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dc.creatorBlanco, Mariana 
dc.creatorÇelen, Bogaçhan 
dc.creatorSchotter, Andrew 
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-16T13:38:32Z
dc.date.available2015-09-16T13:38:32Z
dc.date.created2010-07
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationBlanco, M., Çelen, B., & Schotter, A. (2010). On blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario.
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10796
dc.description.abstractThe theory of reciprocity is predicated on the assumption that people are willing to reward nice or kind acts and to punish unkind ones. This assumption raises the question as to how to define kindness. In this paper we offer a new definition of kindness that we call “blame-freeness.” Put most simply, blame-freeness states that in judging whether player i has been kind or unkind to player j in a social situation, player j would have to put himself in the strategic position of player i, while retaining his preferences, and ask if he would have acted in a manner that was worse than i did under identical circumstances. If j would have acted in a more unkind manner than i acted, then we say that j does not blame i for his behavior. If, however, j would have been nicer than i was, then we say that “j blames i” for his actions (i’s actions were blameworthy). We consider this notion a natural, intuitive and empirically relevant way to explain the motives of people engaged in reciprocal behavior. After developing the conceptual framework, we then test this concept in a laboratory experiment involving tournaments and find significant support for the theory.
dc.format.extent39
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.ispartofSerie documentos de trabajo. No 85 (Julio 2010)
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/007270.html
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.ddcSistemas & doctrinas 
dc.subject.lembBondad
dc.subject.lembAltruismo
dc.subject.lembDesarrollo económico y social
dc.subject.lembCaridad
dc.subject.lembHumanitarismo
dc.titleOn blame-freeness and reciprocity: an experimental study
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.subject.keywordAltruism
dc.subject.keywordBlame
dc.subject.keywordReciprocity
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
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dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 85
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


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