Now showing items 1-11 of 11

    • Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency 

      Roig, Guillem
      I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2017
    • Competition and the hold?up problem: a setting with non?exclusive contracts 

      Roig, Guillem
      This article o?ers a solution to the “hold-up” problem in a bilateral investment game. Without the existence of a centralized grand-contract, a buyer signs non-exclusive contracts with many sellers, and the equilibrium ...
       Pre-Impresión. 2014
    • Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem 

      Roig, Guillem
      "In an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this ...
       Artículo. 2020
    • Duopolistic competition in markets where consumers have switching costs 

      Roig, Guillem
      In a dynamic competition model where firms initially share half of the market and consumers have switching costs, consumers’ sophistication, lifespan and concentration impact the possibility to set collusive prices. I first ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2017
    • Informative advertisement of partial compatible products 

      Roig, Guillem
      Product design and advertisement strategy have been theoretically studied as separate firms decisions. In the present paper, we look at the link between advertisement and product design and we analyze how firms’ advertising ...
       Pre-Impresión. 2014
    • Investment and Market Structure in Common Agency Games 

      Roig, Guillem
      I study the incentives of a common buyer to undertake cooperative investment with a group of suppliers providing a homogeneous input. In my model, investment is not directed to increase the gains from trade but to enhance ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2018
    • Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence 

      Roig, Guillem
      In many markets, firms produce and sell complementary components that form a product system. This paper studies the effects of compatibility in product advertisement and entry decisions in a differentiated product market. ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2017
    • Product compatibility hinders pre-emptive advertising 

      Roig, Guillem
      "This paper considers competition in systems of complementary products and examines how compatibility affects the use of informative advertising by an incumbent to deter entry. Advertising increases demand for a product; ...
       Artículo. 2020
    • Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs 

      Roig, Guillem
      Cuando los consumidores tienen costos de preferencia, deben evaluarse dos efectos opuestos para analizar los incentivos de las empresas para establecer precios colusorios. Por un lado, los costos de preferencia hacen que ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2020
    • The value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contracts 

      Roig, Guillem
      Este artículo examina los incentivos para que un comprador realice una inversión específica de la relación en presencia de múltiples proveedores que brindan un aporte homogéneo. Cuando varios proveedores compiten por un ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2020
    • What determines market structure? an explanation from cooperative investment with non-exclusive contracts 

      Roig, Guillem
      In a common agency setting, where the common buyer undertakes cooperative investment with her suppliers, we obtain a direct link between the level of ex-post competition and investment which affects the market structure ...
       Pre-Impresión. 2014