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dc.creatorRoig, Guillem  
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-11T14:28:05Z
dc.date.available2018-04-11T14:28:05Z
dc.date.created2018-03-23
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/17852
dc.description.abstractI study the incentives of a common buyer to undertake cooperative investment with a group of suppliers providing a homogeneous input. In my model, investment is not directed to increase the gains from trade but to enhance the competitive pressure among suppliers. At the same time, however, investment may strengthen the bargaining position of suppliers. Which effect dominates depends on the intensity of competition in the trading game, which also determines the equilibrium distribution of investment. Then, the model reproduces different market structures, and a firm may have higher incentives to become active in markets where competition is expected to be vigorous.
dc.format.extent41
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/016203.html
dc.subject.ddcProducción 
dc.subject.lembOrganización industrial (Teoría económica)
dc.subject.lembCooperación industrial
dc.titleInvestment and Market Structure in Common Agency Games
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.subject.keywordCooperative investment
dc.subject.keywordMarket structure
dc.subject.keywordCompetition
dc.subject.keywordBargaining position
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.subject.jelD44; L11.
dc.contributor.gruplacFacultad de Economía
dc.creator.googleRoig, Guillem
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 215
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


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