Show simple item record

dc.creatorRoig, Guillem 
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-19T21:33:45Z
dc.date.available2020-06-19T21:33:45Z
dc.date.created2020-06-01
dc.date.issued2020-06-18
dc.identifier.citationRoig, Guillem (2020) The value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contracts. Bogota : Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Bogota. Documentos de trabajo economía. 21 pp.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/25237
dc.descriptionEste artículo examina los incentivos para que un comprador realice una inversión específica de la relación en presencia de múltiples proveedores que brindan un aporte homogéneo. Cuando varios proveedores compiten por un solo comprador, la inversión del comprador afecta su opción externa en caso de ruptura de la relación. La inversión específica de la relación con un proveedor reduce así la opción externa del comprador, en caso de que se produzca un desglose de la oferta con este proveedor, pero aumenta la opción externa del comprador con respecto a un desglose de la oferta de los proveedores competidores. La medida en que los proveedores ofrecen contratos comerciales diseñados para sustituir la pérdida comercial de un desglose de la relación, por lo tanto, da forma a los cambios en la opción externa del comprador y sus incentivos para invertir. El presente documento muestra que la introducción de la competencia a un lado del mercado reduce el problema de atraso asociado con la inversión específica de la relación y establece condiciones en las que la inversión no se materializa.
dc.description.abstractThis article examines the incentives for a buyer to undertake relationship-specific investment in the presence of multiple suppliers who provide a homogeneous input. When multiple suppliers compete for a single buyer, the buyer's investment affects its outside option in the event of a relationship breakdown. Relationship-specific investment with a supplier thus reduces the buyer's outside option, were there to be a supply breakdown with this supplier, but increases the buyer's outside option with respect to a supply breakdown of competing suppliers. The extent to which suppliers offer trading contracts designed to substitute the trade loss from a relationship breakdown, therefore shapes the changes in the buyer's outside option and its incentives to invest. The present paper shows that introducing competition to one side of the market reduces the hold-up problem associated with relationship-specific investment and establishes conditions where investment does not materialize.
dc.format.extent31
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018208.html
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subjectInversión especifica
dc.subjectOpción exterior
dc.subjectDesglose de relación
dc.subject.ddcEconomía 
dc.subject.ddcCooperativas 
dc.titleThe value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contracts
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.subject.keywordSpecific investment
dc.subject.keywordOutside option
dc.subject.keywordRelationship breakdown
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAghion, P., Dewatripont, M. and P. Rey (1994): “Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information”, Econometrica, 62(2), pp. 257-282.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationArru˜nada, B. and XH. V´azquez (2006): “When Your Contract Manufacturer Becomes Your Competitor”, Harvard Business Review 84(9): 135-159
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBattigalli, P., Fumagalli, C., and M. Polo, (2007): “Buyer Power and Quality Improvements”. Research in Economics 61, 45-61.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBernheim, B., and M. Whinston (1986): “Common Agency”, Econometrica, Vol. 54, No. 4, 923- 942
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCai, H. (2003): “ A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership,” RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34(1), pages 63-77, Spring
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChatterjee K. and Y.S. Chiu (2007). “When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?,” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. 7(1), pages 1-39.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChiesa, G., and V. Denicol`o (2009): “Trading with a Common Agent under Complete Information: A Characterization of Nash Equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 296-311.
dc.source.bibliographicCitation——— (2012): “Competition in Non-linear Pricing, Market Concentration and Mergers”, Economic Letters, 117, 414-417
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChe, Y., and T. Chung (1999): “Contract Damages and Cooperative Investment”, The RAND Journal of Economics, 84-105
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChe, Y., and D. Hausch (1999): “Cooperative Investment and the Value of Contracting”, The American Economic Review, 125-147
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChung, T. Y. (1991): “Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investment, and Risk Sharing.” Review of Economic Studies, 58(5), pp. 1031-42.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCole, H. L., Mailath, G. J. and A. Postlewaite, (2001a) “Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies.”, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 101 (2001a), pp. 333-373.
dc.source.bibliographicCitation(2001b). “Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies.” Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, Article 2
dc.source.bibliographicCitationEdlin, A. S. and S. Reichelstein (1996): “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies and Optimal Investment”, American Economic Review, 86, 478-501.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationErnst D. (2000). “Inter-organizational Knowledge Outsourcing: What Permits Small Taiwanese Firms to Compete in the Computer Industry”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 17(2): 223- 255
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFelli, L., and K. Roberts, “Does Competition Solve the Hold-Up Problem?”, Economica, Vol. 83 (2016), pp. 172-200.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationG¨oller, D. (2019): “Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: An Optimal Contract when Interim Renegotiation Is Possible”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 175, pp. 736-764
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHall, P. and D. Soskice (2001): “Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage”, Oxford: Oxford University Press
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHarford, J., Schonlau, R. and J. Stanfield (2018) “Trade Relationships, Indirect Economic Links, and Mergers”, Management Science, pp. 1-26
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHart, O., and J. Moore, (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1119-1158.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHart, O., and J. Moore, (1999): “Foundations of incomplete contracts”, Review of Economic Studies. 66, 115-138.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHori, K. (2006): “Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment”, Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Vol 6.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHorn H., and A. Wolinsky (1988): “Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger”, RAND Journal of economics Vol.19, No 3, 408-419.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHo K., and R. Lee (2019): “Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets ”, American Economic Review 109(2), 473-522.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationInderst, R., and C. Wey, (2007): “Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives” European Economic Review, 51, 647-667
dc.source.bibliographicCitationInderst, R., and C. Wey, (2011): “Countervailing Power and Dynamic Efficiency”, Journal of European Economic Association, 9, 702-720.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKang, M., J. Mahoney and D. Tan (2009): “Why Firms Make Unilateral Investments Specific to Other Firms: The Case of OEM Suppliers”, Strategic Management Journal 30, 117-135.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKlein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchian (1978): “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process”, Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 297-326.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKonakayama, A., T. Mitsui and S. Watanabe (1986): “Efficient Contracting with Reliance and a Damage Measure”, RAND Journal of Economics, 17, 450-457
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLiebman, E. (2018): “Bargaining in Markets with Exclusion: An Analysis on Health Insurance Networks” Unpublished.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLovejoy, W. (1999): “Integrated Operations”, Southwestern College Publishing, Cincinnati, OH
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMailath, G., Postlewaite, A., and L. Samuelson (2013): “Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets”, Theoretical Economics, 8 (2): 535-590
dc.source.bibliographicCitationNg, S. (1997): “Supply chain management at Solectron”. Presentation, industrial Symposium on Supply Chain Management, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationN¨oldeke, G. and K. M. Schmidt (1995): “Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem”, RAND Journal of Economics, 26, 163-179
dc.source.bibliographicCitationPlambeck, E. L. and A. Taylor (2017) “Implications of Breach Remedy and Renegotiation Design for Innovation and Capacity”, Management Science, 53 pp. 1859-1871
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRaskovich, A. (2003): “Pivotal Buyers and Bargaining Position”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 51, 405-426
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRogerson, W. P. (1992): “Contractual Solution to the Hold-up Problem”, Review of Economic Studies, 59, 777-793
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSegal, I. (1999): “Contracting with Externalities”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 337-388
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSegal, I. and M. Whinston (1996): “Naked Exclusion and Buyer Coordination”, Discussion Paper No. 1780, Harvard Institute of Economic Research.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSchmitz, P. W. (2002b): “Simple Contracts, Renegotiation under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-up Problem”, European Economic Review, 46, 169-188.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationVieira-Montez, J., (2007); “Downstream Mergers and Producer’s Capacity Choice: Why Bake a Larger Pie When Getting a Smaller Slice?”, RAND Journal of Economics, 38, 948-966
dc.source.bibliographicCitationWilliamson, O. (1979): “The Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual relations”, Journal of Law and Economics, 22, 233-261.
dc.source.bibliographicCitation(1983): “Credible Commitment: Using Hostages to Support Exchange”, The American Economic Review, 73, 519-540.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationWhitford, J. (2005): “The New Old Economy: Networks, Institutions, and Organizational Transformation of American Manufacturing”, Oxford University Press
dc.subject.jelD44
dc.subject.jelL11
dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record