Now showing items 1-8 of 8

    • A Theory of Armed Clientelism 

      Gallego, Jorge A.
      Armed clientelism is a particular form of patronage in which politicians and non-state armed groups establish a symbiotic relationship where the former provides economic resources, judicial protection, or other benefits, ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2018
    • Blessing a Curse? Institutional Reform and Resource Booms in Colombia 

      Gallego, Jorge A.; Maldonado, Stanislao; Trujillo, Lorena
      Is it possible to revert the resource curse through institutional reform? Evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between abundance of natural resources and economic growth, political stability, democracy, ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2018
    • Can Facebook Ads and Email Messages Increase Fiscal State Capacity? Experimental Evidence from Venezuela 

      Gallego, Jorge A.; Ortega, Federico
      Tax compliance is a big challenge in weakly institutionalized countries, in which citizens do not trust the State and prefer to evade. Can compliance be increased, and hence fiscal state capacity strengthened, using online ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2018
    • Civil conflict and voting behavior : evidence from Colombia 

      Gallego, Jorge A.
      ¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2016
    • Clientelism: Concepts, Agents, and Solutions 

      Gallego, Jorge A.; Wantchekon, Leonard
      En este capítulo discutimos algunos de los temas más importantes relacionados con la literatura en clientelismo político. Luego de definir algunos de los conceptos básicos asociados con este tema, defendemos la afirmación ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2017
    • Preventing rather than Punishing: An Early Warning Model of Malfeasance in Public Procurement 

      Gallego, Jorge A.; Rivero, Gonzalo; Martínez, Juan
      Is it possible to predict corruption and public inefficiency in public procurement? With the proliferation of e-procurement in the public sector, anti-corruption agencies and watchdog organizations in many countries currently ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2018
    • The Political Economy of Patrons, Brokers, and Voters 

      Gallego, Jorge A.; Li, Christopher; Wantchekon, Leonard
      Formal models of political clientelism tend to focus on vote buying, the exchange of cash and goods for votes on election day. However, other components of the phenomenon, such as patronage, the exchange of public jobs and ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2018
    • Tweeting for Peace : Experimental Evidence from the 2016 Colombian Plebiscite 

      Gallego, Jorge A.; Martínez, Juan D.; Munger, Kevin; Vásquez, Mateo
      El extenso conflicto armado colombiano prácticamente llegó a su fin con el el plebiscito por la paz de 2016, que en últimas fue derrotado en una votación reñida. Este conflicto ha dividido profundamente a la sociedad ...
       Documento de trabajo. 2017

       

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