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dc.creatorDustan, Andrew 
dc.creatorMaldonado, Stanislao 
dc.creatorHernandez-Agramont, Juan Manuel 
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-28T13:21:04Z
dc.date.available2019-01-28T13:21:04Z
dc.date.created2018-12-22
dc.date.issued2018 
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18934
dc.description.abstractWe study how non-monetary incentives, motivated by recent advances in behavioral economics, affect civil servant performance in a context where state capacity is weak. We collaborated with a government agency in Peru to experimentally vary the content of text messages targeted to civil servants in charge of a school maintenance program. These messages incorporate behavioral insights in dimensions related to information provision, social norms, and weak forms of monitoring and auditing. We find that these messages are a very cost-effective strategy to enforce compliance with national policies among civil servants. We further study the role of social norms and the salience of social benefits in a follow-up experiment and explore the external validity of our original results by implementing a related experiment with civil servants from a different national program. The findings of these new experiments support our original results and provide additional insights regarding the context in which these incentives may work. Our results highlight the importance of carefully designed non-monetary incentives as a tool to improve civil servant performance when the state lacks institutional mechanisms to enforce compliance.
dc.format.extent98 paginas
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/017106.html
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/
dc.subjectState capacity
dc.subjectNon-monetary incentives
dc.subjectCivil servants
dc.subject.ddcAdministración pública 
dc.subject.lembFuncionarios públicos
dc.subject.lembComportamiento organizacional
dc.subject.lembIncentivos
dc.titleMotivating bureaucrats with non-monetary incentives when state capacity is weak : Evidence from large-scale field experiments in Peru
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.subject.jelC93, D73, O15
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


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Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia