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dc.creatorGallego, Juan M. 
dc.date.accessioned2015-11-17T20:42:48Z
dc.date.available2015-11-17T20:42:48Z
dc.date.created2012-11-01
dc.date.issued2012 
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/11529
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the role of works councils in a simple agency framework in which works councils are supposed to monitor manager’s information on behalf of the workforce, but they are independent agents who might pursue their private interest. First, we consider that workers can incentivize works councils through contingent monetary payments. In order to deter collusion, workers must pay higher compensations in states of nature where they can be expropriated by potential coalitions among works councils and management. Collusion makes contingent payments costly and reduces workers’ payoffs. Second, when elections are the exclusive mechanisms to align works councils’ interest, only well compensated representatives would face an intertemporal tradeoff between accepting management’s transfers at first period and losing rents at the second period. Elections increase the cost of entering on collusive behavior with management and works councils will try to behave on the employees’ interest.
dc.format.extent29 Páginas
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/010092.html
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.ddcProducción 
dc.subject.lembRelaciones industriales
dc.subject.lembComités de empresas
dc.subject.lembAdministración::Participación de Empleados
dc.titleWorks councils: an agency perspective
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.subject.keywordWorkplace Representation
dc.subject.keywordWorks Councils
dc.subject.keywordCollusion
dc.subject.keywordElections
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.subject.jelJ50
dc.subject.jelJ53
dc.subject.jelJ83
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


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