Identidad Institucional CRAI
Logo EdocUR
    • English
    • español
    • português
  •  Work Submission
  •  FAQs
  • English 
    • English
    • español
    • português
  • Login

Contacto

Twitter

Facebook

Youtube

View Item 
  •   Repositorio Institucional EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
  • Investigación
  • Documentos de investigación
  • Facultad de Economía
  • Documentos de trabajo economía
  • View Item
  •   Repositorio Institucional EdocUR - Universidad del Rosario
  • Investigación
  • Documentos de investigación
  • Facultad de Economía
  • Documentos de trabajo economía
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Doctors´ remuneration schemes and hospital competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

  • Exportar citas ▼
    • Exportar a Mendeley
    • Exportar a BibTex
Thumbnail
Visualizar
Date
2011
Author
Bardey, David
Cremer, Helmuth
Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie
Share
Citation
URI
https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/008848.html...

Summary

This paper uses a two-sided market model of hospital competition to study the implications of di§erent remunerations schemes on the physiciansí side. The two-sided market approach is characterized by the concept of common network externality (CNE) introduced by Bardey et al. (2010). This type of externality occurs when occurs when both sides value, possibly with di§erent intensities, the same network externality. We explicitly introduce e§ort exerted by doctors. By increasing the number of medical acts (which involves a costly e§ort) the doctor can increase the quality of service o§ered to patients (over and above the level implied by the CNE). We Örst consider pure salary, capitation or fee-for-service schemes. Then, we study schemes that mix fee-for-service with either salary or capitation payments. We show that salary schemes (either pure or in combination with fee-for-service) are more patient friendly than (pure or mixed) capitations schemes. This comparison is exactly reversed on the providersíside. Quite surprisingly, patients always loose when a fee-for-service scheme is introduced (pure of mixed). This is true even though the fee-for-service is the only way to induce the providers to exert e§ort and it holds whatever the patientsívaluation of this e§ort. In other words, the increase in quality brought about by the fee-for-service is more than compensated by the increase in fees faced by patients.

Keyword

Two-Sided markets ; Common Network Externality ; Providersí remuneration schemes ;

Subject

Administración general ;

Source link

https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/008848.html...

Show full item record

Collections
  • Documentos de trabajo economía [267]
Política de Acceso Abierto URPortal de Revistas URRepositorio de Datos de Investigación URCiencia Abierta UR
 

 

Browse

All of DSpaceCommunities & CollectionsTitlesAuthorsTypeSubjectsAdvisorBy Issue DateThis CollectionTitlesAuthorsTypeSubjectsAdvisorBy Issue Date

My Account

LoginRegister

Statistics

View Usage Statistics
Política de Acceso Abierto URPortal de Revistas URRepositorio de Datos de Investigación URCiencia Abierta UR