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dc.creatorRoig, Guillem  
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-11T21:05:39Z
dc.date.available2020-09-11T21:05:39Z
dc.date.created2014-03-26
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/29850
dc.description.abstractThis article o?ers a solution to the “hold-up” problem in a bilateral investment game. Without the existence of a centralized grand-contract, a buyer signs non-exclusive contracts with many sellers, and the equilibrium investment profile depends on the level of competition in the trading outcome. I a common agency game where both sides of the market undertake investment, full eciency is only implemented when the trading outcome is the most competitive. Due to the strategic complementarity of investments, payo?s are generally not monotone with the bargaining position, and lower competitive outcomes may generate larger aggregate surpluses.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofTSE Working Papers, No. 481 (March 2014); 48 pp.
dc.relation.urihttp://publications.ut-capitole.fr/15874/
dc.sourceTSE Working Papers
dc.titleCompetition and the hold?up problem: a setting with non?exclusive contracts
dc.typepreprint
dc.publisherToulouse School of Economics
dc.subject.keywordHold-up
dc.subject.keywordBilateral investment
dc.subject.keywordCommon agency
dc.subject.keywordCompetition
dc.subject.keywordWelfare
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaPre-Impresión
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/draft
dc.title.TranslatedTitleLa competencia y el problema de los atracos: un escenario con contratos no exclusivos
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 481
dc.relation.citationTitleTSE Working Papers


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