Ítem
Acceso Abierto
Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
| dc.creator | Bardey, David | |
| dc.creator | De Donder, Philippe | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-10-02T17:47:03Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-10-02T17:47:03Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2011 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.description.abstract | We develop a model where a free genetic test reveals whether the individual tested has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease the probability of developing the disease. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers. Insurers offer separating contracts which take into account the individual risk, so that taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its e¢ ciency. We obtain that, if effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, they face a moral hazard problem which induces them to under-provide insurance. We obtain the counterintuitive result that moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low enough. Also, agents may perform the test for lower levels of prevention e¢ ciency when effort is not observable | eng |
| dc.format.extent | 53 páginas | spa |
| dc.format.medium | Recurso electrónico | spa |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.format.tipo | Documento | spa |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_10955 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10955 | |
| dc.language.iso | spa | |
| dc.publisher | Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.publisher.department | Facultad de Economía | spa |
| dc.relation.citationIssue | No. 112 | |
| dc.relation.citationTitle | Serie Documentos de trabajo. Economía | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Serie documentos de trabajo. No 112 (Octubre 2011) | spa |
| dc.relation.uri | https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009083.html | |
| dc.rights.accesRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.rights.acceso | Abierto (Texto completo) | spa |
| dc.rights.cc | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia | spa |
| dc.source.instname | instname:Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.source.instname | instname:Universidad del Rosario | spa |
| dc.source.reponame | reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR | spa |
| dc.subject.keyword | discrimination risk | eng |
| dc.subject.keyword | informational value of test | eng |
| dc.subject.keyword | personalized medecine | eng |
| dc.subject.lemb | Genética | spa |
| dc.subject.lemb | Enfermedades hereditarias | spa |
| dc.subject.lemb | Genética de población | spa |
| dc.subject.lemb | Riesgo relativo (Medicina) | spa |
| dc.subject.nlm | QH 431 | |
| dc.title | Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard | spa |
| dc.type | workingPaper | eng |
| dc.type.hasVersion | info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion | |
| dc.type.spa | Documento de trabajo | spa |
