35 resultados
Resultados de la búsqueda
Mostrando1 - 10 de 35
- ÍtemAcceso Abierto
Las consecuencias inesperadas de la paz(2020-12-28) Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Vergara Agámez, Juliana; Dirección de Investigación e Innovación; Editorial Universidad del RosarioEn el año 2018, al ver las estadísticas crecientes y sistemáticas de los asesinatos de líderes sociales en Colombia y, especialmente, que el análisis de los medios de comunicación se estaba quedando corto frente a la indagación acerca de las causas y los responsables, Juan Fernando Vargas, profesor de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad Rosario, decidió estudiar el fenómeno. Su propósito era contribuir con un análisis riguroso a un tema que para el Ministro de Defensa del momento se limitaba a ‘líos de faldas’, y para los medios era solamente un registro noticioso, pues se limitaban a la descripción de hechos de manera aislada. - ÍtemAcceso AbiertoKilling social leaders for territorial control : The unintended consequences of peace(2018-06-26) Prem, Mounu; Rivera, Andrés F.; Romero, Dario A.; Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Facultad de EconomíaWe study the unintended consequences of the recent peace process in Colombia, that ended over five decades of internal armed conflict with the FARC insurgency. Using a triple differences empirical strategy, we show that the permanent ceasefire that started in December 2014 in the context of the peace negotiations was followed by an increase in the killing of social leaders in previously FARC-dominated territories, perpetrated by other armed groups seeking control of these areas. Consistent with our interpretation that local social leaders are killed to thwart collective action and mobilization at the municipal level, we show that the targeting of social leaders is not explained by the behavior of the overall homicide rate and that it is exacerbated in municipalities with weaker state capacity and an inefficient local judiciary. Our results suggest that partial pacification processes can exacerbate violence by other existing armed groups, aimed at controlling pacified territories.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoEconomic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes(2016-03-14) Cortés Cortés, Darwin; Santamaría, Julieth; Vargas Duque, Juan FernandoIn November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoCommodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia(2013) Dube O.; Vargas Duque, Juan FernandoHow do income shocks affect armed conflict? Theory suggests two opposite effects. If labour is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower conflict by reducing labour supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost effect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation. This is the rapacity effect. Our article exploits exogenous price shocks in international commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in Colombia to assess how different income shocks affect conflict.We examine changes in the price of agricultural goods (which are labour intensive) as well as natural resources (which are not).We focus on Colombia's two largest exports, coffee and oil. We find that a sharp fall in coffee prices during the 1990s lowered wages and increased violence differentially in municipalities cultivating more coffee. This is consistent with the coffee shock inducing an opportunity cost effect. In contrast, a rise in oil prices increased both municipal revenue and violence differentially in the oil region. This is consistent with the oil shock inducing a rapacity effect.We also show that this pattern holds in six other agricultural and natural resource sectors, providing evidence that price shocks affect conflict in different directions depending on the type of the commodity. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoResource curse in reverse: The coffee crisis and armed conflict in Colombia(2006) Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Dube, OeindrilaEntre 1998 y 2003 el precio del café en los mercados internacionales cayó 73 por ciento debido al aumento de la producción del grano en Brasil y Vietnam, lo que originó la llamada “crisis cafetera”. En este trabajo exploramos el efecto de dicho choque exógeno sobre el conflicto armado colombiano. La pregunta es si la violencia política presentó una dinámica distinta en las regiones cafeteras en comparación con las no cafeteras, antes y durante la crisis. Haciendo uso de una metodología de diferencia en diferencias, encontramos que la caída del precio del café a niveles históricamente bajos generó un aumento importante tanto en la incidencia como en la intensidad del conflicto armado colombiano. También proponemos un modelo sencillo sobre la relación entre los choques de precio y el conflicto armado. De éste se desprenden tres mecanismos posibles de transmisión, cuya importancia relativa examinamos empíricamente. La sustitución de cultivos de café por cultivos ilícitos no parece explicar el aumento desproporcional de la violencia durante la crisis. En cambio, sí hay evidencia de que el aumento diferencial de la pobreza en los municipios cafeteros así como el debilitamiento de la institucionalidad, están asociados con mayor violencia política.
ÍtemSolo MetadatosColombia: Democracy, violence, and the peacebuilding challenge(2018) Flores T.E.; Vargas Duque, Juan FernandoAfter years of painstaking negotiations and political obstacles, the end to the conflict between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government appears irreversible. Daunting challenges to the implementation of the agreement remain, however. The five pieces in this special issue rigorously examine those challenges. In doing so, they explore how the field of peace science can help us understand Colombia’s transition from war to peace and how Colombia raises new unexplored questions for scholars. This introduction describes the principal findings of the special issue before offering tangible advice to peacebuilders working in Colombia. © The Author(s) 2018.- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoPeaceful Entry: Entrepreneurship Dynamics during Colombia's Peace Agreement(2022-01-18) Bernal, Carolina; Ortiz, Mónica; Prem, Mounu; Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Grupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del RosarioWhile there is a large literature on how conflict affects entrepreneurship and private investment, much less is known about how the end of a conflict affects businesses and firms' creation. A priory, the direction of the effect is not obvious, as conflicts bequest poverty traps and inequality that reduce the returns of investment, and the territorial vacuum of power that is inherent to most post-conflict situations may trigger new violent cycles. Studying Colombia's recent peace agreement and using a difference-in-differences empirical strategy, we document that dynamics of entrepreneurship in traditionally violent areas closely mapped the politics that surrounded the peace agreement. When the agreement was imminent after a 5-decade conflict and violence had plummeted, local investors from all economic sectors established new firms and created more jobs. Instead, when the agreement was rejected by a tiny vote margin in a referendum and the party that promoted this rejection raised to power, the rate of firms' creation rapidly reversed.
- ÍtemSolo MetadatosTrue Believers, Deserters, and Traitors: Who Leaves Insurgent Groups and Why(2015) Oppenheim, Ben; Steele, Abbey; Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Weintraub, MichaelAnti-insurgent militias and states attempt to erode insurgent groups’ capacities and co-opt insurgent fighters by promising and providing benefits. They do so to create a perception that the insurgency is unraveling and to harness inside information to prosecute more effective counterinsurgency campaigns. Why do some insurgents defect to a paramilitary group and others exit the war by demobilizing, while still others remain loyal to their group? This article presents the first empirical analysis of these questions, connecting insurgents’ motivations for joining, wartime experiences, and organizational behavior with decisions to defect. A survey of ex-combatants in Colombia shows that individuals who joined for ideological reasons are less likely to defect overall but more likely to side-switch or demobilize when their group deviates from its ideological precepts. Among fighters who joined for economic reasons, political indoctrination works to decrease their chances of demobilization and defection to paramilitaries, while opportunities for looting decrease economically motivated combatants’ odds of defection. © 2015, © The Author(s) 2015.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoColombia: Democratic but Violent?(2022-01-17) Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Fergusson, Leopoldo; Grupo de investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del RosarioColombia is a Latin American outlier in that it has traditionally been a very violent country, yet at the same time remarkably democratic. This chapter explores Colombia’s puzzle from a political economy perspective, shedding light on the broader relationship between democracy and violence. The chapter studies some of the most important democratization reforms since Colombia’s independence 200 years ago. It argues that the reforms often failed to curb violence and sometimes even actively, though perhaps unintendedly, exacerbated violent political strife. Democratic reforms were unable to set the ground for genuine power-sharing. They were often implemented amidst a weak institutional environment that allowed powerful elites, the reforms’ ex-ante political losers, to capture the State and offset the benefits of the reforms for the broader society. We conclude by highlighting the implications of the argument for other countries facing democratic reforms, as well as for Colombia’s current peace-building efforts.
- ÍtemAcceso AbiertoThe rise and persistence of illegal crops : evidence from a naive policy announcement(2019-10-08) Mejía, Daniel; Prem, Mounu; Vargas Duque, Juan Fernando; Grupo de Investigaciones. Facultad de Economía. Universidad del RosarioWell-intended policies often have negative unintended consequences if they fail to foresee the different ways in which individuals may respond to the new set of incentives. When widespread and persistent, these may lead to a net reduction of social welfare. Focusing on the case of anti-drug policies, in this paper we show that the recent unprecedented surge in the growing of illicit coca crops in Colombia was the result of a naive and untimely policy announcement during peace negotiations between the government and the FARC guerrillas. On May 2014, the parties’ peace delegations issued a press release announcing that coca-growing farmers would receive material incentives for voluntary crop substitution once a final agreement had been reached. To evaluate the anticipation effect of this announcement we exploit the cross sectional variation on both the cost advantage of growing coca (using an ecological measure of coca suitability) and the expected benefits of doing so (using a predicted measure of where the material benefits would have been targeted). Coca plantations levels remained high even after the implementation of the announced incentives’ scheme. We explain this persistence by documenting that the surge in coca growing is differentially higher in areas with presence illegal armed groups, that benefited financially from availability of a key input in the drug trade.
