Show simple item record

dc.creatorIlkiliç, Rahmi 
dc.creatorKayi, Cagatay 
dc.date.accessioned2015-09-18T18:37:43Z
dc.date.available2015-09-18T18:37:43Z
dc.date.created2012-03
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationIlkiliç, R., & Kayi, Ç. (2012). Allocation rules on networks. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía.
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10828
dc.description.abstractWhen allocating a resource, geographical and infrastructural constraints have to be taken into account. We study the problem of distributing a resource through a network from sources endowed with the resource to citizens with claims. A link between a source and an agent depicts the possibility of a transfer from the source to the agent. Given the supplies at each source, the claims of citizens, and the network, the question is how to allocate the available resources among the citizens. We consider a simple allocation problem that is free of network constraints, where the total amount can be freely distributed. The simple allocation problem is a claims problem where the total amount of claims is greater than what is available. We focus on consistent and resource monotonic rules in claims problems that satisfy equal treatment of equals. We call these rules fairness principles and we extend fairness principles to allocation rules on networks. We require that for each pair of citizens in the network, the extension is robust with respect to the fairness principle. We call this condition pairwise robustness with respect to the fairness principle. We provide an algorithm and show that each fairness principle has a unique extension which is pairwise robust with respect to the fairness principle. We give applications of the algorithm for three fairness principles: egalitarianism, proportionality and equal sacrifice.
dc.format.extent17 páginas
dc.format.mediumRecurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.relation.ispartofSerie Documentos de trabajo ; No. 118
dc.relation.isversionof1
dc.relation.urihttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/009380.html
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.sourcereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.sourceinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.subject.ddcEconomía 
dc.subject.lembDistribución (Teoría Económica)
dc.subject.lembAnálisis coste::Beneficio
dc.subject.lembInternet (Red De Computadores)::Aspectos Económicos
dc.titleAllocation rules on networks
dc.typeworkingPaper
dc.publisherUniversidad del Rosario
dc.publisher.departmentFacultad de Economía
dc.identifier.editorialUniversidad del Rosario, Facultad de Economía
dc.subject.keywordNetworks
dc.subject.keywordClaims problems
dc.subject.keywordEgalitarianism
dc.subject.keywordProportionality
dc.subject.keywordEqual sacrifice
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.type.spaDocumento de trabajo
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto completo)
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAmbec, S. and L. Ehlers (2008). Sharing a river among satiable agents. Games and Economic Behavior 64, 35–50.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAmbec, S. and Y. Sprumont (2002). Sharing a river. Journal of Economic Theory 107, 453–462.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAnsink, E. and H. P. Weikard (2009). Contested water rights. European Journal of Political Economy 25, 247–260.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAnsink, E. and H. P. Weikard (2011). A strategic model of social and economic networks. Social Choice and Welfare. (forthcoming).
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBjørndal, E. and K. J¨ornsten (2010). Flow sharing and bankruptcy games. International Journal of Game Theory 39, 11–28.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBochet, O., R. ˙Ilkılı¸c, and H. Moulin (2010). Egalitarianism under earmark constraints. mimeo. University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBochet, O., R. ˙Ilkılı¸c, H. Moulin, and J. Sethuraman (2011). Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints. Theoretical Economics. (forthcoming).
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBranzei, R., G. Ferrari, V. Fragnelli, and S. Tijs (2008). A flow approach to bankruptcy problems. AUCO Czech Economic Review 2, 146–153.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationBrown, J. (1979). The sharing problem. Operations Research 27, 324–340.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHall, N. G. and R. Vohra (1993). Towards equitable distribution via proportional equity constraints. Mathematical Programming 58, 287–294.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationHoekstra, A. (2006). The global dimension of water governance: Nine reasons for global arrangements in order to cope with local problems. Value of Water Research Report Series 20. UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education.
dc.source.bibliographicCitation˙Ilkılı¸c, R. (2007). Network of commons. mimeo. Maastricht University. Maastricht, the Netherlands
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKar, A. and O. Kıbrıs (2008). Allocating multiple estates among agents with single-peaked preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 31, 641–666.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKlaus, B., H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1997). Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good. Economic Theory 10, 305–333.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationKlaus, B., H. Peters, and T. Storcken (1998). Strategy-proof division with singlepeaked preferences and individual endowments. Social Choice and Welfare 15, 297–311.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationSprumont, Y. (1991). The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59, 509–519.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationThomson, W. (2003). Axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249–297.
dc.source.bibliographicCitationThomson, W. (2006). How to divide when there isnt enough: From the talmud to game theory. mimeo. University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA.
dc.format.tipoDocumento
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 118
dc.relation.citationTitleSerie Documentos de trabajo. Economía


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record