Idealismo epistemológico y realismo metafísico en Charle S. Peirce
Summary
En este ensayo reconcilio la epistemología idealista de Peirce con su realismo metafísico, al proponer una idea de realidad permanentemente corregida por los resultados de la indagación. Esto implica prescindir del acuerdo último y aceptar uno actual y falible.
Abstract
This essay has sought to make compatible Peirce’s idealist epistemology with his
metaphysical realism, by recommending a notion of reality contingently adjusted to
the advancement of the results of inquiry. This idea implies the acknowledgement of a
fallible and current agreement as opposed to any final opinion. In order to do this, first,
I provide the context of the idealism-realism debate illustrating its presence in Peirce’s
thought. Second, I outline several appraisals of Peirce’s philosophy ranging from
idealism to realism. Finally, I explain how Peirce links up truth and reality while
embracing a hypothetical ‘pre-established harmony’ to be experimentally tested.
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