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Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia

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dc.creatorGallego Durán, Jorge Andrés
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-17T21:02:06Z
dc.date.available2015-09-17T21:02:06Z
dc.date.created2015-02
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractWhat are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.eng
dc.format.extent51 páginasspa
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.format.tipoDocumentospa
dc.identifier.citationJorge Andrés, G. D. (2015). Natural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombia. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10819
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economíaspa
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10819
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosariospa
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economíaspa
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 178
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.ispartofSerie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 178spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/012537.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)spa
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombiaspa
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dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.ddcOtros problemas & servicios sociales
dc.subject.lembElecciones::Colombiaspa
dc.subject.lembCorrupción políticaspa
dc.subject.lembCorrupción administrativaspa
dc.subject.lembDesastres naturales::Colombiaspa
dc.titleNatural disasters and clientelism: the case of floods and landslides in Colombiaspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
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