Ítem
Acceso Abierto

Corruption in the Times of Pandemia

Mostrar el registro sencillo de la publicación
dc.contributor.gruplacGrupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.creatorGallego Durán, Jorge Andrés
dc.creatorPrem, Mounu
dc.creatorVargas Duque, Juan Fernando
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T19:02:55Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T19:02:55Z
dc.date.created2020-05-26
dc.date.issued2020-05-13
dc.descriptionLa crisis de salud pública causada por la pandemia de COVID-19, junto con la subsiguiente emergencia económica y la agitación social, ha empujado a los gobiernos a aumentar el gasto de manera sustancial y rápida. Debido a la naturaleza apremiante de la crisis, las normas y procedimientos de contratación pública se han relajado en muchos lugares para acelerar las transacciones. Sin embargo, esto también puede crear oportunidades para la corrupción. Utilizando información a nivel de contrato sobre el gasto público de la plataforma de compras electrónicas de Colombia, y una estrategia de identificación de diferencias en diferencias, encontramos que los municipios clasificados por un algoritmo de aprendizaje automático como tradicionalmente más propensos a la corrupción reaccionan al aumento del gasto liderado por una pandemia. utilizando una mayor proporción de contratos discrecionales no competitivos y aumentando su valor promedio. Esto es especialmente así en el caso de los contratos para adquirir bienes y servicios relacionados con la crisis. Nuestra evidencia sugiere que los grandes shocks negativos que requieren un gasto rápido y masivo pueden aumentar la corrupción, compensando al menos parcialmente los efectos atenuantes de este instrumento fiscal.spa
dc.description.abstractThe public health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with the subsequent economic emergency and social turmoil, has pushed governments to substantially and swiftly increase spending. Because of the pressing nature of the crisis, public procurement rules and procedures have been relaxed in many places in order to expedite transactions. However, this may also create opportunities for corruption. Using contract-level information on public spending from Colombia’s e-procurement platform, and a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that municipalities classified by a machine learning algorithm as traditionally more prone to corruption react to the pandemic-led spending surge by using a larger proportion of discretionary non-competitive contracts and increasing their average value. This is especially so in the case of contracts to procure crisis-related goods and services. Our evidence suggests that large negative shocks that require fast and massive spending may increase corruption, thus at least partially offsetting the mitigating effects of this fiscal instrument.spa
dc.format.extent30spa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.citationGallego, Jorge; Prem, Mounu; Vargas F., Juan (2020) Corruptión in the times of pandemia. Universidad del Rosario, Department of Economics, Documentos de trabajo economía. 30 pp.spa
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_24367
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24367
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/018178.html
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAcemoglu, D., V. Chernozhukov, I. Werning, and M. Whinston (2020): “A Multi-Risk SIR Model with Optimally Targeted Lockdown,” Mimeospa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAdida, C., K. Dinone, and M. Platas (2019): “Ebola, elections, and immigration: how politicizing an epidemic can shape public attitudes,” Politics, Groups, and Identities, 1–27.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAndresen, J., N. Johannsen, and B. Rijkers (2020): “Elite Capture of Foreign Aid: Evidence from Offshore Bank Accounts,” World Bank Policy Research Paper no. 9150.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAvis, E., C. Ferraz, and F. Finan (2018): “Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Estimating the Impacts of Exposing Corrupt Politicians,” Journal of Political Economy, 126, 1912– 1964.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBandiera, O., N. Buehren, M. Goldstein, I. Rasul, and A. Smurra (2019): “The Economic Lives of Young Women in the Time of Ebola: Lessons from an Empowerment Program,” World Bank Working Paper.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBanerjee, A., S. Mullainathan, and R. Hanna (2012): “Corruption,” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBeall, A., M. Hofer, and M. Schaller (2016): ““Infections and elections: Did an Ebola outbreak influence the 2014 US federal elections (and if so, how)?” Psychological Science, 27, 595–605.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004): “How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates?” The Quarterly journal of economics, 119, 249–275.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCAF (2019): “2019 Report on Economic Development - Integrity in Public Policies: Keys to Prevent Corruption,” Tech. rep., CAF-Development Bank of Latin America.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationCampante, F., E. Depetris-Chauvin, and R. Durante (2020): “The Virus of Fear: The Political Impact of Ebola in the U.S.” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationColonnelli, E., J. Gallego, and M. Prem (2020): “What Predicts Corruption?” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationConley, T. G. (1999): “GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence,” Journal of Econometrics, 92, 1–45.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitation——— (2016): Spatial Econometrics, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1–9.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationDe Michele, R. and J. Cruz (2020): “How Transparency Can Save Lives in the Coronavirus Crisis,” Americas Quarterly.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFerguson, N., D. Laydon, G. Nedjati-Gilani, N. Imai, K. Ainslie, M. Baguelin, S. Bhatia, A. Boonyasiri, and Z. Cucunuba et al. (2020): “Report 9: Impact of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand,” Tech. rep., Imperial College London.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFerraz, C. and F. Finan (2008): “Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes,” The Quarterly journal of economics, 123, 703–745.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFisman, R. (2001): “Estimating the value of political connections,” American economic review, 91, 1095–1102.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFisman, R. and M. Golden (2017): Corruption. What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationFluckiger, M., M. Ludwig, and A. Onder (2019): “Ebola and state legitimacy,” Economic Journal, 129, 2064–2089.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGallego, J. (2018): “Natural Disasters and Clientelism: The Case of Floods and Landslides in Colombia,” Electoral Studies, 55, 73–88.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGallego, J., G. Rivero, and J. Martinez (2019): “Preventing Rather than Punishing: An Early Warning Model of Malfeasance in Public Procurement,” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGarret, T. and R. Sobel (2003): “The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster Payments,” Economic Inquiry, 41, 496–509.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGasper, J. and A. Reeves (2011): “Make It Rain? Retrospection and the Attentive Electorate in the Context of Natural Disasters,” American Journal of Political Science, 55, 340–355.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationGonzalez-Torres, A. and E. Esposito (2017): “Epidemics and conflict: Evidence from the Ebola outbreak in Western Africa,” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKhemani, S. (2020): “An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the Time of COVID-19,” World Bank Research and Policy Brief.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLeeson, P. and R. Sobel (2008): “Weathering Corruption,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 51, 667–681.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLoayza, N. and S. Pennings (2020): “Macroeconomic Policy in the Time of COVID-19:A Primer for Developing Countries,” World Bank Reserch and Policy Brief.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationLudvigson, S., S. Ma, and S. Ng (2020): “Covid19 and the Macroeconomic Effects of Costly Disasters,” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMaffioli, E. (2020): “The Political Economy of Health Epidemics: Evidence from the Ebola Outbreak,” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMartinez, L. (2019): “Sources of Revenue and Government Performance: Evidence from Colombia,” Mimeo.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationMobarak, A. and Z. Barnett-Howell (2020): “Poor countries need to think twice about social distancing,” Foreign Policy, 10.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationNikolova, E. and N. Marinov (2017): “Do Public Fund Windfalls Increase Corruption? Evidence From a Natural Disaster,” Comparative Political Studies, 50, 1455–1488.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationOlken, B. (2007): “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of Political Economy, 115, 200–249.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationOlken, B. and R. Pande (2012): “Corruption in Developing Countries,” Annual Review of Economics, 4, 479–509.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationPolley, E. C., S. Rose, and M. J. Van der Laan (2011): “Super learning,” in Targeted Learning, Springer, 43–66.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTransparencia por Colombia (2017): “Indice de Transparencia Municipal. Resultados 2015- abril 2016,” Tech. rep., Corporacion Transparencia por Colombia.spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationTransparency International (2010): “Handbook of Good Practices: Preventing Corruption in Humanitarian Operations,” Tech. rep., Transparency International.spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subjectCorrupciónspa
dc.subjectCOVID-19spa
dc.subjectLa contratación públicaspa
dc.subjectAprendizaje automáticospa
dc.subject.ddcAdministración públicaspa
dc.subject.ddcProblemas sociales & bienestar social en generalspa
dc.subject.jelH57spa
dc.subject.jelH75spa
dc.subject.jelD73spa
dc.subject.jelI18spa
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionspa
dc.subject.keywordCOVID-19spa
dc.subject.keywordPublic procurementspa
dc.subject.keywordMachine learningspa
dc.titleCorruption in the Times of Pandemiaspa
dc.typeworkingPapereng
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajospa
Archivos
Bloque original
Mostrando1 - 2 de 2
Miniatura
Nombre:
index250.html
Tamaño:
221 B
Formato:
Hypertext Markup Language
Descripción:
Descargar
Miniatura
Nombre:
dt250.pdf
Tamaño:
1.49 MB
Formato:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Descripción:
Descargar
Colecciones
Documentos de trabajo economía