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Who controls the board in non-profit organizations? The case of private higher education institutions in Colombia

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dc.creatorBradford, Henry
dc.creatorGuzmán, Alexander
dc.creatorRestrepo-Abondano, Jose-Manuel
dc.creatorTrujillo, María-Andrea
dc.creator.googleBradford, Henry
dc.creator.googleGuzmán, Alexander
dc.creator.googleRestrepo, José Manuel
dc.creator.googleTrujillo, María-Andrea
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-24T20:22:51Z
dc.date.available2019-09-24T20:22:51Z
dc.date.created2018
dc.date.issued2018
dc.description.abstractHow should the governance system in a non-membership non-profit organization be designed? This organizational form has no shareholders; instead, donors provide funds. Thus, at the organizational level, the board of directors could have all the power. Under this legal form, who controls the board? If too powerful, boards could misuse resources or distract the organization from its foundational goals. We examine the case of private higher education institutions (HEIs) in Colombia and the balance of power in university governance systems which feature this organizational form. Most HEIs in our sample have a kind of assembly of representatives as the governance body with the highest authority and able to appoint and control the board. We specifically discuss the assemblies’ reason for being, structure, and functions in private HEIs in Colombia. We analyze a total of 204 HEI governance structures and find governance arrangements with the characteristics of an assembly of representatives in 154 (75.9%). Our analysis highlights features in some of these governance bodies that could lead to overly powerful assemblies (e.g., founder donors with tenure for life). Clearly, a proper balance of power is required to avoid rent-seeking behaviors or the pursuit of harmful private non-monetary benefits from assembly members as well as boards. © 2017, The Author(s).eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10734-017-0177-2
dc.identifier.issn0018-1560
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/20330
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage924
dc.relation.citationStartPage909
dc.relation.citationTitleHigher Education
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 75
dc.relation.ispartofHigher Education, ISSN:1815-60, Vol. 75 (2018) pp. 909-924spa
dc.relation.urihttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10734-017-0177-2.pdfspa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAdams, R., Ferreira, D., A theory of friendly boards (2007) The Journal of Finance, 62 (1), pp. 217-250spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectGobierno de la Universidadspa
dc.subjectBalance de poderspa
dc.subjectJuntas ensamblajesspa
dc.subjectOrganizaciones sin ánimo de lucrospa
dc.subject.ddcDerecho privadospa
dc.subject.keywordUniversity governancespa
dc.subject.keywordBalance of powerspa
dc.subject.keywordAssembliesspa
dc.subject.keywordBoardsspa
dc.subject.keywordNon-profit organizationsspa
dc.subject.lembOrganizaciones sin ánimo de lucrospa
dc.subject.lembUniversidadesspa
dc.titleWho controls the board in non-profit organizations? The case of private higher education institutions in Colombiaspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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