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When Do Signals Counteract The Effects of Confirmation Bias? Evidence From Sell-Side Analysts’ Forecasts

dc.contributor.advisorGómez, Karoll
dc.contributor.advisorFlorez-Acosta, Jorge
dc.creatorAstaiza, José Gabriel
dc.creator.degreeMagíster en Economíaspa
dc.creator.degreetypeFull timespa
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-29T16:54:33Z
dc.date.available2018-10-29T16:54:33Z
dc.date.created2018-10-24
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractI empirically study whether strong signals counteract the effects of confirmation bias in sell-side analysts’ stock price forecasts when these signals are contradictory. I use target prices to measure forecast bias and the growth in Earnings Per Share as signals, and regress analysts’ forecast bias over different deciles of high signals interacted with prior negative forecast bias in a dynamic panel data model. I find that analysts underreact to favorable signals when the prior is pessimistic, except for sufficiently strong signals which cause analysts to issue more optimistic target prices. Also, that analysts underreact to low signals, except for sufficiently low signals.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_18661
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18661
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.publisher.programMaestría en Economíaspa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subjectEarnings growthspa
dc.subjectPessimistic priorspa
dc.subjectOverreaction to signalsspa
dc.subjectContradictory signalsspa
dc.subject.ddcProducciónspa
dc.subject.lembPreciosspa
dc.subject.lembGananciasspa
dc.subject.lembPronóstico de la economíaspa
dc.titleWhen Do Signals Counteract The Effects of Confirmation Bias? Evidence From Sell-Side Analysts’ Forecastsspa
dc.typemasterThesiseng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaTesis de maestríaspa
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