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dc.creatorFatas, Enrique 
dc.creatorMelendez, Miguel Angel 
dc.creatorSolaz, Hector 
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-13T21:17:01Z
dc.date.available2018-11-13T21:17:01Z
dc.date.created2018-11-07
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18696
dc.descriptionWe experimentally study punishment patterns across network structures, and their effect on cooperation. In a repeated public goods setting, subjects can only observe and punish their neighbors. Centralized structures (like the star network) outperform other incomplete networks and reach contribution levels like the ones observed in a complete network. Our results suggest that hierarchical network structures with a commonly observed player benefit more from sanctions not because central players punish more, but because they follow, and promote, different punishment patterns. While quasi-central players in other incomplete architectures (like the line network) retaliate, and get trapped in the vicious circle of antisocial punishment, central players in the star network do not punish back, increase their contributions when sanctioned by peripheral players, and sanction other participants in a prosocial manner. Our results illustrate recent field studies on the evolutionary prevalence of hierarchical networks. We document a network-based rationale for this positive effect in an identity-free, fully anonymous environment.
dc.format.extent38
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/016946.html
dc.subjectPublic good experiments
dc.subjectNetworks
dc.subjectMonitoring
dc.subjectPunishment
dc.subject.lembBienes públicos
dc.subject.lembModelos econométricos
dc.subject.lembTeoría de los juegos
dc.titleThe Vertical Cooperative : An experiment on cooperation and punishment across networks
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelC91
dc.subject.jelC92
dc.subject.jelD90
dc.subject.jelH41


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