



**The impact of peer comparison and social norms on water
consumption behavior: a controlled experiment**

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1 Introduction

Since 2024, major cities such as Bogotá, Mexico City, Cape Town, and Johannesburg have faced water rationing due to record-low reservoir levels. The situation the city is facing reflects a worldwide concern, studied and reported by organizations like the World Bank: the devastating impacts of climate change are imminent, and if decisive actions are not taken, by 2030 the deficit of drinking water could exceed 40% (Neo & Jha, 2023). The current climate situation accounts for the negative externalities that excessive water consumption entails. A common approach to tackling negative externalities are price-related mechanisms (in the fashion of Pigouvian taxes). Nevertheless, when it comes to taxing utilities, a series of political and technical challenges arise: stepping in the way of universal access as well as the difficulties in determining the price-elasticity parameters are some of the hurdles of resorting to these mechanisms (Allcott, 2011).

Considering the challenges posed by price-related mechanisms, behavioral economics sheds light on how issues like water shortages can be addressed by generating incentives to diminish water overconsumption in a more cost-effective manner. Principles such as nudging can encourage sustainable behavior (conscious water consumption, for instance) by leveraging social norms. This work aims to explore the circumstances required for social nudging to be effective in achieving sustainable behavior in the context of rationalizing water consumption in the city of Bogotá.

To achieve this, we implemented a natural field experiment in which some users from Bogotá’s largest water utility company, EAAB, were randomly selected to receive a message through their bill comparing their consumption to that of their neighbors. A difference-in-differences estimation was conducted to assess the impact of this social comparison. The objective was to determine under what circumstances—if any—these messages influenced users’ water consumption patterns.

There is a significant amount of evidence that social nudges are effective in promoting sustainable behavior. Cialdini (2009) and van der Linden (2018) are among the studies that examine the impact of social nudging through appeals to social norms and peer comparison. More specifically, Allcott (2011) and Ayres (2010) tested the effect of a social nudge in the form of messages sent to users comparing their energy consumption to that of their peers, finding a reduction in electricity usage by approximately 2-3%. Similarly, numerous studies have explored the effect of comparison messages on water consumption.

In Colombia, Jaime and Carlsson (2016) and Lopez-Rivas (2019) conducted field experiments in small populations to test the impact of this social nudge. In both cases, the intervention incentivized a reduction in consumption. Jaime and Carlsson (2016) find that households receiving normative feedback reduced their water consumption by approximately 6–7% in a sample of 1,857 households in a small town, while Lopez-Rivas (2019) reports reductions of about 8% among treated households, with additional spillover effects of around 5–6% among nearby households. These findings provide evidence that peer comparison messages can promote water conservation. The present study contributes to this literature by analyzing the same type of behavioral intervention using a substantially larger and more heterogeneous sample of residential users in Bogotá. In addition to estimating average treatment effects

and previously explored heterogeneous responses across socio-economic strata and baseline consumption levels, this study explores the impact of deviations from the average consumption of the relevant comparison group, as well as potential spillover effects within residential complexes. By doing so, it provides new evidence on the conditions under which social comparison messages are more likely to influence water consumption behavior.

The study presented in this paper builds on previous research by exploring the impact of the same social nudge: a message sent to users comparing their consumption to that of their peers. The contribution of this work is threefold: i) it includes a much larger and more heterogeneous sample than previous experiments conducted in Colombia, thereby increasing its external validity; ii) it incorporates multiple thresholds based on the deviation between individual household consumption and the average consumption within the gated community (cut-off points), allowing for a more precise definition of the relevant peer comparison group; and iii) this study examines heterogeneous effects across deviation levels. To the best of the author's knowledge, prior research has not addressed the impact from deviation from baseline in consumption change.

The results reveal spillover effects within gated communities (the units defining neighborhoods) and demonstrate that raising awareness about higher-than-average consumption fosters positive environmental behavior. This effect is most pronounced among users in higher socioeconomic strata, those with higher baseline water usage, and individuals whose consumption slightly exceeds their community's average.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the data and the experimental design implemented in the study. Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy used to estimate the effects of the intervention. Section 5 presents the main results, including the analysis of heterogeneous effects. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the findings.

2 Theoretical framework

The study of social norms has been one of the most prolific areas within experimental economics. As compiled by Bicchieri et al. (2019) in a comprehensive literature review, various studies demonstrate that social norms guide human behavior and interactions across a wide range of decision-making situations: corruption, environmental conservation, charitable behavior, among others. This understanding reflects not only the perception of norms as restrictions but also as motivations. In this sense, the term norm-nudges has been coined for those nudges that arise from social norms, generating behavior changes that are socially optimal (such as reducing pollution, not evading taxes, and reducing water waste, for example). Social norms are the beliefs held about the behavior of the environment, and in this sense, one of the key assumptions behind the functioning of nudges is that there is interdependence among individual behaviors (Cialdini et al., 2004). In other words, a person's decisions depend not only on their own preferences or circumstances but are also influenced by what they perceive others are doing. This interdependence creates a network effect, where individuals' actions are shaped by the behavior of

their peers. As a result, norm-nudges can be effectively used to encourage prosocial behaviors, as establishing positive social standards encourages people to align with these expectations.

Thaler and Sunstein (2008), Schultz (2007), Andor and Fels (2018), Allcott (2011), are some of the studies that demonstrate that social nudges can effectively promote sustainable behavior by bridging the gap between information and behavior by triggering motivation. Nudges that appeal to social norms serve as a mechanism to generate motivation without resorting to prohibitions or economic incentives, which are other methods of motivation (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).

As mentioned above, peer comparison is an essential element in the social nudge. However, contradictory results regarding the expected impact of social comparison have invited a closer examination of the necessary conditions for peer comparison to generate the desired effect. One of these conditions is understanding that social norms are heterogeneous, and in this sense, individuals seek approval within a relevant reference network (te Velde, 2022), where there is a homogenization of norms that diverge in more aggregated contexts.

One of the important assumptions behind the controlled experiment that was conducted was to consider that the relevant group for individuals consisted of their neighbors, understood as those who live in the same gated community. Although this assumption is a simplification of what individuals may consider their relevant comparison network, variables such as income and geographical proximity are crucial for this delimitation.

The experiment was conducted based on the hypothesis that sending alert or congratulatory messages, which compared a user's consumption to that of their peers, would appeal to social norms and make users aware that their behavior was being observed and compared.

- i *Information*: "I am aware that water is a limited resource and that climate change threatens its availability."
- ii *Social norm/intention*: "My peers, the people with whom I believe I should compare myself and who compare me, have behaviors that are pro (or anti) environment, and in that sense, that should be the acceptable behavior and the behavior I should follow."
- iii *Nudge*: "I am being compared; my behavior is being observed, and it could potentially be verified by the network to which I believe I belong."

In this sense, based on what is presented by behavior theory regarding social norms, the nudges and their impact on closing the gap between information and action, it would be expected that the alert message would reduce consumption by appealing to social comparison (Allcott, 2011).

3 Data and experimental design

3.1 The experiment

The experiment was conducted in the city of Bogotá through its major water utility company: Bogotá’s Water and Sanitation Company (EAAB for its acronym in Spanish). The company has a market share of 98%, which means that it serves most of its 9 million inhabitants – a figure that roughly translates into 2.1 million residential users for the utility-. The intervention that was tested was a message sent through the water bill. This message compared the users’ two-month consumption (measured in cubic meters) with that of his neighbors. If the consumption was lower, the user would receive a congratulatory message whereas if the converse happened he would receive an alert one (see Appendix F). In this experiment, “neighbors” are those that belong to the same gated community¹.

3.2 Data

User information was extracted from the EAAB billing database, which includes, among other variables, the following: i) billing period, ii) user ID, iii) type of user (residential, industrial, commercial, official, and multi-user), iv) geographic coordinates, v) cadastral chip, vi) socio-economic stratum, vii) consumption of the period in m^3 , and viii) reading anomaly code. The EAAB collects metering records from each user every two months, resulting in six reading and billing periods per year. However, since these records are not obtained simultaneously, the consumption periods vary by user. For example, the first billing period of 2022 (2022-10) covers December 15th 2021, to February 14th, 2022, for some users, while for others, it covers January 12th to March 11th, 2022. This discrepancy has significant implications for the experiment: the intervention cannot be implemented concurrently. To carry out its reading and billing processes, the EAAB divides the city into five zones (see Appendix E- Figure 9) and 26 billing cycles, each represented by a letter. The billing calendar accounts for manual meter readings and the limited number of workers available to read all users’ meters at once. Consequently, the complete cycle to cover the entire city requires two months. To the EAAB billing database was added the identification of the horizontal property to which the different users belong to (if applicable). This integration was made possible using the cadastral ID key. Once the integrated databases of the EAAB and IGAC were obtained, all non-residential users and residential users who did not belong to a horizontal property were excluded. An additional filter was applied to consider only those complexes with at least twenty users. The selection of this threshold is based on discretionary criteria to ensure a sufficiently robust number of users for conducting analyses of resource distribution within the residential complex. Users should not have consumption deviations or reports of meter malfunctions (information captured in the *reading anomaly* code field). Further refinement of the database was conducted: only billing cycles A, B, C, R and U were considered, as the EAAB granted autho-

¹According to IGAC (National Geographic Institute) nearly a quarter of Bogotá’s households belong to a gated community.

rization to add messages only to the bills of users in these cycles. This restriction follows pre-existing joint-billing agreements in specific zones and cycles, which bundle the water bill with charges for additional utilities (such as solid waste), thereby reducing space for any additional information. Despite this limitation, coverage was achieved throughout the city, including various socio-economic strata. The selection process resulted in a sample of 214,301 users distributed across 2,410 residential complexes. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the resulting users.




Figure 1: Distribution and geographical location of residential users involved in the experiment

3.3 Empirical design

The resulting 214,301 users were allocated to one of the following groups:

1. Clean control group: users in gated communities where no one receives the message.
2. Spillover group: users who do not receive the message but belong to a gated community where some users do receive it.
3. Strict treatment group: users who receive the message.

The reason for having two control groups (clean and impure) instead of just one is to test for spillover effects. Without including an spillover group, the impact of the intervention could be underestimated.

Users were allocated to groups through a two-stage randomization process. First, at the gated community level, approximately 33.3% of communities (out of 2,410) were randomly selected, with all their users assigned to the clean control group. From the remaining 66.6%, half of the users within each gated community were randomly assigned to the impure control group, while the other half were placed in the strict treatment group.

Due to the structure of billing cycles, the same billing period corresponds to different consumption periods (see Tables 1 and 2).

Billing cycle	Baseline			Post-intervention period		
	Billing period	Consumption start date	Consumption end date	Billing period	Consumption start date	Consumption end date
A	2022-60	Jun 25 th , 2022	Aug 23 rd , 2022	2023-10	Aug 24 th , 2022	Oct 21 st , 2022
B	2022-60	Jun 30 th , 2022	Aug 27 th , 2022	2023-10	Aug 28 th , 2022	Oct 26 th , 2022
C	2022-60	Jul 02 nd , 2022	Aug 30 th , 2022	2023-10	Aug 31 th , 2022	Oct 28 th , 2022
R	2022-60	Aug 05 th , 2022	Oct 03 rd , 2022	2023-10	Oct 04 th , 2022	Dec 02 nd , 2022
U	2022-60	Aug 16 th , 2022	Oct 14 rd , 2022	2023-10	Oct 15 th , 2022	Dec 14 th , 2022

Table 1: Experiment timing - consumption

Billing cycle	Baseline			Post-intervention period		
	Billing period	pe- Day prior to printing the billing	Day prior to printing the billing	Billing period	pe- Day prior to printing the billing	Day prior to printing the billing
A	2022-60		Sep 11 th , 2022	2023-10		Nov 10 th , 2022
B	2022-60		Sep 14 th , 2022	2023-10		Nov 15 th , 2022
C	2022-60		Sep 18 th , 2022	2023-10		Nov 17 th , 2022
R	2022-60		Oct 23 rd , 2022	2023-10		Dec 22 nd , 2022
U	2022-60		Nov 03 rd , 2022	2023-10		Dec 30 th , 2022

Table 2: Experiment timing- Billing

The resulting sample size by treatment group and stratum is displayed in Table 3. As shown, the objective of fair coverage across strata was achieved, despite a lower concentration of strata 1 and 2 compared to the broader population in Bogotá (Table 3, column f). This aligns with the concentration of gated communities in areas where higher strata are located. While baseline consumption varies between strata, it remains relatively consistent across treatment groups (Table 4).

Socio-economic stratum	Strict treatment	Impure control	Clean control	Total	Percentage of the total
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Stratum 1	3.629	3.610	4.569	11.808	5.51%
Stratum 2	11.509	11.434	10.471	33.414	15.59%
Stratum 3	14.253	14.275	19.892	48.420	22.59%
Stratum 4	27.364	27.249	26.486	81.099	37.84%
Stratum 5	9.418	9.312	9.678	28.408	13.26%
Stratum 6	3.461	3.462	4.289	11.152	5.20%
Total	69,634	69,282	75,385	214,301	100%

Table 3: Number of observations by treatment group and socio-economic stratum

Socio-economic level	Strict treatment	Impure control	Clean control	Total
Stratum 1	12.94	13.24	13.01	13.06
Stratum 2	13.97	13.96	14.16	14.03
Stratum 3	15.61	15.64	15.50	15.58
Stratum 4	17.56	17.41	17.62	17.53
Stratum 5	19.78	19.78	19.63	19.73
Stratum 6	20.75	20.47	21.04	20.78
Total	16.79	16.73	16.76	16.76

Table 4: Average baseline consumption (m^3) by treatment group and stratum




Figure 2: Balance tests- Consumption

The design effectively creates an experiment within each gated community. Methodologically, this approach allows two users with identical consumption levels in different communities to receive different messages, depending on the average consumption within their respective communities. More broadly, as illustrated in Figure 3, users with consumption levels between 3 and 39 m^3 may receive either a congratulatory or alert message, depending on their community's average consumption. Since the average consumption per billing period in gated communities ranges from 3 to 40.8 m^3 , the baseline consumption distribution for users below their community average considerably overlaps with that of users above it. Consistently, the distribution of the difference between individual users' consumption and their respective gated communities' consumption exhibits an approximately normal distribution (Figure 4).




Figure 3: Baseline user's consumption distribution




Figure 4: Distribution of the difference between user consumption and gated community consumption

4 Empirical strategy

The following estimation was performed for four different scenarios:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \tau(Treat \times Post)_{it} + \gamma Treat_i + \delta Post_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where:

- y_{it} : water consumption of user i , in period t
- τ is the diff-in-diff estimator (the causal impact in the experimental context)
- $Treat_t$: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if user i belongs to the treatment group, and of 0 if it belongs to the control group
- $Post_t$: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the period corresponds to the one following the intervention, and 0 if it corresponds to the period prior to the intervention
- ε_t : error term in period t .

The analyzed scenarios were the following:

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3	Scenario 4
Treat (=1)	Strict treated Impure control	Strict treated	Strict treated	Strict treated
Observations	138 916	69 634	69 634	69.634
Treat (=0)	Clean control	Impure control Clean control	Impure control	Clean control
Observations	75 385	144 667	69 634	75 385
Total observations	214 301	214 301	138 916	145 019

Table 5: Analysis scenarios

The differences between the scenarios presented in Table 5 come from whether users in the three treatment groups are labeled as treated units ($Treat_i = 1$) or non-treated units ($Treat_i = 0$) when using Equation 1. These scenarios were created to identify potential spillover effects. If such effects exist, it is expected that the impact of the intervention (τ) to be smaller in scenarios 2 and 3 (where the Impure control group is counted as part of the control group) compared to scenarios 1 and 4.

For each of these scenarios, Equation 1 was applied to all users who were treated. Additionally, separate regressions were run for those who received a congratulatory message and for those who received a warning message, in order to test for expected differentiated impacts.

5 Results

Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients obtained from Equation 1:

Type of message	All	Warning	Congratulations
Scenario 1			
Treat (=1)	0.000646	-0.0996	0.0178
	0.0456	0.0641	0.0338
Post (=1)	-0.102*	-1.001***	0.0618***
	0.0519	0.0730	0.0384
Treat*Post	-0.0310	-0.0356	-0.0201
	0.0645	0.0906	0.0477
Constant	16.76***	24.72***	10.39***
	0.0367	0.0516	0.0272
N	428 602	191 110	237 492
F	5.361	189.5	234.2
R2 ajustado	0.0000305	0.00295	0.00294
Scenario 2			
Treat (=1)	0.0448	-0.00703	-0.0118
	0.0465	0.0652	0.0345
Post (=1)	-0.120***	-1.018***	0.599***
	0.0375	0.0527	0.0277
Treat*Post	-0.00644	-0.0202	0.0160
	0.0658	0.0922	0.0488
Constant	-16.74***	24.65***	10.41***
N	428 602	191 110	237 492
F	5.749	187.2	234.1
Adjusted R2	0.0000332	0.00291	0.00294
Scenario 3			
Treat (=1)	0.0602	0.0608	-0.0285
	0.0541	0.0760	0.0401
Post (=1)	-0.139**	-1.036***	-0.580***
	0.0542	0.0762	0.0401
Treat*Post	0.0132	-0.00223	0.0358
	0.0765	0.107	0.0568
Constant	16.73**	24.59***	10.42***
	0.0383	0.0539	0.0284
N	277 832	124 124	153 708
F	5.041	124.5	148.0
Adjusted R2	0.0000436	0.00298	0.00286
Scenario 4			
Treat (=1)	0.0307	-0.0694	0.00349
	0.0531	0.0743	0.0393
Post (=1)	-0.102*	1.001***	0.618***
	0.0520	0.0730	0.0384
Treat*Post	-0.0245	-0.0367	-0.00222
	0.0751	0.105	0.0556
Constant	16.76***	24.72***	10.39***
	0.0368	0.0516	0.0272
N	290 038	129 444	160 594
F	3.166	126.4	164.4
Adjusted R2	0.0000224	0.00290	0.00304

Table 6: Diff-in-Diff estimators by scenario and type of message

As shown in Table 6, the impact of the messages on water consumption is not statistically significant in any of the scenarios when assessed in an aggregated man-

ner.

Nevertheless, when examining each scenario and differentiating by i) socio-economic strata, ii) consumption range, iii) average consumption within the gated community, and iv) deviation from the gated community's consumption, some significant effects emerge when assessing the different types of messages.

The lack of significant effects continues to arise when assessing all treated units collectively. As shown in tables 7, 10, 13, and 16 from scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, there are no statistically significant coefficients in the *Treat*Post* column for the socio-economic classifications, consumption range, and average consumption within the gated community: since congratulatory and warning messages may induce different, if not opposite, behaviors, aggregating them could diminish or even cancel the overall impact. Nevertheless, when assessing the disaggregated effects of the Congratulatory and Warning messages separately, some conclusions can be deduced from the necessary conditions for messages to be effective in the context of the experiment.

Spillover effects

The inclusion of both strict and impure control groups aims to assess whether any diffusion occurs from the treated units to the impure controls, given that they belong to the same gated community.

If such transmission exists two conditions should be met:

1. There shouldn't exist significant results when comparing strict treated and impure control units (scenarios 2 and 3)
2. The impact should only be observed in scenarios 1 and 4 and the ones in the former should be stronger than those in the latter.

As can be observed for the Warning messages, there are no significant results obtained for scenarios 2 and 3 (see column (c) in tables 11 and 14) which means that condition 1 is met. Regarding condition 2, significant results are obtained for scenario 1 (column (c), 8) but not for scenario 4 (column (c), 17). Despite the lack of significant results for scenario 4, the significant negative coefficients observed in scenario 1, along with the higher magnitude of the effects, suggest the presence of spillover effects. This implies that sending a Warning message to a user impacts not only the direct recipients but also those who did not receive the message yet reside nearby (within the same gated community).

Warning message: impact on higher socio-economic level users

Since significant results were only observed in Scenario 1, the following discussion focuses on this scenario.

No significant effects were observed for users in strata 1, 2, 3, or 4 in terms of water consumption changes (Table 8, cells highlighted in green). However, the opposite was true for users in higher socio-economic strata (5 and 6). Users in

stratum 5 who consumed more than their gated community’s average reduced their consumption by $0.84 m^3$ after receiving the message. Similarly, users in stratum 6 reduced their consumption by $0.93 m^3$.




Figure 5: Scenario 1. Estimation of the intervention’s impact by socio-economic stratum. Message: Warning.

Impact in high-consumption users

As shown in Table 8 (highlighted in blue), users with a baseline consumption of $24 m^3$ or higher who received a warning message reduced their consumption by an average of $1.31 m^3$. For instance, a user with a baseline consumption between 34 and $100 m^3$, consuming above the gated community’s average, reduced its consumption by an average of $2.6 m^3$ as a result of the warning message.




Figure 6: Estimation of the intervention’s impact by baseline consumption range. Message: Warning

Perception about attainable goals

Cells highlighted in purple in Table 8 show that when compared to their neighbors, users appear to respond to the comparison more effectively when the target is perceived as attainable. Significant results are obtained for closer deviations from the average gated community’s consumption.




Figure 7: Scenario 1. Estimation of the intervention by deviation from the average gated community’s consumption. Message: Warning.

Adverse effects

When users with consumption higher than $24 m^3$ that consume, in the baseline, less than their gated community’s average, receive the congratulatory message, they increase their consumption, on average, by $2.21 m^3$ (Table 9).




Figure 8: Scenario 1. Estimation of the intervention’s impact by baseline consumption range. Message: Congratulations

6 Conclusions

This paper examines the conditions under which social nudging effectively promotes environmentally desirable outcomes. Using an experimental study conducted in Bogotá’s largest water utility company, the findings reveal that messages highlighting higher-than-average water consumption compared to neighbors led to reduced consumption among specific groups. The intervention was particularly effective for:

- i) users from higher socio-economic status, where households in strata 5 and 6 reduced their consumption by approximately 0.84 m^3 (about 4.3%) and 0.93 m^3 (about 4.5%), respectively, after receiving a warning message;
- ii) users with higher baseline water consumption, particularly those consuming more than 24 m^3 , who reduced their consumption by an average of 1.31 m^3 (approximately 5.5%), with reductions reaching up to 2.6 m^3 (about 7.6%) among the highest-consumption users; and
- iii) users whose consumption deviated only slightly from their gated community’s average, suggesting that the effectiveness of the comparison depends on whether the target is perceived as attainable.

Additionally, spillover effects were observed within the group considered as neighbors, indicating that the intervention may influence not only the individuals who receive the message but also other users living in the same residential complex. For users who received a congratulatory message for consuming less than their reference group, some unintended effects were observed: users with relatively high consumption levels increased their water use by approximately 2.21 m^3 , suggesting the presence of a potential rebound or “boomerang” effect.

Beyond these empirical findings, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides evidence from a large-scale field experiment in the context of water consumption, a setting that has been less studied than energy use in the behavioral economics literature. Second, the analysis explores heterogeneous effects across socio-economic strata, consumption levels, and deviations from peer consumption, offering insights into the conditions under which social comparison messages are most effective.

Overall, the results align with the literature on social nudging and support the hypothesis developed. In particular, the magnitude of the observed reductions—ranging from approximately 4% to over 7% for certain groups—are comparable to, and in some cases larger than the reductions typically reported in studies on social-norm interventions in energy consumption. These findings highlight the importance of targeting behavioral interventions toward specific groups and designing messages that make conservation goals appear attainable.

The results also offer valuable policy implications grounded in behavioral economics: direct communication with users, combined with carefully designed social comparison messages, can represent a cost-effective tool for promoting more sustainable water consumption behavior.

A Regressions Scenario 1

	Treat (=1)	Post (=1)	Treat*Post	Constant	N	F	Adjusted R2
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
All	0.000646 (0.046)	-0.102* (0.0519)	-0.0310 (0.0645)	16.76*** (0.087)	428 602	5.361	0.0000305
By socio-economic strata							
Stratum 1	0.0881 (0.135)	-0.219 (0.149)	0.141 (0.190)	13.01*** (0.105)	23 616	1.794	0.000101
Stratum 2	-0.202** (0.0856)	-0.306*** (0.100)	0.0171 (0.121)	14.16*** (0.0709)	66 828	12.61	0.000521
Stratum 3	0.121 (0.082)	-0.112 (0.0903)	-0.0784 (0.118)	15.50*** (0.0839)	96 840	3.270	0.0000703
Stratum 4	-0.138* (0.0765)	-0.157* (0.0887)	0.0136 (0.106)	17.62*** (0.0627)	162 198	4.809	0.0000704
Stratum 5	0.153 (0.149)	0.127 (0.171)	-0.0811 (0.211)	19.63*** (0.121)	56 816	0.606	-0.0000208
Stratum 6	-0.435* (0.232)	0.396 (0.290)	-0.226 (0.370)	21.04*** (0.205)	22 304	3.732	0.000367
By consumption range (m^3)							
[1, 9]	0.0185 (0.0296)	0.908*** (0.0388)	-0.00349 (0.0419)	5.991*** (0.0239)	106 902	683.7	0.0188
[10, 12]	0.00483 (0.0310)	0.407*** (0.052)	-0.0485 (0.0488)	11.01*** (0.0249)	58 420	107.4	0.000544
[13, 15]	-0.00452 (0.0335)	0.158*** (0.0382)	-0.0315 (0.0473)	13.98*** (0.0270)	57 346	12.70	0.000612
[16, 18]	0.00233 (0.0391)	-0.116*** (0.0446)	-0.0179 (0.0583)	16.96*** (0.0315)	50 696	7.850	0.000405
[19, 21]	-0.0149 (0.0499)	-0.477*** (0.0523)	0.0883 (0.0886)	19.95*** (0.0370)	41 824	61.70	0.000433
[22, 24]	0.00960 (0.0484)	-0.548*** (0.0665)	-0.122 (0.0826)	22.94*** (0.0470)	32 402	85.30	0.000774
[25, 27]	0.00580 (0.0716)	-0.872*** (0.0813)	-0.109 (0.101)	25.92*** (0.0576)	24 102	127.4	0.0155
[28, 30]	0.0118 (0.0927)	-1.230*** (0.105)	0.00602 (0.131)	28.93*** (0.0745)	17 106	127.6	0.0217
[31, 33]	0.00326 (0.117)	-1.321*** (0.184)	-0.148 (0.166)	31.91*** (0.0847)	12 172	107.2	0.0255
[34, 100]	-0.0989 (0.168)	-2.599*** (0.191)	-0.0993 (0.237)	41.65*** (0.135)	27 632	185.1	0.0196
By gated-community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	-0.425* (0.231)	-0.176 (0.271)	0.204 (0.327)	8.062*** (0.192)	5 112	1.447	0.000262
[9, 1; 12]	0.334*** (0.127)	0.189 (0.154)	-0.0948 (0.180)	10.77*** (0.109)	29 300	4.229	0.000331
[12, 1; 15]	0.0978 (0.0616)	-0.152*** (0.0660)	0.00269 (0.0868)	13.59*** (0.0485)	134 702	6.161	0.000115
[15, 1; 18]	0.0157 (0.0749)	-0.164*** (0.0838)	-0.0553 (0.106)	16.44*** (0.0923)	121 196	5.120	0.000102
[18, 1; 21]	-0.0951 (0.108)	-0.0927 (0.123)	-0.122 (0.153)	19.47*** (0.0866)	78 006	2.000	0.0000385
[21, 1; 24]	0.0421 (0.193)	-0.287 (0.227)	0.159 (0.273)	22.27*** (0.160)	33 014	1.031	0.0000280
[24, 1; 27]	-0.130 (0.291)	0.374 (0.342)	-0.424 (0.411)	25.49*** (0.242)	17 286	1.338	0.0000587
[27, 1; 30]	-0.641 (0.367)	0.0389 (0.673)	0.148 (0.802)	28.66*** (0.476)	5 746	0.729	-0.000142
[30, 1; 33]	-0.237 (0.094)	-0.306 (0.788)	-0.163 (0.982)	31.31*** (0.522)	3 780	0.373	-0.000498
[33, 7; 40, 8]	-1.732 (1.869)	-0.681 (2.268)	2.844 (2.996)	37.15*** (1.561)	460	0.376	-0.000409
By deviation from gated community consumption							
[-36, 7; -20]	-0.0739 (0.0961)	0.0788 (0.110)	-0.0441 (0.139)	14.40*** (0.0778)	21 438	0.899	-0.0000142
[-19, 9; -15]	-0.119 (0.130)	1.025*** (0.149)	-0.0830 (0.184)	6.907*** (0.103)	11 380	47.12	0.0120
[-14, 9; -11]	0.172* (0.0883)	1.457*** (0.100)	-0.179 (0.126)	5.854*** (0.0708)	25 740	160.9	0.0183
[-10, 9; -10]	0.116 (0.137)	1.691*** (0.179)	0.141 (0.223)	4.838*** (0.126)	8 352	94.15	0.0324
[-9, 9; -9]	-0.102 (0.0949)	0.150 (0.108)	-0.00331 (0.134)	13.59*** (0.0761)	21 914	2.548	0.000212
[-8, 9; -8]	-0.636 (0.092)	2.657*** (0.460)	0.0811 (0.368)	4.485*** (0.325)	1 558	35.06	0.0016
[-7, 9; -7]	-0.00447 (0.0986)	0.255** (0.112)	0.114 (0.140)	12.53*** (0.0794)	21 834	8.549	0.00104
[-6, 9; -6]	-0.0504 (0.0953)	0.374*** (0.101)	0.0520 (0.135)	11.49*** (0.0770)	21 164	13.56	0.00178
[-5, 9; -5]	0.00382 (0.0986)	0.508*** (0.123)	0.00817 (0.139)	10.65*** (0.0760)	19 920	20.10	0.00287
[-4, 9; -4]	0.0925 (0.0997)	0.609*** (0.114)	-0.0279 (0.141)	9.724*** (0.0804)	19 046	26.20	0.00395
[-3, 9; -3]	0.0152 (0.104)	0.669*** (0.119)	0.0166 (0.141)	12.53*** (0.0884)	17 458	31.29	0.00518
[-2, 9; -2]	0.0341 (0.111)	0.850*** (0.125)	-0.0592 (0.156)	8.180*** (0.0884)	15 290	38.95	0.00739
[-1, 9; -1]	-0.0168 (0.119)	0.982*** (0.134)	0.00569 (0.168)	7.505*** (0.0949)	13 532	49.58	0.0107
[-0, 9; 0]	-0.181* (0.104)	0.0450 (0.119)	-0.0901 (0.147)	15.43*** (0.0838)	18 806	3.288	0.000364
[0, 1; 1]	-0.0858 (0.104)	0.0161 (0.147)	-0.198* (0.118)	16.68*** (0.0833)	19 508	2.758	0.000270
[1, 1; 2]	-0.0448 (0.141)	-0.284 (0.256)	-0.988*** (0.206)	26.49*** (0.146)	7 948	31.82	0.0115
[2, 1; 3]	-0.118 (0.202)	-0.126 (0.285)	-1.135*** (0.230)	27.58*** (0.183)	7 306	27.36	0.0107
[3, 1; 4]	-0.0857 (0.126)	-1.611*** (0.144)	0.0127 (0.179)	30.32*** (0.102)	20 146	117.5	0.0170
[4, 1; 5]	-0.132 (0.08)	-0.280*** (0.124)	0.0539 (0.153)	17.78*** (0.0874)	18 340	4.396	0.000555
[5, 1; 6]	0.0844 (0.168)	-2.161*** (0.180)	0.0215 (0.238)	35.27*** (0.134)	13 578	118.0	0.0252
[6, 1; 7]	0.0445 (0.261)	-2.378*** (0.298)	-0.623* (0.309)	40.78*** (0.210)	6 400	84.70	0.0378
[7, 1; 8]	-0.0125 (0.113)	-0.413*** (0.129)	-0.0218 (0.139)	18.65*** (0.0913)	16 980	10.72	0.00171
[8, 1; 9]	-0.0494 (0.129)	-5.022*** (0.469)	0.125 (0.606)	52.40*** (0.346)	6 150	97.44	0.0449
[9, 1; 10]	-0.0665 (0.120)	-0.461*** (0.196)	-0.102 (0.169)	19.90*** (0.095)	15 926	15.04	0.00264
[10, 1; 11]	-0.167 (0.125)	-0.513*** (0.144)	-0.0266 (0.177)	20.94*** (0.102)	14 472	14.72	0.00284
[11, 1; 15]	-0.131 (0.135)	-0.590*** (0.153)	-0.155 (0.191)	22.09*** (0.109)	13 048	20.99	0.00457
[15, 1; 20]	0.171 (0.148)	-0.697*** (0.169)	-0.0325 (0.209)	22.99*** (0.119)	11 746	17.99	0.00432
[20, 1; 25]	0.00360 (0.156)	-1.112*** (0.178)	0.203 (0.229)	24.26*** (0.126)	10 368	29.51	0.00818
[25, 1; 83]	0.188 (0.170)	-0.909*** (0.192)	-0.0872 (0.240)	25.34*** (0.136)	9 192	23.99	0.00745

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 7: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 1. Message: all.

	Treat (=I) (a)	Post (=I) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	-0.0996 (0.0641)	-1.001*** (0.0730)	-0.0356 (0.0066)	24.72*** (0.0516)	191 110	189.5	0.00295
By socio-economic strata							
Stratum 1	-0.0209 (0.157)	-0.894*** (0.174)	0.165 (0.222)	19.11*** (0.123)	10 846	18.27	0.00475
Stratum 2	-0.366*** (0.107)	-1.097*** (0.126)	0.0504 (0.152)	20.35*** (0.0890)	30 392	82.98	0.00803
Stratum 3	0.0882 (0.111)	-0.924*** (0.120)	-0.0950 (0.186)	23.10*** (0.0849)	42 780	54.31	0.00372
Stratum 4	-0.255*** (0.104)	-1.103*** (0.120)	-0.00185 (0.146)	26.07*** (0.0850)	72 110	90.44	0.00371
Stratum 5	0.294 (0.208)	-0.896*** (0.239)	-0.844** (0.422)	28.81*** (0.169)	25 270	16.35	0.00182
Stratum 6	-0.215 (0.137)	-0.0738 (0.294)	-0.925** (0.380)	31.72*** (0.209)	9 712	9.667	0.00267
By consumption range (m^3)							
[1, 9]	-0.0891 (0.258)	-0.114 (0.310)	-0.303 (0.365)	8.102*** (0.219)	632	2.188	0.00562
[10, 12]	0.0867 (0.133)	-0.176 (0.156)	-0.0647 (0.188)	11.28*** (0.110)	3 022	2.260	0.00125
[13, 15]	-0.0176 (0.0587)	-0.249*** (0.0655)	-0.0193 (0.0802)	14.24*** (0.0463)	16 858	16.16	0.00269
[16, 18]	-0.0229 (0.0468)	-0.427*** (0.0533)	0.00223 (0.0602)	17.06*** (0.0377)	29 956	60.71	0.00594
[19, 21]	-0.0195 (0.0494)	-0.635*** (0.0550)	0.0468 (0.0698)	20.01*** (0.0395)	32 922	109.0	0.00975
[22, 24]	0.00957 (0.0603)	-0.728*** (0.0686)	-0.0743 (0.0853)	22.95*** (0.0485)	28 650	120.8	0.01124
[25, 27]	0.0142 (0.0726)	-0.0899 (0.103)	-0.970*** (0.0826)	25.93*** (0.0584)	22 822	146.6	0.0188
[28, 30]	0.00900 (0.0936)	0.0447 (0.132)	-1.304*** (0.107)	28.94*** (0.0754)	16 602	135.9	0.0238
[31, 33]	0.000341 (0.118)	-0.177 (0.166)	-1.326*** (0.134)	31.92*** (0.0950)	12 052	111.1	0.0267
[34, 100]	-0.107 (0.168)	-0.107 (0.237)	-2.598*** (0.191)	41.67*** (0.135)	27 594	185.5	0.0197
By gated-community's average consumption							
[3,2; 9]	-0.621* (0.338)	-0.748* (0.418)	0.00434 (0.506)	12.94*** (0.286)	2 108	5.340	0.00614
[9,1; 12]	0.197 (0.169)	-0.424** (0.206)	-0.130 (0.239)	16.83*** (0.145)	12 744	8.672	0.00180
[12,1; 15]	-0.0140 (0.0778)	-0.900*** (0.0881)	-0.0120 (0.110)	20.24*** (0.0623)	60 016	98.82	0.00487
[15,1; 18]	-0.0747 (0.0946)	-1.065*** (0.106)	-0.0375 (0.134)	24.30*** (0.0749)	53 808	94.98	0.00521
[18,1; 21]	-0.0336 (0.133)	-0.960*** (0.150)	-0.169 (0.188)	28.31*** (0.106)	35 096	47.34	0.00395
[21,1; 24]	-0.162 (0.233)	-1.511*** (0.274)	0.192 (0.300)	32.38*** (0.103)	14 944	27.34	0.00526
[24,1; 27]	-0.486 (0.346)	-0.784* (0.408)	-0.550 (0.409)	36.45*** (0.289)	7 826	12.54	0.00441
[27,1; 30]	-0.616 (0.673)	-1.577** (0.800)	0.400 (0.952)	40.41*** (0.506)	2 646	3.291	0.00259
[30,1; 33]	-0.589 (0.846)	-2.321** (0.904)	0.319 (1.196)	44.25*** (0.639)	1 714	4.544	0.00617
[33,7; 40,8]	-1.141 (2.328)	-3.451 (2.552)	4.243 (3.575)	51.24*** (1.809)	208	0.743	-0.00374
By deviation from gated community consumption							
[0,1; 1]	-0.0858 (0.104)	0.0161 (0.147)	-0.198* (0.118)	16.68*** (0.0833)	19 508	2.758	0.000270
[1,1; 2]	-0.0448 (0.181)	-0.284 (0.256)	-0.988*** (0.206)	26.49*** (0.146)	7 948	31.82	0.0115
[2,1; 3]	-0.118 (0.202)	-0.126 (0.285)	-1.135*** (0.230)	27.58*** (0.103)	7 308	27.36	0.0107
[3,1; 4]	-0.0857 (0.126)	-1.611*** (0.144)	0.0127 (0.179)	30.32*** (0.102)	20 146	117.5	0.0170
[4,1; 5]	-0.132 (0.108)	-0.280** (0.124)	0.0539 (0.183)	17.78*** (0.0874)	18 340	4.396	0.000555
[5,1; 6]	0.0844 (0.168)	-2.161*** (0.190)	0.0215 (0.238)	35.27*** (0.134)	13 578	118.0	0.0252
[6,1; 7]	0.0445 (0.261)	-2.378*** (0.298)	-0.623* (0.369)	40.78*** (0.210)	6 400	84.70	0.0378
[7,1; 8]	-0.0125 (0.113)	-0.413*** (0.129)	-0.0218 (0.159)	18.65*** (0.0913)	16 980	10.72	0.00171
[8,1; 9]	-0.0494 (0.429)	-5.022*** (0.489)	0.125 (0.606)	48.65*** (0.346)	6 400	97.44	0.0449
[9,1; 10]	-0.0665 (0.120)	-0.461*** (0.136)	-0.102 (0.169)	52.40*** (0.102)	15 926	15.04	0.00264
[10,1; 11]	-0.167 (0.125)	-0.513*** (0.144)	-0.0266 (0.177)	19.90*** (0.0905)	14 472	14.72	0.00284
[11,1; 15]	-0.131 (0.135)	-0.590*** (0.153)	-0.155 (0.191)	20.94*** (0.102)	13 048	20.99	0.00457
[15,1; 20]	0.171 (0.148)	-0.697*** (0.169)	-0.0325 (0.209)	22.99*** (0.119)	11 746	17.99	0.00432
[20,1; 25]	0.00360 (0.156)	-1.112*** (0.178)	0.203 (0.220)	24.26*** (0.126)	10 368	29.51	0.00818
[25,1; 83]	0.188 (0.170)	-0.909*** (0.192)	-0.0872 (0.240)	25.34*** (0.136)	9 192	23.99	0.00745

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 8: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 1. Message: Warning.

	Tratamiento (=I) (a)	Tiempo (=I) (b)	Tratamiento*Tiempo (c)	Constante (d)	N (e)	F (f)	R2 Ajust. (g)
Todos	0.0178 (0.0038)	0.618*** (0.0584)	-0.0201 (0.0477)	10.39*** (0.0272)	237 492	234.2	0.00294
Por nivel socioeconómico							
Estrato 1	0.000762 (0.101)	0.342*** (0.112)	0.141 (0.143)	7.929*** (0.0790)	12 770	13.17	0.00285
Estrato 2	-0.152** (0.0628)	0.345*** (0.0734)	0.000264 (0.0887)	9.061*** (0.0519)	36 436	27.31	0.00216
Estrato 3	0.136** (0.0683)	0.531*** (0.0633)	-0.0640 (0.0824)	9.501*** (0.0447)	54 060	51.63	0.00280
Estrato 4	-0.0917* (0.0549)	0.596*** (0.0637)	0.0313 (0.0777)	10.90*** (0.0460)	90 088	97.06	0.00319
Estrato 5	0.0606 (0.114)	0.948*** (0.131)	-0.0892 (0.161)	12.26*** (0.0924)	31 546	45.37	0.00420
Estrato 6	-0.251 (0.203)	1.338*** (0.223)	-0.212 (0.288)	12.93*** (0.159)	12 592	27.04	0.00617
Por rangos de consumo (m^3)							
[1, 9]	0.0152 (0.0297)	-0.575 (0.519)	0.000445 (0.0421)	5.981*** (0.0240)	106 270	689.2	0.0191
[10, 12]	-0.00255 (0.0319)	-0.536 (0.872)	-0.0419 (0.0451)	11.00*** (0.0266)	55 398	119.6	0.00638
[13, 15]	-0.00900 (0.0410)	0.317*** (0.0460)	-0.0209 (0.0580)	13.88*** (0.0329)	40 488	39.98	0.00288
[16, 18]	0.0375 (0.0674)	0.331*** (0.0766)	-0.0428 (0.0953)	16.82*** (0.0542)	20 740	14.85	0.00200
[19, 21]	0.0294 (0.115)	0.163 (0.133)	0.157 (0.163)	19.73*** (0.0943)	8 902	4.993	0.00134
[22, 24]	0.0199 (0.203)	0.902*** (0.233)	-0.587** (0.287)	22.81*** (0.165)	3 752	7.385	0.00508
[25, 27]	-0.130 (0.387)	0.963*** (0.423)	0.913*** (0.0339)	25.78*** (0.299)	1 280	3.141	0.00500
[28, 30]	0.0674 (0.046)	0.673 (0.647)	0.435*** (0.0361)	28.83*** (0.458)	504	0.449	-0.00330
[31, 33]	0.0673 (0.1510)	-1.000 (2.136)	4.444** (2.136)	31.64*** (1.013)	120	3.271	0.0542
[34, 100]	-0.636 (2.852)	-3.182 (2.618)	8.182* (4.034)	35.64*** (1.851)	38	2.355	0.0990
Por consumo promedio del conjunto							
[3.2; 9]	-0.219 (0.142)	0.231 (0.167)	0.335* (0.201)	4.594*** (0.118)	3 004	9.219	0.00814
[9.1; 12]	0.198** (0.0827)	0.642*** (0.0999)	-0.0428 (0.117)	6.281*** (0.0706)	16 556	49.05	0.00863
[12.1; 15]	0.109*** (0.0414)	0.443*** (0.0468)	0.0234 (0.0586)	8.303*** (0.0331)	74 686	94.12	0.00373
[15.1; 18]	0.0109 (0.0509)	0.549*** (0.0568)	-0.0606 (0.0729)	10.22*** (0.0402)	67 388	72.02	0.00315
[18.1; 21]	-0.0416 (0.0759)	0.786*** (0.0859)	-0.0946 (0.107)	12.18*** (0.0608)	42 910	67.34	0.00462
[21.1; 24]	0.0952 (0.138)	0.716*** (0.162)	0.145 (0.196)	13.99*** (0.115)	18 070	28.04	0.00447
[24.1; 27]	0.0422 (0.215)	1.323*** (0.253)	-0.307 (0.304)	16.50*** (0.179)	9 460	21.38	0.00642
[27.1; 30]	-0.830** (0.417)	1.402*** (0.494)	-0.0444 (0.589)	18.75*** (0.349)	3 100	11.44	0.0100
[30.1; 33]	-0.339 (0.523)	1.331** (0.554)	-0.507 (0.740)	20.79*** (0.392)	2 066	3.719	0.00393
[33.7; 40.8]	-2.299 (1.730)	1.597 (1.744)	1.700 (2.447)	25.56*** (1.233)	252	1.976	0.0115
Por desviación del consumo del conjunto							
[-36.7; -20]	-0.0739 (0.0961)	0.0788 (0.110)	-0.0441 (0.136)	14.40*** (0.0778)	21 438	0.899	-0.0000142
[-19.9; -15]	-0.119 (0.130)	1.057*** (0.149)	-0.0330 (0.184)	6.907*** (0.105)	11 380	47.12	0.0120
[-14.9; -11]	0.172* (0.0883)	1.425*** (0.109)	-0.179 (0.125)	5.854*** (0.0708)	25 740	160.9	0.0183
[-10.9; -10]	0.116 (0.157)	1.691*** (0.179)	0.141 (0.223)	4.838*** (0.126)	8 352	94.15	0.0324
[-9.9; -9]	-0.102 (0.0949)	0.150 (0.108)	-0.00331 (0.134)	13.59*** (0.0761)	21 914	2.548	0.000212
[-8.9; -8]	-0.636 (0.402)	2.657*** (0.460)	0.0811 (0.368)	4.485*** (0.325)	1 558	35.06	0.0616
[-7.9; -7]	-0.00447 (0.0986)	0.255** (0.112)	0.114 (0.140)	12.53*** (0.0794)	21 834	8.549	0.00104
[-6.9; -6]	-0.0504 (0.0959)	0.374*** (0.109)	0.0520 (0.135)	11.49*** (0.0770)	21 164	13.56	0.00178
[-5.9; -5]	0.00382 (0.0980)	0.508*** (0.114)	0.00817 (0.139)	10.65*** (0.0790)	19 920	20.10	0.00287
[-4.9; -4]	0.0925 (0.0997)	0.609*** (0.114)	-0.0279 (0.141)	9.724*** (0.0804)	19 046	26.20	0.00395
[-3.9; -3]	0.0152 (0.104)	0.669*** (0.119)	0.0166 (0.147)	9.033*** (0.0838)	17 458	31.29	0.00518
[-2.9; -2]	0.0341 (0.111)	0.850*** (0.125)	-0.0592 (0.156)	8.180*** (0.0884)	15 290	38.95	0.00739
[-1.9; -1]	-0.0168 (0.119)	0.982*** (0.134)	0.00569 (0.168)	7.505*** (0.0949)	13 532	49.58	0.0107
[-0.9; 0]	-0.181* (0.104)	0.0450 (0.119)	-0.0901 (0.147)	15.43*** (0.0838)	18 866	3.288	0.000364
[25.1; 83]	0.188 (0.170)	-0.909*** (0.192)	-0.0872 (0.240)	25.34*** (0.136)	9 192	23.99	0.00745

Error estándar en paréntesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 9: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 1. Message: Congratulations.

B Regressions Scenario 2

	Treat (=1)	Post (=1)	Treat*Post	Constant	N	F	Adjusted R2
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(f)	(f)	(g)
All	0.0448 (0.0465)	-0.120*** (0.0375)	-0.00644 (0.0688)	16.74*** (0.0245)	428 602	5.749	0.0000332
By socio-economic strata							
Stratum 1	-0.166 (0.142)	-0.155 (0.111)	0.0737 (0.201)	13.11*** (0.0787)	23 616	1.277	0.0000351
Stratum 2	-0.0899 (0.0885)	-0.295*** (0.0953)	-0.000131 (0.118)	14.06*** (0.0480)	60 828	9.959	0.000402
Stratum 3	0.0528 (0.0888)	-0.163** (0.0849)	0.0189 (0.127)	15.56*** (0.0447)	96 840	2.802	0.0000558
Stratum 4	0.0491 (0.0785)	-0.157** (0.0623)	0.0251 (0.107)	17.52*** (0.0441)	162 198	3.300	0.0000425
Stratum 5	0.0718 (0.150)	0.105 (0.123)	-0.0659 (0.213)	19.70*** (0.0864)	56 816	0.265	-0.0000388
Stratum 6	-0.0397 (0.275)	0.311 (0.217)	-0.176 (0.389)	20.79*** (0.153)	22 304	0.889	-0.0000149
By consumption range (m^2)							
[1, 9]	-0.0137 (0.0302)	0.895*** (0.0244)	0.0330 (0.047)	6.007*** (0.0172)	106 902	683.7	0.0188
[10, 12]	-0.00802 (0.0318)	0.375*** (0.0254)	0.00218 (0.046)	11.02*** (0.0186)	58 420	106.8	0.00540
[13, 15]	-0.00725 (0.0341)	0.130*** (0.0275)	0.0203 (0.0482)	13.98*** (0.0184)	57 346	12.38	0.000595
[16, 18]	0.00288 (0.0388)	-0.123*** (0.0323)	-0.0153 (0.0503)	16.90*** (0.0228)	50 696	7.831	0.000404
[19, 21]	-0.00838 (0.0469)	-0.430*** (0.0378)	0.0326 (0.0603)	19.95*** (0.0207)	41 824	60.91	0.00428
[22, 24]	0.00252 (0.0599)	-0.629*** (0.0478)	0.00820 (0.0847)	22.94*** (0.0388)	32 402	84.06	0.00763
[25, 27]	-0.00793 (0.0727)	-0.933*** (0.0391)	-0.0294 (0.103)	25.93*** (0.0188)	24 102	126.8	0.0154
[28, 30]	0.0125 (0.0950)	-1.195*** (0.0760)	-0.0975 (0.134)	28.94*** (0.0528)	17 106	127.8	0.0218
[31, 33]	-0.0275 (0.119)	-1.392*** (0.0970)	-0.0745 (0.168)	31.91*** (0.0686)	12 172	106.8	0.0254
[34, 100]	-0.0239 (0.170)	-2.628*** (0.118)	-0.109 (0.241)	41.60*** (0.0977)	27 632	184.8	0.0196
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	-0.438* (0.226)	-0.106 (0.187)	0.204 (0.319)	7.922*** (0.133)	5 112	1.634	0.0000372
[9, 1; 12]	0.124 (0.116)	0.151 (0.0999)	-0.0870 (0.165)	10.97*** (0.0797)	29 300	1.163	0.0000167
[12, 1; 15]	0.0765 (0.0675)	-0.158*** (0.0260)	0.0236 (0.0847)	13.63*** (0.035)	134 702	5.742	0.000106
[15, 1; 18]	0.0420 (0.0788)	-0.210*** (0.0619)	0.0356 (0.111)	16.44*** (0.0348)	121 196	5.437	0.000110
[18, 1; 21]	0.0318 (0.111)	-0.0447 (0.0883)	-0.114 (0.158)	19.40*** (0.0841)	78 006	0.614	-0.0000149
[21, 1; 24]	0.111 (0.189)	-0.195 (0.146)	0.0513 (0.267)	22.26*** (0.111)	33 014	1.017	0.00000153
[24, 1; 27]	0.0922 (0.282)	0.142 (0.235)	-0.178 (0.398)	25.36*** (0.166)	17 286	0.126	-0.000152
[27, 1; 30]	-0.349 (0.541)	0.165 (0.454)	-0.0612 (0.706)	28.33*** (0.321)	5 746	0.381	-0.000323
[30, 1; 33]	0.609 (0.761)	-0.279 (0.576)	-0.414 (1.077)	31.00*** (0.497)	3 780	0.458	-0.000430
[33, 7; 40, 8]	-1.283 (2.221)	0.0407 (3.463)	2.873 (3.665)	36.59*** (1.266)	460	0.300	-0.000459
By deviation from the gated community's consumption							
[-36, 7; -20]	-0.105 (0.0974)	0.0582 (0.0786)	-0.0252 (0.138)	14.39*** (0.058)	21 438	1.190	0.0000265
[-19, 9; -15]	-0.129 (0.132)	1.044*** (0.108)	-0.0259 (0.186)	6.873*** (0.0760)	11 380	47.18	0.0120
[-14, 9; -11]	0.0491 (0.0912)	1.349*** (0.0723)	-0.124 (0.129)	5.950*** (0.0511)	25 740	160.0	0.0182
[-10, 9; -10]	-0.0988 (0.161)	1.732*** (0.130)	0.154 (0.227)	4.945*** (0.020)	8 352	93.21	0.0321
[-9, 9; -9]	-0.6586 (0.0973)	0.108 (0.0782)	0.122 (0.136)	13.54*** (0.053)	21 914	2.014	0.000139
[-8, 9; -8]	-0.535 (0.408)	2.620*** (0.128)	0.276 (0.377)	4.241*** (0.23)	1 558	34.25	0.0602
[-7, 9; -7]	0.000455 (0.101)	0.275*** (0.0807)	0.170 (0.149)	12.53*** (0.0570)	21 834	9.077	0.00111
[-6, 9; -6]	-0.1172* (0.0968)	0.398*** (0.0783)	0.0312 (0.137)	11.51*** (0.0533)	21 164	15.23	0.00201
[-5, 9; -5]	-0.0224 (0.0984)	0.563*** (0.0807)	-0.153 (0.141)	10.66*** (0.0571)	19 920	21.15	0.00303
[-4, 9; -4]	0.0582 (0.102)	0.547*** (0.0816)	0.136 (0.144)	9.765*** (0.0577)	19 046	27.11	0.00410
[-3, 9; -3]	0.0238 (0.107)	0.681*** (0.0831)	-0.00319 (0.131)	9.035*** (0.0601)	17 458	31.29	0.00518
[-2, 9; -2]	-0.0126 (0.114)	0.828*** (0.0913)	-0.0496 (0.161)	8.206*** (0.046)	15 290	39.01	0.00740
[-1, 9; -1]	-0.0551 (0.122)	0.965*** (0.0883)	0.0651 (0.175)	7.512*** (0.0605)	13 532	49.64	0.0107
[-0, 9; 0]	0.0682 (0.106)	-0.0167 (0.0857)	0.00990 (0.130)	15.29*** (0.0606)	18 866	0.331	-0.000106
[0, 1; 1]	-0.0130 (0.106)	-0.244*** (0.0855)	0.175 (0.150)	16.63*** (0.0605)	19 508	3.161	0.000332
[1, 1; 2]	0.0730 (0.184)	-1.149*** (0.149)	-0.0703 (0.269)	26.44*** (0.105)	7 948	30.74	0.0111
[2, 1; 3]	-0.0610 (0.204)	-1.126*** (0.146)	-0.276 (0.280)	27.52*** (0.117)	7 308	27.70	0.0108
[3, 1; 4]	0.0971 (0.129)	-1.686*** (0.104)	0.261 (0.183)	30.23*** (0.0733)	20 146	120.0	0.0174
[4, 1; 5]	-0.1157 (0.110)	-2.233*** (0.0891)	-0.0363 (0.156)	17.75*** (0.0680)	18 340	5.391	0.000718
[5, 1; 6]	0.0127 (0.172)	-2.056*** (0.139)	-0.276 (0.249)	35.32*** (0.0885)	13 578	118.6	0.0253
[6, 1; 7]	0.299 (0.265)	-2.599*** (0.210)	-0.553 (0.374)	40.71*** (0.153)	6 400	83.75	0.0373
[7, 1; 8]	0.0625 (0.113)	-0.448*** (0.0922)	0.0621 (0.161)	18.62*** (0.062)	16 980	11.10	0.00178
[8, 1; 9]	-0.0920 (0.436)	-5.012*** (0.352)	0.217 (0.617)	52.40*** (0.240)	6 150	97.47	0.0450
[9, 1; 10]	0.0187 (0.121)	-0.516*** (0.0983)	-0.0345 (0.172)	19.85*** (0.0685)	15 926	14.29	0.00250
[10, 1; 11]	-0.104 (0.126)	-0.491*** (0.103)	-0.121 (0.178)	20.87*** (0.0790)	14 472	14.62	0.00282
[11, 1; 15]	-0.146 (0.138)	-0.658*** (0.111)	-0.100 (0.194)	22.05*** (0.0783)	13 048	20.62	0.00449
[15, 1; 20]	0.0101 (0.160)	-0.736*** (0.122)	0.0534 (0.213)	23.07*** (0.0662)	11 746	17.76	0.00426
[20, 1; 25]	0.0210 (0.160)	-0.972*** (0.137)	-0.0264 (0.227)	24.26*** (0.0600)	10 368	28.92	0.00802
[25, 1; 83]	0.0853 (0.173)	-0.920*** (0.141)	-0.138 (0.245)	25.43*** (0.094)	9 192	23.56	0.00731

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 10: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 2. Message: all.

	Tratamiento (=1) (a)	Tiempo (=1) (b)	Tiempo*(=1) (c)	Tiempo*Tiempo (d)	N (e)	F (f)	R2 Ajust. (g)
Todos	-0.00703 (0.0023)	-1.018*** (0.0237)	-0.0202 (0.0022)	24.65*** (0.0373)	191 110	187.2	0.00291
Por nivel socioeconómico							
Estrato 1	-0.142 (0.166)	-0.806*** (0.129)	0.0455 (0.234)	19.14*** (0.0015)	10 846	18.34	0.00477
Estrato 2	-0.165 (0.105)	-1.052*** (0.086)	-0.0297 (0.148)	20.16*** (0.0614)	30 392	78.16	0.00756
Estrato 3	-0.0330 (0.119)	-1.004*** (0.097)	0.0810 (0.169)	23.16*** (0.0648)	42 780	54.17	0.00371
Estrato 4	-0.0575 (0.102)	-1.100*** (0.084)	-0.0124 (0.145)	25.91*** (0.0597)	72 110	86.61	0.00355
Estrato 5	0.114 (0.209)	-0.895*** (0.171)	-0.147 (0.295)	28.96*** (0.121)	25 270	15.42	0.00171
Estrato 6	-0.110 (0.398)	-0.941*** (0.315)	-0.117 (0.363)	31.18*** (0.223)	9 712	4.808	0.00118
Por rangos de consumo (m^3)							
[1, 9]	-0.128 (0.240)	-0.537*** (0.205)	0.563* (0.239)	8.085*** (0.145)	632	2.572	0.00742
[10, 12]	0.0586 (0.131)	-0.122 (0.108)	-0.290 (0.185)	11.32*** (0.076)	3 022	3.222	0.00220
[13, 15]	-0.0120 (0.068)	-0.283*** (0.046)	0.0621 (0.080)	14.23*** (0.0328)	16 858	16.26	0.00271
[16, 18]	-0.0140 (0.047)	-0.423*** (0.036)	-0.00787 (0.072)	17.05*** (0.0273)	29 956	60.67	0.00594
[19, 21]	-0.0139 (0.007)	-0.611*** (0.007)	0.0162 (0.071)	20.00*** (0.0288)	32 922	108.9	0.00973
[22, 24]	0.00351 (0.020)	-0.787*** (0.044)	0.0356 (0.087)	22.90*** (0.0390)	28 650	120.5	0.0124
[25, 27]	0.00207 (0.073)	-1.024*** (0.059)	-0.0117 (0.104)	25.94*** (0.042)	22 822	146.2	0.0187
[28, 30]	0.00808 (0.055)	-1.260*** (0.076)	-0.0468 (0.135)	28.94*** (0.054)	16 602	135.8	0.0238
[31, 33]	0.0261 (0.119)	-1.407*** (0.097)	-0.102 (0.168)	31.91*** (0.068)	12 052	110.5	0.0265
[34, 100]	-0.0342 (0.170)	-2.631*** (0.138)	-0.111 (0.241)	41.61*** (0.097)	27 594	185.1	0.0196
Por consumo promedio del conjunto							
[3,2; 9]	-0.401 (0.354)	-0.767*** (0.287)	0.0675 (0.401)	12.64*** (0.203)	2 108	4.063	0.00434
[9,1; 12]	0.0204 (0.133)	-0.481*** (0.133)	-0.104 (0.217)	16.97*** (0.098)	12 744	8.272	0.00171
[12,1; 15]	0.0513 (0.078)	-0.895*** (0.064)	-0.0381 (0.113)	20.22*** (0.043)	60 016	98.92	0.00487
[15,1; 18]	-0.0503 (0.080)	-1.109*** (0.078)	0.0650 (0.139)	24.27*** (0.053)	53 808	94.40	0.00518
[18,1; 21]	0.0623 (0.137)	-1.022*** (0.110)	-0.143 (0.194)	28.27*** (0.075)	35 096	46.72	0.00389
[21,1; 24]	-0.133 (0.230)	-1.380*** (0.189)	0.00433 (0.200)	32.31*** (0.134)	14 944	27.40	0.00527
[24,1; 27]	-0.503 (0.334)	-1.105*** (0.280)	-0.173 (0.472)	36.29*** (0.198)	7 826	11.03	0.00383
[27,1; 30]	-0.245 (0.642)	-1.417*** (0.538)	0.348 (0.908)	40.06*** (0.380)	2 646	3.034	0.00230
[30,1; 33]	0.462 (0.914)	-2.120*** (0.708)	-0.0629 (1.292)	43.77*** (0.500)	1 714	4.497	0.00609
[33,7; 40,8]	-2.371 (2.795)	-2.378 (2.123)	3.778 (3.052)	51.34*** (1.501)	208	4.497	-0.00734
By deviation from gated community's consumption							
[0,1; 1]	-0.0130 (0.106)	-0.244*** (0.085)	0.175 (0.150)	16.63*** (0.060)	19 508	3.161	0.000332
[1,1; 2]	0.0730 (0.184)	-1.149*** (0.149)	-0.0703 (0.260)	26.44*** (0.106)	7 948	30.74	0.0111
[2,1; 3]	-0.0610 (0.204)	-1.126*** (0.166)	-0.276 (0.289)	27.52*** (0.117)	7 308	27.70	0.0108
[3,1; 4]	0.0971 (0.129)	-1.686*** (0.104)	0.261 (0.183)	30.23*** (0.073)	20 146	120.0	0.0174
[4,1; 5]	-0.155 (0.110)	-0.233*** (0.080)	-0.0363 (0.156)	17.75*** (0.0630)	18 340	5.391	0.000718
[5,1; 6]	0.0127 (0.172)	-2.056*** (0.139)	-0.276 (0.243)	35.32*** (0.098)	13 578	118.6	0.0253
[6,1; 7]	0.299 (0.205)	-2.599*** (0.216)	-0.553 (0.374)	40.71*** (0.153)	6 400	83.75	0.0373
[7,1; 8]	0.0525 (0.113)	-0.448*** (0.092)	0.0621 (0.161)	18.62*** (0.062)	16 980	11.10	0.00178
[8,1; 9]	-0.0920 (0.496)	-5.012*** (0.352)	0.217 (0.617)	52.40*** (0.249)	6 150	97.47	0.0450
[9,1; 10]	0.0187 (0.121)	-0.516*** (0.098)	-0.0345 (0.172)	19.85*** (0.069)	15 926	14.29	0.00250
[10,1; 11]	-0.104 (0.120)	-0.491*** (0.103)	-0.121 (0.178)	20.87*** (0.072)	14 472	14.62	0.00282
[11,1; 15]	-0.146 (0.138)	-0.658*** (0.111)	-0.100 (0.194)	23.07*** (0.078)	13 048	20.62	0.00449
[15,1; 20]	0.101 (0.150)	-0.736*** (0.122)	0.0534 (0.213)	22.07*** (0.086)	11 746	17.76	0.00426
[20,1; 25]	0.0210 (0.109)	-0.972*** (0.127)	-0.0264 (0.227)	24.26*** (0.090)	10 368	28.92	0.00802
[25,1; 83]	0.0853 (0.173)	-0.920*** (0.141)	-0.138 (0.245)	25.43*** (0.094)	9 192	23.56	0.00731

Error estándar en paréntesis. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Table 11: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 2. Message: Warning.

	Treat (=1) (a)	Post (=1) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	-0.0118 (0.0345)	0.599*** (0.0277)	0.0160 (0.0488)	10.41*** (0.0196)	237 492	234.1	0.00294
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.107 (0.107)	0.400*** (0.0840)	0.0889 (0.151)	7.963*** (0.0594)	12 770	12.86	0.00278
Stratum 2	-0.0650 (0.0614)	0.335*** (0.0509)	0.0293 (0.0868)	8.979*** (0.0360)	36 436	23.90	0.00188
Stratum 3	0.0758 (0.0630)	0.501*** (0.0483)	-0.0255 (0.0890)	9.559*** (0.0341)	54 060	50.00	0.00271
Stratum 4	0.00525 (0.0546)	0.594*** (0.0447)	0.0702 (0.0772)	10.84*** (0.0316)	90 088	96.36	0.00317
Stratum 5	-0.188 (0.115)	0.899*** (0.0831)	-0.0298 (0.102)	12.36*** (0.0658)	31 546	47.36	0.00439
Stratum 6	-0.176 (0.124)	1.270*** (0.168)	-0.199 (0.303)	12.83*** (0.119)	12 592	26.04	0.00593
By consumption range (m^3)							
[1, 9]	-0.0151 (0.0303)	0.903*** (0.0245)	0.0310 (0.0429)	5.996*** (0.0173)	106 270	689.2	0.0191
[10, 12]	-0.0135 (0.0328)	0.401*** (0.0261)	0.0217 (0.0464)	11.00*** (0.0185)	55 398	119.1	0.00635
[13, 15]	-0.0106 (0.0420)	0.300*** (0.0337)	0.0112 (0.0694)	13.88*** (0.0238)	40 488	39.81	0.00287
[16, 18]	0.0256 (0.0860)	0.309*** (0.0555)	-0.0199 (0.0971)	16.83*** (0.0292)	20 740	14.79	0.00199
[19, 21]	0.0234 (0.115)	0.251*** (0.0939)	0.0513 (0.162)	19.74*** (0.0664)	8 902	4.251	0.00109
[22, 24]	-0.00235 (0.205)	0.585*** (0.165)	-0.224 (0.290)	22.82*** (0.116)	3 752	5.171	0.00332
[25, 27]	-0.146 (0.301)	0.778*** (0.307)	-0.544 (0.511)	25.75*** (0.217)	1 280	3.146	0.00501
[28, 30]	0.155 (0.702)	0.745 (0.501)	-1.448 (0.993)	28.83*** (0.354)	504	1.400	0.00238
[31, 33]	0.0621 (1.788)	-0.109 (1.222)	4.752* (2.529)	31.65*** (0.864)	120	2.707	0.0413
[34, 100]	-1.444 (6.171)	-0.778 (2.002)	19.78** (8.726)	35.44*** (1.416)	38	2.967	0.138
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	-0.0587 (0.137)	0.377*** (0.116)	0.236 (0.194)	4.464*** (0.0820)	3 004	8.815	0.00775
[9, 1; 12]	0.0732 (0.0764)	0.633*** (0.0653)	-0.0599 (0.108)	6.399*** (0.0462)	16 556	46.28	0.00814
[12, 1; 15]	0.00719 (0.0427)	0.431*** (0.0341)	0.0838 (0.0604)	8.371*** (0.0241)	74 686	89.88	0.00356
[15, 1; 18]	0.0193 (0.0533)	0.504*** (0.0420)	0.0230 (0.0753)	10.22*** (0.0297)	67 388	71.94	0.00315
[18, 1; 21]	0.0245 (0.0780)	0.755*** (0.0625)	-0.0922 (0.110)	12.14*** (0.0442)	42 910	66.44	0.00455
[21, 1; 24]	-0.0319 (0.136)	0.770*** (0.112)	0.133 (0.192)	14.07*** (0.0790)	18 070	27.07	0.00431
[24, 1; 27]	0.262 (0.209)	1.160*** (0.173)	-0.144 (0.206)	16.44*** (0.123)	9 460	21.49	0.00646
[27, 1; 30]	-0.375 (0.398)	1.518*** (0.335)	-0.418 (0.504)	18.30*** (0.237)	3 100	10.25	0.00888
[30, 1; 33]	-0.585 (0.581)	1.195*** (0.431)	-0.540 (0.822)	20.76*** (0.305)	2 066	4.297	0.00477
[33, 7; 40, 8]	-4.781** (2.002)	1.867 (1.375)	2.668 (2.916)	25.46*** (0.972)	252	3.514	0.02925
By deviation from the gated community's consumption							
[-36, 7; -20]	-0.105 (0.0974)	0.0582 (0.0789)	-0.0252 (0.138)	14.39*** (0.0558)	21 438	1.190	0.0000265
[-19, 9; -15]	-0.129 (0.132)	1.044*** (0.108)	-0.0259 (0.186)	6.873*** (0.0760)	11 380	47.18	0.0120
[-14, 9; -11]	0.0491 (0.0912)	1.349*** (0.0723)	-0.124 (0.129)	5.950*** (0.0511)	25 740	160.0	0.0182
[-10, 9; -10]	-0.0988 (0.161)	1.732*** (0.130)	0.154 (0.227)	4.945*** (0.0920)	8 352	93.21	0.0321
[-9, 9; -9]	-0.0586 (0.0973)	0.108 (0.0782)	0.122 (0.138)	13.54*** (0.0533)	21 914	2.014	0.000139
[-8, 9; -8]	0.000455 (0.101)	2.620*** (0.328)	0.276 (0.577)	4.241*** (0.232)	1 558	34.25	0.0602
[-7, 9; -7]	-0.172* (0.0968)	0.275*** (0.0807)	0.170 (0.143)	12.53*** (0.0570)	21 834	9.077	0.00111
[-6, 9; -6]	-0.0224 (0.0994)	0.398*** (0.0783)	0.0312 (0.137)	11.51*** (0.0653)	21 164	15.23	0.00201
[-5, 9; -5]	0.0582 (0.102)	0.547*** (0.0816)	-0.153 (0.141)	10.66*** (0.0571)	19 920	21.15	0.00303
[-4, 9; -4]	0.0238 (0.107)	0.681*** (0.0821)	0.136 (0.144)	9.765*** (0.0577)	19 046	27.11	0.00410
[-3, 9; -3]	-0.0126 (0.114)	0.828*** (0.0913)	-0.00319 (0.151)	8.035*** (0.0601)	17 458	31.29	0.00518
[-2, 9; -2]	-0.0551 (0.122)	0.965*** (0.0883)	-0.0496 (0.173)	8.206*** (0.0646)	15 290	39.01	0.00740
[-1, 9; -1]	0.0682 (0.106)	-0.0167 (0.0837)	0.00990 (0.150)	15.29*** (0.0606)	18 866	0.331	-0.000106

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 12: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 1. Message: Congratulations.

C Regressions Scenario 3

	Treat (=1) (a)	Post (=1) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	0.0602 (0.0541)	-0.1399** (0.0542)	0.0132 (0.0765)	16.73*** (0.0383)	428 602	5.041	0.0000436
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.290* (0.167)	-0.0740 (0.167)	-0.00733 (0.286)	13.24*** (0.15)	14 478	2.327	0.000275
Stratum 2	0.00896 (0.0953)	-0.284*** (0.0956)	-0.0109 (0.135)	13.96*** (0.0676)	45 886	6.130	0.000335
Stratum 3	-0.0251 (0.107)	-0.235** (0.107)	0.0910 (0.131)	15.64*** (0.0757)	57 056	2.254	0.0000654
Stratum 4	0.155* (0.0876)	-0.156* (0.0877)	0.0245 (0.124)	17.41*** (0.0620)	109 226	2.452	0.0000893
Stratum 5	-0.00708 (0.173)	0.0827 (0.173)	-0.0733 (0.245)	19.78*** (0.123)	37 460	0.121	-0.0000704
Stratum 6	0.282 (0.324)	0.205 (0.323)	-0.0697 (0.458)	20.47*** (0.230)	13 726	0.581	-0.0000916
By consumption range (m³)							
[1, 9]	-0.0316 (0.0353)	0.881*** (0.0354)	0.0471 (0.0499)	6.025*** (0.0250)	69 342	438.2	0.0186
[10, 12]	-0.0142 (0.0369)	0.340*** (0.0367)	0.0370 (0.0524)	11.02*** (0.0259)	37 694	63.10	0.00492
[13, 15]	-0.00662 (0.0398)	0.102** (0.0388)	0.0493 (0.0563)	13.98*** (0.0284)	37 360	7.078	0.000488
[16, 18]	0.00225 (0.047)	-0.130*** (0.0471)	-0.00808 (0.0641)	16.96*** (0.0333)	32 864	5.500	0.000411
[19, 21]	-0.000817 (0.0544)	-0.379*** (0.0545)	-0.0184 (0.0769)	19.94*** (0.0386)	27 072	34.00	0.000364
[22, 24]	-0.00328 (0.0666)	-0.717*** (0.0666)	0.0954 (0.0984)	22.95*** (0.0488)	20 982	62.32	0.00869
[25, 27]	-0.0150 (0.0851)	-1.000*** (0.0860)	0.0382 (0.120)	25.94*** (0.0668)	15 612	88.56	0.0165
[28, 30]	0.00859 (0.109)	-1.157*** (0.109)	-0.136 (0.154)	28.94*** (0.0769)	11 054	84.36	0.0221
[31, 33]	0.0353 (0.142)	-1.471*** (0.144)	0.00431 (0.201)	31.90*** (0.102)	7 918	71.53	0.0260
[34, 100]	0.0378 (0.199)	-2.659*** (0.201)	-0.0782 (0.282)	41.54*** (0.142)	17 934	122.4	0.0199
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	-0.309 (0.115)	-0.0423 (0.255)	0.140 (0.360)	7.793*** (0.180)	3 510	0.647	-0.000302
[9, 1; 12]	-0.0211 (0.200)	0.124 (0.131)	-0.0597 (0.184)	11.11*** (0.0925)	21 492	0.481	-0.0000725
[12, 1; 15]	0.0335 (0.0751)	-0.165** (0.0752)	0.0302 (0.105)	13.68*** (0.0517)	86 174	3.111	0.0000735
[15, 1; 18]	0.0460 (0.0917)	-0.265*** (0.0918)	0.0905 (0.130)	16.43*** (0.0649)	75 710	4.646	0.000144
[18, 1; 21]	0.112 (0.130)	-0.0917 (0.130)	-0.0669 (0.184)	19.32*** (0.0919)	49 862	0.911	-0.0000536
[21, 1; 24]	0.119 (0.240)	-0.112 (0.240)	-0.0321 (0.306)	22.25*** (0.153)	22 678	0.390	-0.0000807
[24, 1; 27]	0.201 (0.249)	-0.0639 (0.250)	0.0279 (0.455)	25.26*** (0.226)	11 984	0.318	-0.000171
[27, 1; 30]	-0.0741 (0.620)	0.270 (0.620)	-0.167 (0.877)	28.05*** (0.438)	4 050	0.116	-0.000656
[30, 1; 33]	1.089 (0.923)	-0.239 (0.927)	-0.455 (1.303)	30.52*** (0.656)	2 138	0.796	-0.000286
[33, 7; 40, 8]	-0.215 (3.232)	1.424 (3.218)	1.490 (4.570)	35.53*** (2.273)	234	0.352	-0.00842
By deviation from the gated community's consumption							
[-36, 7; -20]	-0.0908 (0.115)	0.0363 (0.115)	-0.00336 (0.162)	14.37*** (0.0813)	14 026	0.494	-0.000108
[-19, 9; -15]	-0.0912 (0.154)	1.030*** (0.156)	-0.0119 (0.217)	6.835*** (0.110)	7 426	29.84	0.0115
[-14, 9; -11]	-0.0548 (0.094)	1.266*** (0.100)	-0.0414 (0.148)	6.054*** (0.0730)	16 536	95.31	0.0168
[-10, 9; -10]	-0.220 (0.189)	1.777*** (0.191)	0.109 (0.267)	5.067*** (0.132)	5370	63.37	0.0337
[-9, 9; -9]	-0.00660 (0.114)	0.0621 (0.115)	0.168 (0.162)	13.49*** (0.0810)	14 094	1.755	0.000161
[-8, 9; -8]	-0.282 (0.453)	2.583*** (0.453)	0.314 (0.644)	3.988*** (0.320)	1 022	24.23	0.0639
[-7, 9; -7]	0.00370 (0.118)	0.297** (0.117)	0.148 (0.167)	12.52*** (0.0827)	14 138	7.069	0.00129
[-6, 9; -6]	-0.197* (0.115)	0.423*** (0.116)	0.00585 (0.161)	11.54*** (0.0868)	13 796	11.24	0.00222
[-5, 9; -5]	-0.0332 (0.117)	0.624*** (0.117)	-0.214 (0.165)	10.67*** (0.0841)	12 944	14.56	0.00313
[-4, 9; -4]	0.0142 (0.119)	0.481*** (0.119)	0.202 (0.169)	9.810*** (0.0839)	12 394	16.92	0.00384
[-3, 9; -3]	0.0214 (0.123)	0.694*** (0.122)	-0.0157 (0.174)	9.037*** (0.0863)	11 328	20.67	0.00518
[-2, 9; -2]	-0.0421 (0.123)	0.803*** (0.123)	-0.0247 (0.187)	8.236*** (0.0930)	9 772	23.97	0.00700
[-1, 9; -1]	-0.0634 (0.142)	0.945*** (0.143)	0.0853 (0.201)	7.521*** (0.101)	8 622	32.30	0.0108
[-0, 9; 0]	0.221* (0.123)	-0.0840 (0.124)	0.0772 (0.174)	15.14*** (0.0876)	12 240	3.109	0.000517
[0, 1; 1]	0.0440 (0.125)	-0.296** (0.126)	0.227 (0.177)	16.58*** (0.0890)	12 574	3.008	0.000479
[1, 1; 2]	0.131 (0.215)	-1.325*** (0.216)	0.106 (0.304)	26.38*** (0.153)	5 162	23.92	0.0131
[2, 1; 3]	0.000784 (0.231)	-1.116*** (0.233)	-0.286 (0.327)	27.46*** (0.165)	4 762	20.34	0.0120
[3, 1; 4]	0.191 (0.150)	-1.768*** (0.149)	0.342 (0.212)	30.14*** (0.106)	13 044	80.48	0.0180
[4, 1; 5]	-0.117 (0.129)	-0.182 (0.129)	-0.0869 (0.182)	17.71*** (0.0912)	11 932	3.167	0.000545
[5, 1; 6]	-0.0453 (0.200)	-1.934*** (0.203)	-0.398 (0.284)	35.38*** (0.144)	8 670	77.91	0.0259
[6, 1; 7]	0.378 (0.310)	-2.844*** (0.313)	-0.308 (0.438)	40.63*** (0.222)	4154	63.24	0.0430
[7, 1; 8]	0.0793 (0.133)	-0.484*** (0.133)	0.0985 (0.188)	18.60*** (0.0943)	11 170	7.835	0.00183
[8, 1; 9]	-0.0897 (0.140)	-5.000*** (0.141)	0.206 (0.727)	52.40*** (0.364)	4 000	60.53	0.0427
[9, 1; 10]	0.0720 (0.142)	-0.576*** (0.143)	0.0251 (0.201)	19.80*** (0.101)	10 368	10.69	0.00279
[10, 1; 11]	-0.0255 (0.148)	-0.467*** (0.148)	-0.145 (0.209)	20.79*** (0.105)	9 558	9.375	0.00262
[11, 1; 15]	-0.105 (0.159)	-0.731*** (0.159)	-0.0271 (0.225)	22.01*** (0.112)	8 458	15.02	0.00495
[15, 1; 20]	0.0168 (0.179)	-0.778*** (0.180)	0.0952 (0.254)	23.15*** (0.128)	7 646	11.15	0.00397
[20, 1; 25]	0.0256 (0.187)	-0.824*** (0.184)	-0.175 (0.264)	24.25*** (0.130)	6 722	16.02	0.00666
[25, 1; 83]	-0.0209 (0.207)	-0.932*** (0.209)	-0.126 (0.292)	25.54*** (0.148)	5 904	15.69	0.00741

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 13: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 3. Message: all.

	Treat (=I) (a)	Post (=I) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	0.0608 (0.0760)	-1.036*** (0.0792)	-0.00223 (0.107)	24.59*** (0.0589)	124 124	124.5	0.00298
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.179 (0.193)	-0.698*** (0.192)	-0.0624 (0.272)	19.18*** (0.136)	6 698	10.35	0.00417
Stratum 2	0.0121 (0.120)	-1.011*** (0.120)	-0.0704 (0.160)	19.98*** (0.0848)	20 928	51.04	0.00712
Stratum 3	-0.119 (0.143)	-1.116*** (0.143)	0.192 (0.202)	23.25*** (0.101)	25 216	34.36	0.00395
Stratum 4	0.0909 (0.119)	-1.097*** (0.120)	-0.0153 (0.168)	25.77*** (0.0845)	48 622	57.74	0.00349
Stratum 5	-0.0504 (0.240)	-0.895*** (0.242)	-0.147 (0.339)	29.13*** (0.171)	16 652	11.14	0.00182
Stratum 6	0.562 (0.472)	-1.061** (0.475)	0.00283 (0.667)	30.51*** (0.336)	6 008	4.316	0.00165
By consumption range (mp³)							
[1, 9]	-0.114 (0.250)	-0.867*** (0.251)	0.893** (0.354)	8.071*** (0.178)	456	5.151	0.0266
[10, 12]	0.0225 (0.150)	-0.0728 (0.150)	-0.339 (0.213)	11.35*** (0.106)	2 068	3.198	0.00318
[13, 15]	-0.00423 (0.0660)	-0.316*** (0.0660)	0.0956 (0.0946)	14.22*** (0.0475)	11 238	11.35	0.00276
[16, 18]	-0.00274 (0.0562)	-0.419*** (0.0567)	-0.0123 (0.0794)	17.04*** (0.0401)	19 446	38.22	0.00571
[19, 21]	-0.00482 (0.0583)	-0.583*** (0.0585)	-0.0117 (0.0825)	19.99*** (0.0414)	21 104	67.90	0.00942
[22, 24]	-0.00197 (0.0727)	-0.851*** (0.0721)	0.0998 (0.103)	22.97*** (0.0510)	18 492	81.77	0.0129
[25, 27]	-0.00737 (0.0866)	-1.084*** (0.0875)	0.0486 (0.122)	25.95*** (0.0617)	14 762	99.96	0.0197
[28, 30]	0.00460 (0.110)	-1.212*** (0.109)	-0.0942 (0.155)	28.94*** (0.0774)	10 776	87.89	0.0236
[31, 33]	0.0354 (0.141)	-1.496*** (0.143)	-0.0136 (0.200)	31.90*** (0.101)	7 864	75.24	0.0275
[34, 100]	0.0294 (0.199)	-2.668*** (0.201)	-0.0740 (0.282)	41.55*** (0.142)	17 918	123.0	0.0200
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3; 2; 9]	-0.141 (0.393)	-0.784*** (0.385)	0.0846 (0.555)	12.38*** (0.272)	1 442	2.444	0.00300
[9; 1; 12]	-0.0777 (0.169)	-0.522*** (0.170)	-0.0631 (0.239)	17.06*** (0.120)	9 422	7.445	0.00205
[12; 1; 15]	0.0800 (0.0931)	-0.890*** (0.0934)	-0.0433 (0.132)	20.19*** (0.0660)	38 508	64.32	0.00491
[15; 1; 18]	-0.0132 (0.110)	-1.162*** (0.116)	0.118 (0.164)	24.23*** (0.0819)	33 700	60.90	0.00530
[18; 1; 21]	0.110 (0.150)	-1.093*** (0.160)	-0.0714 (0.225)	28.22*** (0.113)	22 370	33.70	0.00437
[21; 1; 24]	-0.0727 (0.261)	-1.260*** (0.263)	-0.115 (0.369)	32.25*** (0.186)	10 290	17.21	0.00470
[24; 1; 27]	-0.360 (0.379)	-1.390*** (0.381)	0.112 (0.506)	36.15*** (0.270)	5 438	8.700	0.00423
[27; 1; 30]	0.0427 (0.743)	-1.285* (0.741)	0.216 (1.050)	39.77*** (0.524)	1 870	1.717	0.00115
[30; 1; 33]	1.216 (1.126)	-1.802 (1.154)	-0.381 (1.092)	43.02*** (0.816)	1 978	2.687	0.00515
[33; 7; 40.8]	-2.599 (3.682)	2.24e-15 (3.917)	1.400 (0.207)	51.57*** (2.770)	106	0.233	-0.0224
By deviation from gated community's consumption							
[0; 1; 1]	0.0440 (0.126)	-0.296** (0.126)	0.227 (0.177)	16.58*** (0.0890)	12 574	3.008	0.000479
[1; 1; 2]	0.131 (0.215)	-1.325*** (0.216)	0.106 (0.304)	26.38*** (0.153)	5 162	23.92	0.0131
[2; 1; 3]	0.000784 (0.231)	-1.116*** (0.233)	-0.286 (0.327)	27.46*** (0.165)	4 762	20.34	0.0120
[3; 1; 4]	0.191 (0.150)	-1.768*** (0.149)	0.342 (0.212)	30.14*** (0.106)	13 044	80.48	0.0180
[4; 1; 5]	-0.117 (0.129)	-0.182 (0.129)	-0.0869 (0.182)	17.71*** (0.0912)	11 932	3.167	0.000545
[5; 1; 6]	-0.0453 (0.209)	-1.934*** (0.209)	-0.398 (0.283)	35.38*** (0.144)	8 670	77.91	0.0259
[6; 1; 7]	0.378 (0.310)	-2.844*** (0.313)	-0.308 (0.438)	40.63*** (0.222)	4154	63.24	0.0430
[7; 1; 8]	0.0793 (0.139)	-0.484*** (0.139)	0.0985 (0.188)	18.60*** (0.0943)	11 170	7.835	0.00183
[8; 1; 9]	-0.0897 (0.514)	-5.000*** (0.514)	0.206 (0.727)	52.40*** (0.364)	4 000	60.53	0.0427
[9; 1; 10]	0.0720 (0.142)	-0.576*** (0.143)	0.0251 (0.201)	19.80*** (0.101)	10 368	10.69	0.00279
[10; 1; 11]	-0.0255 (0.148)	-0.467*** (0.148)	-0.145 (0.209)	20.79*** (0.105)	9 558	9.375	0.00262
[11; 1; 15]	-0.105 (0.159)	-0.731*** (0.159)	-0.0271 (0.225)	22.01*** (0.112)	8 458	15.02	0.00495
[15; 1; 20]	0.0168 (0.179)	-0.778*** (0.180)	0.0952 (0.254)	23.15*** (0.128)	7 646	11.15	0.00397
[20; 1; 25]	0.0256 (0.187)	-0.824*** (0.184)	-0.175 (0.264)	24.25*** (0.130)	6 722	16.02	0.00666
[25; 1; 83]	-0.0209 (0.207)	-0.932*** (0.209)	-0.126 (0.292)	25.54*** (0.148)	5 904	15.69	0.00741

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 14: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 3. Message: Warning.

	Treat (=1) (a)	Post (=1) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	-0.0285 ^(0.0461)	0.580 ^{***} ^(0.0401)	0.0358 ^(0.0658)	10.42 ^{***} ^(0.0284)	153 708	148.0	0.00286
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.151 ^(0.127)	0.477 ^{***} ^(0.128)	0.0128 ^(0.180)	8.006 ^{***} ^(0.0605)	7 780	10.48	0.00364
Stratum 2	0.0102 ^(0.0699)	0.326 ^{***} ^(0.0700)	0.0385 ^(0.0089)	8.904 ^{***} ^(0.0495)	24 958	16.46	0.00185
Stratum 3	-0.00464 ^(0.0798)	0.459 ^{***} ^(0.0757)	0.0165 ^(0.107)	9.640 ^{***} ^(0.0535)	31 840	25.31	0.00229
Stratum 4	0.0669 ^(0.0632)	0.592 ^{***} ^(0.0631)	0.0726 ^(0.0894)	10.77 ^{***} ^(0.0447)	60 604	67.70	0.00329
Stratum 5	-0.293 ^{**} ^(0.131)	0.848 ^{***} ^(0.130)	0.0206 ^(0.185)	12.47 ^{***} ^(0.0222)	20 808	31.88	0.00443
Stratum 6	-0.0494 ^(0.254)	1.182 ^{***} ^(0.254)	-0.112 ^(0.359)	12.70 ^{***} ^(0.180)	7 718	13.30	0.00476
By consumption range (m^3)							
[1, 9]	-0.0312 ^(0.0355)	0.893 ^{***} ^(0.0355)	0.0416 ^(0.0602)	6.012 ^{***} ^(0.0251)	68 886	442.4	0.0189
[10, 12]	-0.0164 ^(0.0380)	0.364 ^{***} ^(0.0378)	0.0589 ^(0.0537)	11.00 ^{***} ^(0.0267)	35 626	71.76	0.00592
[13, 15]	-0.00797 ^(0.0401)	0.281 ^{***} ^(0.0400)	0.0299 ^(0.0694)	13.87 ^{***} ^(0.0347)	26 122	24.30	0.00267
[16, 18]	0.00811 ^(0.0801)	0.286 ^{***} ^(0.0805)	0.00345 ^(0.113)	16.85 ^{***} ^(0.0569)	13 418	8.611	0.00170
[19, 21]	0.0117 ^(0.135)	0.338 ^{**} ^(0.135)	-0.0355 ^(0.190)	19.75 ^{***} ^(0.0652)	5 968	3.787	0.00140
[22, 24]	-0.0161 ^(0.226)	0.272 ^(0.223)	0.0885 ^(0.320)	22.84 ^{***} ^(0.158)	2 490	1.331	0.000399
[25, 27]	-0.110 ^(0.423)	0.572 ^(0.441)	-0.338 ^(0.598)	25.71 ^{***} ^(0.312)	850	0.962	-0.000136
[28, 30]	0.158 ^(0.830)	0.853 ^(0.797)	-1.556 ^(1.174)	28.83 ^{***} ^(0.563)	278	0.977	-0.000255
[31, 33]	0.0220 ^(2.035)	2.154 ^(2.084)	2.489 ^(3.727)	31.69 ^{***} ^(1.898)	54	1.443	0.0245
[34, 100]	-1.143 ^(0.277)	3.000 ^(4.639)	16.00 ^(13.12)	35.14 ^{***} ^(3.280)	16	1.303	0.0571
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	0.0629 ^(0.165)	0.515 ^{***} ^(0.168)	0.0981 ^(0.233)	4.343 ^{***} ^(0.119)	2 068	8.219	0.0104
[9, 1; 12]	-0.0143 ^(0.0866)	0.626 ^{***} ^(0.0868)	-0.0530 ^(0.123)	6.486 ^{***} ^(0.0614)	12 070	32.10	0.00767
[12, 1; 15]	-0.0693 ^(0.0469)	0.418 ^{***} ^(0.0499)	0.0972 ^(0.0705)	8.447 ^{***} ^(0.0353)	47 666	59.12	0.00364
[15, 1; 18]	0.0183 ^(0.0625)	0.450 ^{***} ^(0.0624)	0.0772 ^(0.0884)	10.22 ^{***} ^(0.0441)	42 010	41.59	0.00289
[18, 1; 21]	0.0633 ^(0.0066)	0.720 ^{***} ^(0.0077)	-0.0574 ^(0.128)	12.10 ^{***} ^(0.0641)	27 492	39.04	0.00413
[21, 1; 24]	-0.101 ^(0.150)	0.820 ^{***} ^(0.155)	0.0829 ^(0.220)	14.14 ^{***} ^(0.109)	12 388	20.59	0.00472
[24, 1; 27]	0.316 ^(0.239)	1.016 ^{***} ^(0.238)	0.000232 ^(0.398)	16.39 ^{***} ^(0.100)	6 546	13.20	0.00556
[27, 1; 30]	0.00795 ^(0.446)	1.617 ^{***} ^(0.440)	-0.516 ^(0.630)	17.91 ^{***} ^(0.316)	2 180	6.627	0.00769
[30, 1; 33]	-0.540 ^(0.094)	0.986 ^(0.687)	-0.332 ^(0.981)	20.72 ^{***} ^(0.486)	1 160	1.669	0.00173
[33, 7; 40.8]	-4.599 [*] ^(2.055)	2.333 ^(2.882)	2.202 ^(3.752)	25.28 ^{***} ^(1.795)	128	2.319	0.0302
By deviation from the gated community's consumption							
[-36, 7; -20]	-0.0908 ^(0.115)	0.0363 ^(0.115)	-0.00336 ^(0.102)	14.37 ^{***} ^(0.0813)	14 026	0.494	-0.000108
[-19, 9; -15]	-0.0912 ^(0.154)	1.030 ^{***} ^(0.156)	-0.0119 ^(0.217)	6.835 ^{***} ^(0.110)	7 426	29.84	0.0115
[-14, 9; -11]	-0.0548 ^(0.104)	1.266 ^{***} ^(0.103)	-0.0414 ^(0.148)	6.054 ^{***} ^(0.0730)	16 536	95.31	0.0168
[-10, 9; -10]	-0.220 ^(0.189)	1.777 ^{***} ^(0.191)	0.109 ^(0.267)	5.067 ^{***} ^(0.135)	5370	63.37	0.0337
[-9, 9; -9]	-0.00660 ^(0.114)	0.0621 ^(0.115)	0.168 ^(0.102)	13.49 ^{***} ^(0.0810)	14 094	1.755	0.000161
[-8, 9; -8]	-0.282 ^(0.455)	2.583 ^{***} ^(0.452)	0.314 ^(0.644)	3.988 ^{***} ^(0.320)	1 022	24.23	0.0639
[-7, 9; -7]	0.00370 ^(0.118)	0.297 ^{**} ^(0.117)	0.148 ^(0.167)	12.52 ^{***} ^(0.0527)	14 138	7.069	0.00129
[-6, 9; -6]	-0.197 [*] ^(0.114)	0.423 ^{***} ^(0.114)	0.148 ^(0.167)	11.54 ^{***} ^(0.0808)	13 796	11.24	0.00222
[-5, 9; -5]	-0.0332 ^(0.117)	0.624 ^{***} ^(0.117)	0.00585 ^(0.161)	10.67 ^{***} ^(0.0531)	12 944	14.56	0.00313
[-4, 9; -4]	0.0142 ^(0.110)	0.481 ^{***} ^(0.119)	0.202 ^(0.169)	9.810 ^{***} ^(0.0839)	12 394	16.92	0.00384
[-3, 9; -3]	0.0214 ^(0.125)	0.694 ^{***} ^(0.122)	-0.0157 ^(0.174)	9.037 ^{***} ^(0.0863)	11 328	20.67	0.00518
[-2, 9; -2]	-0.0421 ^(0.132)	0.803 ^{***} ^(0.133)	-0.0247 ^(0.187)	8.236 ^{***} ^(0.0899)	9 772	23.97	0.00700
[-1, 9; -1]	-0.0634 ^(0.142)	0.945 ^{***} ^(0.143)	0.0853 ^(0.201)	7.521 ^{***} ^(0.101)	8 622	32.30	0.0108
[-0, 9; 0]	0.221 [*] ^(0.128)	-0.0840 ^(0.124)	0.0772 ^(0.174)	15.14 ^{***} ^(0.0876)	12 240	3.109	0.000517

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table 15: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 3. Message: Congratulations.

D Regressions Scenario 4

	Treat (=1)	Post (=1)	Treat*Post	Constant	N	F	Adjusted R2
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
All	0.0307 (0.0533)	-0.102* (0.0520)	-0.0245 (0.0751)	16.76*** (0.0368)	290 038	3.166	0.0000224
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.0610 (0.158)	-0.219 (0.148)	0.138 (0.223)	13.01*** (0.105)	16 396	0.807	-0.0000353
Stratum 2	-0.198** (0.0982)	-0.306*** (0.100)	0.0117 (0.139)	14.16*** (0.0711)	43 960	8.804	0.000532
Stratum 3	0.109 (0.0987)	-0.112 (0.0902)	-0.0328 (0.140)	15.50*** (0.0838)	68 290	1.703	0.0000309
Stratum 4	-0.0604 (0.0880)	-0.157* (0.0887)	0.0258 (0.124)	17.62*** (0.0927)	107 700	1.999	0.0000278
Stratum 5	0.149 (0.173)	0.127 (0.172)	-0.118 (0.245)	19.63*** (0.122)	38 192	0.362	-0.0000502
Stratum 6	-0.295 (0.309)	0.396 (0.292)	-0.261 (0.437)	21.04*** (0.206)	15 500	1.938	0.000181
By consumption range (m³)							
[1, 9]	0.00279 (0.0345)	0.908*** (0.0338)	-0.0290 (0.0488)	5.991*** (0.0239)	72 342	473.2	0.0192
[10, 12]	-0.00235 (0.0369)	0.407*** (0.0350)	-0.0208 (0.0608)	11.01*** (0.0247)	39 378	80.17	0.00600
[13, 15]	-0.00783 (0.0387)	0.158*** (0.0380)	-0.00678 (0.0547)	13.98*** (0.0269)	38 630	10.70	0.000753
[16, 18]	0.00314 (0.0457)	-0.116*** (0.0449)	-0.0219 (0.0640)	16.96*** (0.0318)	34 500	5.194	0.000365
[19, 21]	-0.0153 (0.0534)	-0.477*** (0.0523)	0.0792 (0.0755)	19.95*** (0.0370)	28 362	45.52	0.00469
[22, 24]	0.00793 (0.0664)	-0.548*** (0.0666)	-0.0733 (0.0967)	22.94*** (0.0471)	21 734	48.84	0.00656
[25, 27]	-0.00155 (0.0828)	-0.872*** (0.0815)	-0.0902 (0.117)	25.92*** (0.0370)	16 456	81.96	0.0145
[28, 30]	0.0161 (0.107)	-1.230*** (0.104)	-0.0624 (0.131)	28.93*** (0.0735)	11 538	93.32	0.0234
[31, 33]	0.0205 (0.134)	-1.321*** (0.133)	-0.146 (0.190)	31.91*** (0.0938)	8 308	71.96	0.0250
[34, 100]	-0.0802 (0.194)	-2.599*** (0.191)	-0.138 (0.274)	41.65*** (0.133)	18 790	126.6	0.0197
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	-0.579** (0.268)	-0.176 (0.274)	0.274 (0.279)	8.062*** (0.184)	3 364	2.001	0.0000892
[9, 1; 12]	0.323** (0.142)	0.189 (0.153)	-0.124 (0.291)	10.77*** (0.108)	18 614	2.841	0.000297
[12, 1; 15]	0.115 (0.0714)	-0.152** (0.0693)	0.0178 (0.101)	13.59*** (0.0490)	91 732	4.718	0.000122
[15, 1; 18]	0.0387 (0.0882)	-0.164* (0.0841)	-0.0101 (0.125)	16.44*** (0.0594)	83 376	2.5706	0.0000565
[18, 1; 21]	-0.0392 (0.127)	-0.00327 (0.123)	-0.155 (0.179)	19.47*** (0.0869)	53 176	1.061	0.00000346
[21, 1; 24]	0.102 (0.331)	-0.287 (0.226)	0.143 (0.312)	22.27*** (0.160)	21 684	1.096	0.0000133
[24, 1; 27]	-0.0300 (0.331)	0.374 (0.341)	-0.410 (0.468)	25.49*** (0.241)	11 306	0.742	-0.0000684
[27, 1; 30]	-0.678 (0.643)	0.0389 (0.671)	0.0648 (0.910)	28.66*** (0.475)	3 720	0.682	-0.000257
[30, 1; 33]	0.301 (0.845)	-0.306 (0.744)	-0.387 (1.184)	31.31*** (0.326)	2 724	0.258	-0.000819
[33, 7; 40, 8]	-1.840 (2.650)	-0.681 (2.182)	3.595 (2.747)	37.15*** (1.543)	342	0.338	-0.00586
By deviation from the gated community's consumption							
[-36, 7; -20]	-0.119 (0.110)	0.0788 (0.109)	-0.0458 (0.156)	14.40*** (0.0770)	14 448	1.309	0.0000642
[-19, 9; -15]	-0.164 (0.148)	1.057*** (0.146)	-0.0388 (0.209)	6.907*** (0.104)	7 756	33.87	0.0126
[-14, 9; -11]	0.144 (0.104)	1.425*** (0.100)	-0.200 (0.140)	5.854*** (0.0708)	17 294	11.4	0.0188
[-10, 9; -10]	0.00835 (0.180)	1.691*** (0.180)	0.195 (0.249)	4.838*** (0.127)	5 722	63.60	0.0318
[-9, 9; -9]	-0.105 (0.110)	0.150 (0.107)	0.0804 (0.150)	13.59*** (0.0759)	14 888	2.262	0.000254
[-8, 9; -8]	-0.00258 (0.115)	2.657*** (0.069)	0.240 (0.273)	4.485*** (0.331)	1 040	23.97	0.0622
[-7, 9; -7]	-0.149 (0.109)	0.374*** (0.107)	0.0550 (0.154)	11.49*** (0.0759)	14 626	6.872	0.00120
[-6, 9; -6]	-0.0126 (0.112)	0.508*** (0.110)	-0.0973 (0.188)	10.65*** (0.0780)	14 282	9.870	0.00186
[-5, 9; -5]	0.0997 (0.116)	0.609*** (0.113)	0.0742 (0.184)	9.724*** (0.0822)	12 778	21.70	0.00484
[-4, 9; -4]	0.0261 (0.122)	0.669*** (0.119)	0.00859 (0.172)	9.033*** (0.0839)	11 678	20.49	0.00498
[-3, 9; -3]	0.0133 (0.130)	0.850*** (0.126)	-0.0714 (0.183)	8.180*** (0.0908)	10 450	26.57	0.00729
[-2, 9; -2]	-0.0480 (0.140)	0.982*** (0.136)	0.0476 (0.197)	7.505*** (0.0959)	9 294	34.71	0.0108
[-1, 9; -1]	-0.0717 (0.122)	0.0450 (0.119)	-0.0518 (0.172)	15.43*** (0.0844)	12 798	0.478	-0.000122
[0, 1; 1]	-0.0641 (0.120)	-0.198* (0.118)	0.128 (0.170)	16.68*** (0.0832)	13 294	1.050	0.0000113
[1, 1; 2]	0.0200 (0.210)	-0.988*** (0.206)	-0.232 (0.296)	26.44*** (0.146)	5 390	18.72	0.00977
[2, 1; 3]	-0.118 (0.239)	-1.135*** (0.226)	-0.267 (0.308)	27.58*** (0.167)	4 962	19.69	0.0112
[3, 1; 4]	0.0104 (0.147)	-1.611*** (0.143)	0.185 (0.208)	30.32*** (0.101)	13 572	72.48	0.0156
[4, 1; 5]	-0.190 (0.125)	-0.280*** (0.123)	0.0107 (0.177)	17.78*** (0.0871)	12 408	4.651	0.000882
[5, 1; 6]	0.0624 (0.196)	-2.161*** (0.191)	-0.172 (0.276)	35.27*** (0.135)	9 368	87.37	0.0269
[6, 1; 7]	0.229 (0.305)	-2.378*** (0.301)	-0.774* (0.431)	40.78*** (0.213)	4 376	55.71	0.0362
[7, 1; 8]	0.0270 (0.130)	-0.413*** (0.128)	0.0272 (0.183)	18.65*** (0.0908)	11 418	6.420	0.00142
[8, 1; 9]	-0.0942 (0.403)	-5.022*** (0.484)	0.228 (0.697)	52.40*** (0.342)	4 152	66.38	0.0451
[9, 1; 10]	-0.0307 (0.130)	-0.461*** (0.137)	-0.0898 (0.197)	19.90*** (0.0908)	10 776	9.049	0.00224
[10, 1; 11]	-0.180 (0.144)	-0.513*** (0.143)	-0.0985 (0.204)	20.94*** (0.101)	9 720	11.91	0.00336
[11, 1; 15]	-0.184 (0.157)	-0.590*** (0.153)	-0.168 (0.222)	22.09*** (0.101)	8 816	14.37	0.00453
[15, 1; 20]	0.180 (0.171)	-0.697*** (0.168)	0.0147 (0.241)	22.99*** (0.119)	7 960	11.72	0.00402
[20, 1; 25]	0.0167 (0.180)	-1.112*** (0.175)	0.114 (0.254)	24.26*** (0.124)	6 920	23.37	0.00961
[25, 1; 83]	0.178 (0.193)	-0.909*** (0.189)	-0.149 (0.273)	25.34*** (0.133)	6312	17.57	0.00781

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 16: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 4. Message: all.

	Treat (=1) (a)	Post (=1) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	-0.0694 (0.0743)	-1.001*** (0.0790)	-0.0367 (0.105)	24.72*** (0.0516)	129 444	126.4	0.00290
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.111 (0.184)	-0.894*** (0.174)	0.134 (0.261)	19.11*** (0.123)	7 462	13.94	0.00518
Stratum 2	-0.360*** (0.123)	-1.097*** (0.126)	0.0153 (0.174)	20.35*** (0.0892)	19 960	57.91	0.00848
Stratum 3	0.0287 (0.131)	-0.924*** (0.130)	0.00108 (0.185)	23.10*** (0.0847)	30 194	34.10	0.00328
Stratum 4	-0.210* (0.118)	-1.103*** (0.120)	-0.00943 (0.167)	26.07*** (0.0846)	47 992	60.68	0.00372
Stratum 5	0.269 (0.241)	-0.896*** (0.240)	-0.146 (0.341)	28.81*** (0.170)	17 090	11.24	0.00179
Stratum 6	-0.648 (0.444)	-0.844*** (0.421)	-0.213 (0.628)	31.72*** (0.298)	6 746	4.992	0.00177
By consumption range (m^3)							
[1, 9]	-0.146 (0.307)	-0.114 (0.327)	0.140 (0.434)	8.102*** (0.231)	406	0.0840	-0.00683
[10, 12]	0.0981 (0.145)	-0.176 (0.147)	-0.236 (0.205)	11.28*** (0.104)	1 978	3.294	0.00347
[13, 15]	-0.0197 (0.0651)	-0.249*** (0.0651)	0.0286 (0.0921)	14.24*** (0.0460)	11 234	8.702	0.00205
[16, 18]	-0.0243 (0.0544)	-0.427*** (0.0535)	-0.00383 (0.0769)	17.06*** (0.0377)	20 398	41.75	0.00596
[19, 21]	-0.0219 (0.0578)	-0.635*** (0.0562)	0.0410 (0.0817)	20.01*** (0.0377)	22 438	76.10	0.00994
[22, 24]	0.00857 (0.0705)	-0.728*** (0.0685)	-0.0236 (0.0977)	22.95*** (0.0485)	19 262	73.51	0.0112
[25, 27]	0.0106 (0.0838)	-0.970*** (0.0823)	-0.0660 (0.119)	25.93*** (0.0582)	15 564	95.49	0.0179
[28, 30]	0.0113 (0.107)	-1.304*** (0.105)	-0.00265 (0.132)	28.94*** (0.0743)	11 184	98.74	0.0255
[31, 33]	0.0176 (0.134)	-1.326*** (0.133)	-0.183 (0.190)	31.92*** (0.0941)	8 214	74.56	0.0262
[34, 100]	-0.0923 (0.194)	-2.598*** (0.191)	-0.144 (0.274)	41.67*** (0.135)	18 766	126.7	0.0197
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3, 2; 9]	-0.694 (0.428)	-0.748* (0.432)	0.0483 (0.605)	12.94*** (0.305)	1 358	3.544	0.00559
[9, 1; 12]	0.158 (0.188)	-0.424** (0.204)	-0.161 (0.265)	16.83*** (0.144)	8 070	5.494	0.00167
[12, 1; 15]	0.0258 (0.0910)	-0.900*** (0.0886)	-0.0335 (0.120)	20.24*** (0.0626)	40 880	67.78	0.00488
[15, 1; 18]	-0.0813 (0.112)	-1.065*** (0.107)	0.0210 (0.158)	24.30*** (0.0755)	37 030	60.23	0.00478
[18, 1; 21]	0.0209 (0.150)	-0.960*** (0.151)	-0.205 (0.220)	28.31*** (0.107)	23 978	31.31	0.00378
[21, 1; 24]	-0.198 (0.262)	-1.511*** (0.260)	0.135 (0.371)	32.38*** (0.190)	9 868	20.39	0.00586
[24, 1; 27]	-0.664* (0.392)	-0.784* (0.406)	-0.494 (0.554)	36.45*** (0.287)	5 142	8.663	0.00445
[27, 1; 30]	-0.594 (0.753)	-1.577** (0.786)	0.509 (1.064)	40.41*** (0.456)	1 706	2.218	0.00214
[30, 1; 33]	-0.0126 (0.084)	-2.321*** (0.892)	0.138 (1.391)	44.25*** (0.631)	1 250	3.652	0.00633
[33, 7; 40, 8]	-2.269 (2.897)	-3.451 (2.493)	4.851 (4.097)	51.24*** (1.793)	162	0.702	-0.00558
By deviation from gated community's consumption							
[0, 1; 1]	-0.0641 (0.120)	-0.198* (0.118)	0.128 (0.170)	16.68*** (0.0832)	13 294	1.050	0.0000113
[1, 1; 2]	0.0200 (0.210)	-0.988*** (0.206)	-0.232 (0.296)	26.49*** (0.146)	5 390	18.72	0.00977
[2, 1; 3]	-0.118 (0.230)	-1.135*** (0.236)	-0.267 (0.338)	27.58*** (0.167)	4 962	19.69	0.0112
[3, 1; 4]	0.0104 (0.147)	-1.611*** (0.143)	0.185 (0.208)	30.32*** (0.101)	13 572	72.48	0.0156
[4, 1; 5]	-0.190 (0.125)	-0.280** (0.123)	0.0107 (0.177)	17.78*** (0.0871)	12 408	4.651	0.000882
[5, 1; 6]	0.0624 (0.196)	-2.161*** (0.191)	-0.172 (0.278)	35.27*** (0.135)	9 368	87.37	0.0269
[6, 1; 7]	0.229 (0.305)	-2.378*** (0.301)	-0.774* (0.431)	40.78*** (0.213)	4 376	55.71	0.0362
[7, 1; 8]	0.0270 (0.130)	-0.413*** (0.128)	0.0272 (0.183)	18.65*** (0.0908)	11 418	6.420	0.00142
[8, 1; 9]	-0.0942 (0.463)	-5.022*** (0.484)	0.228 (0.697)	52.40*** (0.342)	4 152	66.38	0.0451
[9, 1; 10]	-0.0307 (0.139)	-0.461*** (0.137)	-0.0898 (0.197)	19.90*** (0.0968)	10 776	9.049	0.00224
[10, 1; 11]	-0.180 (0.144)	-0.513*** (0.143)	-0.0985 (0.204)	20.94*** (0.101)	9 720	11.91	0.00336
[11, 1; 15]	-0.184 (0.157)	-0.590*** (0.153)	-0.168 (0.222)	22.09*** (0.101)	8 816	14.37	0.00453
[15, 1; 20]	0.180 (0.171)	-0.697*** (0.168)	0.0147 (0.241)	22.99*** (0.119)	7 960	11.72	0.00402
[20, 1; 25]	0.0167 (0.180)	-1.112*** (0.175)	0.114 (0.254)	24.26*** (0.124)	6 920	23.37	0.00961
[25, 1; 83]	0.178 (0.193)	-0.909*** (0.189)	-0.149 (0.273)	25.34*** (0.133)	6312	17.57	0.00781

Table 17: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 4. Message: Warning.

	Treat (=1) (a)	Post (=1) (b)	Treat*Post (c)	Constant (d)	N (e)	F (f)	Adjusted R2 (g)
All	-0.00349 (0.0593)	0.618*** (0.0884)	-0.00222 (0.0586)	10.39*** (0.0272)	160 594	164.4	0.00304
By socio-economic stratum							
Stratum 1	-0.0736 (0.118)	0.342*** (0.111)	0.147 (0.167)	7.929*** (0.0787)	8 934	8.241	0.00243
Stratum 2	-0.147** (0.0723)	0.345*** (0.0788)	0.0194 (0.102)	9.061*** (0.0622)	24 000	18.55	0.00219
Stratum 3	0.134* (0.0660)	0.531*** (0.0680)	-0.0557 (0.0976)	9.501*** (0.0446)	38 096	38.77	0.00297
Stratum 4	-0.0582 (0.0633)	0.596*** (0.0686)	0.0677 (0.0895)	10.90*** (0.0450)	59 708	66.57	0.00328
Stratum 5	-0.0865 (0.123)	0.948*** (0.132)	-0.0789 (0.188)	12.26*** (0.0931)	21 102	31.86	0.00437
Stratum 6	-0.276 (0.239)	1.338*** (0.222)	-0.268 (0.339)	12.93*** (0.159)	8 754	19.67	0.00636
By consumption range (m^3)							
[4, 9]	-0.000337 (0.0346)	0.913*** (0.0389)	0.0212 (0.0490)	5.981*** (0.0240)	71 936	475.1	0.0194
[10, 12]	-0.0108 (0.0370)	0.435*** (0.0359)	-0.0121 (0.0324)	11.00*** (0.0254)	37 400	90.04	0.00709
[13, 15]	-0.0130 (0.0475)	0.317*** (0.0463)	-0.00590 (0.0671)	13.88*** (0.0327)	27 396	29.32	0.00309
[16, 18]	0.0415 (0.0791)	0.331*** (0.0776)	-0.0411 (0.112)	16.82*** (0.0340)	14102	10.39	0.00199
[19, 21]	0.0352 (0.132)	0.163 (0.132)	0.139 (0.186)	19.73*** (0.0935)	5 924	2.703	0.000862
[22, 24]	0.0116 (0.230)	0.902*** (0.237)	-0.541 (0.349)	22.81*** (0.148)	2 472	6.348	0.00645
[25, 27]	-0.180 (0.435)	0.963*** (0.442)	-0.729 (0.615)	25.78*** (0.313)	892	2.723	0.00577
[28, 30]	0.153 (0.774)	0.673 (0.658)	-1.376 (1.094)	28.83*** (0.405)	354	0.883	-0.000992
[31, 33]	0.0779 (1.789)	-1.000 (1.381)	5.643*** (2.530)	31.64*** (0.976)	94	3.525	0.0753
[34, 100]	-1.636 (3.162)	-3.182*** (1.291)	22.18*** (4.471)	35.64*** (0.913)	24	14.55	0.639
By the gated community's average consumption							
[3;2; 9]	-0.188 (0.162)	0.231 (0.167)	0.382* (0.229)	4.594*** (0.118)	2 006	5.765	0.00708
[9;1; 12]	0.190** (0.0925)	0.642*** (0.0992)	-0.0692 (0.131)	6.281*** (0.0701)	10 544	30.88	0.00843
[12;1; 15]	0.0746 (0.0484)	0.443*** (0.0468)	0.0720 (0.0684)	8.303*** (0.0331)	50 852	68.96	0.00399
[15;1; 18]	0.0200 (0.0599)	0.549*** (0.0570)	-0.0219 (0.0848)	10.22*** (0.0403)	46 346	54.51	0.00345
[18;1; 21]	-0.0100 (0.0889)	0.786*** (0.0884)	-0.123 (0.126)	12.18*** (0.0611)	29 198	45.59	0.00456
[21;1; 24]	0.0442 (0.159)	0.716*** (0.162)	0.187 (0.225)	13.99*** (0.115)	11 816	18.15	0.00434
[24;1; 27]	0.201 (0.246)	1.323*** (0.252)	-0.307 (0.347)	16.50*** (0.178)	6 164	15.25	0.00689
[27;1; 30]	-0.826* (0.479)	1.402*** (0.490)	-0.302 (0.678)	18.75*** (0.353)	2 014	7.324	0.00934
[30;1; 33]	-0.614 (0.642)	1.331** (0.564)	-0.676 (0.608)	20.79*** (0.399)	1 474	3.607	0.00528
[33;7; 40;8]	-4.886** (2.089)	1.597 (1.648)	2.939 (2.055)	25.56*** (1.165)	180	3.235	0.0361
By deviation from the gated community's consumption							
[-36;7; -20]	-0.119 (0.110)	0.0788 (0.100)	-0.0458 (0.156)	14.40*** (0.0770)	14 448	1.309	0.000642
[-19;9; -15]	-0.164 (0.148)	1.057*** (0.146)	-0.0388 (0.209)	6.907*** (0.104)	7 756	33.87	0.0126
[-14;9; -11]	0.144 (0.104)	1.425*** (0.100)	-0.200 (0.140)	5.854*** (0.0708)	17 294	111.4	0.0188
[-10;9; -10]	0.00835 (0.183)	1.691*** (0.180)	0.195 (0.259)	4.838*** (0.127)	5 722	63.60	0.0318
[-9;9; -9]	-0.105 (0.110)	0.150 (0.107)	0.0804 (0.156)	13.59*** (0.0759)	14 888	2.262	0.000254
[-8;9; -8]	-0.779 (0.476)	2.657*** (0.469)	0.240 (0.673)	4.485*** (0.331)	1 040	23.97	0.0622
[-7;9; -7]	-0.00258 (0.115)	0.255*** (0.112)	0.190 (0.163)	12.53*** (0.0794)	14 626	6.872	0.00120
[-6;9; -6]	-0.149 (0.109)	0.374*** (0.107)	0.0550 (0.154)	11.49*** (0.0759)	14 282	9.870	0.00186
[-5;9; -5]	-0.0126 (0.122)	0.508*** (0.110)	-0.0973 (0.158)	10.65*** (0.0780)	13 540	11.60	0.00234
[-4;9; -4]	0.0997 (0.116)	0.609*** (0.115)	0.0742 (0.164)	9.724*** (0.0892)	12 778	21.70	0.00484
[-3;9; -3]	0.0261 (0.130)	0.669*** (0.139)	0.00859 (0.172)	8.103*** (0.0839)	11 678	20.49	0.00498
[-2;9; -2]	0.0133 (0.140)	0.850*** (0.136)	-0.0714 (0.183)	9.033*** (0.0690)	10 450	26.57	0.00729
[-1;9; -1]	-0.0480 (0.140)	0.982*** (0.136)	0.0476 (0.197)	7.505*** (0.0650)	9 294	34.71	0.01108
[-0;9; 0]	-0.0717 (0.122)	0.0450 (0.110)	-0.0518 (0.172)	15.43*** (0.0844)	12 798	0.478	-0.000122

Standard error in parenthesis. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

Table 18: Diff-in-Diff estimator for Scenario 4. Message: Congratulations.

E EAAB's Commercial division




Figure 9: EAAB's commercial division of Bogotá.

Source: EAAB's geographic portal. (https://www.acueducto.com.co/wps/portal/EAB2/Home/Clientes_Preferenciales/acceso_publico/Zonas_de_servicio)



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