Identidad Institucional CRAI
Logo EdocUR
    • English
    • español
    • português
  •  Work Submission
  •  FAQs
  • English 
    • English
    • español
    • português
  • Login

Contacto

Twitter

Facebook

Youtube

View Item 
  •   Repositorio Institucional EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
  • Investigación
  • Documentos de investigación
  • Facultad de Economía
  • Documentos de trabajo economía
  • View Item
  •   Repositorio Institucional EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
  • Investigación
  • Documentos de investigación
  • Facultad de Economía
  • Documentos de trabajo economía
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

  • Exportar citas ▼
    • Exportar a Mendeley
    • Exportar a BibTex
Thumbnail

Date
2011
Author
Bardey, David
De Donder, Philippe
Métricas

Share
Citation
URI
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009083.html...

Abstract
We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable

Keyword

discrimination risk ; informational value of test ; personalized medecine ;

Source link

https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009083.html...

Show full item record

Collections
  • Documentos de trabajo economía [285]
Política de Acceso Abierto URPortal de Revistas URRepositorio de Datos de Investigación URCiencia Abierta UR
 

 

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsTitlesAuthorsTypeSubjectsAdvisorBy Issue DateThis CollectionTitlesAuthorsTypeSubjectsAdvisorBy Issue Date

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

View Usage Statistics
Política de Acceso Abierto URPortal de Revistas URRepositorio de Datos de Investigación URCiencia Abierta UR