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dc.creatorGilles, Enrique 
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-17T15:30:44Z
dc.date.available2015-09-17T15:30:44Z
dc.date.created2010
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationGilles, E. (2010). Political intervention in economic activity. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10810
dc.description.abstractThis paper proposes a political economy explanation of bailouts to declining industries. A model of probabilistic voting is developed, in which two candidates compete for the vote of two groups of the society through tactical redistribution. We allow politicians to have core support groups they understand better, this implies politicians are more or less effective to deliver favors to some groups. This setting is suited to reproduce pork barrels or machine politics and patronage. We use this model to illustrate the case of an economy with both an efficient industry and a declining one, in which workers elect their government. We present the conditions under which the political process ends up with the lagged-behind industry being allowed to survive.
dc.format.extent36 páginas
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo. No 83 (Junio 2010)
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/007180.html
dc.subject.ddcProducción 
dc.subject.lembEconomía
dc.subject.lembPolítica económica
dc.subject.lembClientelismo
dc.subject.lembDistribución de la riqueza
dc.titlePolitical intervention in economic activity
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario
dc.subject.keywordprobabilistic voting
dc.subject.keywordredistribution
dc.subject.keywordsurvival of inefficient firms
dc.subject.keywordpork barrels
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1996). “The determinants of success of special interest in redistributive politics”. The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4, 1132-1155.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDixit, Avinash and John Londregan (1995). “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency”. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, December, pp 856-866.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKornai, J´anos; Eric Maskin and G´erard Roland (2003). “Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint”. Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 41, No. 4, December, pp 1095-1136(42).
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRobinson, James A. and Ragnar Torvik (2005). “A Political Economy Model of the Soft Budget Constraint”. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4274, October
dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10810
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 83
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR


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