Ítem
Acceso Abierto
The Need for Enemies
Título de la revista
Autores
Fergusson L.
Robinson J.A.
Torvik R.
Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando
Archivos
Fecha
2016
Directores
ISSN de la revista
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Editor
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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Resumen
Abstract
We develop a model where some politicians have an edge in undertaking a task and this gives them electoral advantage, creating an incentive to underperform in the task. We test the empirical implications in the context of fighting against insurgents, using Colombian data. The main prediction is that large defeats for the insurgents reduce the probability that these politicians fight them, especially in electorally salient places. We find that after the largest victories against FARC rebels, the government reduced its counterinsurgency efforts, especially in politically important municipalities. Politicians need to keep enemies alive in order to maintain their political advantage. © 2014 Royal Economic Society
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Keywords
Electoral system , Political power , Political relations , Colombia
