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dc.creatorColeff, Joaquín 
dc.creatorGarcía, Daniel 
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-09T20:34:55Z
dc.date.available2015-10-09T20:34:55Z
dc.date.created2013
dc.date.issued2013 
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10997
dc.descriptionWe analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.
dc.format.extent22 páginas
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo. No 142 (Septiembre 2013)
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000091/011006.html
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.ddcProducción 
dc.subject.lembEconomía
dc.subject.lembContratos::Aspectos Económicos
dc.subject.lembOferta y demanda
dc.subject.lembInformación::Aspectos Económicos
dc.subject.lembPolítica de precios
dc.titleInformation provision in procurement auctions
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia


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