International Peacekeeping

ISSN: 1353-3312 (Print) 1743-906X (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/finp20

The Micro-foundations of Peace: Attitudes Towards the Implementation of Colombia's Peace Agreement in war-affected Regions

Silvia Otero-Bahamón, Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios, Abbey Steele, Casper Kurpan & Helga Malmin Binningsbø

To cite this article: Silvia Otero-Bahamón, Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios, Abbey Steele, Casper Kurpan & Helga Malmin Binningsbø (2025) The Micro-foundations of Peace: Attitudes Towards the Implementation of Colombia's Peace Agreement in war-affected Regions, International Peacekeeping, 32:3, 560-588, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2025.2471445

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2025.2471445

INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
2025, VOL. 32, NO. 3, 560–588
https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2025.2471445

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

The Micro-foundations of Peace: Attitudes Towards the Implementation of Colombia's Peace Agreement in war-affected Regions

Silvia Otero-Bahamón[a], Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios[b], Abbey Steele[b], Casper Kurpan[b] and Helga Malmin Binningsbø[c]

[a]School of International, Political, and Urban Studies, Universidad del Rosario, Bogotá, Colombia; [b]Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands; [c]Peace Research Institute Oslo, Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT

What explains public support for peace agreements, especially as implementation unfolds? It has been eight years since the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) reached a peace accord, among the most comprehensive and ambitious accords ever signed. How has the Colombian public in war-affected communities shifted their opinions about the agreement since its implementation began? We leverage a 12,000-individual panel survey on perceptions and attitudes towards the peace accord collected in 2019 and 2021, and an original municipal-level dataset on peace accord implementation activities beginning in 2016, to explore how actual peace agreement implementation over time relates to people's satisfaction with peace agreement implementation. We find that contrary to our expectations, implementation is not robustly associated with shifts in satisfaction with the implementation of the agreement. We disaggregate by type of project and find that some types of public goods are associated with either more or less satisfaction. We propose possible mechanisms to account for these heterogeneous effects, including intensity, targeting, attribution, corruption and responsiveness. The findings contribute to directions for future research and policymaking.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 16 July 2024; Accepted 18 February 2025

KEYWORDS Peacebuilding; peace processes; Colombia; implementation; public opinion

Introduction

Peace accords have become a standard approach to ending armed conflicts in recent decades.[1] The successful implementation of these agreements,

CONTACT Abbey Steele abbey.steele@uva.nl

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2025.2471445

[1]Joshi and Quinn, "Implementing the Peace"; Kreutz, "How and when armed conflicts end."

however, requires substantial resources, time, and critically, civilian support.[2] This public backing can shape elite commitment to peace agreements through both formal democratic channels and informal means, including public opinion polls and unconventional forms of political participation.[3] Yet, despite the recent growth in micro-level studies of people's perceptions in conflict-affected societies, our understanding of what shapes ordinary civilians' attitudes towards peace agreements and peace processes remains limited, particularly during the implementation phase. Importantly, it is not yet clear to what extent these attitudes respond to the implementation itself. A possible scenario is that how the peace process is carried out shapes civilians´ attitudes towards the peace agreement's implementation, subsequently influencing elites' decisions about further implementation.

The relationship between the implementation of peace agreements and the subsequent support for or disillusionment with peace processes is not merely a gap in the literature. November 2024 marked the eight-year anniversary of the peace accord reached between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), among the most comprehensive and ambitious accords ever signed. It aims to end the over 50- year-long armed conflict that has killed more than 250,000 and displaced more than 7 million people. To carry out the massive peacebuilding effort, bureaucrats must implement a wide variety of provisions, many of those in the same communities heavily affected by armed conflict. Officials from Colombian government agencies responsible for the execution of the peace accord express concerns that the public may not fully recognize that the various projects and investments introduced in their communities stem directly from the peace agreement's implementation.[4] The dominant perception is that unfulfilled expectations and disillusionment concerning the execution of the peace agreement could weaken the determination to persist in these efforts and might also jeopardize the potential for future peace agreements with other armed groups.[5]

At the national level, implementation also influences elites. In a surprising development, Colombian President Gustavo Petro declared in May 2024 that the sluggish implementation of the peace agreement warranted the convening of a constituent assembly. The president's rationale was that a new constitution would grant the necessary authority to execute the peace agreement, which Petro says the state has so far failed to do. Consequently,

[2]OHCHR, "Rule-of-law tools"; Nilsson, "Anchoring the peace"; Botero and Sanchez, "Paz y opinión."
[3]Garbiras Diaz et al., "Influencia y resistencia."
[4]Interview with an official from the Agencia de Renovación Territorial (Agency for Territorial Renovation - ART), the agency charged with overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the peace agreement across government agencies, 21 December 2021.
[5]Durango, "El acuerdo"; Espectador, "Sin implementación"; Niño, "Los obstáculos"; Nussio et al., "Testing statebuilding's 'missing link'."

implementation has become not only a matter of public opinion and support for peace agreements, but also a potential catalyst for unforeseen political volatility.[6]

This study examines whether the way the Colombian peace agreement is carried out affects people's satisfaction with implementation as it unfolds. In line with popular perception, we expect that civilian satisfaction responds directly to implementation measures: more projects implemented should lead to higher civilian satisfaction. In this study, we focus on communities most affected by conflict because that is where implementation is concentrated. We expect that in war-affected communities targeted for peace agreement implementation in Colombia, which overwhelmingly supported the signing of the peace agreement,[7] residents that observe progress on the peace agreement's implementation will continue or increase their support for it.

We test these expectations with an original dataset on peace agreement implementation disaggregated by location and sector across the Colombian government's institutions and ministries. The dataset reflects the territorial focus of the 2016 Colombian peace agreement, which identifies 16 regions known as PDETs (the acronym in Spanish) for the implementation of the peace agreement. To measure satisfaction over time, we use a large-scale survey of civilians living in PDET regions. The MAPS (Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support) survey, collected by coauthors in collaboration with UNDP Colombia, contains questions about people's experiences and perceptions of the armed conflict and peace agreement and was fielded in 2019 and 2021. The first wave interviewed 12,052 respondents and the second 11,777 - of which 7,716 were interviewed in both waves.[8] This is a unique source for understanding how people view the implementation of the peace agreement where and as it is primarily carried out. We use this survey to gauge satisfaction with peace agreement implementation as well as individual characteristics. Merging the datasets allows us to test whether exposure to implementation measures is associated with satisfaction with the peace agreement implementation.

Surprisingly, our findings provide only partial support for the idea that more implementation yields increased satisfaction. However, an analysis of projects by sector shows that health-related projects reduce satisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement, whereas agricultural and infrastructure projects increase satisfaction. Other types of projects involving housing and education do not affect satisfaction. We provide some insights to interpret these mixed findings. Agricultural projects are more frequent,

[6]El Pais, "Petro señala."
[7]Tellez, "Worlds apart."
[8]Weintraub et al., "Introducing MAPS dataset."

visible, tangible, and targeted than implementation in other areas. They may also be easier to attribute to the peace process rather than to the everyday dealings of the state. Health projects, in contrast, are scarcer, frequently linked to corruption scandals and harder to link to peace agreement implementation. Sectors that rely on contractors for implementation may also generate suspicions of corruption, compared to more direct investments.

This article makes two contributions. First, it introduces a new, detailed dataset on peace agreement implementation in the sixteen PDET regions of Colombia prioritized for peacebuilding. Our dataset enhances our understanding of how a peace agreement is implemented by disaggregating implementation in territorial and sectoral terms. Second, it presents, to our knowledge, the first analysis of satisfaction with peace agreement implementation as it unfolds, matching implementation data with a panel survey from war-affected regions. Most existing data on the implementation of peace agreements in civil wars focuses on tracking peace processes at the national level – for example the content of the signed agreements and the implementation of provisions such as power-sharing between the parties in conflict.[9] In contrast, our data offer unique insights into the territorial and sectoral unevenness of peace implementation, and when matched with our panel data from MAPS, is the first dataset we know of that allows tracking individual´s changing perceptions of peace agreement implementation over time. In this regard, this study is one of the few that has examined the implementation of "territorial peace," a concept articulated by Colombian peace negotiators, according to which peace requires a territorial transformation of the underlying conditions that favoured the development of the conflict in specific areas. Yet, by providing a granular view of implementation and its impact on local populations' perceptions, we reveal a surprising disconnect between implementation and satisfaction. The disconnect is worth further research. Dissatisfaction despite implementation, or even because of implementation, may stem from multiple possible channels. It is important to develop further understanding of which are triggered by peace agreement implementation in general, so that policymakers can design interventions that will avoid backlash, and weigh trade-offs where they are unavoidable. In the context of Colombia, satisfaction with the peace agreement may be crucial to establish agreements with other armed groups as the government is currently attempting.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature on perception with implementation and support for peace agreements. Next, we provide background on Colombia´s 2016 peace agreement and the process of implementation. We then delve into

[9]e.g. PA-X dataset by Bell and Badanjak, and the Peace Accord Matrix by Joshi and Darby.

the empirics and analyses of our study, identifying and discussing the main results. The last section provides conclusions and suggests avenues for further research.

Peace Agreement Implementation and Support for Peace Agreements

What shapes civilian attitudes towards peace? Peace agreements are complex political processes that unfold over many years. Yet most literature on this topic centres on civilian attitudes – whether supportive or oppositional - towards the contents of peace agreements, with two dominant strands of research emerging: one explores how the bargaining and negotiation aspects of peace agreements influence public support, and the other examines how the agreements' design — including specific provisions and their sequencing — shapes this support.[10] However, once the terms of the agreement are reached, the text is signed, and implementation begins, we have a limited understanding of what shapes civilian attitudes toward the way peace agreements are being carried out. In other words, a crucial distinction exists between civilian attitudes toward agreement contents and attitudes towards the subsequent political process that such agreements launch.

This distinction between attitudes towards agreement content and attitudes towards implementation process is crucial yet understudied. For instance, an initial opponent of a peace agreement may become satisfied with its implementation if anticipated threats fail to materialize or if tangible benefits emerge. Conversely, an early enthusiastic supporter may grow disillusioned with ongoing implementation if their material and security conditions deteriorate, if the agreement generates unmet expectations, or when abstract provisions translate into real and concrete decisions that seem unfair.[11] This suggests that we cannot infer satisfaction with implementation from support for a peace agreement. Yet since peace agreement implementation demands sustained resources and political will over extended periods, understanding the distinct factors that shape public buy-in during implementation can be essential for success.[12] Yet the literature so far does not ask how ongoing implementation shapes public support for peace.

The literature provides grounding to expect that ongoing interventions framed in peace agreements will shape citizens' satisfaction with the implementation, and in turn, influence support for the agreement and

[10]Fabbe et al., "A persuasive peace."
[11]Botero, "La Confianza."
[12]Joshi and Quinn, "Implementing the Peace"; McKeon, "Civil society"; Prendergast and Plumb, "Building local capacity"; Botero and Sánchez, "Paz y opinión."

commitment to peace agreements.[13] However, implementation may push attitudes in opposing directions. On the one hand, implementation may increase satisfaction. This expectation coincides with the literature on institutional performance: when a government provides services and public goods, citizens will be more supportive of the state and its institutions.[14]

Alternatively, interventions framed in the agreement may increase expectations about the material or justice benefits the agreement will bring, that if unmet, will lead to lower rather than higher satisfaction. In Colombia, studies suggest that participation can increase expectations that backfire when unmet.[15] Vélez-Torres et al. analysed participation in the context of the peace agreement and found that state officials constrained and limited the scope of participation, marginalizing and minimizing the demands for substantial transformation of power structures, and favouring inconsequential and superficial demands.[16] Support for implementation dwindled as communities realized that there was no "real" participation. These conclusions are aligned with the findings of Velásquez et al. who argue that procedural participation, if not embedded within a larger national pact that addresses the structural agrarian causes of the conflict, results in a displacement of responsibility from national elites towards local communities.[17] Along the same lines, Herrera and Dessein maintain that participation of coca growers in programmes related to the peace agreement has served a procedural rather than a transformative function, as coca growing continues to be criminalized by the national government.[18]

Another way implementation may reduce rather than enhance satisfaction is when citizens are confronted with concrete decisions that translate the abstract terms of an agreement into reality. In a survey experiment, Botero finds that while respondents generally support and trust the Special Peace Jurisdiction (JEP, for its Spanish initials), their support weakens when faced with a hypothetical but concrete restorative justice ruling—the very type of decision the tribunal is meant to make.[19]

These experiences suggest that implementing certain aspects of the agreement, such as participation or restorative justice, can lead to greater dissatisfaction over time. This presents two competing perspectives on how implementation affects satisfaction: it may reinforce trust by demonstrating that the state is fulfilling its commitments, or it may breed disillusionment—

[13]Ditlmann et al., "Addressing violent intergroup conflict."
[14]Brixi et al., "Trust, voice, and incentives"; Ditlmann et al., "Addressing violent intergroup conflict"; Hutchison and Johnson, "Capacity to trust?"; Godefroidt et al., "Developing political trust"; Mishler and Rose, "Origins of political trust?"
[15]Nussio et al., "Testing statebuilding's 'missing-link'."
[16]Vélez-Torres et al., "Fests of vests."
[17]Velásquez et al., "Largely on their own."
[18]Herrera and Dessein, "We are not Drug Traffickers."
[19]Botero, "La confianza."

either by raising expectations that remain unmet or by failing to deliver the punitive justice citizens expect. We contribute to this theoretical debate by leveraging unique empirical data. To our knowledge, no existing study systematically tracks a broad swath of conflict-affected citizens and their evolving perceptions of implementation in their communities.

We test the expectation that civilian satisfaction with peace agreement implementation should increase with more implementation. Here, we assume that implementation is evidence that the state is meeting at least some expectations. We use unique data to test whether this relationship holds in the context of Colombia, within communities targeted by peace agreement implementation. As we explain below, our data allow us to leverage both variation over time in individuals' attitudes, through a large-scale panel survey; and implementation data that varies over time and across communities that are eligible for peace agreement programming. All things equal, we expect that individuals who live in a community that receives more implementation activities will be more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction with the implementation compared to prior to these implementation activities. In other words, we expect the intensity of implementation to influence individuals' reported satisfaction.

The 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement and Implementation

The most recent peace process between the Colombian government and the FARC began with secret talks in 2011. Those talks became an official negotiation between 2012 and 2016, when international guarantors and representatives of the FARC and the Colombian government negotiated the contents of a peace agreement that comprised six sub-agreements ('pillars'): comprehensive rural reform, political participation, end of conflict (demobilization and reincorporation of the FARC), illicit drugs, victims of the conflict (reparation and transitional justice), and implementation and verification.[20] The peace agreement was signed by the parties on 26 September 2016 but failed to win support in a plebiscite on 2 October 2016 by a slim margin. The terms of the agreement were then renegotiated following a brief "feedback" period, and the government and the FARC-EP signed the slightly modified agreement on 26 November 2016.

The plebiscite and its narrow defeat raised the question of who supported the peace agreement. Kreiman and Masullo find that people in municipalities exposed to violence by the FARC were more likely to vote "yes" for the agreement.[21] Liendo and Braithwaite find instead that political preferences were

[20]Colombia Peace Agreement, "Final agreement."
[21]Kreiman and Masullo, "Who shot the bullets?"; see also Matanock and Garbiras-Diaz, "Considering concessions."

more relevant in explaining support for the peace process (in 2014), and that this variation was consistent with voting patterns in the 2016 plebiscite.[22] Some scholars focused on the content of the agreement and how different provisions generated support or not. For instance, Carlin et al. find that provisions addressing transitional justice increase support for the agreement, while the incorporation of ex-FARC members into the political system was associated with decreased support for the peace agreement.[23] Botero finds that citizens support the transitional justice court, but reject restorative justice decisions that the court is expected to implement.[24] Tellez finds that people living in conflict zones in Colombia were more willing to grant concessions to rebels.[25] Ávila García et al. contend that a majority of citizens support provisions that would benefit victims, but reject provisions that enhance political participation of ex-combatants. Despite a public divided over support for the agreement, it was ratified by Congress in December 2016.[26]

The initial implementation of Colombia's peace agreement began under the Santos administration (2014–2018) with several key achievements: the disarmament of over 7,000 combatants and their concentration in Territorial Training and Reincorporation Spaces (ETCRs); the establishment of transitional justice institutions like the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) and the Truth Commission; the creation of sixteen Special Peace Constituencies in the House of Representatives to enhance representation of conflict-affected areas; and the launch of the National Comprehensive Program for the Substitution of Illicit Crops (PNIS).

Simultaneously, to advance comprehensive rural reform – the first pillar of the agreement – the Santos government designated sixteen regions encompassing one-third of the country and 170 municipalities as priority areas based on conflict impact, poverty levels, illicit economies, and weak institutional capacity. In each of these regions a "Program for Development with a Territorial Focus" (PDETs) was created, which is a planning instrument through which communities, in consultation with local actors, developed, discussed, aggregated and prioritized their demands.[27] To make PDETs actionable, and to link them with formal investment plans, each PDET translated into a Plan of Action for Regional Transformation (PATR for its initials in Spanish), which together prioritized over 33.000 initiatives. However, implementation faced significant challenges during its

[22]Liendo and Braithwaite, "Determining the Colombian attitudes."
[23]Carlin et al., "Pitfall to peace"; see also Tellez, "Peace agreement design" for similar findings on peace agreements in general.
[24]Botero, ""La confianza."
[25]Tellez, "Worlds apart"; see also Observatorio de la Democracia, "Colombia rural posconflicto" and "Colombia, Un Pais."
[26]Ávila García et al., "Actitudes ciudadanas."
[27]Velásquez et al., "Largely on their own."

first six years. Early obstacles included slow legislative progress, insufficient budget allocation, and poor institutional coordination.

Decisions on allocation of funding to PDET implementation involve multiple actors. National state agencies and ministries can select initiatives in specific municipalities if these align with sectoral goals. Meanwhile, mayors and governors can design projects to launch specific PDET initiatives and secure funding through special national funds, international cooperation, or their own resources. Given that initiative can originate from either national or local actors with varying preferences, in the Colombian context, there is no systematic mechanism linking public opinion to project investment decisions. The decentralized and fragmented nature of PDET funding mechanisms—spanning national programmes to local taxation—introduces variation in how projects are selected and funded, reducing the likelihood that current satisfaction systematically drives investment decisions.

The Duque administration (2018–2022), elected on a platform critical of the peace agreement, has been criticized for "slow-walking" implementation. While transitional justice institutions such as the JEP and the Truth Commission moved forward with their work, executive-dependent initiatives stalled. By April 2022, near the end of Duque's government, only 21% of the 33,000 PATR initiatives in PDET regions had secured investment plans, with merely 6% reaching completion.[28] Rural reform—a cornerstone of the peace deal—has faced severe delays, and efforts to substitute illicit crops have been largely ineffective. Security deteriorated as dissident groups—comprising former combatants who either rejected the agreement or became disillusioned—expanded their territorial control.

The 2022 election of left-wing president Gustavo Petro brought a renewed emphasis on peace. Petro's "Total Peace" strategy seeks to expand the agreement's scope by engaging not only former FARC members but also other armed groups. Despite these ambitions, economic constraints and missed fiscal targets have limited peace-related funding, including PDET projects, while various armed groups continue aggressive territorial expansion. The Kroc Institute's Colombia Barometer Initiative monitors progress on 578 stipulations of the peace agreement, ranging from legislative reforms to institutional changes and particular programmatic measures. As of February 2024, 31% of stipulations were fully implemented, 20% were at intermediate levels, 38% were at minimal levels, and 11% had not yet begun.[29] The focus of the reports is primarily on the legislative and policy milestones that are required to implement the agreement.[30]

[28]CINEP-CERAC, "Undécimo Informe."
[29]Álvarez et al., "Quarterly report."
[30]In one of their most recent reports Álvarez et al., Kroc describes an initiative in which local teams will analyze implementation at a lower level, eventually supplementing the national measures with Regional Barometers.

Periodic surveys provide insight into how the Colombian public views implementation and the peace process. The Observatorio de la Democracia at the Universidad de los Andes found that only 13% of surveyed respondents believe that most of the peace agreement has been implemented.[31] The MAPS survey, which we describe in further detail below, sampled across all 16 PDET regions and found that satisfaction with implementation varies across the PDETs, and over the two waves, in 2019 and 2021.[32] In the next section, we assess whether this variation can be accounted for by concrete implementation across the PDETs and over time.

Empirics

Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Peace Agreement Implementation

To measure individual satisfaction with peace agreement implementation, we use the MAPS survey data.[33] This panel survey was collected in two waves (2019 and 2021), sampled to achieve representativity of each of the 16 regions targeted for implementation of the 2016 peace agreement (PDET regions) in Colombia. The first wave surveyed 12,052 respondents in seventy-two PDET municipalities, and the second wave recontacted 7,716 (64.0%) of these respondents. Those respondents from the first wave that were unable to be surveyed in the second (mostly due to being unreachable) were replaced by an adult randomly selected on the same block.

The MAPS survey covers the regions evenly, which allows for analyzing the impact of violence and peacebuilding efforts on perceptions and attitudes in a more detailed manner compared to other surveys. Most studies interested in tracking, monitoring and understanding post-conflict societies use nationally representative surveys, even though most armed conflicts are geographically concentrated.[34] While national public opinion is inherently important, we also know that substantial variation within war zones exists, which we suspect will also influence variation in support for peace processes over time.[35] The MAPS sample allows us to study variation across PDETs and over time as peace agreement implementation unfolds.

The applied instrument in both waves asks about support for the content[36] and satisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement

[31]Observatorio de la Democracia, "Colombia, un pais."
[32]Weintraub et al., "Introducing Maps dataset."
[33]Ibid.
[34]Buhaug and Gates, "The geography of civil war"; Dyrstad et al., "Perceptions of peace agreements"; Raleigh, "Political marginalization."
[35]Nygård et al., "Lights and shadows," Weintraub at al., "Introducing MAPS dataset."
[36]Table A.2 (Appendix A) replicates our main models using satisfaction with the content of the peace agreement as the dependent variable.



Figure 1. Average satisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement by municipality, wave 1 (left) and wave 2 (right).

with FARC, in general terms and by 13 central components of the agreement. As our dependent variable, we use a question that asks: "In general terms, how satisfied are you with the way that the peace agreement signed by the Government and the FARC-EP in 2016 is being carried out?" Respondents could report on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 refers to the respondent being "Not at all satisfied", 2 "Somewhat satisfied", 3 "Satisfied" and 4 "Very satisfied" (see Figure 1).

Satisfaction varies across the communities in the regions that receive implementation projects, and over time. Figure 1 shows average satisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement by municipalities for wave 1 and wave 2 of the MAPS survey. The average satisfaction with the implementation in 2019 was 1.5, with a standard deviation of 0.68, and in 2021 it was 1.7 and 0.73 respectively. While the mean is still below "somewhat satisfied", satisfaction has improved between the two waves and the share of respondents being "not at all satisfied" fell from 60% to 46%.

Independent Variables: Peace Implementation

In this article, we ask if this variation in satisfaction can be explained in part by how implementation has unfolded in these regions. To answer this question, we need detailed information about peace agreement implementation. To construct the dataset, we interviewed five key officers in charge of peace implementation between 2016 and 2021. From these interviews –carried out between September and November 2021 – we tracked the funding system of the peace implementation, the sources that have compiled the project design

and execution, and the resource allocation for each project. The compiled data includes projects designed by national agencies to implement the peace agreement (e.g. ministries and institutes responsible for health, education, and public infrastructure) and projects designed by mayors and governors in PDET regions, as outlined in the Regional Transformation Action Plans (PATR). These projects were selected for funding through one of the available sources described below.[37] In addition, the interviewees validated the datasets of projects we collected, especially those respondents who worked at the national planning office (DNP, *Departamento Nacional de Planeación*), which audits all the projects of implementation funded by national sources.

Peace agreement implementation in Colombia has been funded through three main sources: i) national sources, allocated from the annual state budget (*Presupuesto General de la Nación*) and special funds created with the peace agreement (*Colombia en Paz* Fund, *OCAD Paz* Fund and *Obras por Impuestos* Programme), ii) local sources, allocated from the state transfers to the subnational administrative units (departments and municipalities) and their own taxation systems; and iii) international cooperation, allocated by several countries' funds and managed by the state office of cooperation (*Agencia Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional)*. We collected the basic data of all the projects funded, or that will be funded, by the first and the third sources[38] until December of 2021. This includes a brief description of the project, the pillar of the peace agreement that was implemented by each project, the date of creation in the audit system managed by DNP, and the municipality where the project has been or will be executed.[39] We include more details about the data collection process and the building of the dataset of the implemented projects in Appendix B.

Figure 2 shows the number of peace agreement projects implemented in the municipalities prior to 2019 (year of the first MAPS survey wave) and after 2019 and prior to 2021 (year of the second MAPS survey wave).

Once we collected the data from each funding source, we merged them into one dataset and cleaned the data, removing projects without a date of creation and verifying whether the location of the project corresponds with their brief description. From this description, we classified each project into eight areas of implementation of the peace agreement:

[37]We do not include measures of implementation related to the societal and political integration of ex-FARC members, and the operation of transitional justice institutions, such as the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (*Justicia Especial para la Paz, JEP),* the Truth Commision *(Comisión de la Verdad)* and the Search Unit for Persons Reported Missing *(Unidad de Búsqueda de Personas dadas por Desaparecidas*).

[38]The design and execution of projects funded by the second source are not tracked, because local authorities (mayors and governors) do not have to report this information to the national offices. According to our interviewees, most of the local offices do not know how to report their own implementation data in the national system managed by the DNP.

[39]Our dataset differs from the Kroc Institute's Barometer Initiative, as it uses municipality-year as the unit of analysis rather than stipulation-month. This approach enables us to pinpoint where specific activities have taken place.



Figure 2. Number of peace agreement projects implemented within municipalities between 2017 and 2019, wave 1 (left) and between 2019 and 2021, wave 2 (right).

infrastructure, education, health, rural housing, agriculture, democratic participation, truth and justice, and others. This sector information, together with location information, allows us to generate variables that count the number of total and sector-specific projects implemented within a municipality and a PDET region, before the collection of each survey wave (2019 and 2021). About half of the projects in the dataset have information available about the year in which the funding was allocated to the project, allowing us to capture temporal variation in the implementation of the projects. Table 1 lists the number of projects implemented in each of the PDET regions and Table 2 shows the number of projects by each sector of the peace agreement.

The data provide a detailed tracking of the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement, because it is possible to identify its unevenness by the geographical and temporal distribution of the projects, and the agreement pillars privileged by their designers and executors. Further, the data provide concrete evidence that implementation has not been uniformly executed across targeted territories, over time and across the pillars of the agreement. A limitation of our data is that it is not possible to differentiate between the projects that were implemented before each survey wave was collected, and those projects that were in the process of being implemented during the data collection. This differentiation requires a detailed tracking of the timeline of each project, which has not been carried out by the agencies in charge of the implementation of the 2016 peace agreement. While this means that we cannot be sure which projects were fully implemented at the time of our survey waves, the data reliably indicate implementation activity. This is

Table 1. Projects implemented (without missing years) within PDET regions.

PDET	Projects implemented by 2019	Projects implemented by 2021	Difference 2019–2021	Total number of projects
Arauca	67	164	97	231
Alto Patía - Norte del Cauca	290	715	425	1005
Bajo Cauca y Nordeste Antioqueño	79	546	467	625
Catatumbo	125	310	185	435
Putumayo	174	355	181	529
Sur de Bolívar	46	180	134	226
Sur de Córdoba	44	212	168	256
Sur de Tolima	61	118	57	179
Chocó	79	327	248	406
Macarena - Guaviare	165	256	91	421
Pacífico Medio	33	134	101	167
Pacífico y Frontera Nariñense	116	365	249	481
Sierra Nevada - Perijá	81	287	206	368
Urabá Antioqueño	45	204	159	249
Cuenca del Caguán y Piedemonte Caqueteño	136	540	404	676
Montes de María	69	303	234	372
Total	1610	5016	3406	6626

Table 2. Projects implemented (without missing years) by sectors of peace agreement.

Sector	Projects implemented by 2019	2021	Difference 2019–2021	Total number of projects
Infrastructure	228	607	379	835
Education	127	358	231	485
Health	5	246	241	251
Rural housing	17	237	220	254
Agriculture	36	469	433	505
Democratic participation	379	552	173	931
Truth and justice	44	871	827	915
Other projects	774	1676	902	2450
Total	1610	5016	3406	6626

what communities observe to evaluate whether the state is upholding its promises and meeting civilians' expectations.

Given that the number of projects varies according to the population size of each municipality, we use the rate of projects per 100,000 inhabitants, in total and by sector as indicators of implementation measures, our independent variables. If our hypothesis is correct, we should observe that an increase in the rate of projects is associated with higher satisfaction with implementation of the peace agreement.

Controls

Several studies focus on how civilian characteristics and wartime experiences also shape support for peace agreements. People who live close to or experience violence firsthand tend to be more supportive than non-victimized people of attempts at ending armed conflict.[40] One possibility is that the prospect of an end to such violence outweighs perceived drawbacks of the provisions in the agreement.[41] In Colombia, this was evident in the 2016 referendum on the peace agreement, where "no" votes were more prevalent in areas less affected by the conflict with the FARC, whereas "yes" votes dominated in municipalities more exposed to the conflict.[42] To control for this, we included two variables: first, whether the survey respondent reports being a victim of the conflict, and for the wave 2 cross-sectional models, we also included the municipal share of voters that supported the peace agreement in the plebiscite of October of 2016.

Related to wartime experiences and victimization, we also include a control for direct beneficiaries of peace accord implementation. The MAPS survey question "have you received reparations" directly identifies

[40]Tellez, "Worlds apart"; Liendo and Braithwaite, "Determinants of Colombian attitudes."
[41]Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz, "Considering concessions."
[42]Kreiman and Masullo, "Who shot the bullets?"; Nygård and Weintraub, "Rejecting peace?."

individuals who have received compensation by the state in recognition of their victim status. It is a dichotomous variable with the value 1 for recipients and 0 for those who have not received reparations. In wave 1, 8% of the sample reported having received reparations, and in wave 2, that figure increased to 14%.[43]

Although the survey does not include a question on the direct participation of survey respondents in the participatory institutions that followed the peace accord, we proxy this participation by including a dichotomous variable with the value 1 for respondents who during the last 12 months participated in communal boards, civil society, and victims' organizations, or if they contacted a local leader or politician, or a municipal authority. We assume that individuals who participated in these local democratic institutions also participated in the broad participatory process that led to the definition of the territorial development plan in each PDET. Such participation could increase expectations about implementation, which if unmet, would leave these respondents less satisfied on average than their neighbours who did not participate.

We also included individual-level controls in our models with respondents' answers to demographic questions (gender, age, level of education, main activity, if they live in rural or urban areas and own their homes), as well as questions about their perceptions about security and the existence of control by illegal armed groups in the municipalities where they live. The idea behind the inclusion of the latter variables is that deterioration of security conditions might worsen satisfaction with peace implementation. We seek to isolate the effect of peace agreement implementation from these other processes that might be occurring at the same time.

To refine our estimation of the link between the number of peace implementation projects and individual satisfaction with the implementation, we accounted for the total population of each municipality in our sample. Additionally, we incorporated measures indicative of development and state capacity. We used municipal annual income, represented in logarithmic terms, as a control for the level of local development. Furthermore, the proportion of this income allocated by the central government in 2019 and 2021 serves as a proxy for local state capacity. The underlying assumption is that municipalities with a larger portion of income generated locally have more robust extractive institutions. We hypothesize that municipalities with greater shares of development and higher state capacity levels are better positioned to facilitate effective peace implementation. These controls allow us to determine whether the observed increases in satisfaction are genuinely attributable to the peace projects themselves or rather a byproduct of robust local governance mechanisms.

[43]See descriptive statistics on Table A.1 in Appendix.

We also use these municipal-level controls to account for selection into peace agreement implementation. We expect that bureaucrats charged with implementing collective goods measures will target them to communities that they perceive to be better able to collaborate to implement and sustain the public good, increasing the chance that implementation is a success. This perception can be based on several factors, but we think the most important is the presence of an existing administrative apparatus that can serve as a local partner for implementation of national-level investments.

Analyses and Results

To test whether implementation increases satisfaction with the peace process, we first run ordinal probit regressions using the level of satisfaction with peace agreement implementation in the second wave as the dependent variable. We run separate models using the rate of all projects in each municipality per 100,000 inhabitants (Column 1 in Table 3), as well as the rates of projects by sector of implementation (Column 2 in Table 3). In all models, we include the control variables described above and fixed effects by PDET. Thus, the coefficients estimate variation in levels of satisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement reported by individuals living in the same PDET. We run these analyses on the second wave of the survey data, when sufficient PDET implementation had taken place.

In addition, we leverage the panel data to fit ordinal first-difference models using the difference between satisfaction with peace agreement implementation reported by each recontacted individual in each wave (Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3). For instance, if in wave 1 a person responded that their level of satisfaction was "not at all satisfied," but in wave 2 the response was "satisfied," the person experienced a change of 2 on the satisfaction scale. The independent variable is the number of new projects implemented between waves 1 and 2 in the municipality where the respondent resides. We also include all time-varying control variables from our cross-sectional models.

The cross-sectional analyses allow us to include controls that do not vary over time, and that we expect to influence satisfaction. We also use first-difference models because they offer several key advantages when applied to survey responses from recontacted individuals. These models aim to explain the changes in a variable over time within the same individual. By focusing on differences over time, these models assess the effect of time-varying factors or interventions—such as the implementation of the peace agreement with FARC—while controlling for individual-specific characteristics that remain constant over time but may influence responses. Additionally, these models address endogeneity concerns by mitigating the impact of unobserved factors that do not change over time.

Table 3. Relationship between the rate of implemented projects per 100,000 inhabitants and the satisfaction with implementation of the 2016 peace agreement with FARC.

	Wave 2 (1)	Wave 2 (2)	First-difference (3)	First-difference (4)
Rate of implemented projects per 100,000 inhabitants				
All projects	0.001		0.001	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Infrastructure		−0.005		0.004*
		(0.003)		(0.002)
Education		0.005		0.001
		(0.003)		(0.002)
Health		−0.022*		−0.053***
		(0.011)		(0.014)
Rural housing		−0.003		0.014
		(0.007)		(0.011)
Agriculture		0.011***		0.015***
		(0.003)		(0.005)
Democratic participation		−0.007**		0.004*
		(0.003)		(0.002)
Truth and justice		0.003*		−0.003*
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Other projects		0.002		0.001
		(0.001)		(0.002)
Individual control variables				
Victim of conflict	−0.167***	−0.166***	0.112	0.102
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.069)
Receive reparation	0.115**	0.115**	0.103	0.094
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.096)	(0.100)
Live in rural areas	0.038	0.025		
	(0.046)	(0.045)		
Worse security perception	−0.209***	−0.212***	−0.140***	−0.128***
	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Illegal armed groups control	−0.054	−0.053	−0.015	−0.018
	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Woman	−0.021	−0.021		
	(0.028)	(0.028)		
18–35 years old	0.063	0.063	−0.019	0.003
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.091)	(0.089)
Secondary education	−0.123***	−0.123***	−0.211**	−0.186*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Own home	−0.004	−0.007	−0.020	−0.007
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Unemployed	−0.158*	−0.164*	−0.027	−0.036
	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.063)	(0.062)
Political engagement	0.144***	0.147***	0.018	0.044
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Municipal control variables				
Total population (log)	−0.062	−0.165	1.416	1.754
	(0.155)	(0.162)	(2.405)	(2.350)
Annual income (log)	0.291**	0.341**	0.150	0.190
	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.386)	(0.332)
Transfers from central state	3.575***	3.085***	2.476	2.406
	(0.986)	(0.887)	(3.699)	(3.528)
Vote share Yes in 2016 plebiscite	0.248	0.398		
	(0.283)	(0.244)		
N	10124	10124	5916	5916
Pseudo R-squared	0.082	0.083	0.007	0.016

(*Continued*)

Table 3. Continued.

	Wave 2 (1)	Wave 2 (2)	First-difference (3)	First-difference (4)
Wald Chi-squared *p*-value	0.340	0.003	0.395	0.000

Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses, with PDET fixed effects in wave 2 models. Wald Chi-squared tests have one degree of freedom for wave 2 models and eight for first-difference models.
*$p < 0.10$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$.

The results do not align with our expectations: a higher rate of implemented projects in a municipality shows no significant relationship with satisfaction (Columns 1 and 3 in Table 3). However, the effects are heterogeneous across sectors. More projects in health are associated with reduced satisfaction regarding the peace agreement's implementation, whereas more projects in agriculture increase such satisfaction. These results are consistent across models. Specifically, an increase in the rate of health projects implemented before 2021 (Column 2 in Table 3) and between 2019 and 2021 (Column 4 in Table 3) is linked to lower satisfaction in 2021 (Column 2) and negative changes in satisfaction between waves (Column 4). Conversely, more implementation of agricultural projects before 2021 correlates with higher satisfaction with the peace agreement's implementation in 2021 and positive changes in individual satisfaction between 2019 and 2021, as anticipated by our hypothesis.

The results for other sectors are more nuanced. First, the coefficients of democratic participation projects and truth and justice projects are contradictory across models. More democratic participation projects implemented before 2021 are associated with lower satisfaction with the peace agreement in 2021. However, in the first difference model the coefficient reverses, indicating that more projects implemented between waves yield higher satisfaction. The opposite occurs with truth and justice projects: while more implementation up until 2021 yields higher satisfaction, an increase in projects between 2019 and 2021 leads to decreased satisfaction between waves. We do not have a theory to explain these contradictory findings.

Interestingly, while more infrastructure projects before 2021 are not associated with higher satisfaction, our first difference models (Column 4 in Table 3) show that additional infrastructure projects implemented between 2019 and 2021 yield positive changes in satisfaction with the peace agreement between waves. In contrast, education and rural housing projects have no significant association with satisfaction regarding peace agreement implementation. Despite this lack of significance, the p-value of the goodness-of-fit test shows that including the projects separated by sectors significantly improves the model's fit. Figure 3 illustrates our most consistent results: the predicted probabilities of the change in satisfaction over the increase in the rates of health and agricultural projects between waves. The two graphics in the first column of Figure 3 show the predicted



Figure 3. Predicted probability of each outcome of the variation in satisfaction with the implementation of peace agreement by the increase in health and agriculture projects.

probabilities for the lowest outcome (-3), which reflects the greatest decrease in satisfaction with the peace agreement (respondents' satisfaction changed from the highest level (4) to the lowest level (1) between waves 1 and 2). The probability of this outcome is significantly higher as the increase in the rate of health projects becomes greater. The increase in such projects is also associated with higher probabilities of a one-point decrease in satisfaction (predicted outcome -1) and a two-point decrease (predicted outcome -2), as well as lower probabilities of positive changes in satisfaction (predicted outcomes 1, 2, and 3).

The controls in our study offer intriguing insights, particularly in the context of the existing literature. Whereas victimization emerges as a potent negative correlate of satisfaction with peace agreement implementation in models 1 and 2 (Table 3), its influence vanishes in the first difference model, indicating that prior violence experiences have a more substantial impact on satisfaction than ongoing victimization post-implementation. A contrasting pattern is observed with the positive and significant effects of receiving reparations on the satisfaction with peace agreement implementation in wave 2 (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). Having received reparations is associated with more satisfaction with peace agreement implementation, but the first difference models show that receiving reparations between waves 1 and 2 does not change satisfaction (the variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent had not received reparations in wave 1, but reports having received them in wave 2).

Taken together, these findings suggest that past experiences of victimization have lasting negative effects on individuals' satisfaction with the implementation of the peace agreement. Although having received reparations can change this perception, the reality is that most victims in our sample who are eligible for reparations have not received them. Perhaps both findings—the negative effects of victimization and the null effects of

having received reparations between waves—suggest unfulfilled expectations regarding compensation and justice for wartime experiences. The longer victims have waited, the more disillusioned they become, and receiving reparations in the post-conflict era does not substantially alter this perception.

The perception of deteriorating security consistently undermines satisfaction in all models, highlighting that post-conflict safety shapes civilian satisfaction with peace implementation. Municipal income, representing development level, enhances satisfaction as anticipated. Yet, intriguingly, greater reliance on national transfers—a marker of weaker local state capacity —also correlates with increased satisfaction, but only in the wave 2 models (columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). This could be explained by the fact that where local governments are weak, national initiatives in peace implementation may stand out more prominently. It might be easier in such areas to attribute improvements to the peace agreement. On the other hand, political engagement, measured as participation, is associated with greater satisfaction in wave 2. Nevertheless, this association disappears when using panel data.

Robustness

The results of our main models suggest that implementation of the peace agreement does not improve satisfaction with implementation, an association that differs depending on the type of project implemented. We test the robustness of our findings using different measures for our key variables and models (Appendix A). Table A.3. presents the results of bivariate ordinal probit models, including each rate of implemented projects separately. To estimate models with variables at the same level of analysis (municipalities), Table A.4. replicates our main models using the municipal average of satisfaction with implementation. Table A.5 replicates our main models with an alternative independent variable. In these models, we use the rate of implemented projects per square kilometer. As the size of Colombian municipalities varies widely, it is plausible that a given number of implemented projects leads to higher satisfaction in smaller municipalities compared to larger ones. We also replicate our wave 2 estimations controlling for lagged satisfaction with the peace agreement (Table A.6). We find similar results across all of these alternative estimations, and confirm the associations presented in Figure 3: health projects are related to decreases in satisfaction with peace agreement implementation, while agricultural projects are associated with improvements in satisfaction.

Finally, we run three matching analyses (Table A.7) using our control variables to fit probit regression models on a dummy variable that has the value of one if the rate of implemented projects per 100,000 inhabitants is

above the median (72.9). The predicted values of this dummy variable are used to match municipalities –using nearest neighbour, inverse-probability-weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) and propensity score matching (PSM) methods– and estimate the average treatment effects on the satisfaction with peace agreement implementation. Two out of three of our matching methods (nearest neighbour and IPWRA) confirm our findings on health and agriculture projects. In municipalities where the number of health projects are above the median, the satisfaction with implementation is significantly lower, while in municipalities where the number of agricultural projects is above the median, satisfaction is higher.

Discussion and Directions for Future Research

We anticipated that implementation measures would enhance satisfaction with the peace agreement's implementation. We found instead that the number of peace-related projects in a municipality is not associated with levels of satisfaction with peace agreement implementation in any of the models. In this section, we discuss the results and draw on them to point to directions for future research.

One question our analyses raise is whether our inferences suffer from reverse causality: what if policymakers and bureaucrats implement the peace agreement in communities that are less satisfied with it or its implementation? While plausible, we find it unlikely in the context of Colombia. As we explain in the background section, the process of designing and executing implementation can begin within the municipalities themselves, or from one of many different national-level or departmental ministries. As a result, we find it unlikely that satisfaction systematically affects targeting in this way. During our data collection process, it is also notable that none of the bureaucrats we spoke with identified a process of targeting that incorporated public opinion in this way. Empirically, we address this possible selection effect in two ways: we leverage our panel survey to study the difference in levels of satisfaction before and after a period of implementation; and following a similar logic, we use a lagged indicator of satisfaction in cross-sectional models to account for levels of satisfaction prior to implementation. Both exercises affirm that levels of satisfaction at the aggregate do not shift following implementation; and that these effects are heterogeneous across sector. These differences across sector point to promising avenues for future research. In the first difference models, we found that certain project types exerted significant influence. Agricultural projects were associated with increased satisfaction, while health projects were linked to decreased satisfaction. Adding projects in transportation, education or rural housing yield no detectable effects. What might account for these different effects?

We identify several possible explanations for these mixed findings, which strike us as promising directions for future research: implementation may need to clear a threshold of frequency and visibility before it affects satisfaction; perceived benefits and attribution; perceptions of corruption; and mismatches between execution and expectations.

Agricultural projects are frequently implemented (211 projects between 2019 and 2021, compared to far fewer in most other sectors, see Table 2) and show a correlation with higher satisfaction, suggesting a threshold of visibility may be necessary for positive effects to be recognized by the community. This threshold seems unmet by sectors with medium or low levels of implementation, such as health, where expectations may be unfulfilled due to the infrequency of project execution. The scarcity of health projects might have inflated expectations, only to lead to disappointment when subsequent implementation was not forthcoming.[44] This suggests a critical mass of implementation may be necessary before a positive perception of the peace agreement's effects takes hold.

We can also interpret these results by considering possible differentiated impacts of project implementation based on perceived benefits and their attribution to the peace agreement. Our analysis suggests that agricultural projects have a distinct positive effect on satisfaction with the peace agreement, possibly due to their direct and immediate impacts on the livelihoods of beneficiaries. The concrete nature of these projects, including transitioning to crops like cacao or sacha inchi, establishing fisheries or cattle farms, improving processing plants, or building basic irrigation systems, manifests tangible benefits that likely enhance satisfaction. In contrast, projects in sectors like transport, education, democracy, and truth and justice might yield benefits that are less immediate and less perceptible to communities, potentially spreading over a longer period, thus affecting satisfaction levels more slowly or less perceptibly. The gradual and diffuse impact of these projects may also complicate their direct association with the peace agreement.

We also believe that the mechanism of attribution affects the diverse impacts we observe. Agricultural projects, typically not funded by local or national agencies, may be perceived as direct outcomes of the peace agreement when they are implemented. In contrast, sectors like education, transport, housing, or health usually receive national or local government funding. This historical trend could lead to the peace agreement's implementation in these sectors not being distinctly associated with the peace process by residents, potentially explaining the non-significant effects on satisfaction levels. In addition, misattribution may be operating in the data generation process. Camilo Sánchez, a former health ministry official, posits that projects

[44]It may also be that the Covid-19 pandemic, which hit between the first and second wave of the survey, increased people's expectations regarding health services to levels difficult to meet.

are sometimes labelled as part of the peace agreement by Bogotá bureaucrats to bolster implementation figures, even though these initiatives may not have a substantial connection to the peace agreement, thereby not convincing the public of its effectiveness.[45] In essence, routine state activities might be mischaracterized as peace agreement actions by bureaucrats, going unnoticed by communities. However, it is possible that people recognize when typical state-implemented projects are inaccurately credited to the peace agreement, which could lead to confusion and skepticism, ultimately reducing satisfaction with the peace process. Such a scenario is plausible in the health sector.

Additionally, the perception of corruption may contribute to lower satisfaction. Sparse implementation of health projects, such as constructing hospitals or supplying ambulances, could raise suspicions of corruption, especially if they are contracted out to third parties and community members perceive these projects as fraught with irregularities. This perception could, therefore, negatively influence satisfaction with the peace agreement. Qualitative research into the health projects strongly associated with negative satisfaction could provide insights into the unfolding processes and assess whether factors such as misattribution or perceptions of (or actual) corruption undermined these initiatives.

Finally, as we explained above, the PDETs were mechanisms for aggregating preferences and communities' priorities for peace agreement measures.[46] To the extent that the implementation activities did not reflect these preferences, respondents may be as dissatisfied with the process as with the outcome or agreement. Future work could investigate the congruence or divergence of implementation from the PDET agreements.

These interpretations point to the multifaceted nature of satisfaction with peace agreement implementation, shaped by the visibility of benefits, the clarity of their attribution to the peace process, the frequency of project execution, perceptions of integrity and transparency, and (in)consistency with communities' expressed priorities.

Conclusion

In this paper, we argue that peace agreement implementation is likely to affect citizens' satisfaction with the peace process. We disaggregate types of peace agreement measures into eight sectors, focusing on various public goods provisions, and expect that more projects implemented are associated with higher satisfaction with the implementation. To test our expectations, we collected a new dataset on peace agreement implementation in Colombia

[45]Interview with the authors, Bogotá, 8 August 2023.
[46]Velásquez et al., "Largely on their own."

and combined it with a panel survey of 12,000 respondents in regions targeted for the peace agreement implementation.

This research underscores the importance of public support in the success of peace agreements and addresses a significant gap in understanding how the implementation of these agreements shapes public opinion, particularly within communities directly affected by conflict as implementation unfolds. Moving beyond theoretical discussions, it is essential to examine the actual impact of peace processes on the attitudes of those living in regions targeted by peace agreements. Their perspectives are crucial indicators of the long-term viability of peace and warrant deeper investigation into how support is sustained or not. In contrast to our expectations, we do not find strong empirical support for a relationship between actual implementation and satisfaction. When we disaggregate peace agreement measures by sector, we find countervailing associations with agricultural and health measures, though not with those related to transport and other measures. We suspect that part of the reason for the results is a problem of attribution, both from respondents potentially not realizing which measures are related to the peace agreement, and from bureaucrats categorizing measures as related to the peace agreement when in fact they are not. Additionally, we anticipate that certain types of implementation projects generate immediate and tangible benefits that are likely to increase satisfaction, whereas other projects may have opaque or indirect benefits that are less likely to influence support for the peace agreement.

Future work could undertake to explain variation in implementation across the PDETs and across sectors. While we do not believe that levels of satisfaction drive what is implemented where, variation in peace agreement implementation is important to understand. Which municipalities are able to organize and request particular interventions? Which requests are prioritized? And how do bureaucrats in Bogotá prioritize which projects to fund and implement where? Further, our dataset could be combined with the Colombia Barometer to provide a robust description of implementation of the 2016 Colombian peace agreement at all levels of government and across the 578 stipulations.

Our findings may be disheartening for supporters of peace agreement implementation, but we emphasize that this does not imply the unimportance or ineffectiveness of such efforts. One possibility is that maintaining a stable level of satisfaction with the agreement, rather than aiming for increases, is a reasonable goal for policymakers and could be sufficient to sustain political support for the peace process. Additionally, if attribution is indeed a critical issue, an effective response might involve enhancing government communication about the measures, particularly through community participation mechanisms that promote local ownership and oversight of the implementation process. If a critical mass of projects is necessary to

gain visibility and increase satisfaction, then more rather than scant implementation is needed. A secondary recommendation is to ensure accurate classification of measures as peace-related; reliable data is essential for evaluating the impact of implementation.

Acknowledgements

A version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Network of European Peace Scientists 2023. We thank Pablo Valbuena for excellent research assistance, and acknowledge financial support from PRIO to collect peace agreement implementation data in Colombia. We also thank UNDP Colombia, Camilo Sánchez, Michael Weintraub, Håvard Mokleiv Nygard, and Marianne Dahl for their collaboration on the MAPS survey.

Notes on contributors

Silvia Otero-Bahamón is an Associate Professor in the School of International, Political, and Urban Studies at Universidad del Rosario in Bogotá, Colombia. She earned her Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern University. Her research delves into the political economy of inequality, social policy, the politics of infrastructure, and state formation, with a focus on Latin America.

Sebastián Pantoja-Barrios is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam. His research interests include political participation and local state capacity in weak democracies and conflict-affected societies.

Abbey Steele is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. She earned her PhD in political science at Yale University. She is the author of *Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War* (2017, Cornell University Press), and researches displacement and its implications and state- and peacebuilding.

Casper Kurpan is a Junior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, where he earned his MSc in Social Sciences. His research interests include comparative politics, state-building and political trust.

Helga Malmin Binningsbø is a Senior Researcher at PRIO. She earned her PhD in political science at the Norwegian University of Science & Technology. Her current interests include conflict-related justice, peacebuilding, and public opinion.

Bibliography

Agencia de Renovación del Territorio. "Inversión Nacional." https://centralpdet.renovacionterritorio.gov.co/inversion-nacional/, 2021.

Álvarez, J. E., M. G. Vásquez, I. Z. García, et al. A Call to Action: Third Special Report on the Implementation Status of the Colombian Final Peace Accord's Ethnic Approach. University of Notre Dame, 2024b.

Álvarez, J. E., M. G. Vásquez, B. F. Linares, et al. "Quarterly Report: Implementation Status of the Colombian Final Peace Accord, July–September 2023 (Version 1)." University of Notre Dame. https://doi.org/10.7274/25251592.v1 (accessed May 15, 2024), 2024a.

Ávila, C. A., J. C. Plata, and J. C. Rodríguez. "Actitudes Ciudadanas Hacia Los Componentes del Acuerdo de Paz y Su Implementación." In Paz y Opinión Pública en Colombia, 3–20. Universidad El Rosario Ediciones Uniandes, 2024.

Bell, C., and S. Badanjak. "Introducing PA-X: A New Peace Agreement Database and Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 3 (2019): 452–466.

Botero, S. "La Confianza en la Justicia Especial para la Paz: Una Mirada Desde la Opinión Pública." In *Paz y Opinión Pública en Colombia*, 183–198. Universidad El Rosario Ediciones Uniandes, 2024.

Botero, S., and M. G. Sánchez. "Paz y Opinión Pública en Colombia." Universidad El Rosario Ediciones Uniandes, 2024.

Brixi, Hana, Ellen Lust, and Michael Woolcock. Trust, Voice, and Incentives: Learning from Local Success Stories in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa. No. 295. World Bank Publications, 2015.

Buhaug, H., and S. Gates. "The Geography of Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 4 (2002): 417–433.

Carlin, R. E., G. J. Love, J. L. McCoy, and J. Subotić. "Pitfall to Peace: FARC's Political Participation and Mass Support for Peace Talks in Colombia." *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 12, no. 3 (2020): 323–344.

CINEP-CERAC. "Undécimo Informe de Verificación de la Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz en Colombia." https://cinep.org.co/undecimo-informe-de-verificacion-de-la-implementacion-del-acuerdo-final-de-paz-en-colombia/, 2022.

Colombia Peace Agreement. "Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace." Republic of Colombia and FARC-EP, Bogotá, Colombia, November 24, 2016.

Ditlmann, R. K., C. Samii, and T. Zeitzoff. "Addressing Violent Intergroup Conflict from the Bottom Up?" *Social Issues and Policy Review* 11 (2017): 38–77.

Durango, D. R. "El Acuerdo de la Habana: Una Oportunidad para la Paz Total." http://www.lasillavacia.com/red-de-expertos/red-social/el-acuerdo-de-la-habana-una-oportunidad-para-la-paz-total/ (accessed November 9, 2023), 2023.

Dyrstad, K., K. M. Bakke, and H. M. Binningsbø. "Perceptions of Peace Agreements and Political Trust in Post-War Guatemala, Nepal, and Northern Ireland." *International Peacekeeping* 28, no. 4 (2021): 606–631.

El País. "Petro Señala al Estado Colombiano de No Querer Cumplir el Acuerdo de Paz con las FARC." May 24. https://elpais.com/america-colombia/2024-05-15/petro-senala-al-estado-colombiano-de-no-querer-cumplir-el-acuerdo-de-paz-con-las-farc.html (accessed June 16, 2024), 2024.

Espectador, E. "Sin Implementación No Hay Paz." https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/editorial/sin-implementacion-no-hay-paz/ (accessed November 9, 2023), 2023.

Fabbe, K., C. Hazlett, and T. Sınmazdemir. "A Persuasive Peace: Syrian Refugees' Attitudes Toward Compromise and Civil War Termination." *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 1 (2019): 103–117.

Garbiras, N., M. García-Sánchez, and A. M. Matanock. "Influencia y Resistencia. La Formación de Opiniones de Ciudadanos y Élites Políticas Hacia el Acuerdo de Paz." In *Paz y Opinión Pública en Colombia*, 119–142. Universidad El Rosario Ediciones Uniandes, 2024.

Godefroidt, A., A. Langer, and B. Meuleman. "Developing Political Trust in a Developing Country: The Impact of Institutional and Cultural Factors on Political Trust in Ghana." *Democratization* 24, no. 6 (2017): 906–928.

Haass, F., C. A. Hartzell, and M. Ottmann. "Citizens in Peace Processes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 66, no. 9 (2022): 1547–1561.

Hartzell, C. A., M. Hoddie, and D. Page. "Civil War Settlements, Perceived Agreement Fairness, and Trust in Political Authorities: Investigating the Influence of Power Sharing on Public Opinion in Divided Societies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 68, no. 7-8 (2023): 1552–1579. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231202774.

Herrera, I. R., and J. Dessein. "'We Are Not Drug Traffickers, We Are Colombian Peasants': The Voices and History of Cocaleros in the Substitution Programme of Illicit Crops in Colombia." *Geoforum* 141 (2023): 103734.

Hutchison, M. L., and K. Johnson. "Capacity to Trust? Institutional Capacity, Conflict, and Political Trust in Africa, 2000–2005." *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 6 (2011): 737–752.

Joshi, M., and J. Darby. "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): A Database of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Their Implementation, 1989–2007." *Peacebuilding* 1, no. 2 (2013): 256–274.

Joshi, M., and J. M. Quinn. "Implementing the Peace: The Aggregate Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements and Peace Duration After Intrastate Armed Conflict." *British Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4 (2017): 869–892.

Kreiman, G., and J. Masullo. "Who Shot the Bullets? Exposure to Violence and Attitudes Toward Peace: Evidence from the 2016 Colombian Referendum." *Latin American Politics and Society* 62, no. 4 (2020): 24–49.

Kreutz, J. "How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (2010): 243–250.

Liendo, N., and J. M. Braithwaite. "Determinants of Colombian Attitudes Toward the Peace Process." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35, no. 6 (2018): 622–636.

Matanock, A. M., and N. Garbiras-Díaz. "Considering Concessions: A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35, no. 6 (2018): 637–655.

McKeon, C. "Civil Society: Participating in Peace Processes." People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society, 567–575, 2005.

Mishler, W., and R. Rose. "What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies." *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 1 (2021): 30–62.

Morgan-Jones, E., D. Stefanovic, and N. Loizides. "Citizen Endorsement of Contested Peace Settlements: Public Opinion in Post-Dayton Bosnia." *Democratization* 28, no. 2 (2021): 434–452.

Nilsson, D. "Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in Peace Accords and Durable Peace." *International Organizations* 38, no. 2 (2012): 243–266.

Niño, C. "Los Obstáculos para la 'Paz Total' en Colombia | Nueva Sociedad." https://nuso.org/articulo/305-obstaculos-paz-total-colombia/ (accessed November 9, 2023), 2023.

Nussio, E., M. García-Sánchez, B. Oppenheim, and S. Pantoja-Barrios. "Testing Statebuilding's 'Missing Link': Effects of Government Communications in Colombia." *The Journal of Development Studies* 56, no. 3 (2019): 509–526.

Nygård, H. M., A. Steele, H. M. Binningsbø, et al. "Lights and Shadows of the Peace Agreement Implementation in Colombia: Attitudes and Perceptions in the PDET Territories." Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://www.prio.org/publications/12731, 2021.

Nygård, H. M., and M. Weintraub. "Rejecting Peace? Legacies of Violence in Colombia." Conflict Trends PRIO 4, 2016.
Observatorio de la Democracia. Colombia Rural Posconflicto: Paz, Conflicto y Reconciliación, 2017. Observatorio de la Democracia – Universidad de los Andes, 2018.
Observatorio de la Democracia. "Colombia, Un País Más Allá del Conflicto, 2019 – Paz, Conflicto y Reconciliación." Observatorio de la Democracia – Universidad de los Andes, 2020.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: National Consultations on Transitional Justice: Technical Report. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009.
Prendergast, J., and E. Plumb. "Building Local Capacity: From Implementation to Peacebuilding." Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, 327–349, 2002.
Quinn, L., and M. Gómez Vásquez. 2023. "Implementation of the Colombian Peace Accord Reaches Its Sixth Year." University of Notre Dame. https://doi.org/10.7274/6395W666821.
Raleigh, C. "Political Marginalization, Climate Change, and Conflict in African Sahel States." *International Studies Review* 12, no. 1 (2010): 69–86.
Tellez, J. F. "Worlds Apart: Conflict Exposure and Preferences for Peace." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 4 (2019b): 1053–1076.
Tellez, J. F. "Peace Agreement Design and Public Support for Peace: Evidence from Colombia." *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 6 (2019): 827–844.
Velásquez, M., N. Ávila, M. Villota, et al. "Largely on Their Own: Dealing with the Rural Legacies of Conflict Through Local Participatory Peacebuilding." *Journal of Agrarian Change* 21, no. 2 (2021): 313–331.
Vélez-Torres, I., K. Gough, J. Larrea-Mejía, et al. 2022. "Fests of Vests: The Politics of Participation in Neoliberal Peacebuilding in Colombia." *Antipode* 54, no. 2: 586–607.
Weintraub, M., A. Steele, S. Pantoja-Barrios, et al. "Introducing the Mapping Attitudes, Perceptions and Support (MAPS) Dataset on the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Peace Research* 61, no. 6 (2024): 1085–1098.