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Conflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?

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dc.creatorZuleta, Hernando
dc.creatorVillaveces-Niño, Marta-Juanita
dc.creatorAndonova, Veneta
dc.creator.googleZuleta, Hernandospa
dc.creator.googleVillaveces, Marta Juanitaspa
dc.creator.googleAndonova, Venetaspa
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-21T19:38:57Z
dc.date.available2018-11-21T19:38:57Z
dc.date.created2013
dc.date.issued2013
dc.description.abstractWe model conflict between two agents in which each one has two possible strategies: cease-fire or rejection of the truce. We use the concept of pre-donations, namely, a redefinition of the game in which each agent commits to transfer a share of its output to the other agent (Sertel, 1991). Conditions are established under which a system of pre-donations may facilitate a truce. In particular, for conflicts involving high costs there is a distributive mechanism, acceptable for both parties, whereby cease-fire is the best strategy for both of them. However, in many cases the conditions are not right for such a scheme of pre-donations to be effective. Some limitations of the framework are analyzed and the model is extended to deal with certain shortcomings in the basic setup. To illustrate the relevance of the theoretical results, we briefly describe the circumstances that have characterized the negotiation processes between the Colombian government and various illegal groups in this long-lasting armed conflict. © 2013 The Authors.eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issnISSN 1053-5357
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/18725
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.relation.citationEndPage117
dc.relation.citationStartPage105
dc.relation.citationTitleJournal of Socio-Economics
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 47
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Socio-Economics, ISSN: 1053-5357, Vol. 47 (2013) pp. 105-117spa
dc.relation.urihttps://ac.els-cdn.com/S1053535713001340/1-s2.0-S1053535713001340-main.pdf?_tid=7406595f-c821-4db1-b75f-16223b8eac81&acdnat=1540057698_4bee929d0ef4ec1c822e4de02390c912spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.rights.cchttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/spa
dc.source.bibliographicCitationAlesina, A., Perotti, R., Income distribution, political instability, and investment (1996) European Economic Review, 40 (6), pp. 1203-1228spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
dc.subjectAlto al fuegospa
dc.subjectColombiaspa
dc.subjectConflictospa
dc.subjectDistribuciónspa
dc.subject.keywordCease-Firespa
dc.subject.keywordColombiaspa
dc.subject.keywordConflictspa
dc.subject.keywordDistributionspa
dc.subject.lembConflicto armadospa
dc.subject.lembNegociación de conflictosspa
dc.subject.lembDonacionesspa
dc.titleConflict and negotiation in Colombia : Are pre-donations useful?spa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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