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dc.creatorBardey, David 
dc.creatorDe Donder, Philippe
dc.descriptionWe develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable
dc.format.extent53 páginas
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo. No 112 (Octubre 2011)
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.lembEnfermedades hereditarias
dc.subject.lembGenética de población
dc.subject.lembRiesgo relativo (Medicina)
dc.titleGenetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.subject.keyworddiscrimination risk
dc.subject.keywordinformational value of test
dc.subject.keywordpersonalized medecine
dc.subject.nlmQH 431
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia

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