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Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments

dc.creatorAycinena Abascal, Diegospa
dc.creatorRentschler L.spa
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-26T00:07:42Z
dc.date.available2020-05-26T00:07:42Z
dc.date.created2019spa
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies entry decisions in contests with private values. Potential contestants observe their value and the common opportunity cost of entry, and make entry decisions simultaneously. Theory predicts that whether or not contestants are informed of the number of entrants prior to choosing their expenditures has no effect on entry or aggregate expenditures. We test these assertions in our experiments. We find substantial over-entry in both information structures. However, entry is higher when contestants are informed. Since expenditures do not, on average, differ across information structures, aggregate expenditure is also higher when contestants are informed. Contestants earn on average less than the opportunity cost of entry. © 2019eng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.07.001
dc.identifier.issn1762680
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24023
dc.language.isoengspa
dc.publisherElsevier B.V.spa
dc.relation.citationTitleEuropean Journal of Political Economy
dc.relation.citationVolumeVol. 60
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Journal of Political Economy, ISSN:1762680, Vol.60,(2019)spa
dc.relation.urihttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85069601383&doi=10.1016%2fj.ejpoleco.2019.07.001&partnerID=40&md5=0535ea64802a5ec8f74c4b8bde476082spa
dc.rights.accesRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.accesoAbierto (Texto Completo)spa
dc.source.instnameinstname:Universidad del Rosariospa
dc.source.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURspa
dc.subject.keywordContestsspa
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous entryspa
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsspa
dc.titleEntry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experimentsspa
dc.typearticleeng
dc.type.hasVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spaArtículospa
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