El País Cali

	1	El_País9:
	2	The JEP will make official this Friday the expulsion of Iván Márquez, Aldinever and Romaña
..JEP	3	By this Friday afternoon, the decision of the incident of noncompliance of the Room of Recognition of Truth and Responsibility and Determination of the Facts and Behaviors of the JEP will be known in front of the case of Iván Luciano Márquez Marín Arango, 'Iván Márquez'; José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, 'Zarco Aldinever' and Henry Castellanos Garzón, 'Romaña'. What the magistrates of this Chamber have analyzed is whether the guerrilla chiefs of the former Farc committed any type of fault in the face of the obligations that the Constitution and the law impose on those who want to access the benefits and guarantees of the transitional process that is followed in the JEP.
..Rules enforcer	4	At the time, the court specified that in this particular case they would study whether there had been "a laying down of arms, no recidivism in the commission of crimes, full truthfulness, comprehensive reparation of the victims and reconciliation of Colombian society, and appearance before the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition".
..JEP	5	Days after the appearance of the video of the rearmament of the mentioned subversives, in which at the head of Iván Márquez they informed of the birth of the second Marquetalia, the JEP informed that it would unify its files, since the three were united by the same procedural cause.
..Subject of the Cr	6	It is predicted that Romaña, Márquez and el Zarco will suffer the same fate as Santrich and Wálter Mendoza, and be expelled from the court. A decision practically sung since the beginning of this scandal, since the magistrates had pointed out that all deserters appearing around Marquez and company were out of the Jurisdiction.

	1	El_País10:
	2	Expulsion of Marquez and Romaña from the JEP is a good message for the country: Government
..JEP	3	After learning that the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) expelled former members of the FARC, Iván Luciano Márquez Marín Arango, 'Iván Márquez'; José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, 'Zarco Aldinever', and Henry Castellanos Garzón, 'Romaña', the Counselor for Stabilization Emilio Archila stated that this decision is a good message for the country and could be the beginning of a new dynamic within this tribunal.
..Government	4	"For 8 months I had said that in the case of the three, the conditions had been met for them to be removed from Transitional Justice definitively. We hope that this is the beginning of a dynamic where we can distinguish between those who were never in the process and the vast majority of those who are in the process," added the counselor.
..Initiator of Recor	5	Archila said that for those who remain in the reincorporation after the signing of the peace agreement with the Farc, the government will continue to guarantee their accompaniment and support. He also recalled that he and President Iván Duque have been meeting with former combatants both in the former Territorial Spaces of Training and Reincorporation (ETCR) and outside them to ratify this commitment.
..Subject of the	6	The decision of the JEP was taken after analyzing the video where these three subjects appear in the company of 'Jesús Santrich' who announced his rearmament under the argument that the State has been failing to comply with what was agreed in Havana. It was also taken into account that they did not appear before this tribunal, despite multiple summonses to testify in case 001, which analyzes all the kidnappings committed by this guerrilla group during the conflict.
..Rule Follower	7	"The video is proof of abandoning the reincorporation process and moving away from the peace process. They have decided to return to the armed struggle ignoring the benefits they were granted. In the case of Henry Garzón, this Court had information with a new act of displacement against the population of a village in Uribe, Meta," said Judge Iván González, who read the decision.
..JEP		

	1	El_País11:
	2	JEP made official the expulsion of Iván Márquez, Romaña and Zarco Aldinever
..JEP	3	The Board of Truths and Accountability and Determination of Facts and Behaviors announced this Friday the expulsion of Ivan Luciano Marquez Marin Arango, 'Ivan Marquez'; Jose Manuel Sierra Sabogal, 'Zarco Aldinever', and Henry Castellanos Garzon, 'Romagna', the former guerrilla chiefs who appeared in a video announcing their rearmament. "The video is proof of abandoning the reincorporation process and moving away from the peace process. They have decided to return to the armed struggle ignoring the benefits they were given. In the case of Henry Garzón this Court had information with a new act of displacement against the population of a village in Uribe, Meta", pointed out Judge Iván González, in charge of reading the providence.
..JEP	4	The ruling specifies that the court investigating case 001, which analyzes all the kidnappings committed by this guerrilla group during the conflict, failed to respond to the calls made to them without justification.
..Rule Follower	5	For the magistrates, the video, in addition to being a declaration of rearmament, can be understood as a call for others to take the same path, which could break the confidence of many ex-combatants. "The Chamber analyzed the degree of noncompliance in order to define the corresponding sanction, and it was established that it is generalized, leaving any treatment of benefits given to them without a constitutional floor. This Chamber can only recognize their condition of deserters", added Gonzalez.
..JEP		

8.3.4 El Tiempo

	1	El_Tie9:
	2	Pulling of ears from the JEP to Mindefensa for tests on 'Mayimbú'
	3	<i>This justice system extended the deadline for information on the crimes of the ex-Farc to be sent to it.</i>
..JEP ..Peace Proce ..Alerter	4	After the Ministry of Defense asked the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) for an extension to send it the intelligence information on the crimes that Leyder Johany Noscue Bototo, alias Mayimbú, would have committed after the signing of the Peace Agreement, that justice decided to grant him more time. However, it expressed concern about this request.
..Truth Seeker ..Subject of the	5	By means of an order signed on September 27, the Recognition Chamber of the JEP gave five working days, that is, until next Friday, to send him the information it has on the conduct of 'Mayimbú', a dissident of the Farc accused of participating in the murder of five people in Suárez, Cauca, among them the candidate for mayor Karina García.
..JEP	6	But in the decision, the Chamber expresses its surprise, "since it was the Minister of Defense himself who sent a letter informing the Court of the possible participation of Mr. Noscue Bototo" in that massacre.
..JEP	7	"It is worrying that the intelligence information available to the Ministry of Defense does not reflect in real time the situation evidenced in its communiqué of September 6 of this year, which leads to a request for an extension of the terms to issue a response," the JEP magistrates add in the order.
..Rule Follower	8	The JEP opened an incident of verification of noncompliance against 'Mayimbú' on September 13, since he signed a commitment act before that jurisdiction more than two years before, on March 14, 2017, by virtue of which he was released by a court in Cali. Then, according to the information spread by the authorities, the man, of Nasa origin, reoffended and rejoined the police force, so he could be definitively excluded from the JEP as it happened with 'Jesús Santrich' and 'El Paisa'.
..Truth Seeker	9	However, in order to comply with due process and make the decision to exclude the dissident from the JEP, the court requested the Ministry of Defense on September 16 to submit the evidentiary material related to the crimes that 'Mayimbú' would be committing.
..Ministry of Defer	10	The request of the Ministry of Defense to the JEP, to give it more time, was filed on September 24th, when it asked for "an extension of additional working days to obtain the information from the various Defense Sector agencies competent to make the required report".
..Peace Preventer	11	Two weeks ago another controversy had arisen between the Ministry of Defense and the JEP, also because of this case, since the Minister, Guillermo Botero, stated that they had not captured 'Mayimbú' because the JEP had not excluded him and that gave him a kind of immunity.
..Rule Follower	12	To this, both the JEP and analysts consulted by this newspaper responded that the authorities not only could, but should capture him if they had information about crimes committed by him after December 1, 2016, since the JEP's powers only extend to crimes committed up to that date in the context of, on the occasion of, or in relation to the armed conflict.
..JEP	13	Last week, when announcing the exclusion of alias Walter Mendoza, who appeared in the video in which Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich announced their rearmament, the JEP said that the exclusion of 'Mayimbú' could also occur in the
..JEP		coming days. However, given the extension granted to the Ministry of Defense, it is likely that it will take longer.

	1	El_Tie10:
	2	Márquez', 'Romaña' and 'Aldinever', three expulsions sung at the JEP
	3	<i>This Friday, it will be formalized that the three re-armed ex-Farc are out of the jurisdiction.</i>
	4	This Friday, an open cycle will be closed on August 29th, when several former chiefs of the demobilized FARC guerrilla turned their backs on the peace process and publicly announced, through a video, their return to arms. The loss of all the benefits of the peace process was formalized.
	5	One of the first consequences of this was that the country saw once again, dressed in camouflaged green and carrying weapons, 'Iván Márquez', ex-chief negotiator of the Farc in Havana, and 'Jesús Santrich', who had recently become a representative to the Chamber, surrounded by other former guerrilla leaders such as Hernán Darío Velásquez, 'El Paisa'; Henry Castellanos Garzón, 'Romaña'; and José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, 'Zarco Aldinever', was that from President Iván Duque to different voices of public opinion asked to be excluded from the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP).
..JEP		
..Peace Proces	6	And the JEP responded that same day, not with the expulsions, but with a public declaration by the president of the jurisdiction, Patricia Linares, who explained that the incidents of non-compliance of the rearmed ex-guerrillas were being set in motion and that the rearmament was "a fact of the greatest gravity" and a cause for exclusion from the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition.
..JEP		
	7	Is there a financial backdrop?
..Rule Follower	8	However, the expulsions would not be as fast as some sectors of opinion wanted, since it was necessary to fill in the procedural steps in line with the guarantees of due process to which all citizens are entitled. In addition, the JEP had to review the incidents of verification of compliance that, prior to the video in question, had already been opened against 'Santrich' and 'El Paisa', for previous non-compliance.
..Peace Proces		
..Brave decision n	9	It was precisely on these two former members of the Farc's General Staff that the JEP made the first expulsions from its jurisdiction firm. In the case of 'El Paisa', for failing to comply with his commitments to the System, which he stopped appearing since 2018, and in the case of 'Santrich', for considering him a "manifest armed deserter" of the peace process.
..Brave decision n	10	The decision regarding Jesús Santrich was unique in that the JEP decided not to resolve the appeals that were in process, with respect to the guarantee of non-extradition that had been granted months earlier and that had been appealed by the Attorney General's Office, but rather decided to cut the deal. The figure of an armed deserter means that the JEP loses jurisdiction by removing the matter, since when 'Santrich' decides to rearm, all the proceedings involving him automatically cease to be of interest to that special justice and return to the ordinary justice system.
..Peace Proces		
..Brave decision n	11	When the exclusion of 'Santrich' and 'El Paisa' was announced on September 13, Magistrate Eduardo Cifuentes explained and insisted that all the rearming seen in the video were outside the JEP. However, the decision was only firm on these two, and in process on the other members of that residual group that, it is presumed, is settled in Venezuela.
	12	On September 27, José Vicente Lesmes, alias Walter Mendoza, met the same fate.

		<p>This one had also had a compliance verification incident opened before the rearmament video, since he stopped attending the JEP summonses since May 20. Furthermore, it was learned that he had gone with 'Santrich', without knowing at that time where or what. He was also treated as an armed deserter.</p>
<p>...JEP</p> <p>..Brave decisic</p>	<p>13</p>	<p>When the JEP announced the exclusion of 'Mendoza', it also informed that "in the next few days" the same decision would be taken regarding the missing persons, and that day arrived. The magistrates would sign the order that leaves the ex-guerrillas outside the JEP this Thursday and its content will be known since 2:00 p.m. on Friday.</p>
<p>..Rules enforcer</p>	<p>14</p>	<p>A joint decision will be made about 'Márquez', 'Romaña' and the 'Zarco Aldinever', since their verification incidents, being the same facts, were unified. Their expulsions, at this point, are an officialization of what the JEP itself had already announced would happen: any ex-combatant who returns to arms automatically loses the benefits to which he could have had access if he had contributed to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition, following his reincorporation processes.</p>
<p>..Fair and impartial</p>	<p>15</p>	<p>At least as far as the JEP is concerned, the chapter on the rearmament of 'Marquez' and company will be resolved and closed this Friday, as there is no other legal recourse against the expulsions. The expulsions of Olivio Merchán, alias El Loco Iván, and of Élder Caviedes, other rearming men whose expulsion process was announced on 17 September, would remain pending, if they are not also announced.</p>

	1	El_Tie11:
	2	'Romaña', expelled from the JEP, displaced communities in Meta in 2018
	3	<i>This was affirmed by that justice when it expelled 'Iván Márquez' and 'Zarco Aldinever' as well.</i>
..JEP ..Rules enforcer	4	As expected, the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) left out of its competence this Friday the ex-commanders of the Farc who decided to rearm and who were not yet officially out of the jurisdiction: 'Iván Márquez', Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias Romaña, and José Manuel Sabogal, alias El Zarco Aldinever.
..Rule Follower	5	The three men, who announced their rearmament publicly in a video on August 29, were excluded from the JEP for failing to comply with the conditionality regime they signed when they submitted to the jurisdiction after the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016.
	6	One fact stood out in the decision: in the practice of evidence about the non-compliance of former FARC commanders, they found that 'Romaña' displaced communities in La Uribe, Meta, in 2018, while he was still in the process of reincorporation.
..FARC dissen ..Structural/Cu	7	The events took place in the village of La Ativa, in that municipality, where Romaña organized a meeting with the community and informed them that he had returned to the area "and that he planned to take back the land that belonged to him". This, according to the information known by the JEP, happened in May 2018. Those peasants whom he met would be settlers who had been able to recover their land after losing it years earlier, precisely after being displaced by the former FARC commander.
..JEP ..Structural/Cu	8	A year earlier, in May 2017, the same Romaña had already sent armed men to the area so that "in his name and under threat, they would coerce the inhabitants of the area to move, once again, out of their territories," reads the JEP's car. These acts were denounced to the Prosecutor's Office in the municipality of Granada, Meta, in December 2018.
	9	"They unjustifiably failed to comply with the summonses for the truth issued by the JEP".
..Peace Processes	10	In the reading of the decision, made by the magistrate Ivan Gonzalez, of the Chamber of Truth Recognition, in which case 01 refers to the kidnappings committed by the Farc in the conflict, and to which the ex-Farc were linked, including the already expelled 'Jesus Santrich' and 'El Paisa', he explained that the three men had no excuse for having abandoned the peace process.
..Fair and impartial	11	After investigating on the ground and with authorities, the JEP concluded that in none of the three cases were there concrete threats to the security of 'Márquez', 'Romaña' or 'Aldinever'. In the case of the first one, former chief negotiator of the FARC in Havana, the justice of the peace recognized that difficulties of public order have been registered near the ETCR in Miravalle, but that these did not establish a direct threat against the appearance of the now leader of a residual group of the FARC.
	12	The JEP highlighted the contradiction that, in view of the supposed security threats against them, the three men, 'Márquez', 'Romaña' and 'Zarco Aldinever', instead of requesting greater protection measures, decided to leave their respective security schemes. Furthermore, they did not resort to the mechanisms provided, both in the National Protection Unit and in the Jurisdiction itself. For this reason, they were declared armed dissidents, just as it happened in the case of 'Jesús Santrich'.
	13	The lawyers for the former participants decided that they would not file any appeal against the decision of the JEP's Chamber, and neither did the Delegated Attorney General's Office. In addition, the defenders of the expelled persons called for sanctions not only against ex-combatants who fail to comply, but also against institutions that "have not complied with the agreement. "That the sanctions be made effective not only for the ex-combatants of the FARC, but also for the entities" of the state in charge of fulfilling the objectives of the Peace Accord.
..Rules enforcer	14	The incidents of verification of non-compliance against the three were not opened by the video known to the country, but rather from before, between May and June, when they stopped complying with the summonses for voluntary versions that would contribute to truth, justice and reparation for the victims.
	15	As a consequence of the expulsion decided by the JEP, all the processes that were taking place in this jurisdiction returned to the ordinary justice system within a maximum period of five working days.

8.4 10th of November 2019 – 16th of November 2019

8.4.1 *El Colombiano*

	1	EL_Col10:
	2	JEP does not grant permission for Senator Victoria Sandino to leave the country
..JEP	3	The Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz did not grant an exit permit from the country to the senator of the Farc Party, Victoria Sandino, who intended to attend events in Germany and Belgium between this Monday and next Friday.
	4	The congresswoman said she would be in the old continent on account of an invitation extended to her by the organization Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Colombia, Fescol.
..Rule rejecter	5	"Sandino has fulfilled in an integral, satisfactory and permanent way the norms and procedures that the JEP guides, so, in spite of not having any restrictive measure of freedom, she informed the jurisdiction of her intention to participate in the event to which she had been invited by FESCOL, bringing all the pertinent documentation," said from the Party.
..Partido FARC		
..Partial institut	6	The National Political Council of that community wonders this Sunday morning if with the decision the JEP exceeds the scope of its powers since, they say, the senator does not have restrictive measures to leave the country. In fact, they recall that "Congresswoman Sandino has repeatedly left the country in compliance with an agenda related to her work as a senator of the Republic (...) accepting invitations from countries that work for the defense of human rights".
..JEP		
..Rule Follower	7	Although the JEP's reasons for denying the permit are not known in depth, the Farc party argues that the court responded to their request by not complying with the formal requirements. However, it is expected that in the next few hours the JEP's ruling will be known in order to determine the legal reasons that led to the decision.

8.4.2 El Espectador

	1	El_Esp11:
	2	Victims refuse to go to the JEP in the case of General (r) Torres Escalante
	3	His position is due to the fact that, although the officer (r) apologized for the false positives that were committed when he was the commander of the 16th Brigade of the Army, he insists that he never ordered them.
..JEP	4	Two weeks ago, a voluntary judicial proceeding was scheduled to take place before the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in the case of the false positives attributed to retired General Henry William Torres Escalante. However, the victims refused to participate. They told the transitional tribunal, arguing that they were not willing to be mocked or re-victimized because the officer (r) insisted on his innocence.
..Voices of Victims	5	This episode is associated with the position that Torres Escalante has taken on the accusations against him. The retired officer went to the JEP to publicly apologize to the victims, but from the perspective of not accepting responsibility for what happened. At the time, Torres Escalante claimed that when he was commander of the 16th Brigade, they hid what was happening from him.
..Military	6	"I regret not having been able to prevent those deaths or detect them in time," reiterated Torres Escalante, who emphasized that his failure to accept responsibility is based on his rejection of the statements made by two of his subordinates before the Prosecutor's Office and the JEP. "I will never be able to admit responsibility because I would be lying. I never agreed with a subordinate to pass off homicides as deaths in combat".
	7	The officer (r) stated that if there is any responsibility on his part, he will assume it with the honor and dignity that corresponds to him as a member of the active reserve of the Army; but that, even if he is denied all his rights as a defendant, he does not intend to lie to improve his personal situation. Today, General (r) Henry Torres Escalante is one of the few officers who remains deprived of his liberty because of the notorious scandal of false positives.
..Military	8	"I can never admit to a responsibility of this kind because I would be lying. I never ordered the death of citizens who did not pose a real, immediate and effective danger to the citizenry but also to the troops. I never ordered simulated combat to justify a casualty caused in violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. I never agreed with a subordinate to make homicides happen as they die in combat. As a commander, I never preferred a casualty over a capture or a demobilization," wrote the ex-uniformed officer.
	9	In the document he handed over to the JEP, Torres Escalante added that he does not accept any responsibility for the events for which he is being investigated because, he says, "I humbly but honorably and energetically ignore and reject the statements delivered by two subordinates of mine in different cases to the Prosecutor's Office and the JEP, who after years of deprivation of liberty, turned against their own words and began to attribute to me a stellar participation in several deaths that they should not have caused and that should not have occurred.
..Voices of Victims	10	Faced with this position of Torres Escalante, the victims of the false positives in the area where he was commander of the XVI Brigade decided to refuse to attend the voluntary versions scheduled for the case. In a letter to this newspaper, the victims told the judges of the JEP that they do not intend to come forward to see how Torres Escalante wants to appear as a victim of the judicial system, politics and his subordinates.
..Someone speaki	11	"We find with great sadness that he is lying to us, that he is lying to other victims, to his institution, to the JEP and to the Colombian State," said a relative of the victims, in whose opinion Torres Escalante's position is giving them a residual role in his request for forgiveness, "in our eyes it is arrogant, since he is only pursuing benefits for his personal cause, without leaving aside the fact that by merely joining the JEP he is granted benefits.
	12	In the missive, the victims insist that it is an insult to the memory of their relatives and other citizens that Torres Escalante says that "he never ordered the death of citizens who did not pose a real and immediate danger to the citizenry, but also to the troops. According

		to the victims, despite his appearances in the media, Torres Escalante's words are misleading and that is why they are not willing to participate in the proceedings of this case.
..Someone speaki	13	They conclude that the position of General (r) Henry Torres Escalante can be summed up in expressions that offend the dignity of the victims, by not behaving in accordance with the gravity of the facts, incurring even more serious justifications, with blatant disregard for international humanitarian law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
..Structural/Cultur	14	The soldier is being investigated for his alleged participation in two killings of civilians who were not part of the armed conflict and were presented as "combat casualties" by the Army on March 16, 2007 in Aguazul, Casanare, the area where the Torres Escalante Brigade was operating. The victims were Daniel and Roque Julio Torres, father and son, who were presented as Eln guerrillas.
	15	According to the Attorney General's Office, second lieutenant Marco Fabián García Céspedes, a subordinate of General (r) Torres Escalante and who led the operation, put weapons in the hands of the two victims and had them shot, while ordering the activation of an M-60 machine gun and an MGL grenade launcher to simulate combat. After learning of the operation carried out by his men, Torres publicly praised the members of the 65th Counter-Guerrilla Battalion for their achievement.
	16	According to the retired officer, he never knew that García Céspedes later gathered the military who participated in the operation to agree on the version they should give to the Military Criminal Justice investigation. Nor did he know what he had done to alter the scene of the crime. In 2012, Lieutenant Garcia Céspedes was convicted of the double extrajudicial execution. Then the uniformed officer told the Prosecutor's Office that the operation that put him behind bars was based on an intelligence annex with information from the enemy and that it had the support and signature of his commanders.
..Structural/Cultur	17	However, in 2015, Lieutenant García Céspedes told the Prosecutor's Office that no one had given him orders to commit the double homicide and that it had all happened on his initiative. About General (r) Henry Torres Escalante, he said that he did not know that they were individual actions and that, instead, he had arranged them to look like combat. The defense of the senior officer cannot explain why the Prosecutor's Office did not take into account Céspedes' retraction.
..Structural/Cultur	18	In March 2016, when the Attorney General's Office ordered the arrest of the General (r) for the death of the two members of the Torres family, he was a member of the command of the Military Forces. In those nine years since the extrajudicial execution of the peasants, Henry Torres Escalante commanded the Ninth Brigade in Neiva (Huila), the Fifth Division for the center of the country, and the joint command of the southwestern Colombia.
..Structural/Cultur	19	In July 2017, the former officer signed the act of commitment to submit to the JEP. A year later, before this special justice, he went to a first hearing in which he announced his commitment to contribute to the truth. Even so, in December 2018, the JEP's Legal Situation Definition Chamber denied him his freedom because he had not been detained for at least five years.
	20	At that time, the Appeals Section also informed him that members of the security forces could agree to replace the detention measure with a non-custodial one, provided that they made "early, extraordinary and exhaustive" contributions to the truth. But so far not a single new word has come out from Torres Escalante, who is being held in a military unit in compliance with an assurance measure, ordered in his trial in the ordinary justice system for cases of extrajudicial executions.

	1	El_Esp12:
	2	Organizations ask the JEP to open a case of forced disappearance
..JEP	3	On November 14, victims and organizations will ask the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz to advance in the investigations and search for the more than 80,000 people who have disappeared in Colombia because of the armed conflict.
..Subject of the C	4	The forced disappearance committed by armed actors during the conflict had three purposes: to punish and educate those with different political positions, to generate terror in order to gain territorial control, and to hide crimes such as homicides and sexual violence, since it is a crime that erases any evidence. This is explained in the report <i>Hasta encontrarlos</i> , by the National Center of Historical Memory (CNMH). Such purposes make it one of the most atrocious crimes of the war, because it translates into a state of constant uncertainty for families.
	5	In Colombia the magnitude of this crime is such that the State has not been able to consolidate an official figure. In the National Registry of Disappeared Persons there are 28,755 victims of this crime and the Single Registry of Victims recognizes 47,762 people, which shows a wide under-registration and lack of communication between institutions. The most precise figure is that of the Observatory of Memory and Conflict of the CNMH, which, through the crossing of nearly 10,000 databases and documents, consolidated 82,998 cases of forced disappearance in Colombia.
..Peace Processel	6	This Thursday, November 14, the association Human Rights Everywhere (HREV) and the National Movement of Victims of State Crimes (Movice) will make the first public and official request before the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) to open a case dedicated to investigating forced disappearance in the framework of the armed conflict. They will give the judges of the Recognition Chamber the book <i>Cartography of Forced Disappearance in Colombia</i> , a project of the HREV that was born to divulge the gaps in information about this crime and the debt that the State has to establish the real dimension of the disappeared left by the war. Through maps, the book compares the number of cases by department, according to their proximity to river basins, for example; the number of women victims, the cases of disappearance by year, among other aspects. It also provides important conclusions: the phenomenon is so widespread that in only 5% of Colombia's municipalities are there no recorded cases. And, most seriously, it shows that 99.5% of the cases remain in impunity.
..Experts	7	Just as a case was opened to investigate kidnapping or forced recruitment, one should also be opened to study cases of forced disappearance in the JEP, said Érik Arellana, one of the authors of the book and son of Nydia Érika Bautista, an M-19 activist who disappeared on August 30, 1987. "It is important to talk about this at a macro level, to understand why these practices have occurred, who has benefited and why those responsible have not been brought to justice," he added.
..Experts	8	At the public event, they will also hand over information on some 240 cases of forced disappearance in the Catatumbo region, collected by the Poderpaz Corporation. According to its spokesperson, Lorena Acevedo, the request is focused on having the forced disappearance investigated by the Truth Commission, the UBPD, and the JEP. The first two to find out why it was systematically committed and to find those who remain disappeared. And at the JEP, to bring those responsible to justice.
..Truth Seeker		
..Rules enforce		
..Structural/Cultur	9	The first demonstration of the organizations to open this case was on August 30, 2018, when the Movice asked the JEP for precautionary measures in 16 places in the country where there are presumed to be people who have been disappeared, to guarantee the families the search, identification and dignified delivery of the bodies. These sites include the area of influence of the Hidroituango mega-project in Antioquia; La Escombrera and La Arenera in the Comuna 13 of Medellín; the central cemetery of San Onofre and the one in the village of Rincón del Mar, as well as the La Alemania and El Palmar farms in Sucre.
..Peace Processel	10	The JEP has already held public hearings for the cases of Antioquia, and on November 20 and 21, the one related to San Onofre will be held in Cartagena. According to Adriana Arboleda, director of the Corporación Jurídica Libertad and also a spokesperson for

		<p>Movie, the judges of the Non-Recognition Section, who are responsible for imposing the precautionary measures, were insisted on the opening of the case during the hearings.</p>
<p>...JEP</p> <p>...Peace Process</p>	<p>11</p>	<p>This section transferred the request to the president of the Recognition Chamber of the JEP, Oscar Parra, on October 27th, and this chamber will receive the report from HREV and Poderpaz next Thursday. However, Parra told this media that the presentation of reports does not mean that specific cases will be opened. "What we are thinking about is analyzing what would be the routes to open new cases. They have made the same request with sexual violence, but the court has to define if it works at a territorial level or as an autonomous case". He also said that they will cross-check the reports they have received on this issue to find the most appropriate investigation strategy, for example, from what period to investigate the forced disappearance.</p>
	<p>12</p>	<p>He was emphatic that this crime is already being prioritized by the Recognition Chamber in a transversal manner in the seven cases already open, mainly in the cases of kidnapping, forced recruitment of minors and extrajudicial executions. It is also being analyzed in the open case on the victimization of the Patriotic Union political party, and in the territorial cases of Tumaco, Ricaurte, Barbacoas, the situation in Urabá and the situation in the northern part of the Cauca and southern part of Valle del Cauca</p>
<p>...JEP</p> <p>...Solutions</p>	<p>13</p>	<p>"We are analyzing various possibilities of new prioritizations," the magistrate left in the air, without giving more details. Several questions remain: How would the JEP address the dimension of this crime in its ten years of life so that impunity does not continue to be the rule? How would they articulate with the Search Unit for Persons reported missing, which is extrajudicial, so that families can recover their loved ones and there is justice?</p>

1	El_Esp13:
2	The fear of the ex-guerrilla fighters of the Farc in Caquetá to declare in the JEP
3	Former combatants of the disappeared guerrillas in the southwest of the country are concerned about their safety, in the midst of the difficult public order situation that this region is going through. The fear is increased by the fact that, to date, 170 returnees have been killed, according to the FARC party.
4	In the midst of the two massacres that occurred in Corinto, Cauca, at the end of October, another former FARC combatant was murdered in the neighboring department of Caquetá. The crime of Wilson Parra in the municipality of Curillo, perpetrated on October 29th, went unnoticed by most of the country. However, for the former guerrilla members who took refuge in the Peace Accord in the southwest of the country, it was another sad reminder of the danger they are exposed to by being committed to reincorporation. According to the FARC Party, since the agreement was signed with the government, at least 170 former combatants have been killed, 15 of them in Caquetá, followed by Antioquia (18), Nariño (23) and Cauca (30).
5	The delicate situation of public order in the department of Caquetá, the former heart of the extinct FARC, has several ex-guerrillas afraid to speak out before the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP). Some of the leaders and key members of the subversive group during the armed conflict in Caquetá have been summoned before this justice system in voluntary proceedings to speak in case 001 - or they have already spoken - related to the issue of kidnappings. "Some people in the region are waiting for them to speak in order to charge them for the crimes they committed in the past," said a source close to the reincorporation process in the department, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
6	In Caquetá, a former guerrilla sanctuary, the FARC, between 1965 and 2013, carried out 53 attacks on the department's municipal capitals and 455 kidnappings, according to the National Center of Historical Memory. Among them, two of the victimizing acts emblematic of the war committed by the illegal group: the massacre of the Turbay Cote family on December 29, 2000, when they were on their way from Florencia to Puerto Rico. The second, at the end of 2009, was the kidnapping and subsequent murder of the governor of the department, Luis Francisco Cuéllar, who had been held captive five times and was accused of having links to paramilitarism. The justice system was never able to prove them.
7	Another government official who has continuous contact with former combatants from the two Territorial Training and Reincorporation Centers (ETCR) in Caquetá said that there are drug trafficking groups -including dissidents-, businessmen, and "cattle ranchers" who do not "like or want" former guerrilla members to settle in the area. He also pointed out that the assassination of ex-guerrilla fighter Alexander Parra on October 24th within the ETCR of Mariana Páez in Mesetas (Meta) further increases the fears of ex-guerrilla fighters. "Parra was one of the main leaders and even worked with the government. He was committed to peace," said the public official, who asked not to reveal his name so as not to expose his life.
8	El Espectador contacted three former FARC leaders who are in the two ETCRs in Caquetá, but none of them wanted to talk about their own fears or those that some of their comrades would have of testifying before the JEP. "It is very difficult for them to talk about their concerns to the media because they now live with their families and fear for their lives. Every week they are killing a reincorporated person and that doesn't help much either," said the government official.
9	In addition to this complex situation, 22 lawyers who defend and advise former guerrilla combatants before the Special Court for Peace have received threats and follow-up. The same fate has befallen the uniformed members of the Public Force who have gone before the transitional justice system to confess to crimes in the cases of extrajudicial executions, known as "false positives. After their declarations before the judges of the Recognition Chamber, their families and even their lawyers have been persecuted and threatened with death.

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	10	What is the public order situation in Caquetá?
..Structural/Cultur	11	In the south of Caquetá there is a presence of different drug cartels. According to the Ombudsman's Office, among them is the Heroes of the Valley cartel, an organization that has been operating for at least three years in this and other departments such as Huila and Tolima. According to the Sijin, the organization is financed by the Envigado Office. Another criminal group is the Salado blanco cartel, a mafia named after the southern municipality of Huila that has moved into Caquetá looking to buy coca base paste to send to North America. This drug mafia is related to the Triana Peña de Neiva clan, which one of its leaders was extradited by the Colombian government to Argentina for drug trafficking crimes.
..Structural/Cultur	12	The Ombudsman's Office has also detected the presence of members of Mexico's New Generation Jalisco cartel, which moves coca paste from Caquetá. During the last electoral campaign, the supervising body denounced that there was a risk that "the drug trafficking groups would position themselves for their purposes". The data takes on total relevance due to the accusations against the now governor-elect, Arulfo Gasca, of having links with illegality (which have not been demonstrated until now) and the recent condemnation by the Supreme Court against the governor of the department, Alvaro Pacheco, for his links with paramilitary groups that fed on drug trafficking.
..Structural/Cultur	13	Last June, the Ombudsman, Carlos Negret, denounced the presence in Caquetá of the Sinaloa Cartel, but the police say that they are only emissaries of the Mayo Zambada organization. At that time, the Ombudsman indicated that in the municipalities of Solano, Curillo and San José del Fragua there is a presence of the transnational cartel, "whose interest is in the purchase and sale of coca base paste, as well as in the control of the routes for the sale of coca and marijuana to Brazil and Peru. On that occasion he also expressed his concern about the recruitment of minors, which today is spoken of by the death of eight minors during a bombing of a dissident camp in Caquetá.
..Experts	14	The fears of the former combatants are centered, according to this newspaper, on the formation of common crime and criminal organizations, which in some cases would come from paramilitarism. Although the Ombudsman's Office has not identified these types of criminal gangs, it does note that there are a number of attacks and threats against ex-combatants and officials working to implement the Peace Accord. "The occurrence of human rights violations whose authorship is unknown is of concern, that is, they are not associated with the actions of dissident groups, and that are producing a generalized atmosphere of insecurity and anxiety in San Vicente del Caguán and La Macarena (Meta)," states an early warning in January 2019.
	15	In addition to these attacks, the origin of which is unknown, the FARC dissidents are in a process of reconfiguration and have extended their actions to several municipalities. The 40th front from San Vicente del Caguán and the area shared with La Macarena (Meta), towards the east of the former and the area of Cartagena del Chairá. Likewise, the appearance of the dissidents of the 62nd front with a group calling itself the "Rodrigo Cadete Unit of the FARC-EP", named after the dissident leader who died in combat last February and who is present in San Vicente del Caguán, Puerto Rico, Cartagena del Chairá, south of La Montañita and with sporadic appearances in El Paujil.
..Structural/Cultur	16	In the southern part of the department, particularly in municipalities located on the Caquetá River strip (Curillo and Solano), the dissidents of the first front have been present, the first group to step aside from the Peace Agreement in June 2016 and which is commanded by alias Gentil Duarte. In the first half of 2019, a group calling itself the Carolina Ramírez Front made its presence felt in rural areas of the municipality of Curillo, the same group that has made its presence felt in Vaupés. This advance of the dissidents in Caquetá is another warning for the ex-combatants, who are pointed out as "traitors to the cause" in the threatening pamphlets and in those that argue that they are "the real FARC-EP".
	17	After the departure of the FARC from the territories and their subsequent demobilization, the Eastern Bloc dissidents acting in Meta and Guaviare gradually entered and consolidated their actions in the department of Caquetá, mainly in the municipalities of
	18	San Vicente del Caguán and Cartagena del Chairá. For its part, a dissident structure of the Teófilo Forero Mobile Column was located on the eastern mountain range corridor, between San Vicente del Caguán and Puerto Rico, interested in the control of legal (livestock, goods and services, oil exploitation) and illegal (coca economy and control of drug trafficking corridors) income. There is also interest, says the Ombudsman's Office, in the land and river mobility corridors that from San Vicente del Caguán allow mobility to the departments of Huila, Meta and Guaviare; and along the Caguán River, with the municipalities of Cartagena del Chairá and Solano (Caquetá) and the departments of Amazonas and Putumayo, which are used for trafficking of illicit substances to Brazil. In addition, these areas have been used for the mobility of men, weapons and the location of supply and withdrawal zones, which has allowed them to evade military operations and the consolidation of their structures.

8.4.3 El País Cali

	1	El_País12:
	2	JEP denies permission for Senator Victoria Sandino to leave the country
..JEP	3	The Special Jurisdiction for Peace did not grant an exit permit from the country to the senator of the Farc Party, Victoria Sandino, who intended to attend events in Germany and Belgium between this Monday and next Friday. The congresswoman said she would be in the old continent on account of an invitation extended to her by the organization Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Colombia, Fescol.
..Partido FARC	4	"Sandino has fulfilled in an integral, satisfactory and permanent way the norms and procedures that the JEP guides, so, in spite of not having any restrictive measure of freedom, she informed the jurisdiction of her intention to participate in the event to which she had been invited by FESCOL, bringing all the pertinent documentation," said from the Party.
..Rule rejecter	5	The National Political Council of that community wonders this Sunday morning if with the decision the JEP exceeds the scope of its powers since, they say, the senator does not have restrictive measures to leave the country.
..Partido FARC	6	In fact, they recall that "Congresswoman Sandino has repeatedly left the country in compliance with an agenda related to her work as a senator of the Republic (...) accepting invitations from countries that work for the defense of human rights.
..Rule rejecter	7	Although the JEP's reasons for denying the permit are not known in depth, the Farc party argues that the court responded to their request by not complying with the formal requirements.
..Brave decision n	8	However, it is expected that in the next few hours the JEP's ruling will be known in order to determine the legal reasons that led to the decision.

8.4.4 El Tiempo

	1	El_Tie12:
	2	This is how the JEP investigates 8,839 cases of children recruited by the Farc
	3	<i>At least 3,131 minors taken by the ex-guerrilla were under 15 years old.</i>
..Truth Seeker	4	The first recorded recruitment of children by the FARC dates back 48 years to 1971. From then on, the guerrillas incorporated at least 8,839 minors into their ranks and turned them into combatants, a crime for which they now have to answer to the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) in case 07, the most recent case opened by that justice.
..Structural		
..JEP	5	This Tuesday, the JEP issued a statement in which it clarifies that "it continues with case 07 on recruitment and sexual violence against girls and boys in the armed conflict. The JEP reminds that neither recruitment nor sexual violence are amnestiable or pardonable crimes in the Jurisdiction".
..JEP		
..Structural/Cultur	6	The recruitment that continues to be carried out by other illegal armed groups, among them the Farc dissidents - as shown by the bombing in which eight minors died in Caquetá, known in early November - is a behavior inherited from the demobilized guerrilla. The JEP has already called 37 former combatants, including former guerrilla chiefs, to give their versions for enlisting children in their ranks, and the first thing they will have to clarify is what their recruitment policy was.
..Truth Seeker		
	7	The magistrate of the Truth Recognition Chamber of the JEP, Ivan Gonzalez Amado, rapporteur on the recruitment and use of children in the conflict, explains that in this investigation - which also investigates sexual crimes against minors, executions and cruel or degrading treatment - two lines are followed.
	8	The first seeks to determine the responsibilities of the members of the FARC. And the second, of members of the Public Force. No State agent has been linked to case 07, until now. "We know, from some stories, that some minors, after they were demobilized, were taken to a patrol with the Army to identify camps, people or places with weapons," explains Judge González. He also tells that "the Farc has said on two occasions that there were children who were trained by the Public Force and then incorporated as spies in the guerrilla ranks".
..JEP		
	9	As the information on these cases is precarious, in 2020 they will focus on collecting data that will allow them to determine if they link any member of the Public Force.
..Truth Seeker	10	Despite the high possibility of under-registration, progress has been made with regard to the use of minors by the FARC. The Chamber in charge has so far reviewed 15 reports that refer to these practices. It has also documented 413 Afro-descendant and 471 indigenous victims.
	11	While 4,930 victims were between the ages of 15 and 17, at least 3,131 were under 15, the limit set by international humanitarian law. Even children up to the age of 7 were registered. So far only 35 people have been accredited as victims, of which 15 are indirect, that is, family members.
	12	In the FARC, the recruitment policy has been adopted since the Seventh Conference in 1982, when it was decided not to recruit children under 15 years of age. Although on paper this was the norm, according to González this does not mean that they have complied. That is why 14 former Farc commanders and Arturo Ruiz, a member of the mobile column, were called to account for Operation Berlin (a combat in which dozens of minors recruited by the Farc participated).
	13	Of the universe of victims, 32 percent were women and 67 percent were men. Although the Farc said that they treated them equally, there were differences, for example, in the area of reproductive rights, the policy on birth control adopted at the Eighth Conference in 1993. While girls were forced to have abortions, a child who caused a pregnancy was not sanctioned; and while they were forced to plan, they did not have to use condoms.
	14	Children or perpetrators?
..JEP	15	Children enrolled in an armed group are victims, "but that doesn't mean they remain

..JEP		victims all the time," explains Judge González.
	16	When they turn 18, they lose the special protection they had as minors.
..JEP	17	"IHL does not treat them as civilians, because they participate in the armed confrontation. However, that does not mean that, even as combatants, they are not covered by the protection that should be given to children under international human rights and constitutional law. even as combatants, they are entitled to special protection," says Gonzalez.
	18	IHL does not treat them as civilians, because they participate in the armed conflict. However, this does not mean that, even as combatants, they are not covered by protection
	19	This protection implies, for example, assigning them tasks that do not put them in charge of the fight.
..Peace Processes	20	He adds that this does not mean that the enemy cannot fight them, because the combat is not between individuals but between armed forces. In any case, says González, in the presence of minors, the principles of proportionality and precaution must prevail in the operations.
	21	The criticism of the Rosa Blanca Corporation
..Partial institution	22	The Rosa Blanca victims' corporation, which brings together victims of these crimes, has been a harsh critic of the JEP, to the point that members such as journalist Herbin Hoyos have promoted the collection of signatures to carry out a referendum to overturn that jurisdiction.
..JEP	23	Judge González says he is concerned that Rosa Blanca "will make a big fuss in the media saying that they are victims and that the State and the JEP are not investigating. He says that they have been called to present reports on the acts of sexual violence in the Farc that they have denounced, but that the corporation "has not been able to bring any report, despite the fact that we have had several meetings.
..JEP	24	Although the JEP could incorporate these denunciations ex officio, the data that is publicly aired about rapes and abortions in the ranks of the demobilized guerrillas does not have sufficient information to be incorporated into the case, "so we are waiting for them to bring us the true data so that we can begin the corresponding investigations," concludes González.
..Peace Process		

Statutory Declaration

I confirm that the submitted thesis is original work and was written by me without further assistance.

Appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

The thesis was not examined before, nor has it been published. The submitted electronic version of the thesis matches the printed version.

Declaración Jurada

Confirmo que la tesis presentada es un trabajo original y que ha sido escrita por mí sin ayuda de terceros.

Se ha dado el crédito apropiado cuando se ha hecho referencia al trabajo de otros.

La tesis no ha sido examinada con anterioridad, ni ha sido publicada. La versión electrónica de la tesis presentada coincide con la versión impresa.

Zirndorf, 31st of March 2021

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Signature