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More roads, more conflict? The effect of rural roads on armed conflict and illegal economies in Colombia
This paper estimates the impact of rural roads on armed conflict and illicit crops in Colombia over a fourteen year period of rapid growth of road investments. We estimate the causal impact of these interventions using micro-data of the royalties revenues to the transport sector at the municipal level, and implement a strategy of Difference-in-Differences with staggered adoption. The results show that new rural roads, in particular small projects known as placa-huella, have a positive causal effect on armed conflict and on coca crops. These unintended effects of road provision are mainly driven by the intensification of violence in wealthier municipalities. In these places, we find that the new connectivity leads to an increase in the production of legal crops. Hence, wealthier municipalities are more attractive to armed groups and more vulnerable to attacks that seek to expropriate these new rents. In addition, the institutional background seems to be determinant in the sign of the effect: in municipalities with qualified and stable institutions, road provision mitigates the development of illegal activity. These results highlight the importance of providing public goods in parallel with strengthening the local state capacity through reliable institutions.
Fear to Vote: Explosions, Salience, and Elections
Criminal groups use violence strategically to manipulate the behavior of victims and bystanders. At the same time, violence is a stimulus that causes fear, which also shapes people’s reactions. Taking advantage of the randomness in the timing of antipersonnel landmine accidents in Colombia, as well as their coordinates relative to those of voting polls, we identify the effect of violence-induced fear (independent from intentions) on electoral behavior. Fortuitous landmine explosions reduce political participation. We further disentangle whether the type of fear caused by landmine explosions responds to an information channel (whereby people learn about the risk of future victimization) or by the salience of the explosion (which causes individuals to make impulsive decisions, driven by survival considerations), and show evidence in favor of the latter. While the turnout reduction takes place across the ideological spectrum, we document that the explosions induce a shift in the political preferences of individuals who do vote. These findings point to worrisome potential consequences for the consolidation of democracies in places affected by conflict.
El programa Proniño en Colombia: su efecto en la reducción del trabajo infantil
The purpose of this paper is to empirically evaluate the effect of a greater or lesser exposure of the Proniño program of Fundacion Telefonica in the amount of hours worked by children and adolescents. Taking information from the 2010 and 2012 empirically assesses the impact on the duration of treatment exposure, eliminating the duration selection bias through the methodology of Propensity Score Matching. The results show that exposure to treatment does manage to reduce the number of hours worked by children and adolescents, reaching the highest levels of reduction when the program exposure is broader; in this case, three years and particularly for the age group between 12 to 14 years. Finally, there is evidence that the program is more effective in reducing the number of hours worked per week of children (men) than girls (women).
Resource curse in reverse: The coffee crisis and armed conflict in Colombia
Between 1998 and 2003 production increases in Brazil and Vietnam drove down the price of coffee by 73 percent in global markets, triggering the “international coffee crisis”. We examine the effect of this exogenous price shock on Colombia’s civil war, exploring whether politically-motivated violence presented different dynamics in the coffee -growing regions relative to the non- coffee regions, during the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we find causal evidence that the steep decline in coffee prices substantially increased both the incidence and intensity of Colombia’s civil war. We also propose a simple model linking the price shock to violence and empirically examine the relative importance of three potential mechanisms. While crop substitution from coffee to coca explains very little of the variation, a disproportionate increase in poverty in coffee areas is associated with greater violence, as is a lower state capacity.
Las consecuencias inesperadas de la paz
In the year 2018, after seeing the increasing and systematic statistics of the murders of social leaders in Colombia, especially considering that the analysis of the media was falling short in investigating the causes thereof and those responsible, Juan Fernando Vargas, a professor at the Faculty of Economics of Universidad del Rosario, decided to study the phenomenon. His purpose was to contribute to a rigorous analysis of an issue that was limited to “affairs” for the Defense Minister in duty and only a news record for the media because they were limited to describing facts in isolation.
Killing social leaders for territorial control : The unintended consequences of peace
We study the unintended consequences of the recent peace process in Colombia, that ended over five decades of internal armed conflict with the FARC insurgency. Using a triple differences empirical strategy, we show that the permanent ceasefire that started in December 2014 in the context of the peace negotiations was followed by an increase in the killing of social leaders in previously FARC-dominated territories, perpetrated by other armed groups seeking control of these areas. Consistent with our interpretation that local social leaders are killed to thwart collective action and mobilization at the municipal level, we show that the targeting of social leaders is not explained by the behavior of the overall homicide rate and that it is exacerbated in municipalities with weaker state capacity and an inefficient local judiciary. Our results suggest that partial pacification processes can exacerbate violence by other existing armed groups, aimed at controlling pacified territories.
Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia
How do income shocks affect armed conflict? Theory suggests two opposite effects. If labour is used to appropriate resources violently, higher wages may lower conflict by reducing labour supplied to appropriation. This is the opportunity cost effect. Alternatively, a rise in contestable income may increase violence by raising gains from appropriation. This is the rapacity effect. Our article exploits exogenous price shocks in international commodity markets and a rich dataset on civil war in Colombia to assess how different income shocks affect conflict.We examine changes in the price of agricultural goods (which are labour intensive) as well as natural resources (which are not).We focus on Colombia's two largest exports, coffee and oil. We find that a sharp fall in coffee prices during the 1990s lowered wages and increased violence differentially in municipalities cultivating more coffee. This is consistent with the coffee shock inducing an opportunity cost effect. In contrast, a rise in oil prices increased both municipal revenue and violence differentially in the oil region. This is consistent with the oil shock inducing a rapacity effect.We also show that this pattern holds in six other agricultural and natural resource sectors, providing evidence that price shocks affect conflict in different directions depending on the type of the commodity. © The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
How peace saves lives: evidence from Colombia
The victimization of civilians and combatants during internal conflicts causes large socioeconomic costs. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether peace negotiations can significantly reduce this burden. One key reason is the lingering presence of antipersonnel landmines, which are hidden underground and remain active for decades. Looking at the recent experience of Colombia, we quantify the number of lives saved by the reduction of landmine accidents and study the institutional conditions under which peace agreements can significantly reduce landmine victimization. Our findings highlight the importance of: reduced counterinsurgency campaigns, post-conflict information sharing, comprehensive humanitarian mine clearance and mine risk management campaigns.
Economic shocks and crime: evidence from the crash of ponzi schemes
In November 2008, Colombian authorities dismantled a network of Ponzi schemes, making hundreds of thousands of investors lose tens of millions of dollars throughout the country. Using original data on the geographical incidence of the Ponzi schemes, this paper estimates the impact of their break down on crime. We find that the crash of Ponzi schemes differentially exacerbated crime in affected districts. Confirming the intuition of the standard economic model of crime, this effect is only present in places with relatively weak judicial and law enforcement institutions, and with little access to consumption smoothing mechanisms such as microcredit. In addition, we show that, with the exception of economically-motivated felonies such as robbery, violent crime is not affected by the negative shock.
Combatant recruitment and the outcome of war
Why do some civil wars terminate soon, with victory of one party over the other? What determines if the winner is the incumbent or the rebel group? Why do other conáicts last longer? We propose a simple model in which the power of each armed group depends on the number of combatants it is able to recruit. This is in turn a function of the relative ëdistanceíbetween group leaderships and potential recruits. We emphasize the moral hazard problem of recruitment: Öghting is costly and risky so combatants have the incentive to defect from their task. They can also desert altogether and join the enemy. This incentive is stronger the farther away the Öghter is from the principal, since monitoring becomes increasingly costly. Bigger armies have more power but less monitoring capacity to prevent defection and desertion. This general framework allows a variety of interpretations of what type of proximity matters for building strong cohesive armies ranging from ethnic distance to geographic dispersion. Di§erent assumptions about the distribution of potential Öghters along the relevant dimension of conáict lead to di§erent equilibria. We characterize these, discuss the implied outcome in terms of who wins the war, and illustrate with historical and contemporaneous case studies.
