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dc.creatorVargas, Juan F. 
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-19T18:47:55Z
dc.date.available2015-09-19T18:47:55Z
dc.date.created2010-04
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10839
dc.descriptionI develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness of conflict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that repression driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.
dc.format.extent30 páginas
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo, N. 82
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/006906.html
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.ddcProcesos sociales 
dc.subject.lembViolencia política
dc.subject.lembPobreza
dc.subject.lembSolución de conflictos
dc.titleRebellion, repression and welfare
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.subject.keywordRebellion
dc.subject.keywordRepression
dc.subject.keywordInequality
dc.subject.keywordMarkov Perfect Equilibrium
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia


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