Show simple item record

dc.creatorSautua, Santiago-Ignacio 
dc.date.accessioned2016-05-20T13:56:44Z
dc.date.available2016-05-20T13:56:44Z
dc.date.created2016-03-07
dc.date.issued2016
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/12038
dc.description.abstractPrevious research has shown that often there is clear inertia in individual decision making---that is, a tendency for decision makers to choose a status quo option. I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two potential determinants of inertia in uncertain environments: (i) regret aversion and (ii) ambiguity-driven indecisiveness. I use a between-subjects design with varying conditions to identify the effects of these two mechanisms on choice behavior. In each condition, participants choose between two simple real gambles, one of which is the status quo option. I find that inertia is quite large and that both mechanisms are equally important.
dc.format.extent97 páginas
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/014587.html
dc.subject.ddcEconomía 
dc.subject.lembEconomía
dc.subject.lembToma de decisiones
dc.subject.lembInercia::Aspectos Económicos
dc.titleDoes uncertainty cause inertia in decision making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.subject.keywordstatus quo
dc.subject.keywordinertia
dc.subject.keywordreference-dependent preferences
dc.subject.keywordregret aversion
dc.subject.keywordambiguity
dc.subject.keywordindecisiveness
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAgnew, Julie, Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Annika SundÈn. 2003. ìPortfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 401(k) Plan.îAmerican Economic Review, 93(1): 193-215.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationArlen, Jennifer, and Stephan Tontrup. 2014. ìDoes the Endowment E§ect Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing E§ect of Institutions.î NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-36; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-18.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBar-Hillel, Maya, and Efrat Neter. 1996. ìWhy Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets?îJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(1): 17-27.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBell, David. 1982. ìRegret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty.îOperations Research, 30 (5): 961-981.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBell, David. 1985. ìDisappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty.î Operations Research, 33(1): 1-27.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBewley, Truman F. 2002. ìKnightian Decision Theory: Part I.îDecisions in Economics and Finance, 25(2): 79-110.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCamerer, Colin, and Dan Lovallo. 1999. ìOverconÖdence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach.îAmerican Economic Review, 89(1): 306-318.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCettolin, Elena, and Arno Riedl. 2013. ìIndecisiveness Under Uncertainty: Incomplete Preferences in Disguise.î Available at http://adres.ens.fr/IMG/pdf/incomplete_pref_uncertainty.pdf.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChoi, James, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, and Andrew Metrick. 2004. ìFor Better or Worse: Default E§ects and 401(k) Savings Behavior.î In Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, edited by David Wise, 81-121. University of Chicago Press.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCronqvist, Henrik, and Richard Thaler. 2004. ìDesign Choices in Privatized Social-Security Systems: Learning from the Swedish Experience.îAmerican Economic Review, 94(2): 424-428.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDean, Mark. 2008. ìStatus Quo Bias in Large and Small Choice Sets.î Available at http://www.columbia.edu/~md3405/Working_Paper_4.pdf.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDellaVigna, Stefano. 2009. ìPsychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field.îJournal of Economic Literature, 47(2): 315-372.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDellaVigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2006. ìPaying Not to Go to the Gym.îAmerican Economic Review, 96(3): 694-719.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationEllsberg, Daniel. 1961. ìRisk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms.îQuarterly Journal of Economics, 75(4): 643-669.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationEngel, E., and A. Venetoulias. 1991. ìMonty Hallís Probability Puzzle.î Chance, 4: 6-9.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationEpstein, Larry G., and Martin Schneider. 2007. ìLearning under Ambiguity.îReview of Economic Studies, 74: 1275-1303.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationEricson, Keith M. Marzilli, and Andreas Fuster. 2011. ìExpectations as Endowments: Evidence on Reference-Dependent Preferences from Exchange and Valuation Experiments.îQuarterly Journal of Economics, 126(4): 1879-1907.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationErt, Eyal, and Ido Erev. 2013. ìOn the Descriptive Value of Loss Aversion in Decisions under Risk: Six ClariÖcations.îJudgment and Decision Making, 8(3): 214-235.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFiliz-Ozbay, Emel, and Erkut Y. Ozbay. 2007. ìAuctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment.î American Economic Review, 97(4): 1407-1418.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFox, Craig, and Kelly See. 2003. ìBelief and Preference in Decision under Uncertainty.î In Thinking: Psychological Perspectives on Reasoning, Judgment and Decision Making, edited by David Hardman and Laura Macchi. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGhirardato, Paolo, Fabio Maccheroni, and Massimo Marinacci. 2004. ìDi§erentiating Ambiguity and Ambiguity Attitude.îJournal of Economic Theory, 118(2): 133-173.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGilboa, Itzhak. 2009. Theory of Decision under Uncertainty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGilboa, Itzhak, and David Schmeidler. 1989. ìMaxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior.îJournal of Mathematical Economics, 18: 141-153.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGilovich, Thomas, and Victoria Medvec. 1995. ìThe Experience of Regret: What, When and Why.îPsychological Review, 102(2): 379-395.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGleicher, Faith, Kathryn Kost, Sara Baker, Alan Strathman, Steven Richman, and Steven Sherman. 1990. ìThe Role of Counterfactual Thinking in Judgments of A§ect.îPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 16: 284-295.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHarinck, Fieke, Eric Van Dijk, Ilja Van Beest, and Paul Mersmann. 2007. ìWhen Gains Loom Larger than Losses: Reversed Loss Aversion for Small Amounts of Money.îPsychological Science, 18(12): 1099-1105.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHartman, Raymond, Michael Doane, and Chi-Keung Woo. 1991. ìConsumer Rationality and the Status Quo.î Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1): 141-162.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJohn, Oliver P., Eileen M. Donahue, and Robert L. Kentle. 1991. ìThe Big Five Inventoryó Versions 4a and 54.îBerkeley: University of California, Institute of Personality and Social Research.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJohnson, Eric, and Daniel Goldstein. 2003. ìDo Defaults Save Lives?î Science, 302: 1338-1339.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationJohnson, Eric, John Hershey, Jacqueline Meszaros, and Howard Kunreuther. 1993. ìFraming, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions.î Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 7: 35-51.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. ìProspect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.îEconometrica, 47(2): 263-292.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1982. ìThe Psychology of Preferences.îScientiÖc American, 246: 160-173.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKatuöµc·c, Peter, Fabio Michelucci, and Miroslav Zaj̵cek. 2015. ìDoes Feedback Really Matter in One-Shot First-Price Auctions?îJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 119: 139-152.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKlibano§, Peter, Massimo Marinacci, and Sujoy Mukerji. 2005. ìA Smooth Model of Decision Making Under Ambiguity.îEconometrica, 73(6): 1849- 1892.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKlibano§, Peter, Massimo Marinacci, and Sujoy Mukerji. 2012. ìOn the Smooth Ambiguity Model: A Reply.îEconometrica, 80(3): 1303-1321.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationK½oszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2006. ìA Model of ReferenceDependent Preferences.îQuarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4): 1133-1165.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKoszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin. 2007. ìReference-Dependent Risk Attitudes.îAmerican Economic Review, 97(4): 1047-1073.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLandman, Janet. 1987. ìRegret and Elation Following Action and Inaction: A§ective Responses to Positive Versus Negative Outcomes.îPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 13: 524-536.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLanger, Ellen J. 1975. ìThe Illusion of Control.îJournal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(2): 311-328.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLoomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden. 1982. ìRegret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice under Uncertainty.îThe Economic Journal, 92(368): 805-824.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLoomes, Graham, and Robert Sugden. 1986. ìDisappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty.îThe Review of Economic Studies, 53(2): 271-282.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMaccheroni, Fabio, Massimo Marinacci, and Aldo Rustichini. 2006. ìAmbiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences.îEconometrica, 74(6): 1447-1498.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMadrian, Brigitte C., and Dennis F. Shea. 2001. ìThe Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior.îQuarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4): 1149-1187.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMaltz, Amnon, and Giorgia Romagnoli. 2016. ìThe E§ect of Ambiguity on Status Quo Bias: an Experimental Study.î Available at https://sites.google.com/site/amnonmaltz/research.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationQuiggin, John. 1982. ìA Theory of Anticipated Utility.î Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3: 323-343.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRabin, Matthew. 2000. ìRisk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem.îEconometrica, 68(5): 1281-1292.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRisen, Jane, and Thomas Gilovich. 2007. ìAnother Look at Why People Are Reluctant to Exchange Lottery Tickets.î Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(1): 12-22.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRoca, MercÈ, Robin Hogarth, and John Maule. 2006. ìAmbiguity Seeking as a Result of the Status Quo Bias.îJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 32: 175-194.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRoss, Lee, and Richard Nisbett. 1991. The Person and The Situation: Perspectives of Social Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSamuelson, William, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1988. ìStatus Quo Bias in Decision Making.îJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1: 7-59.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSautua, Santiago I. 2016. ìRisk, Ambiguity, and DiversiÖcation.îAvailable at https://sites.google.com/site/santiagoisautua/research
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSavage, Leonard J. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSprenger, Charles. 2015. ìAn Endowment E§ect for Risk: Experimental Tests of Stochastic Reference Points.îJournal of Political Economy, 123(6): 1456- 1499.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationStrack, Philipp, and Paul Viefers. 2015. ìToo Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions.îAvailable at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2465840 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2465840.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationStrahilevitz, Michal A., and George Loewenstein. 1998. ìThe E§ect of Ownership History on the Valuation of Objects.îJournal of Consumer Research, 25(3): 276-289.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSugden, Robert. 2003. ìReference-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility.î Journal of Economic Theory, 111: 172-191.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationThaler, Richard. 1980. ìToward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice.î Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1: 39-60.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationThaler, Richard, and Cass Sunstein. 2009. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New York: Penguin Books.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTierney, John. 1991. ìBehind Monty Hallís Doors: Puzzle, Debate and Answer?îThe New York Times, July 21.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. ìAdvances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty.îJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5: 297-323.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationvan de Ven, Niels, and Marcel Zeelenberg. 2011. ìRegret Aversion and the Reluctance to Exchange Lottery Tickets.î Journal of Economic Psychology, 32: 194-200.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationvos Savant, Marilyn. 1990a. ìAsk Marilyn.îParade, 15, September 9.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationvos Savant, Marilyn. 1990b. ìAsk Marilyn.îParade, 25, December 2.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationvos Savant, Marilyn. 1991. ìAsk Marilyn.îParade, 12, February 17.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationWeinstein, Neil. 1980. ìUnrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events.î Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5): 806-820.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationWeinstein, Neil. 1987. ìUnrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample.îJournal of Behavioral Medicine, 5: 481-500.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationZeelenberg, Marcel, Wilco W. van Dijk, and Antony Manstead. 1998. ìReconsidering the Relationship between Regret and Responsibility.î Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 74: 254-272.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationZeelenberg, Marcel, and Rik Pieters. 2007. ìA Theory of Regret Regulation 1.0.îJournal of Consumer Psychology, 17(1): 3-18.
dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.subject.jelC91
dc.subject.jelD01
dc.subject.jelD03
dc.subject.jelD81
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_12038
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR


Files in this item

Thumbnail
Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

 

Línea de atención a estudiantes: (601) 297 0200 opción 3 y 1 I Calle 12C Nº 6-25 - Bogotá D.C. Colombia.