TY - JOUR AU - Borst, Grégoire AU - Kosslyn, Stephen M AU - Kievit, Rogier A AU - Thompson, William L TI - A fictitious entry to demonstrate complicated bibliographies T2 - Journal of Nothingness VL - 1 SP - 2-3 PY - 2011 DA - 2011 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Mazumder, Bhashkar AU - Miller, Sarah TI - The Effects of the Massachusetts Health Reform on Household Financial Distress T2 - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy VL - 8 IS - 3 SP - 284-313 PY - 2016 DA - 2016/8 DO - 10.1257/pol.20150045 UR - https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150045 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150045 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Jensen, Gail A AU - Morrisey, Michael A TI - Endogenous Fringe Benefits, Compensating Wage Differentials and Older Workers T2 - International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics VL - 1 IS - 3/4 SP - 203-226 PY - 2001 DA - 2001 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - Springer AB - Employers are the principal source of health insurance for Americans under age 65. Economic theory argues that workers pay for health insurance in the form of lower wages or reductions in other forms of compensation. This paper uses 1994 and 1998 Health and Retirement Survey data to examine the wage-health insurance trade-off for older U.S. workers. Job and insurance choice are treated as endogenous in a two stage least squares framework. There is strong evidence supporting the treatment of nonwage benefits as endogenous. The preferred specification indicates an annual health insurance wage adjustment of 6,300. The magnitude of the trade-off is fragile, however. SN - 1389-6563 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/3528904 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kolstad, Jonathan T AU - Kowalski, Amanda E TI - Mandate-based health reform and the labor market: Evidence from the Massachusetts reform T2 - Journal of Health Economics VL - 47 SP - 81-106 PY - 2016 DA - 2016 AB - We model the labor market impact of the key provisions of the national and Massachusetts “mandate-based” health reforms: individual mandates, employer mandates, and subsidies. We characterize the compensating differential for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) and the welfare impact of reform in terms of “sufficient statistics.” We compare welfare under mandate-based reform to welfare in a counterfactual world where individuals do not value ESHI. Relying on the Massachusetts reform, we find that jobs with ESHI pay 2812 less annually, somewhat less than the cost of ESHI to employers. Accordingly, the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform was approximately 8 percent of its potential size. SN - 0167-6296 DO - 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.01.010 UR - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167629616000278 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.01.010 KW - Affordable Care Act, Massachusetts health reform, Welfare effects, Labor market, Individual mandate ER - TY - JOUR AU - Garthwaite, Craig AU - Gross, Tal AU - Notowidigdo, Matthew J TI - Public Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Employment Lock T2 - The Quarterly Journal of Economics VL - 129 IS - 2 SP - 653-696 PY - 2014 DA - 2014 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - Oxford University Press AB - We study the effect of public health insurance on labor supply by exploiting a large public health insurance disenrollment. In 2005, approximately 170,000 Tennessee residents abruptly lost Medicaid coverage. Using both across- and within-state variation in exposure to the disenrollment, we estimate large increases in labor supply, primarily along the extensive margin. The increased employment is concentrated among individuals working at least 20 hours a week and receiving private, employer-provided health insurance. We explore the dynamic effects of the disenrollment and find an immediate increase in job search behavior and a steady rise in both employment and health insurance coverage following the disenrollment. Our results are consistent with a significant degree of ‘‘employment lock’’—workers who are employed primarily to secure private health insurance coverage. SN - 0033-5533 UR - https://www.jstor.org/stable/26372559 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gouskova, Elena TI - Public Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Employment Lock: Effects or Data Artifacts? T2 - SSRN PY - 2015 DA - 2015/11/10 DO - 10.2139/ssrn.2688582 UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=2688582 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2688582 ER - TY - CHAP AU - Leibowitz, Arleen A2 - Triplett, Jack E TI - Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation T2 - The Measurement of Labor Cost SP - 371-394 PY - 1983 DA - 1983 PB - University of Chicago Press CY - Chicago ER - TY - JOUR AU - Eberts, Randall W AU - Stone, Joe A TI - Wages, Fringe Benefits, and Working Conditions: An Analysis of Compensating Differentials T2 - Southern Economic Journal VL - 52 IS - 1 SP - 274-280 PY - 1985 DA - 1985 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - Southern Economic Association SN - 0038-4038 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/1058920 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Amuedo‐Dorantes, Catalina AU - Mach, Traci TI - Performance pay and fringe benefits: Work incentives or compensating wage differentials? T2 - International Journal of Manpower VL - 24 IS - 6 SP - 673-698 PY - 2003 DA - 2003 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - Southern Economic Association DO - 10.1108/01437720310496157 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/01437720310496157 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gruber, Jonathan TI - The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits T2 - The American Economic Review VL - 84 IS - 3 SP - 622-641 PY - 1994 DA - 1994 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - American Economic Association AB - I consider the labor-market effects of mandates which raise the costs of employing a demographically identifiable group. The efficiency of these policies will be largely dependent on the extent to which their costs are shifted to group-specific wages. I study several state and federal mandates which stipulated that childbirth be covered comprehensively in health insurance plans, raising the relative cost of insuring women of childbearing age. I find substantial shifting of the costs of these mandates to the wages of the targeted group. Correspondingly, I find little effect on total labor input for that group. SN - 0002-8282 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118071 ER - TY - RPRT AU - Sheiner, Louise TI - Health care costs, wages, and aging PY - 1999 DA - 1999/5/19 PB - Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) UR - https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgfe/1999-19.html ER - TY - CHAP AU - Olson, Craig A A2 - William T. Alpert, A2 - Woodbury, Stephen A TI - Part Time Work, Health Insurance Coverage, and the wages of Married Women T2 - Employee Benefits and Labor Markets in Canada and the United States SP - . 295-324 PY - 2000 DA - 2000 PB - Upjohn Institute for Employment Research CY - Kalamazoo ER - TY - JOUR AU - Baicker, Katherine AU - Chandra, Amitabh TI - The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums T2 - Journal of Labor Economics VL - 24 IS - 3 SP - 609-634 PY - 2006 DA - 2006 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - [The University of Chicago Press, Society of Labor Economists, NORC at the University of Chicago] AB - We estimate the effect of rising health insurance premiums on wages, employment, and the distribution of part‐time and full‐time work using variation in medical malpractice payments driven by the recent “medical malpractice crisis.” We estimate that a 10 increase in health insurance premiums reduces the aggregate probability of being employed by 1.2 percentage points, reduces hours worked by 2.4, and increases the likelihood that a worker is employed only part time by 1.9 percentage points. For workers covered by employer provided health insurance, this increase in premiums results in an offsetting decrease in wages of 2.3. SN - 0734-306X UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/505049 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gasparini, Leonardo AU - Tornarolli, Leopoldo TI - Labor Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean: Patterns and Trends from Household Survey Microdata T2 - Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad IS - 63 SP - 13-80 PY - 2009 DA - 2009 ER - TY - BOOK AU - Ahmad, Ehtisham AU - Drèze, Jean AU - Hills, John AU - Sen, Amartya TI - Social Security in Developing Countries PY - 1991 DA - 1991 PB - Oxford University Press AB - The term ‘social security’ has a very different meaning in underdeveloped countries and is best understood as poverty alleviation. This book attempts to define social security in the Third World and to examine what sorts of programmes are most suitable for developing countries. It reviews current literature on the subject. Some chapters explore broad themes; others describe social security provisions in various regions in India, China, Latin America, and Southern Africa. Western systems are compared and broad assessments made of the traditional social security systems in Third World village societies. The book aims to put the subject of social security firmly on the agenda of development economic research with a view to stimulate much further research in this area. SN - 9780198233008 DO - 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198233008.001.0001 UR - https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198233008.001.0001 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198233008.001.0001 ER - TY - CHAP AU - Lucio Romero, Ruth Alicia A2 - Undp, TI - Towards a Universal Pension Protection Scheme - Ecuador T2 - Sharing Innovative Experiences: Successful Social Protection Floor Experiencies SP - 239-225 PY - 2011 DA - 2011 PB - ILO - SU/SSC (UNDP) CY - New York ER - TY - CHAP AU - Minteguiaga, Analía AU - Carmel, Valerie A2 - Lafleur, Jean-Michel A2 - Vintila, Daniela TI - Access to Social Protection by Immigrants, Emigrants and Resident Nationals in Ecuador T2 - Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond (Volume 3): A Focus on Non-EU Sending States SP - 109-125 PY - 2020 DA - 2020 PB - Springer International Publishing CY - Cham AB - Formal labour and affiliation to Ecuador's social security system is the main gateway for access to social protection benefits, especially in the case of migrants. However, a large informal labour market and low levels on inclusion in the social security system forces large sectors of society to rely on family and community arrangements for the management of risk and economic uncertainty. The state provides some non-contributory benefits through cash transfer programs but, with the exception of health care, these only cover people living in conditions of extreme poverty. Universal, non-means tested programs are limited to the public health and education systems. Overall, migrants face several obstacles to access social protection benefits. Gaining the right to work legally is mostly reserved for white-collar and highly educated immigrants, excluding impoverished immigrants. Paired to the inability to access labour-related benefits and government programs for the so-called poor, immigrants lack the safety nets provided by extended family and a community setting. Nationals residing abroad have restricted access to social benefits, having access only to the contributory pension system on a voluntary basis. This chapter discusses the social protection system in Ecuador and focuses on eligibility criteria to show the extent of migrants' access to the social benefits. SN - 9783030512378 DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-51237-8_6 UR - https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51237-8_6 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51237-8_6 ER - TY - RPRT AU - Bérgolo, Marcelo AU - Cruces, Guillermo TI - Labor Informality and the Incentive Effects of Social Security: Evidence from a Health Reform in Uruguay PY - 2012 DA - 2012/1 PB - Inter-American Development Bank AB - This paper studies the incentive effects of social security benefits on labor market informality following a policy reform in Uruguay. The reform extended health benefits to dependent children of private sector salaried workers, and thus altered the incentive structure of holding formal jobs within the household. The identification strategy of the reform¿s effects relies on a comparison between workers with children (affected by the reform) and those without children (unaffected by the reform). Difference in differences estimates indicate a substantial effect of this expansion of coverage on informality rates, which fell significantly by about 1.3 percentage points (a 5 percent change) among workers in the treatment group with respect to those in the control group. The evidence also indicates that individuals within households jointly optimized their allocation of labor to the formal and informal sector. Workers responded to the increased incentives for only one member of the household to work in the formal sector. These findings provide evidence of the relevant and substantial incentive effects of social security benefits on the allocation of employment. UR - https://ideas.repec.org/p/idb/brikps/3829.html KW - Social Security KW - CEDLAS ER - TY - THES AU - Molina, Andrea Isabel TI - Essays in labor economics, with applications to Ecuador PY - 2017 DA - 2017 PB - Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales - FLACSO ECUADOR M3 - Ph.D. Thesis ER - TY - BOOK AU - Perry, Guillermo E AU - Maloney, William AU - Arias, Omar AU - Fajnzylber, Pablo AU - Mason, Andrew D AU - Saavedra, Jaime TI - Informality: Exit and Exclusion PY - 2007 DA - 2007 PB - The World Bank Group AB - Informality: exit and exclusion analyzes informality in Latin America, exploring root causes and reasons for and implications of its growth. The authors use two distinct but complementary lenses: informality driven by exclusion from state benefits or the circuits of the modern economy, and driven by voluntary 'exit' decisions resulting from private cost-benefit calculations that lead workers and firms to opt out of formal institutions. They find both lenses have considerable explanatory power to understand the causes and consequences of informality in the region. Informality: exit and exclusion concludes that reducing informality levels and overcoming the 'culture of informality' will require actions to increase aggregate productivity in the economy, reform poorly designed regulations and social policies, and increase the legitimacy of the state by improving the quality and fairness of state institutions and policies. Although the study focuses on Latin America, its analysis, approach, and conclusions are relevant for all developing countries. UR - https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbpubs:6730 KW - Social Protections and Labor - Labor Markets Banks and Banking Reform Social Protections and Labor - Labor Standards Work and Working Conditions Tertiary Education Finance and Financial Sector Development Education ER - TY - JOUR AU - Barcellos, Silvia Helena AU - Jacobson, Mireille TI - The Effects of Medicare on Medical Expenditure Risk and Financial Strain T2 - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy VL - 7 IS - 4 SP - 41-70 PY - 2015 DA - 2015/11 DO - 10.1257/pol.20140262 UR - https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20140262 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140262 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bosch, Mariano AU - Campos-Vazquez, Raymundo M TI - The Trade-Offs of Welfare Policies in Labor Markets with Informal Jobs: The Case of the "Seguro Popular" Program in Mexico T2 - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy VL - 6 IS - 4 SP - 71-99 PY - 2014 DA - 2014/11 DO - 10.1257/pol.6.4.71 UR - https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.6.4.71 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.4.71 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Galiani, Sebastian AU - Weinschelbaum, Federico TI - Modeling Informality Formally: Households and firms T2 - Economic Inquiry VL - 50 IS - 3 SP - 821-838 PY - 2012 DA - 2012 AB - Informality is widespread in most developing countries. In Latin America, 50% of salaried employees work informally. Three stylized facts characterize informality: (1) small firms tend to operate informally while large firms tend to operate formally; (2) unskilled workers tend to be informal while skilled ones have formal jobs; (3) ceteris paribus, secondary workers (a worker other than the household head) are less likely to operate formally than primary workers. We develop a model that accounts for all these facts. In our model, both heterogeneous firms and workers have preferences over the sector they operate and choose optimally whether to function formally or informally. There are two labor markets, one formal and the other informal, and both firms and workers act unconstrained in them. By contrast, a prominent feature of the preexisting literature is that workers' decisions play no role in determining the equilibrium of the economy. In our model, policies that reduce the supply of workers in the informal labor market at given wages will increase the level of formality in the economy. This has noteworthy implications for the design of social programs in developing countries. We also show that an increase in the participation of secondary workers would tend to raise the level of informality in the economy. (JEL J24, J33) DO - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00413.x UR - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00413.x UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00413.x ER - TY - BOOK AU - Levy, Santiago TI - Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: Social Policy, Informality, and Economic Growth in Mexico PY - 2008 DA - 2008 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - Brookings Institution Press AB - Despite various reform efforts, Mexico has experienced economic stability but little growth. Today more than half of all Mexican workers are employed informally, and one out of every four is poor. Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes argues that incoherent social programs significantly contribute to this state of affairs and it suggests reforms to improve the situation. Over the past decade, Mexico has channeled an increasing number of resources into subsidizing the creation of low-productivity, informal jobs. These social programs have hampered growth, fostered illegality, and provided erratic protection to workers, trapping many in poverty. Informality has boxed Mexico into a dilemma: provide benefits to informal workers at the expense of lower growth and reduced productivity or leave millions of workers without benefits. Former finance official Santiago Levy proposes how to convert the existing system of social security for formal workers into universal social entitlements. He advocates eliminating wage-based social security contributions and raising consumption taxes on higher-income households to simultaneously increase the rate of growth of GDP, reduce inequality, and improve benefits for workers. Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes considers whether Mexico can build on the success of Progresa-Oportunidades, a targeted poverty alleviation program that originated in Mexico and has been replicated in over 25 countries as well as in New York City. It sets forth a plan to reform social and economic policy, an essential element of a more equitable and sustainable development strategy for Mexico. UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt6wpfgq ER - TY - JOUR AU - Papps, Kerry L TI - The Effects of Social Security Taxes and Minimum Wages on Employment: Evidence from Turkey T2 - ILR Review VL - 65 IS - 3 SP - 686-707 PY - 2012 DA - 2012 AB - Using worker-level panel data for the period from 2002 to 2005, the author analyzes the separate employment effects of increases in the social security taxes paid by employers and increases in the minimum wage in Turkey. Variation over time among low-wage workers in the ratio of total labor costs to the gross wage gives rise to a natural experiment. The author's regression estimates indicate that a given increase in social security taxes has a larger negative effect on the probability of a worker remaining employed in the next quarter than an equal size increase in the minimum wage. This result is incompatible with the textbook model of labor supply and demand, and it suggests that workers may increase effort in response to an increase in wages. The author's comparison of the employment responses of workers in different demographic groups provides some indirect evidence that the central finding is consistent with this explanation. DO - 10.1177/001979391206500309 UR - https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391206500309 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979391206500309 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Graves, John A AU - Gruber, Jonathan TI - How Did Health Care Reform in Massachusetts Impact Insurance Premiums? T2 - American Economic Review VL - 102 IS - 3 SP - 508-513 PY - 2012 DA - 2012/5 DO - 10.1257/aer.102.3.508 UR - https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.102.3.508 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.508 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Olson, Craig A TI - Do Workers Accept Lower Wages in Exchange for Health Benefits? T2 - Journal of Labor Economics VL - 20 IS - S2 SP - S91-S114 PY - 2002 DA - 2002 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - [The University of Chicago Press, Society of Labor Economists, NORC at the University of Chicago] AB - Compensating wage theory predicts that workers receiving more generous fringe benefits are paid a lower wage than comparable workers who prefer fewer fringe benefits. This study tests this prediction for employer‐provided health insurance by modeling the wages of married women employed full‐time in the labor market. Husband's union status, husband's firm size, and husband's health coverage through his job are used as instruments for his wife's own employer health insurance benefits. The estimates suggest wives with own employer health insurance accept a wage about 20 lower than what they would have received working in a job without benefits. SN - 0734-306X UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/338675 ER - TY - BOOK AU - Arnold, Daniel AU - Whaley, Christopher M TI - Who Pays for Health Care Costs? The Effects of Health Care Prices on Wages PY - 2020 DA - 2020 PB - RAND Corporation CY - Santa Monica, CA DO - 10.7249/WRA621-2 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.7249/WRA621-2 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bertrand, Marianne AU - Duflo, Esther AU - Mullainathan, Sendhil TI - How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates? T2 - The Quarterly Journal of Economics VL - 119 IS - 1 SP - 249-275 PY - 2004 DA - 2004 Y2 - 2022/12/13 PB - Oxford University Press AB - Most papers that employ Differences-in-Differences estimation (DD) use many years of data and focus on serially correlated outcomes but ignore that the resulting standard errors are inconsistent. To illustrate the severity of this issue, we randomly generate placebo laws in state-level data on female wages from the Current Population Survey. For each law, we use OLS to compute the DD estimate of its "effect" as well as the standard error of this estimate. These conventional DD standard errors severely understate the standard deviation of the estimators: we find an "effect" significant at the 5 percent level for up to 45 percent of the placebo interventions. We use Monte Carlo simulations to investigate how well existing methods help solve this problem. Econometric corrections that place a specific parametric form on the time-series process do not perform well. Bootstrap (taking into account the autocorrelation of the data) works well when the number of states is large enough. Two corrections based on asymptotic approximation of the variance-covariance matrix work well for moderate numbers of states and one correction that collapses the time series information into a "pre"- and "post"-period and explicitly takes into account the effective sample size works well even for small numbers of states. SN - 0033-5533 UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098683 ER -