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dc.creatorRoig, Guillem
dc.description.abstractIn a common agency setting, where the common buyer undertakes cooperative investment with her suppliers, we obtain a direct link between the level of ex-post competition and investment which affects the market structure of the supply side of the market. We show that more competitive equilibria are associated with a larger and more homogeneous distribution of investment among active suppliers, and an equilibrium with no investment might occur when competition is mild. In our model, buyer’s investment works as a mechanism to incentivize competition, and its effectiveness is positively related to the level of competition ex-post. In general, the equilibrium investment profile is lower than efficiency, and we surprisingly find that higher competitive markets may sustain a larger number of suppliers.
dc.relation.ispartofTSE Working Papers, No. 482 (March 2014); 43 pp.
dc.sourceTSE Working Papers
dc.titleWhat determines market structure? an explanation from cooperative investment with non-exclusive contracts
dc.publisherToulouse School of Economics
dc.subject.keywordCooperative investment
dc.subject.keywordInvestment distribution
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)
dc.title.TranslatedTitle¿Qué determina la estructura del mercado? una explicación de la inversión cooperativa con contratos no exclusivos
dc.relation.citationIssueNo. 482
dc.relation.citationTitleTSE Working Papers

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