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dc.creatorCremer, Helmuth 
dc.creatorDe Donder, Philippe 
dc.creatorMaldonado, Dario 
dc.creatorPestieau, Pierre 
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-25T23:55:42Z
dc.date.available2020-05-25T23:55:42Z
dc.date.created2008
dc.identifier.issn15736970
dc.identifier.issn09275940
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22182
dc.description.abstract"This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings and labor supply decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is ""paternalistic"": the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates, with and without liquidity constraints. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree is unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC."
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Tax and Public Finance, ISSN:15736970, 09275940, Vol.15, No.5 (2008); pp. 547-562
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-50249107600&doi=10.1007%2fs10797-007-9031-2&partnerID=40&md5=b9e0e75fa97a83f6371c11416cb1b726
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.titleDesigning a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity
dc.typearticle
dc.subject.keywordDual-self model
dc.subject.keywordMyopia
dc.subject.keywordSocial security
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaArtículo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-007-9031-2
dc.relation.citationEndPage562
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 5
dc.relation.citationStartPage547
dc.relation.citationTitleInternational Tax and Public Finance
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 15


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