Show simple item record

dc.creatorAycinena, Diego 
dc.creatorElbittar, Alexander 
dc.creatorGomberg, Andrei 
dc.creatorRentschler, Lucas 
dc.date.accessioned2020-08-25T20:10:06Z
dc.date.available2020-08-25T20:10:06Z
dc.date.created2020-08-24
dc.date.issued2020-08-25
dc.identifier.citationAycinena, Diego; Elbittar, Alexander; Gomberg, Andrei; Rentschler, Lucas (2020) Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 33 pp.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/28282
dc.descriptionLa sabiduría convencional sugiere que prometerle a un agente información gratuita desplazaría la costosa adquisición de información. Demostramos teóricamente que esta intuición solo se sostiene como un caso filo de cuchillo donde los priores son simétricos. Para los antecedentes asimétricos, se predice que los agentes aumentarán su adquisición de información cuando se les prometa información gratuita en el futuro. Probamos en el laboratorio si tal desplazamiento ocurre tanto para los anteriores simétricos como asimétricos. Encontramos apoyo teórico para las predicciones: cuando los antecedentes son asimétricos, la promesa de información "gratuita" en el futuro induce a los sujetos a adquirir información costosa que de otra manera no estarían adquiriendo.
dc.description.abstractConventional wisdom suggests that promising an agent free information would crowd out costly information acquisition. We theoretically demonstrate that this intuition only holds as a knife-edge case where priors are symmetric. For asymmetric priors, agents are predicted to increase their information acquisition when promised free information in the future. We test in the lab whether such crowding out occurs for both symmetric and asymmetric priors. We find theoretical support for the predictions: when priors are asymmetric, the promise of future “free” information induces subjects to acquire costly information which they would not be acquiring otherwise.
dc.format.extent33 pp.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018358.html
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Colombia
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/co/
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subjectAdquisición de información
dc.subjectIgnorancia racional
dc.subjectExperimentos
dc.subject.ddcEconomía 
dc.titleDoes free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.subject.keywordInformation acquisition
dc.subject.keywordRational ignorance
dc.subject.keywordExperiments
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAllcott, Hunt and Dmitry Taubinsky, “Evaluating behaviorally motivated policy: Experimental evidence from the lightbulb market,” American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (8), 2501–2538
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBattaglini, Marco, Rebecca B. Morton, and Thomas R. Palfrey, “The swing voter’s curse in the laboratory,” Review of Economic Studies, 2010, 77 (1), 61–89
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBernheim, B. Douglas and Dmitry Taubinsky, “Behavioral Public Economics,” in “Handbook of Behavioral Economics,” Vol. 1, Elsevier B.V., 2018, chapter 5, pp. 381–516
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBhargava, Saurabh, George Loewenstein, and Justin Sydnor, “Choose to lose: Health plan choices from a menu with dominated options,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2017, 132 (3), 1319–1372
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBhattacharya, Sourav, John Duffy, and Sun Tak Kim, “Voting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence,” Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 102, 316–338
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBlackwell, David, “Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments,” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1962, 33 (2), 719–726
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBollinger, Bryan, Phillip Leslie, and Alan Sorensen, “Calorie posting in chain restaurants,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2011, 3 (1), 91–128
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCaplin, Andrew and Daniel Martin, “A testable theory of imperfect perception,” Economic Journal, 2015, 125 (582), 184–202
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCaplin, Andrew and Daniel Martin, “Framing as Information Design,” 2018.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCaplin, Andrew; Daniel Martin and Mark Dean, “Revealed preference, rational inattention, and costly information acquisition,” American Economic Review, 2015, 105 (7), 2183–2203
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChade, Hector and Edward E. Schlee, “Another look at the Radner-Stiglitz nonconcavity in the value of information,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 107 (2), 421–452
dc.source.bibliographicCitationChaloupka, Frank J., Kenneth E. Warner, Daron Acemoglu, Jonathan Gruber, Fritz Laux, Wendy ˘ Max, Joseph Newhouse, Thomas Schelling, and Jody Sindelar, “An evaluation of the FDA’s analysis of the costs and benefits of the graphic warning label regulation,” Tobacco Control, 2015, 24 (2), 112–119
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDean, Mark and Nathaniel Neligh, “Experimental Tests of Rational Inattention,” Working Paper, 2017, (June), 1–55
dc.source.bibliographicCitationElbittar, Alexander, Andrei Gomberg, Cesar Martinelli, and Thomas R. Palfrey ´ , “Ignorance and bias in collective decisions,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, dec 2016, In press
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFischbacher, Urs, “z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments,” Experimental economics, 2007, 10 (2), 171–178
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFligner, Michael A and George E Policello, “Robust rank procedures for the Behrens-Fisher problem,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1981, 76 (373), 162–168
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFrederick, Shane, “Cognitive reflection and decision making,” Journal of Economic perspectives, 2005, 19 (4), 25–42
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGrosser, Jens and Michael Seebauer, “Standing versus Ad Hoc Committees with Costly Information Acquisition,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGuarnaschelli, Serena, Richard D. Mckelvey, and Thomas R. Palfrey, “An Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules,” American Political Science Review, 2018, 94 (2), 407–423
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHannaford, Paula L., Valerie P. Hans, and G. Thomas Munsterman, “Permitting jury discussions during trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform.,” Law and Human Behavior, 2000, 24 (3), 359–382
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLarreguy, Horacio, John Marshall, and James M Snyder, “Publicizing malfeasance: When the local media structure facilitates electoral accountability in Mexico,” The Economic Journal, 2020
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLeon, Gianmarco ´ , “Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Peru,” Journal of Development Economics, 2017, 127 (December 2016), 56–71
dc.source.bibliographicCitationRadner, Roy and Joseph Stiglitz, “A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information,” in M. Boyer and R.E. Kihlstrom, eds., Bayesian models in economic theory, Elsevier, 1984, chapter 3, pp. 33–52
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelC90
dc.subject.jelD44
dc.subject.jelD80
dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosario
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Colombia
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 2.5 Colombia